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Abstract 
 
Solomon Inuwa 
A Critical Evaluation of the 2009 Niger Delta Amnesty Disarmament 
Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme 
Keywords: Nigeria, Niger-Delta, Amnesty, Disarmament, Demobilisation, 
Reinsertion, Reintegration, Neopatrimonialism, State, Patronage.  
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) have become a key 
component of the postconflict peacebuilding orthodoxy. Therefore, this study 
evaluates the efficacy of Amnesty, Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (ADDR) in conflict prevention and resolution using the 2009 Niger 
Delta ADDR programme as a case study. The study evaluated the effectiveness 
of the programme using the minimalist and maximalist framework advanced in 
the DDR literature. The key findings and conclusions of the Study were that a 
minimalist DDR would only achieve security stabilisation and return ex-
combatants to the status quo- ante society with all the pre-conflict grievances 
unaddressed thereby bequeathing a high potential of relapse to violence. 
Furthermore, for DDR to be an effective conflict prevention and resolution 
mechanism and postconflict peacebuilding force, its conceptualisation, design 
and implementation must be maximalist in nature with a transformative agenda 
that aims to address the roots causes of violence.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1. Genesis of the Research 
My interest in the Niger Delta conflict was as far back as 2004-2007 when I served 
at the Headquarters of the 34th Artillery Brigade of the Nigerian Army (NA), 
Owerri, Imo state South Eastern Nigeria. The period coincided with when the 
Niger Delta conflict escalated to an insurgency. Consequently, the 34th Brigade 
to which I was deployed was involved in the protection of oil facilities located 
within the state. Against this backdrop, my initial interest and involvement in the 
Niger Delta conflict was from a purely military point of view. In 2008, I was 
admitted to the United Nations mandated University for Peace in Costa Rica to 
undertake a Master of Art (MA) degree in International Peace Studies and I 
eventually wrote my MA thesis on the Niger Delta conflict. 
 
When I returned to Nigeria in August 2009, the then Nigerian president, Umaru 
Musa Yar’Adua, had already initiated a peace process aimed at ending and 
resolving the conflict. The initiative eventually led to the implementation of an 
Amnesty, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (ADDR) programme. 
Consequently, in 2011, having been admitted to the University of Bradford’s 
doctoral programme in Peace Studies, I decided to expand my MA dissertation 
to a doctoral thesis. 
1.1. Introduction and Background to the Research Questions 
The conflict between the people of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, Multinational 
Oil Companies (MNOCs) and the Nigerian State over control of oil resources, 
environmental degradation, lack of infrastructure and general underdevelopment 
has remained both protracted and intractable (Ahonsi, 2011: 28-41). The conflict 
can be traced to 1957 when the people of the Niger Delta region made a 
submission to the Willinks Commission set up by the departing British colonial 
administration to investigate their grievances. Unfortunately, the commission’s 
failure to adequately address the grievances led to the abortive Niger Delta 
secessionist revolt led by Isaac Adaka Boro (Simbine, 2006: 47). Thereafter, 
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agitations in the region assumed a pattern of nonviolent and violent resistance. 
Past Nigerian governments, both military and civilian failed to pay attention to the 
fundamental sources of the agitations but resorted to the use of military force to 
suppress even the most peaceful protests (Ibid.: 47). Nevertheless, successive 
Nigerian governments have made some efforts at resolving the conflict through 
the implementation of various developmental programmes but without any major 
success due to lack of consultation with the people of the Niger Delta region, as 
well as corruption and inept bureaucracy (Adeyemo & Olu-Adeyemi, 2010: 46-48 
and Ogundiya 2011: 22). 
On assuming power in 2007, President Yar’adua resolved to end the conflict by 
setting up the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta (TCND) (Ogundiya, 2011: 
24). The TCND was to examine all past recommendations made towards 
resolving the conflict and come up with a roadmap for the resolution of the conflict. 
In June 2009, the president accepted one of the key recommendations of the 
TCND, which was the implementation of an ADDR programme in the Niger Delta 
region. Despite the euphoria that accompanied the programme, commentators 
have expressed dissenting views regarding the extent to which the ADDR 
programme has succeeded in bringing lasting peace, stability and development 
to the Niger Delta.  
1.2. Research Questions 
According to Blaikie (2010: 58-59), research questions help to define the nature 
and scope of a study. Furthermore, ‘good research questions ask about things 
that are particularly relevant to the aims of the research- things that are likely to 
provide information that will offer some new insight relating to the aims of the 
research’ (Denscombe, 2012: 74-75). Against such a background, this evaluative 
case study was guided by the following primary and secondary research 
questions. 
1.2.1. Primary Research Questions 
(i). How successful was the Niger Delta ADDR programme in achieving its 
statutory objective? 
(ii). How has the way Niger Delta ADDR programme was conceptualised, 
negotiated, planned and implemented affected its success or otherwise? 
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1.2.2. Secondary Research Questions 
(i). What is the principal source of the Niger Delta conflict? 
(ii). How has the Nigerian State tried to manage the Niger Delta conflict since its 
inception and how effective have the state’s intervention measures proven to be? 
1.3. Significance of the Case Study  
DDR has become an integral part of the post-conflict peacebuilding orthodoxy; 
yet its efficacy and role in conflict prevention remains a contested issue (Muggah, 
2005: 1-5; Verkoren et al, 2010: 2; Giustozzi, 2012: 2 and Stankovic, 2015: 691). 
Therefore, by engaging in this evaluative case study, I shall primarily be making 
a significant and original contribution to the current academic and policy debates 
and literature on the role of DDR in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, 
particularly the efficacy of the maximalist approach to DDR. This is because 
lessons identified will be relevant to the future conduct of DDR; for as Jennings 
(2008: 5) rightly noted ‘… examining how DDR plays out on the ground would 
likely enable future programming to be formulated and implemented more 
effectively, improving outcomes and mitigating potential unintended and harmful 
consequences.’  Additionally, this case study is significant because it will 
contribute to the DDR literature in a unique way because the Niger Delta case 
study represents a nationally owned DDR programme, while current DDR case 
studies in the literature are mainly internationally driven and implemented under 
the supervision of the United Nations (UN). Overall, this research represents a 
significant contribution to the field of DDR in peacebuilding. Additionally, at the 
secondary level, I shall be contributing to the literature on the political economy 
of armed conflict by testing its empirical and analytical validity as well as the 
specific literature on the political economy of the Niger Delta conflict and Nigerian 
State. Also, at the empirical level, this dissertation will be making an original 
contribution to the current policy literature on the resolution of the Niger Delta 
conflict.  
1.4. Overview of Research Methodology and Methods 
This section presents the theoretical orientations that underpinned this research 
and the systematic procedures followed to answer the study’s research 
questions.  
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1.4.1. Researcher’s Broader Theoretical Framework: Liberalism 
In this section, I present my broader theoretical framework that informs my 
analysis of the sources and drivers of conflict in the Niger Delta. This section also 
introduces the conceptual framework for evaluating the Niger Delta DDR 
programme. The goal of the theoretical framework is to provide a broader 
perspective for understanding the origins of the Niger Delta conflict. Therefore, 
this thesis largely draws on liberalism as its broader theoretical framework for 
explaining the roots of the Niger Delta conflict. Nevertheless, applying Liberalism 
as my theoretical framework, this thesis is not concerned with contributing to the 
broader theoretical debates in International Relations (IRs) between Liberalism, 
Realism, Marxism and Social Constructionism etc. I am cognizant of the fact that, 
there are varieties of Liberalism both in theory and empirical context, nonetheless 
irrespective of the varieties they have some common universals (Mahon, 2008: 
342-361). Consequently, Liberalism as understood in this study is within the 
context of ‘Social Liberalism’ which is predicated on the contention that ‘the state 
now had a positive role, creating the conditions for all to develop to their full 
potential, even if this involved measures to counteract the impact of market 
forces’ (Ibid.: 344). Therefore, the essence of the state from the Social Liberal 
point of view is to guarantee the wellbeing and unfettered development of its 
citizenry.  
Against this background, Burchill (2009: 57) argues that liberalism is the most 
lasting and significant theoretical perspective that developed from the era of 
European Enlightenment (Hegre, 2005: 17; Pugh, 2005: 2; Gat, 2005: 73; Russet, 
2013:95; Navari, 2013: 33 and Dunne, 2014: 116). It is against this perspective 
that this thesis will evaluate the operationalisation and effectiveness of DDR in 
general and the Niger Delta ADDR in particular. Similarly, according to Burchill 
(2009: 57) liberals posit that the solution to war and violent conflict is democracy 
and free trade, in which democratic processes and institutions would curb the 
power of public office holders, their excesses and propensity for violence both at 
the global and domestic levels. He also maintains that commerce at both the 
international and domestic levels limit the barriers between individuals and unite 
them into one community, and likewise nations of the world can be united through 
international commerce. Burchill (2009: 57) asserted that ‘liberal states, founded 
on individual rights such as equality before the law, free speech and civil liberty, 
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respect for private property and representative government, would not have the 
same appetite for conflict and war’ (also see Brown and Ainley, 2009: 20). 
Similarly, as espoused by one of its proponents, liberalism: 
…calls for freedom from arbitrary authority, often called “negative 
freedom,” which includes freedom of conscience, a free press and free 
speech, equality under the law, and the right to hold, and therefore to 
exchange, property without fear of arbitrary seizure. Liberalism also calls 
for those rights necessary to protect and promote the capacity and 
opportunity for freedom, the “positive freedoms.” Such social and 
economic rights as equality of opportunity in education and rights to health 
care and employment, necessary for effective self-expression and 
participation, are thus among liberal rights. A third liberal right, democratic 
participation or representation, is necessary to guarantee the other two. 
To ensure that morally autonomous individuals remain free in those areas 
of social action where public authority is needed, public legislation has to 
express the will of the citizens making laws for their own community 
(Doyle, 1983: 206-207). 
 
The liberal core values highlighted above have given rise to the ‘democratic 
peace theory,’ often referred to as ‘democratic peace thesis’ (Hegre, 2005: 18; 
Gat, 2005: 73; Pugh, 2005: 2; Owen, 1998: 139; Paris, 2004: 40-42 and Navari, 
2013: 40). The ‘democratic peace theory or thesis’ postulates that societies that 
are organised based on liberal democratic systems of governance, hardly go to 
war with each other. Thus, in line with this, Hagre (2005: 18) argues that ‘… there 
is a strong tendency for domestic [my italics] and international peace to follow 
when the large majority of individuals in a society… have control over decisions 
in both political and economic issues.’  Therefore, within the framework of 
liberalism, the panacea for inter and intra-state conflict is to ensure that societies 
are organised based on the liberal democratic systems of governance and a free 
market economy. As Owen (1998: 145) argues ‘liberal democracies are believed 
reasonable, predictable, and trustworthy because they are governed by their 
citizens’ true interests, which harmonize with all individuals’ true interests around 
the world.’ Furthermore, liberal democracies can lessen the potential for conflict 
because they provide structural and normative constraints on the conduct of 
governing elites. Structural constraints refer to institutional frameworks for 
regulating the behaviour of leaders while normative constraints are universally 
held values that regulate the conduct of leaders and individuals in society (Owen, 
1998: 140).  
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To fully comprehend the association between democratic peace theory, global 
and domestic peace, and stability, Galtung and Scott’s (2008: 16-31) theory of 
democracy is pertinent. Galtung and Scott identified three characteristics of 
democracy that are essential to the attainment of peace and stability, be it at the 
domestic or international level. As they argued, the number one essence of 
democracy is to rule by consent of the people; this implies that those who rule 
must do so based on the legitimacy given to them by the ruled, which makes 
those that rule accountable to the ruled. In other words, ‘democracy is rule with 
the consent of the ruled according to rules that make the rulers accountable to 
the ruled’ (Ibid.: 25). Consent can be achieved through a plebiscite or indirectly 
(for example representatives in an assembly could do so through voting). 
Legitimacy achieved by consent ensures that ‘… what the ruled want sets limits 
to what the rulers do…’ (Ibid: 17), thereby ensuring that leaders are accountable 
to those that they rule. The second essence of democracy as theorised by 
Galtung and Scott is that of the ‘nonviolent conflict resolution’ (Ibid: 19), which 
implies that incompatible goals between different groups or parties are to be 
resolved through nonviolent means such as dialogue and negotiation. The third 
essence of democracy as they argue is the provision of ‘basic human needs, 
basic human rights’ (Ibid.23). They posit that ‘democracy… has as an ultimate 
goal to satisfy the basic human needs for all, particularly for the neediest (sic)…’ 
This ensures that society’s basic human needs are provided for all to live with 
dignity (Ibid.).  
Liberals also argue that transparency and accountability in governance is an 
important prerequisite for a peaceful democratic society. And as rightly noted by 
Fox (2007: 664) ‘… transparency and accountability are key to all manner of 
‘good governance’, from anti-poverty programmes to corporate responsibility, 
participatory budgeting, and NGO management.’ For instance, regarding 
transparency Hollyer et al., (2011: 1192-1193) argue that it connotes 
‘government’s willingness to disseminate policy-relevant data… [and] in its 
broadest sense may pertain to all factors that affect information flow in a polity…’ 
As further noted by Fox (2007: 663) ‘the right to information is increasingly 
recognised as a fundamental democratic right...’. For transparency to engender 
accountability, the government must engage in proactive dissemination of 
information regarding its activities and performance to the public as well as 
7 
 
creating the enabling environment for demand-driven access to information; a 
situation of deliberate ‘…institutional commitment to respond to citizens’ request 
for specific kinds of information or documents…’ (Ibid.: 665). In the same vein, 
for transparency to engender accountability, information disseminated by the 
government must go beyond ‘opaque or fuzzy transparency’ to clear 
transparency. ‘Opaque or fuzzy transparency involves the dissemination of 
information that does not reveal how institutions actually behave in practice, 
whether in terms of how they make decisions or the results of their actions. The 
term also refers to information that is divulged only nominally, or which is revealed 
but turns out to be unreliable (Ibid.: 667). On the other hand, ‘clear transparency 
refers both to information access policies and to programmes that reveal reliable 
information about institutional performance, specifying officials’ responsibilities as 
well as where public funds go’ (Ibid.). Accountability is achieved when by access 
to clear information citizens are empowered to question the actions or inactions 
of public individuals and institutions or to make them answerable for their actions 
or inactions (Hale, 2008: 75-76).  
Against this background, as I will demonstrate in this case study, the roots of the 
Niger Delta conflict are predicated on the fact that the Nigerian state is not 
governed based on a liberal democratic ethos of good governance thereby failing 
in its social liberal functions of ensuring the wellbeing and unfettered development 
of its citizenry. Thus, I argue that substituting a liberal democratic ethos with a 
neopatrimonial mode of governance was what created the social conditions of 
alienation and frustration that snowballed into violent conflict not just in the Niger 
Delta but other parts of Nigeria. 
As I earlier noted I shall also be presenting my theoretical framework for 
evaluating the Niger Delta DDR programme. In this regard, Muggah (2009: 14) 
and Özerdem (2013: 225-236) have argued that every DDR programme is 
anchored on minimalist or maximalist philosophical assumptions. That is 
conceptualised and implemented as security stabilization project or as an 
opportunity for development where the broader issues of community 
development, human security and development will be addressed to reduce the 
risk of violent conflict. Muggah posited that there are two contending approaches 
with concomitant implications for the kind of impact and end-state that DDR will 
bequeath: 
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Conventional DDR can be envisioned on a continuum that extends from a 
narrow minimalist (establishing security) to a broad maximalist (an 
opportunity for development) perspective. More traditional security –
oriented entities such as DPKO tend to adopt the former perspective. Their 
focus is on removing weapons, cantoning ex-soldiers and fulfilling the 
terms of peace agreement to the letter. Their strategic goals include a 
reduction of the likelihood of war recurrence while their micro imperatives 
are more specifically oriented toward de-linking the command and control 
of armed groups. By way of contrast, ostensibly ‘development’ agencies 
including the UNDP and the World Bank tend to endorse interventions that 
call for much broader ambition and scope. They aim to rehabilitate ex –
combatants and provide for dependents, children and the infirm so that 
they can assume productive roles in (civil) society while also reinforcing 
public institutions and their legitimacy by promoting markets, infrastructure 
and property rights in areas of (re)integration (Muggah, 2009: p. 14). 
 
Consequently, this study will evaluate the Niger Delta DDR programme from the 
minimalist and maximalist perspectives developed by Muggah. This study argues 
and demonstrate that the failure of the Niger Delta DDR programme to adopt a 
maximalist approach to DDR implies that its conflict resolution and prevention 
potential was limited in important ways. Conversely, lasting peace in the Niger 
Delta would have been furthered by the adoption of an approach based on 
maximalist assumptions about DDR and social liberal democratic ethos. The 
decision to adopt a minimalist approach in the conceptualisation, design and 
implementation of the programme ultimately suggests that the ADDR programme 
would only achieve a short-term and fragile peace that left neopatrimonialism, 
underdevelopment and the grievances of Niger Delta communities unaddressed. 
1.4.2. Overall Research Strategy- the Case Study Approach 
The research questions for this study were investigated within the framework of 
evaluative case study research. According to Thomas (2009: 115), a case study 
entails an in-depth investigation into one single case or possibly a small number 
of cases. Thus, as an approach to research, ‘case study is a strategy for doing 
research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context using multiple sources of evidence’ 
(Robson, 2011: 136). This implies that in case study research, data is collected 
using a variety of methods of data collection to get a complete picture of the topic 
being investigated. There are several types of case study research in the 
literature, one of which is the evaluation case study that Thomas succinctly 
asserted as follows: 
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Evaluation is framed by the expectation that you are doing the research to 
see how well something is working or has worked. Something has been 
changed or a new idea introduced and evaluative research is carried out 
to find out what the change has led to. Have things got better or worse or 
just stayed the same? (Thomas, 2012: 99).  
 
Therefore, this evaluative case study critically examined to what extent the 2009 
Niger Delta ADDR programme succeeded in achieving its statutory objective of 
conflict prevention. Additionally, the study also examines how sustainable the 
relative peace achieved via the programme is, and to what extent the programme 
has positively impacted the developmental wellbeing of the Niger Delta region 
and its citizens.  
1.4.3. Justifications for Adopting the Case Study Method 
The case study method was adopted in this study because of the rich and in-
depth nature of the data it enabled me to generate, along with the analytical 
insight it permitted (Creswell, 2007: 73; Bryman, 2008: 53; Thomas, 2009: 115-
117; Blaikie, 2010: 189-191; Kumar, 2011: 126-127; Thomas, 2012: 17-23). The 
advantage gained in utilising this method is further buttressed by Merriam (1988: 
1) who contended that ‘case studies illuminate the reader’s understanding of the 
phenomenon under study. They can bring about the discovery of new meaning, 
extend the reader’s experience, or confirm what is known.’ Furthermore, 
engaging in an in-depth and holistic study of the 2009 Niger Delta ADDR 
programme enables me to gain knowledge with ‘… wider implications and, 
importantly, that would not have come to light through the use of a research 
strategy that tried to cover a large number of instances…’ (Denscombe, 2010: 
53). 
However, despite the advantages associated with the case study approach, I am 
conscious of its inherent limitations. For example, Willis et al. (2007: 239) argue 
that ‘the case study has been the most criticised and most used form of social 
science research.’ Against this backdrop, four major issues have been raised 
against case study research (see Yin (2009: 14-16 and Bryman, 2008: 391-392). 
For example, according to Bryman, the lack of methodological rigour that 
characterises case study research strategy is a primary concern. He explains that 
case study researchers hardly comply with laid down systematic procedures. 
Consequently, they can hardly absolve themselves of the tendency to be biased, 
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as the entire research process, findings and conclusions are often tailored to 
confirm or disprove a preconceived position. This is supported by the assertion 
that ‘case studies are sometimes carried out in a sloppy, perfunctory, and 
incompetent manner and sometimes even in a corrupt, dishonest way’ (Bromley, 
1986: xiii).  This makes it very difficult for case studies to be replicated (Bryman, 
2008: 391). Nonetheless, I will argue that the question of complying with 
methodological rigour and objectivity is not unique to the case study, but 
applicable to all research methods. Furthermore, I am of the opinion that 
compliance or non-compliance with methodological rigour, has nothing to do with 
the research strategy, but the personal integrity of the researcher. In other words, 
both qualitative and quantitative researchers are liable to ‘cut corners’ or exhibit 
‘lack of transparency’ in the conduct of their work, depending on the researcher’s 
integrity.  
The second pitfall raised against the case study approach is that ‘…they provide 
little basis for scientific generalization’ (Yin, 2009: 15). Similarly, other scholars 
such as Creswell (2007: 4-75), Blaikie (2010: 191-197), Robson (2011: 137) and 
Thomas (2012: 17-19) have all expressed doubt about the possibility for case 
study findings to be generalised to the larger research population thereby 
denigrating its quality of being a scientific approach to conducting investigation. 
On the other hand, Yin has responded to this critique by arguing that ‘…case 
studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to 
populations or universes’ (Yin, 2009: 15). Thus, as I pointed out earlier, part of 
the significance of this study lies in its potential to contribute to theory building 
and elaboration in the field of DDR and political economy of armed conflict. 
Similarly, Myers (2000: 1-2) has debunked the contention that findings of case 
studies are not generalisable when she notes that ‘I suggest that while… [case] 
studies are not generalizable in the traditional sense of the word, nor do they 
claim to be…partial generalizations may be possible to similar populations…’. 
Thus, findings from case studies can be generalisable to other cases with similar 
characteristics.   
The third argument against case study research is that the rising popularity of 
‘true experiments’ which establish causal relationships within events (Yin, 2009: 
16) has diminished its usefulness. However, my view is that in social science 
investigation, it is practically impossible to establish with mathematical finality 
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causal relationships between events. Additionally, human beings being the 
subject of social research can hardly be subjected to real experimental research 
as obtainable in the natural sciences.  
The fourth criticism raised against the case study method is that it does get 
prolonged, leading not only to high financial cost but the acquistion of voluminous 
and often unreasonable data, which becomes difficult to manage (Yin, 2009:15). 
I do acknowledge the validity of this weakness because, my field work lasted 
between September 2013 and January 2014, with huge financial implications in 
terms of logistics for transportation and hotel accommodation, during which large 
volumes of primary and secondary information were gathered. However, 
reasonable financial arrangements before going to the field, inner will, motivation 
and commitment enabled me to overcome this challenge.   
1.4.4. Research Methods and Procedures 
This section presents the specific steps followed to generate the data for this case 
study and how the data was analysed. It also presents the research delimitations 
and limitations as well as the challenges I experienced in the field and how they 
were resolved or mitigated. 
1.4.5. Sample Size, Method and Access to Research Participants 
Credibility is an important consideration in the selection of respondents in any 
research (Brouneus, 2011: 134). This implies that I needed to recruit credible 
respondents that would enable me to gather reliable and valid information for the 
study (Rubin & Rubin, 2005: 65). Therefore, as suggested by Rubin & Rubin, I 
ensured that the respondents in this study were experienced and knowledgeable 
in different aspects of my research (Ibid.). To achieve this, I initially applied the 
purposive method of sampling to recruit the study’s respondents. In purposive 
sampling, ‘researchers use their special knowledge or expertise about a group to 
select subjects who represent this population’ (Berg, 2004: 36). My knowledge of 
potential participants with the requisite information on my case study is not 
exhaustive; therefore, I complemented purposive sampling with snowball 
sampling.  Snowball sampling is ‘…the process of selecting a sample using 
networks’ (Kumar, 2011: 208). In this case, I benefited immensely from the 
process whereby a reliable and competent respondent offered to introduce me to 
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another reliable and competent respondent. In total 53 respondents drawn from 
the categories of persons shown in table 1.1 were interviewed for this case study.   
Table 1.1: Categories and Number of Respondents Interviewed and held 
Focus Group Discussion (FGD) with 
Serial 
No. 
Category of Respondents No. of 
Respondents 
Interviewed 
1 Ex-MEND Commanders 4 
2 Community leaders 3 
3 Members of the Nigerian security forces 
serving/retired 
3 
4 Members of the Technical Committee of the Niger 
Delta (TCND) 
2 
5 Members of the Presidential Amnesty Planning 
Committee  
3 
6 Senior staff of the Niger Delta Amnesty 
Programme and NIMASA office 
2 
7 Members of the Disarmament and Demobilisation 
Implementation Committee 
5 
8 Members of nongovernmental organisations 
(NGOs) 
20 
9 Government policy makers serving/retired 2 
10 Community development chairperson of an oil 
producing community 
1 
11 Niger Delta academic experts 8 
12 Total 53 
13 2 x Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) 7 and 5 
participants in 
each group 
 
Furthermore, ‘trust is usually a crucial element in gaining access to potential 
research participants in conflict situations, yet that trust is often difficult to secure’ 
(Norman, 2009: 71). Consequently, to access some of the respondents, I relied 
on the help of credible gatekeepers who are described by Brouneus (2011: 134) 
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as ‘… people in a state, bureaucracy or organisation in a society or community 
who decide who can or cannot have access to a specific community.’ Two 
persons served as my gatekeepers, one of whom was a staff member of a 
nongovernmental organization, who was instrumental in facilitating my access to 
all the nongovernmental organisations’ respondents interviewed for this study. A 
retired military colleague of mine and an indigene of the Niger Delta assisted by 
two of his friends facilitated my interviews with former militants’ commanders, 
Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with former militants’ soldiers and visits to 
selected oil producing communities.   
1.4.6. Methods of Data Collection 
I utilised qualitative methods of data collection in conducting this case study. 
Qualitative methods of data collection emphasise the need to comprehend the 
social world from the perspectives and interpretations of the various social actors 
(Bryman, 2008: 266). This implies that the qualitative method ‘…focuses on how 
people perceive their worlds and how they interpret their experiences’ (Rubin & 
Rubin, 2012: 3). Therefore, the primary data for this study was collected using 
semi-structured in-depth interviews and FGDs. Additionally, these two methods 
were combined with secondary sources of data.  
1.4.7. Semi-Structured In-Depth Interviews 
Generally, ‘interviews are a method for collecting data in which selected 
participants (the interviewees) are asked questions to find out what they do, think 
or feel’ (Collis & Hussey, 2009: 144). Furthermore, according to Arksey & Knight 
(1999: 2) when it is used, the goal is to generate from the research respondents 
‘data on understandings, opinions… attitudes, feelings and the like, that people 
have in common’ regarding an issue or issues. In an in- depth semi-structured 
interview ‘the researcher has a list of questions or fairly specific topics to be 
covered, often referred to as an interview guide…’ (Bryman, 2008: 438). The 
interview guide served as my reference guide while conducting interviews as it 
was carefully designed to capture and reflect the study’s research questions (see 
Brouneus, 2011: 132). Different sets of interview guides were used to interview 
different categories of respondents depending on which aspects of my case study 
research questions they were knowledgeable on.  
One of the factors that informed my decision to use the semi-structured, in-depth 
interview approach is the flexibility that characterises this method (Bryman, 2008: 
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438-439) because ‘in qualitative interviewing, ‘rambling’ or going off on tangents 
is often encouraged; it gives insight into what the interviewee sees as relevant 
and important…’ The method gave me the advantage of probing my interviewees’ 
responses to get the maximum information I could from them.  
However, despite the strength of in-depth interviewing, I am conscious of its 
associated challenges, of which Robson (2011: 281) has identified a number. 
Some of these challenges with which I was confronted were administrative and 
logistical in nature; coupled with the difficulty in securing appointments, 
permission, and the sometimes-unanticipated cancellation of such appointments. 
Finally, it is argued that in semi-structured in-depth interviewing ‘biases are 
difficult to rule out’ (Robson, 2011; 281). In this regard, Collis & Hussey (2009: 
147) warn that as a researcher asks questions and the respondent replies, she 
or he needs ‘…to be aware of the potential for inadvertent class, race or sex bias.’ 
Consequently, Brouneus (2011: 135) suggested that qualitative researchers 
should try to understand the motives of their respondents. Conscious of this, I 
took judicious notice of possible biases from my interviewees and reflected on 
my own biases during and after the interview process. 
1.4.8.  Focus Group Discussions 
Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) are usually held with a select number of people 
or with small groups focusing on a definite topic with the aim of investigating issue 
or issues (Bryman, 2008: 473 and Bowling, 2011: 424). It is, therefore ‘…a 
research technique that collects data through group interaction on a topic 
determined by the researcher’ (Morgan, 1997: 6). In this study, I conducted 2 
FGDs, one in Yenagoa, Bayelsa state and another in an oil producing community 
in the state with a group of ex-militants, each group comprised of 7 and 5 
members respectively. All the participants in the 2 FGDs were male, in their mid-
twenties and early thirties and were formerly under the command and control 
(C&C) of different commanders. In terms of ethnicity, they were all from the Ijaw 
ethnic nationality and educationally they have not gone beyond secondary school 
level. The FGDs enabled me to explore their motivations for going into militancy, 
the nature of life during militancy and their general opinions on the DDR 
programme. One of the main advantages gained in using this method was the 
depth of information I gathered during the two sessions. However, I could not hold 
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FGDs with community members as I discussed in the research delimitations and 
limitations section below.  
1.4.9.  Secondary Sources 
In this study, in-depth semi-structured interviews and FGDs were complemented 
with secondary sources of information. This include journal articles, books and 
reports from the office of the Special Adviser to the Nigerian President on Niger 
Delta Affairs, the Amnesty quarterly news magazine, International Crisis Group’s 
reports on the Niger Delta conflict. Also consulted are a variety of credible 
Nigeria-based newspapers, both in print and electronic form; such as Punch 
newspaper, Vanguard newspaper, Leadership newspaper, the Nation newspaper 
and Premium Times Online newspaper. Also used was information posted on the 
official websites of the Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty 
Programme (NDAP), the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), the 
Federal Ministry of Environment, the National Oil Spill Detection and Response 
Agency (NOSDRA) and the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency 
(NIMASA). Other secondary sources used include reports and commentaries 
from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and other credible internet 
sources and reports written by nongovernmental organisations. Secondary 
sources were highly valuable in this research because they provided me with 
high-quality data with little logistical and financial commitment. But beyond that, 
where access to primary data was impossible, secondary sources became the 
only alternative means of getting information (see section on research 
delimitation and limitations). However, as Kumar (2011: 163-164) pointed out, 
when using secondary sources one needs to critically evaluate the validity and 
reliability of such information because of possible biases. One of the methods I 
used to test the veracity of secondary information obtained was to compare the 
consistency of what several sources said on the same issue and by 
crosschecking with data obtained through primary sources. 
1.5. Research Delimitations and Limitations 
Every research has its delimitations and limitations (Rakotsoane, 2012: 13) and 
this study is no exception. Generally, in research ‘… the delimitations of a project 
are self-imposed boundaries decided upon by the researcher and are therefore 
distinct from ‘limitations’, which arise from factors beyond the control of the 
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researcher’ (Denscombe, 2012: 69). Consequently, according to Denscombe 
delimitations set out the followings: 
• Boundaries to the literature that will be reviewed. 
• Things that will be done in the research and things that will not be done 
and why. 
• Items or people that will be included in the research and those that will 
not- and why. 
• Factors that will be looked at in the research and those that will not- 
and why. 
• The time span to be covered- and why (Ibid). 
 
Three important issues in terms of delimitations or scope are involved in this 
study. One of which is in terms of literature coverage. The literature examined in 
Chapter two principally covers the theoretical and policy-related literature on first 
generation DDR, often referred to as conventional DDR and for which the United 
Nations Integrated, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards 
(UN IDDRS 2006) serves as its framework of implementation. However, the 
practice and conduct of DDR have evolved over time in response to the 
contemporary conflict environments that DDR is being conducted in and which 
do not fit into the first generation theoretical and practitioner literature. Indeed, it 
was in recognition of, and response to, this changing DDR environment that the 
United Nations (UN) in 2010 developed a new DDR operational guideline 
document titled Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR) practices in Peace Operations. In line with the above, 
Muggah and O’Donnell highlighted the new kind of armed groups that DDR 
practitioners are dealing with in the field: 
  
Many organizations operating in war zones (and also outside of them) are 
struggling to identify ways of ‘disengaging’ Al Shabaab in Somalia or 
northern Kenya, Jihadi fighters in Syria or Iraq, Taliban remnants in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, or Boko Haram militia in Nigeria… (Muggah and 
O’Donnell, 2015: 2). 
 
Therefore, it is sufficient to say that this study has focused less on second 
generation DDR literature. This decision was taken because the 2009 Niger Delta 
ADDR programme was conducted within the framework of traditional DDR and 
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so its analysis can only be achieved within the context of first generation DDR 
literature. However, where relevant, second generation DDR literature was 
consulted.  
 
The second delimitation is in terms of the scope of what is to be covered in the 
case study. In this case, the Niger Delta conflict started as far back to the period 
immediately after independence, characterised by several dynamics which 
makes it practically impossible to cover everything and which necessitated my 
use of periodisation to summarise and cover the entire conflict history. Also, in 
the management of the conflict several ad hoc intervention measures were 
implemented by the Nigerian government which are too numerous to be covered. 
Consequently, only the most important and non ad-hoc interventions were 
covered in this study. The last delimitation of this study has to do with the period 
covered in terms of the evaluation of the DDR programme, which is 2009-2013. 
Accordingly, developments and occurrences that occurred beyond 2013 have 
only been referred to buttress and corroborate certain arguments and claims 
made in the analysis. 
 
As already noted ‘limitations are matters and occurrences that arise in a study 
which is out of the researcher’s control. They limit the extensity to which a study 
can go, and sometimes affect the result and conclusions that can be drawn’ 
(Simon and Goes, 2013: 1). Suffice to point out that this case study was affected 
by certain factors which were essentially beyond my control, and in this vein, four 
important cases are worthy to be mentioned here. One was the uncooperative 
response I received from the office of the Presidential Adviser to the President on 
the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme. All my initial efforts to secure an interview 
and have access to official documents regarding the implementation of the ADDR 
programme proved abortive. This situation only slightly changed when a military 
colleague of mine linked me up to his friend who was part of the senior 
management staff in the Adviser’s office. The senior management staff eventually 
granted me an interview and gave me a report written for the members of the 
Nigerian parliament regarding the programme’s implementation from 2009 to 
December 2011. The report and information contained in the three years’ 
anniversary edition of the Amnesty News an in-house news publication of the 
Special Adviser’s Office and a transcribed live television interview with a staff 
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member in the Adviser’s office served as my major source of reliable information. 
These were the invaluable sources of reliable statistics and reference regarding 
the programme’s implementation that I used in this study. However, my findings 
and analyses were still limited to some extent by the lack of access to current 
data on the exact number of ex-militants demobilised, provided with reintegration 
training, job opportunities or business start-up capital and the government’s 
budgetary spending on the programme between 2009-2013.  
 
Likewise, my effort to secure interviews with officials of the Niger Delta 
Development Commission (NDDC) and the National Oil Spill Detection and 
Response Agency (NOSDRA) proved abortive. For example, at the NDDC, the 
promise of an interview was changed to providing me with a published report on 
the Commission’s activities; which at the end of the day was not fulfilled. 
Consequently, the only choice I was left with was to rely on relevant information 
I could get from their various websites.  
 
In the same vein, my effort to get the response of MNOCs on certain issues by 
interviewing a designated senior staff of Shell Petroleum proved abortive; the 
bureaucratic conditions set for me could not be met during the 4 months’ period 
earmarked for my fieldwork (September, October, November and December 
2013). Equally, follow-up efforts and email communications requesting to have 
the interview done via telephone did not yield any positive outcome. Thus, against 
my wish, the study was concluded without the opportunity to speak to any staff of 
MNOCs. 
 
Finally, the last limitation was my inability to conduct FGDs with members of oil 
producing communities as originally planned in the study’s design. The huge 
financial cost of holding it hindered the plan. However, many Niger Delta based 
civil society organisations’ respondents and individual community leaders 
interviewed helped to mitigate the effect of not being able to hold FGDs with 
grassroots communities.  
1.6. Method of Data Analysis 
Data collected in this study was analysed using thematic content analysis 
procedures. More than just a single technique, content analysis is a set of 
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methods for analysing the symbolic content of any communication. The basic 
idea is to reduce the total content of a communication (e.g., all of the words or all 
of the visual imagery) to a set of categories that represent some characteristic of 
research interest. Thus, content analysis may involve the systematic description 
of either verbal or nonverbal materials (Singleton Jr. & Straits, 1999: 383). 
The analytic procedure I observed in analysing the data obtained is as outlined 
by Marshall & Rossman (2006: 151-167). Some of the procedures involved are 
concurrent in nature:  
(a) Organising the Data. The first activity I observed was to organise the 
information collected by sorting and tagging it to indicate names, dates, 
time and places where the interviews were held. This process made 
matching of the transcribed interviews to the appropriate respondent easy.  
(b) Immersion in the Data. The second critical process in analysing the data 
was immersing myself in the data. This involved the act of reading and re-
reading through all the transcribed interview data sets. This process was 
iterative in nature because I had been listening to the audio recording of 
the interviews while still in the field. This enabled me to get myself fully 
acquainted and familiar with the responses of various respondents and the 
entire data in general which also enabled me to start seeing the emerging 
pattern of explanations to the study’s research questions. 
(c) Generating Themes/Categories. Having successfully acquainted and 
familiarised myself with the data, I developed the themes used in coding 
the data. Descriptive themes are topical issues relating to the research 
questions and which also show a pattern in the data. The themes had 
direct bearing to the research questions. Accordingly, the following themes 
that linked the data with the research questions were developed: 
(i). Opinions and insights about the sources and drivers of the Niger Delta conflict. 
(ii). Opinion and insights about how the Nigerian government has managed the 
conflict and how effective the management was. 
(iii). Opinions and insights regarding how the programme was conceptualised, 
designed and implemented and the effect these factors have had on the 
programme’s success or otherwise. 
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(iv). Opinions and insights regarding the extent to which the programme has 
achieved its objectives or not. 
(d) Coding the Data. At this stage of the analysis, I carried out the actual 
coding of the information according to the themes identified in c (i- iv) 
above. Again, it is important to point out that in the process of coding the 
data I took due cognizance of manifest and latent content in the data. Berg 
(2004: 269-270) posits that manifest data are those apparent categories 
or themes that are obvious in the data and can easily be identified and 
coded while latent are hidden content or meanings contained in the data 
that require serious analytical thinking and reflection to identify and 
interpret them.  
(e) Writing Analytic Memos/Marginal Notes. At this stage, I began to 
develop marginal notes that reflected my deeper analytical thinking, 
reflections and interpretations of the issues contained in the coded 
portions of the data being analysed in relations to my research questions. 
However, drawing analytic memos and marginal notes was a continuous 
process that I commenced while in the field and listening to the recorded 
interviews. 
(f) Offering Interpretations. At this stage, I began extrapolating; in terms of 
providing interpretations of the coded data through inferences and 
deductions. The process at this stage involved comparing and contrasting 
various portions of the information being analysed.   
(g) Searching for Alternative Understandings. At this stage of the analysis, 
I offered a self-critique of the deductions, inferences, findings and 
conclusion reached in (f) above. To achieve the most refined and plausible 
meanings and interpretations of the data, I applied triangulation.  Willis et 
al (2007:218) have argued in support of the application of triangulation at 
the level of data interpretation. As they note, ‘in qualitative research there 
is a…concept called triangulation. It is often used as a qualitative 
equivalent of validity and reliability. The essential idea of triangulation is to 
find multiple sources of confirmation when you want to draw a conclusion’. 
Therefore, the analytical value of multiple points of view in the field of 
political economy of armed conflict, the DDR literature and social science, 
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in general, were applied in the process of comprehending the data and 
different events and occurrences derived from the field. Furthermore, 
throughout the analysis I resorted to extracting, a technique which ‘… 
emphasizes “pulling” out some section of a source material for purposes 
of quotation especially direct quotations’ (Amajirionwu, 1987:30) to 
support and buttress my assertions and conclusions. 
(h) Writing the Final Report of the Case Study Research. As stated in the 
significance of this study, the final report of this case study will make a 
substantial contribution to existing academic debates on the role of DDR 
in conflict prevention, the sub-field of the political economy of armed 
conflict, the literature on the Niger Delta conflict and the Nigerian State. 
Similarly, at the empirical level, it will provide insights for better future DDR 
design and implementation. 
1.7. Ethical Considerations  
The highest premium was given to ethical issues while conducting this study. 
First, all respondents involved in this study did so voluntarily based on informed 
consent. All respondents were adequately informed about what the research was 
about, the kind of information sought, why I needed the information and 
participation was voluntary (Kumar, 2011: 244). As part of the process of securing 
informed consent, all the respondents were issued with a comprehensive 
information brief about the study which clearly explained their rights and 
privileges should they agree to participate. A sample of the respondents’ 
information brief is in appendix 1. This enabled them to make an informed 
decision regarding their participation. Furthermore, before the commencement of 
any interview, the issue of informed consent was reiterated to every participant. 
A sample of the respondents’ consent form is in appendix 2. Importantly, I sought 
the approval of each respondent before his or her voice was recorded on tape. 
A critical ethical consideration was adherence to the principle of anonymity and 
confidentiality. In this context, anonymity is ‘the degree to which the identity of 
message source is unknown and unspecified; thus, the less knowledge one has 
about the source and the harder it is to specify who the source is among possible 
options, the more anonymity exists’ (Scott, 2005: 243). Achieving and ensuring 
anonymity is important because ‘it is unethical to identify an individual respondent 
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with the information provided by him/her’ (Kumar, 2011: 246). In view of the 
sensitive nature of my case study topic, respondents were accorded anonymity 
in the entire thesis chapters, which means that their identity is concealed in the 
research report (Oliver, 2003:77). Similarly, confidentiality has to do with practical 
steps taken to safeguard the information collected from unauthorised access 
(Whelan, 2007: 3). All information collected was reasonably protected from 
unauthorised access by storing the data in a secured computer and used strictly 
for the purpose collected. 
1.8. Challenges in the Field 
Wood (2006: 373) argued that ‘field research in conflict zones is challenging…’ 
One of the key field challenges that I had to cope with was the general insecurity 
that pervades the Niger Delta in terms of crimes particularly robbery, kidnapping 
and piracy in the Delta coastal waterways. To mitigate security risk, I had to 
charter a private speed boat during my visit to oil producing communities in the 
creeks of Bayelsa state which increased the financial cost of the field work. This 
decision was taken based on feedback from an informant who suggested that it 
was safer to travel to the creeks with a registered charter speed boat because 
there was a mutually beneficial gentleman’s agreement between the boat drivers 
and the youth engaged in piracy. Registered chartered speed boats were less 
likely to be attacked by pirates compared to other public passenger boats.  
However, the challenges experienced in Abuja and Port Harcourt were less 
enormous. In Abuja, the biggest difficulty was securing interviews with 
government officials, long waiting or the sudden cancellation of appointments. In 
Port Harcourt, the chaotic traffic situation coupled with poor conditions of the 
motorways and the high cost of hiring taxi drivers were the main challenges I 
experienced.  
1.9. Problematising the Niger Delta and Niger Delta Conflict 
The use of concepts or terms is critical in academic debate and research. In this 
regard, Ramsbotham et al. (2011: 30) contend that even in the same academic 
field, concepts are often confusing and contested because the same concepts 
are used by scholars to connote different meanings. The significance of defining 
and clarifying concepts in research is important because it enables the researcher 
to identify his key concepts, what he understands them to be and how he intends 
to use them (Denscombe, 2012: 68). 
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It is thus pertinent to conceptualise and clarify unfamiliar concepts that have been 
recurrently used in this thesis for readers to have an unambiguous understanding 
of their meaning. Therefore, unacquainted terms like the Niger Delta and Niger 
Delta conflict are hereby problematised and clarified. 
1.9.1.  Problematising the Niger Delta 
‘The terms “Niger Delta” and Niger Delta Region” have usually been used 
interchangeably to refer to the oil-rich zone of the Federal Republic of Nigeria’ 
(George-Ukpong, 2012: 9).  However, a pertinent issue here is that the existing 
literature on the Niger Delta tends to present it as a monolithic homogeneous 
geopolitical region comprising of different but united minority ethnic groups 
occupying Nigeria’s south-south geopolitical zone. However, such a portrayal 
does not reflect the region’s contemporary empirical reality and lacks any strong 
analytical utility. For instance, Ebeku (2006: 22) has argued that though the Niger 
Delta Region may have common interests and problems ‘there is abundant 
evidence that the Niger Delta people are not a homogeneous entity…’. Therefore, 
to achieve a more nuanced understanding of the Niger Delta in the context of this 
thesis, it is fundamental to appropriately problematize it. One important 
contemporary representation of the Niger Delta in the literature is that of Azaiki 
who defines the Region from a geographical perspective. According to him: 
The Niger Delta is the largest wetland in Africa, and third in the world. It 
covers an area of 70,000km2 and consists of a number of ecological 
zones-sandy coastal ridge barrier, brackish or saline mangroves, 
freshwater, permanent and seasonal swamp forests and lowland rain 
forests. The whole area is traversed and criss-crossed by a large number 
of rivers, streams, rivulets, creeks and twenty estuaries-Forcados, 
Escravos, Benin and Ramos in the western flank and Dodo, Pennington 
Digotoru, Middleton, Koluama, Fishtown, Sangana, Nun, Brass, St 
Nicholas, San Barbara, San Bartholomew, New Kalabari, Andoni, and 
Opobo (Azaiki, 2003: 39). 
 
The above conceptualisation of the Niger Delta emphasises its peculiar terrain as 
the defining feature of the region, and to a reasonable extent, the definition is 
relevant because the unique nature of the region’s terrain highly influences its 
development and environmental challenges as well (Ibid.: 19). Nevertheless, I 
argue that the definition falls short of bringing to the fore the complexities that 
characterise the region in terms of its complex ethnic composition and the 
concomitant inter-ethnic and clan contestation among the various ethnic 
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nationalities occupying the region. In line with this George-Ukpong (2012: 12), 
observes that ‘the definition of the Niger Delta (region) has since gone beyond 
the traditional 70,000 square [s]… [kilometres], oil-rich region…’ He further 
contends that ‘for political reasons, the Niger Delta region has been variously 
defined to suit particular interests at various times. Today the political Niger Delta 
is known to be synonymous with the oil-producing states of Nigeria.’ In line with 
that Ebeku (2006: 19) maintains that ‘in recent times, … other definitions of the 
Niger Delta have emerged to distort the geographical definition of the region.’ He, 
therefore, contends that ‘a further variant of the political definitions is even more 
sweeping, as it considers the Niger Delta to be synonymous with oil-producing 
areas’ (Ibid: 20). This perspective of the Niger Delta was further reinforced and 
complicated by the 2000 Niger Delta Development Commission’s enabling act 
(Ugwoha, 2010: 12), which brought in states geographically outside the region as 
part of the Niger Delta because of their oil producing status. This perspective was 
further advanced by the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme, which defines the 
Niger Delta as the oil producing states of Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, 
Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers states (Federal Government of Nigeria Niger 
Delta Amnesty Programme, n.d.). The Map of Nigeria showing the 9 Oil 
Producing States is in figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1: Map of Nigeria Showing the 9 oil Producing States  
Source: Aniefiok, E. I., Udo, J. I., Margaret, U. I. and Sunday, W. Petters. (2013). 
(Online). ‘Petroleum exploration and production: past and present environmental 
issues in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, American Journal of Environmental Protection, 
Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 78-90. Available at: http://pubs.sciepub.com/env/1/4/2  
(Accessed: 03 January 2015). 
 
However, as argued by Akpan (2011: 3) such a conceptualisation has been 
contested by many on the basis that oil should not be the yardstick for inclusion 
or exclusion of an area as part of the Niger Delta but rather geographical 
peculiarities. In the same vein, Ebeku (2006: 21) has argued that a major problem 
with the above definition is that it makes the boundaries of the Niger Delta region 
indeterminate. For example, if oil is eventually found in any of the northern states, 
such a state can clamour for it to be included as one of the constituent 
beneficiaries of the Niger Delta Development Commission’s development 
programmes; yet geographically such a state does not fall within the region.  
 
There is also the identity construct definition, whereby reference to the Niger 
Delta evokes a sense of minority ethnic groups who have been marginalised and 
subjugated by the majority ethnic groups in Nigeria as far back as the pre-
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independence era. For example, Omeje (2006: 32) argues that apart from Abia, 
Imo and Ondo states which form part of the Niger Delta, ‘the rest of the States 
are populated by varying sizes of minority ethnic groups.’ However, the minority 
identity label attached to the Niger Delta Region gives it the image of an ethnically 
monolithic and homogenous region. Conversely, existing evidence shows that 
the various ethnic groups in the region are very much engaged in inter-ethnic 
rivalry. For instance, Adeotun (2005:47) described the Niger Delta as a divided 
society by contending that ‘the Niger-Delta…is a complex one, with each of the 
region’s ethnic groups fighting its neighbours. They are seemingly all enemies, 
with no two groups being able to unite in friendship.’ Corroborating this position, 
Imobighe (2002: 36-52) demonstrated how the Ijaw, Urohobo and Itsekiri, three 
major ethnic groups from the Niger Delta region engaged in a destructive war of 
supremacy regarding who among them is the original owner of Warri, regarded 
as the second largest city in the region.  
 
Again, the dispute over ownership of oil wells between the states of Cross River 
and Akwa Ibom (Azuakola, 2012: 1-2) and those of Rivers and Bayelsa 
(Pointblanknews.com, 2012: 1-5) illustrates the high level of contestation over the 
control of oil resources amongst the various states that make up the Niger Delta 
region. Lastly, a major shortcoming of the minority construct definition of the Niger 
Delta is the tendency to overlook certain ethnic nationalities that see themselves 
as minorities within the region. Such ethnic nationalities accuse major ethnic 
nationalities within the Niger Delta of marginalisation. This inevitably gives rise to 
the construct of minorities within minorities and appellations like ‘core Niger Delta 
states or ethnic groups’. For instance, many have argued that the Ijaw ethnic 
nationality, given their numerical strength in the region, tends to see the Niger 
Delta as synonymous to Ijaw; therefore whatever decision is to be taken in 
respect of the region must reflect Ijaw views and interests, irrespective of the 
other ethnic nationalities in the region.1 Against these contending perspectives, 
within the context of this thesis, an integrated definition will be adopted whereby 
both the geographical, political and minority definitions of the Niger Delta will be 
employed. This implies that the Niger Delta Region will be construed in this work 
as a geographical region within Nigeria, which, while home to a substantial 
                                                          
1. Respondent 018-Niger Delta academic expert, November 2013. 
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number of the nation’s minority ethnic groups (relative to the majority ethnic 
groups) in relation   to majority ethnic groups boasts a distinctive terrain and is 
the consortium of Nigeria’s oil producing states and communities. Nevertheless, 
it is important to note that even though the recurrent use of the term in this study 
may give the semblance of an ethno monolithic region, it is not in any way so; 
neither is it devoid of inter-ethnic rancour.  
1.9.2. Problematising the Niger Delta Conflict   
According to Ogundiya (2011: 11-49) the genesis of the Niger Delta conflict dates 
back to the colonial period and over the years it has gone through a historical 
process of mutation (changing dynamics). Therefore, a reference to it may likely 
produce different understandings and so there is a need to problematize it. More 
importantly, Omeje (2006: 16) argues that despite the plethora of academic 
research on the Nigerian oil conflict (Niger Delta conflict) much of it focuses on 
an examination of the conflict’s causes, dynamics and remedial solutions without 
proffering a precise definition of what the conflict is all about. This lack of a clear-
cut definition has prevented an in-depth understanding of the conflict of which the 
concomitant implication is the temptation for scholars and researchers to engage 
in extreme generalisations that elevate the conflict to Nigeria’s crises of post-
independence state-making (Ibid.: 17). Against this backdrop, Omeje 
problematises the conflict in this way: 
At the heart of the conflict is crude oil-its exploration, extraction, 
distribution, sale, allocation and use of the accruable revenues, and 
perhaps most decisively, the politicization of the overall processes. There 
are three dominant parties to the conflict. These include firstly, the oil 
bearing communities, which are mostly ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta 
area represented by diverse community-based organizations (CBOs), as 
well as sub-and pan- ethnic bodies. Secondly, there is the oil industry, 
responsible for generating petro-resources on which… the entire system 
of rentier accumulation is based…The third is the state, predominantly (but 
not exclusively) an unstable coalition of some ethnic majority elites 
(Omeje, 2006: 16).  
 
Following this problematisation, Omeje further argues that: 
…one can operationally define the Nigerian oil conflict as the gamut of 
conflicts, both open and latent, related to oil extraction, transportation, and 
distribution activities, as well as the politics concerning the disposition, 
appropriation and utilisation of financial resources and opportunities 
derived or perceived as deriving from oil resources in the country (Omeje, 
2006: 17). 
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A similar argument was advanced by Ojakorotu (2008: 92) who maintains that 
the conflict in the Niger Delta may be attributed to several key issues: exclusion 
and marginalisation in terms of access to oil revenue, demand for resource 
control, environmental despoliation and unacceptable human right violations. 
Ojakorotu re-echoes Omeje’s representation of the conflict by contending that the 
conflict in the Niger Delta is reflective of the contradictions of environmental 
governance and oil politics in Nigeria (Ibid).  
Within the context of the above definition of the conflict, Osaghae, et al (2008: 
31-32) argue that three dimensions of the conflict can be deciphered within the 
larger Niger Delta conflict, namely Federal Government-Community conflicts 
which take two forms; one, the entire Niger Delta region versus the Nigerian 
federal state. This revolves around obnoxious laws and policies pertaining to oil 
exploitation, production and the distribution of revenue arising from it. In other 
words, it is largely triggered by the fear of domination on the part of the minority 
by the majority ethnic groups and further reinforced by the contention over 
resource allocation which later metamorphosed to absolute resource control 
agitations. The second dimension has to do with the conflict between specific 
Niger Delta oil bearing communities and the Federal Government over its 
excessive application of force to protect the assets of MNOCs, as in the case of 
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) and the Nigerian State. 
There is also community versus oil company conflicts, which have to do with 
disagreement over compensation to communities’ due to environmental 
degradation they have suffered. The last are inter and intra-community conflicts, 
this centred around struggles between and within communities and clans over 
the ownership of land endowed with oil. Therefore, the works of Omeje, Ojakorotu 
and Osaghae have provided an in-depth analytical problematization of the Niger 
Delta conflict which to a reasonable extent conforms to the conflict’s historical 
trajectory and dynamics over the years. However, the current state of the conflict 
is that it has mutated into a youth-led armed rebellion against the state. The youth 
claimed to have resorted to armed struggle because of the Nigerian State’s failure 
to respond to non-violent agitations from the Region. Therefore, the current phase 
of the conflict fits into Agbiboa’s (2014: 51) problematization in which he argues 
that ‘a distinguishing characteristic [of the conflict] has been the rise of ethnic 
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militias claiming to represent the interests of the oil-bearing communities in their 
struggle for survival.’ 
 
However, despite the analytical and empirical usefulness of such 
problematization of the conflict, two major weaknesses can be identified. As 
earlier pointed out, one is the tendency to assume that the Niger Delta region is 
a monolithic homogenous entity as far as the conflict is concerned and second is 
the tendency to gloss over the role of the Niger Delta ruling elite in furthering the 
marginalisation and underdevelopment of the region. A situation whereby the 
Niger Delta ruling elites replicate in the region the same type of injustice they 
accuse the hegemonic Nigerian federal state of perpetrating against them. For 
instance, while political elites from the Niger Delta region continue to clamour for 
increased revenue allocation from the federal government, such revenue only 
serves the prebendal accumulation of the Niger Delta ruling elite instead of being 
used to address the pressing development needs of the region. This is particularly 
the case since the return of Nigeria to democratic governance, as rightly noted in 
this assertion: 
The denial of democratic dividends is most pronounced in the Niger Delta, 
where governors and chairmen of local government councils have 
plundered the treasuries to enrich themselves and their cronies, while the 
population is left to squalor in abject poverty, neglect, and want. While we 
strongly condemn the federal government for its gross neglect of the Niger 
Delta, it would be irresponsible of us to condone the policies of the Niger 
Delta governors and chairmen of local government councils that have 
equally marginalized and impoverished the population. Thus [,] the Niger 
Delta state governors and chairmen of local government councils lack the 
moral authority to criticise the federal government when their policies have 
equal if not more debilitating effects on the population (Natufe, 2006: 3). 
 
Corroborating the above contention, Osaghe et al, (2008: 21) argue that one of 
the key actors in the Niger Delta Conflict were the so-called elders/elites which 
they describe as comprising of businessmen, retired civil servants and military 
generals, traditional and political leaders who control the socioeconomic and 
power structures in the region. This category of elites draws their prominence and 
wealth from their role as interlocutors between the masses of the region, the state 
and MNOCs, and use their privileged intermediary position as a means of 
prebendal accumulation. According to them: 
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Through their role as intermediaries they are able to build-up great prestige 
and wealth with which they have established region-wide client networks. 
The Niger-delta elite provides a classic example of the phenomenon of 
‘Straddling’ with one and the same person simultaneously occupying the 
key posts in political, economic and traditional spheres of public life in the 
Niger-delta, making of (sic)the Niger-delta elite a very powerful person 
(Ibid.). 
 
What this suggests is that the connection between the Niger Delta political elite, 
particularly the governors and militancy in the region, intersect personal and 
group interest; hence his contention that the conflict today ‘is driven by collective, 
personal and opportunistic interest’ (Ako, 2011: 47). Therefore, one could argue 
that the Niger Delta conflict is a struggle between elites from minority ethnic 
nationalities, whose land by accident of geography has the oil deposit, and elites 
from the majority ethnic nationalities who have dominated the sharing of oil rents 
over the years.  
 
Against this backdrop, a reference to the Niger Delta conflict in this thesis is 
premised on Omeje’s and Osaghae’s problematization of the conflict, 
notwithstanding their inadequacies. However, readers of this work should also 
understand that there is a replication of the politics of neopatrimonialism at the 
regional level by political elites from the Niger Delta Region that further 
marginalises the masses of the Region, thereby reinforcing their 
underdevelopment and predicaments. 
1.10. The Structure of the Thesis and Synopsis of Chapters 
This thesis is divided into six chapters, and each chapter is further subdivided 
into sections addressing different themes and arguments. Therefore, it is apposite 
to provide a structural outline of the chapters and the principal arguments and 
issues they addressed. 
Chapter One, being the introductory chapter provides a background introduction 
to the thesis. It also highlights the significance of the research, the methodology, 
methods of data collection and analysis that underpinned the study. Equally, the 
chapter problematizes the Niger Delta and Niger Delta conflict and provides the 
structural outline and synopsis of the thesis chapters. 
Chapter Two reviews some of the relevant theoretical, empirical and policy-
related literature on amnesty and DDR in the context of the transition from an 
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authoritarian to democratic dispensation and war to peace transition. The 
literature review is structured around the thematic debates in the DDR literature. 
Furthermore, the approach to the literature review adopted is critical in nature, 
highlighting some of the apparent gaps and weaknesses in the debates. Also, the 
chapter sets the background for the analysis of the Niger Delta ADDR programme 
by signposting some of the theoretical and empirical arguments to be examined 
in subsequent chapters of the thesis.  
Chapter Three critically examines the historical origins, dynamics and Nigerian 
State management of the Niger Delta conflict prior to the introduction of the ADDR 
programme. The chapter is divided into three parts, and the first part unpacks the 
conflict by advancing the thesis’s framework for explaining the conflict’s origin, its 
changing dynamics and how the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger 
Delta’s era of the conflict became the most violent phase. The second part of the 
chapter provides a periodisation of the conflict’s historical trajectory, while the 
third part analyses its management by the Nigerian State. In terms of contribution 
to knowledge and the existing literature on the conflict, the historical analysis of 
the conflict carried out in this chapter reveals that a substantial body of scholarly 
work located the conflict in decades of relative deprivation, poverty, 
environmental degradation and general underdevelopment etc. On the other 
hand, there are scholarly works that locate the conflict and its changing dynamics 
in the very nature and character of the Nigerian State. However, empirical and 
secondary evidence analysed in the chapter provided convincing theoretical 
corroboration and affirmation of the perspective that trace the conflict to the 
dysfunctional nature and character of the Nigerian rentier-neopatrimonial state. 
The analysis revealed that grievances of marginalisation, relative deprivation, 
poverty and general underdevelopment that underlay the conflict are symptoms 
of the crisis and contradictions of a rentier and neopatrimonial state system that 
resulted in the Nigerian State failing in its core functions. Likewise, current 
literature on the political economy of armed conflict is replete with criticisms of 
Collier’s greed theory of conflict and feasibility hypothesis. However, despite the 
validity of these criticisms, secondary and empirical data analysed in the chapter 
has demonstrated that even though Collier’s greed theory of conflict and civil war 
feasibility hypothesis may not be a valid explanation for conflict onset, evidence 
adduced in this chapter corroborate the fact that their explanatory potency in 
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terms of nuancing the dynamics of conflict cannot be underestimated or 
completely renounced.  
Chapter Four is subdivided into three main sections. The first section examines 
the ADDR’s programme’s conceptualisation, negotiation and planning as well as 
implementation. Based on this examination, the second part highlights the 
challenges and problems that characterised the implementation process. The 
third section is the conclusion which summarises the main argument of the 
chapter. In terms of contribution to knowledge, existing DDR literature is 
bifurcated between those that argue for a minimalist or maximalist DDR. Those 
that advocate for a minimalist DDR insist that it should only aim at restoring 
security and stability in the aftermath of violent conflict. On the other hand, those 
that advocate for maximalist DDR argue that unless a DDR programme is framed 
as an opportunity for development that aims at addressing the underlying sources 
of conflict and the concomitant security challenges it produces; its potential to 
contribute to lasting peace will be minimal. Accordingly, empirical and secondary 
data analysed in this study corroborates and affirms the position of those that 
advocate for maximalist DDR. Similarly, the current literature reveals that DDR 
can be initiated through a comprehensive peace agreement (peace accord) as 
an outcome of negotiated settlement amongst the conflicting parties. It can also 
be initiated in the aftermath of absolute military defeat by the victorious party. 
Alternatively, it can be initiated through ‘coercive disarmament’ as a form of peace 
enforcement. However, a modest knowledge discovery and contribution to the 
literature in the chapter is that the Niger Delta ADDR was achieved neither 
through negotiated settlement, the absolute military defeat of the militants by the 
Nigerian military nor was it a clear case of coercive disarmament. In contrast, 
empirical evidence analysed, revealed that it is best described as a pseudo-
compellence negotiated settlement. A DDR negotiation process that 
simultaneously integrates the features of a negotiated settlement, military 
enforcement and monetary patronage as inducement. Hence it straddles peace 
enforcement and negotiated settlement. Thus, it represents an alternative way of 
negotiating DDR. Similarly, is the concept of executive amnesty, a not too 
common concept in the literature that emerged from the chapter. An executive 
amnesty represents an amnesty that was not a product of robust engagement 
with all the relevant stakeholders but more of a unilateral imposition by the state. 
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Furthermore, the concept of purchased renunciation of militancy which denotes 
buying the peace that emerged from the chapter represents another modest 
knowledge discovery. It means the commodification of peace; a situation whereby 
peace has become a commodity that can be purchased instead of nurturing.   
Chapter Five examines the extent to which the ADDR programme succeeded in 
achieving its statutory objectives. The chapter is subdivided into two main 
sections, and the first section evaluates it as a security stabilisation programme 
while the second section examines it from the perspective of an all-inclusive DDR 
recommended by the TCND. The chapter also juxtaposes the implementation of 
the TCND’s recommendation with that of the maximalist DDR. The last section of 
the chapter summarises the main arguments of the chapter. In terms of 
contribution to knowledge and literature, the resort to amnesty in the peace 
process has been heavily criticised as rewarding impunity. Nonetheless, both 
empirical and secondary evidence examined in this study proved that irrespective 
of these criticisms, amnesty would continue to be relevant and a strong motivation 
in wooing combatants particularly those of second generation militias to disarm 
and remain committed to a peace process. Furthermore, the existing literature 
suggests that the success of a disarmament programme and its potential to 
contribute to peace depends on the quantity of weapons recovered. However, an 
interesting discovery in this study is the fact that oftentimes the immediate 
improvement in security is not the function of how many weapons are recovered 
but the symbolic significance of the exercise to the conflict parties and other 
stakeholders. In the same vein, this case study equally discovered that 
irrespective of how disastrously the disarmament programme was conducted, its 
confidence building potential was still notable. A significant contribution to 
knowledge and existing DDR literature that emerged from this chapter was 
concerning the focus of existing case studies of DDR in the literature. They focus 
on internationally driven DDR programmes which were implemented within the 
framework UN IDDRSs. However, this case study provides a unique contribution 
to knowledge because its represents a case of a nationally owned peacetime 
DDR programme undertaken by a dysfunctional rentier neopatrimonial state, 
which was designed and implemented based on the normative standard of a 
rentier neopatrimonial state. Thus, the neopatrimonial ethos and standard that 
informed the conduct of the DDR explained why the Nigerian State resorted to 
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the use of patronage and exclusion. Targeting some selected top militant 
commanders with the manifest capacity to unleash violence and threaten the 
operations of MNOCs and flow of oil rents to the state to keep in check other less 
powerful commanders. The Niger Delta ADDR programme, therefore, represents 
a case of neopatrimonial DDR and hence a new conceptual addition to existing 
literature.  
Chapter Six is the concluding chapter and demonstrates the extent to which the 
case study succeeded in answering its central research question. The chapter 
also highlights the study’s theoretical and policy contributions. It also suggests 
potential research question for future research on the Niger Delta. 
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Chapter Two 
Review of Relevant Literature: Amnesty, Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration 
 
2. Introduction 
This chapter reviews relevant empirical, theoretical and policy literature in the 
field of Amnesty, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (ADDR). Some 
of the key issues examined in the literature review include the role of amnesty in 
the transition from authoritarian to democratic systems of governance and from 
war to peace and the controversy between the advocates of amnesty and those 
against its application in peace process. Those in support of amnesty argue that, 
oftentimes, it must be used to facilitate the transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy and from war to peace.  On the other hand, those opposed to it 
contend that it encourages impunity by shielding perpetrators of human rights’ 
violations and those that take arms against the state from being prosecuted. 
The review also raises some key theoretical and empirical issues regarding the 
planning and implementation of disarmament, most especially the factors 
planners need to consider when preparing for disarmament, and the possible 
challenges that can undermine it. Equally, the review identifies key 
implementation challenges highlighted in the literature such as the economic 
agendas of fighters and conflict ‘profiteers’ as potential ‘peace spoilers’. An 
important theoretical debate in the literature concerns the kind of incentives that 
should be offered to motivate fighters to disarm. In this case, some scholars have 
emphasised the need to offer economic incentives due to the strong economic 
agendas that inform and drive contemporary civil wars. In contrast, some scholars 
maintain that the primary concern of fighters during the disarmament and 
demobilisation process is whether their security will be guaranteed during and 
after the process; while others argue that the best way to address the security 
concerns of ex-combatants is to give them a stake in post-war political power 
arrangements. The debates in the literature concerning conventional and 
nonconventional approaches to demobilisation were also examined. The 
conventional approach contends that disarmed fighters must properly demobilise 
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and disband both their military organisation and command and control structures 
and be freed from the control of their commanders. In contrast, some scholars 
have questioned this conventional assumption and approach to demobilisation 
and argue that the absolute breakup of command and control structures is 
impossible and oftentimes their retention can play a positive role in the process 
of reintegration. Similarly, some scholars have argued that cantonment is 
essential in the process of demobilisation while others contend that it tends to 
reinforce the command and control structures that it is meant to destroy.  
The reintegration of ex-combatants has been identified in the literature as the 
most critical stage of the DDR process; nevertheless, it is the least funded. The 
debate regarding the reintegration of ex-combatants and DDR, in general, is 
premised on minimalist and maximalist conceptualisations. The minimalist 
perspective views ex-combatants as a potent security threat and potential ‘peace 
spoilers’; thus, it approaches DDR as a security stabilisation project aimed at 
appeasing and engaging ex-combatants so that they do not pose any future 
security threat. Consequently, all reintegration support programmes are skewed 
in their favour, ironically jeopardising their prospects of successful reintegration 
because it triggers resentment against them. 
In contrast, the maximalist perspective approaches DDR as an opportunity for 
development and therefore sees certain category of ex-combatants as a 
potential repository of human resource that can be galvanised to jumpstart the 
political economy of peace if the security threat label attached to them is de-
emphasised. Equally, the perspective sees the reintegration phase of DDR as an 
avenue for addressing the root causes of conflict such as the human security and 
development challenges of the larger post-conflict society. This is achieved by 
engendering a process of state transformation that will significantly reduce the 
sources of structural violence as the roots of violent conflict. Furthermore, the 
tendency for international agencies that fund DDR programmes to impose their 
preferences on the benefiting societies, has been a source of friction that 
undermines the process of reintegration and the DDR process in general, 
motivating some scholars to clamour for national ownership and participatory 
approaches to DDR. Similarly, the lack of proper coordination and working at 
cross-purposes among funding agencies and DDR stakeholders at local and 
international levels has been a major setback to the process of reintegration. It 
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has become a theatre of unequal power relations between international funding 
agencies, national governments and ex-combatants all of which undermines the 
DDR process.  
An important debate in the literature is how to measure success in DDR given the 
different motives of the various funding agencies and their lack of a universal 
benchmark for determining success or failure. Those from the minimalist 
perspective measure success in terms of the number of weapons collected, ex-
combatants demobilised, activities of spoilers successfully curtailed and the 
restoration of the state’s prerogative of the legitimate use of force. Conversely, 
those from a maximalist perspective use a wider yardstick to measure success 
by looking at the extent to which the underlying sources of conflict have been 
significantly addressed and the level of improvement in human security and 
development indices recorded. Accordingly, the maximalist approach to DDR is 
often referred to in the literature as a transformative or all-inclusive/holistic 
approach. 
In terms of structure, this chapter is divided into three main parts, the first of which 
explores amnesty and attempts an empirical review of its application in the 
transition from authoritarian to democratic systems of governance, the war to 
peace transition and its relation to DDR. The second part of the chapter examines 
DDR as an important component of the post-conflict peacebuilding and 
reconstruction orthodoxy.  It highlights the mutually reinforcing connection 
between its three phases as provided in the United Nations Integrated 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (UN IDDRS, 2006) 
and reviews relevant academic and policy literature in the area. The third and 
concluding part of the chapter summarises the key arguments in the review.
  
2.1. Conceptualising Amnesty, Review of Empirical Application and 
Nexus with DDR 
This section begins by conceptualising amnesty, followed by an empirical review 
of its application in the process of transition from authoritarianism to democracy 
and from war to peace. Specifically, it examines the nexus between amnesty and 
DDR and the contending arguments for and against its application in peace 
processes.  
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2.1.1. Conceptualising Amnesty 
Amnesty has been applied in different political contexts and granted to different 
political actors (Olsen et al., 2010: 2). For example, according to Naqvi (2010: 76) 
amnesties for war crimes and crimes of an international nature are mostly 
resorted to by states transitioning from dictatorial military regimes to democratic 
systems of governance or from war to peace. States that find themselves in such 
situations are likely to explore the possibility of granting amnesty for certain 
offences and categories of persons (Ibid.). The use of amnesty laws became 
prominent in the 1970s and 1980s in Latin American countries where military 
juntas ceding power to democratically elected governments, granted amnesties 
to themselves or compelled the new government to do so in view of the egregious 
human rights violations they committed while in power (Ibid.: 79). Equally, 
countries undergoing violent conflict often resort to amnesty as a means of 
wooing adversarial parties to the negotiating table and to support the 
commencement of demobilisation, reintegration and reconciliation (Ibid.: 84). 
Indeed, it has been asserted in the literature that: 
Amnesty is the most common mechanism contained within peace 
[agreements] concluded between 1980 and 2006, appearing in 30 of the 
77 cases [peace agreements]. In 22 of these cases [peace agreements], 
general amnesties covered all individuals and all violations or crimes 
(including violations of international human rights law) (Vinjamuri and 
Boesenecker (2007: 16). 
 
Several scholars and practitioners such as Francis (2000: 361-367), Cobban 
(2007: 4-5), Mallinder (2008: 4), Ikelegbe (2010: 6-7), Bois-Pedain (2007: 6) and 
Lessa and Payne (2012: 4) have conceptualised amnesty in different ways; some 
in an explicit manner and others, implicitly. Nevertheless, Freeman (2011: 12) 
observes that a major problem associated with most definitions of amnesty is 
that, they are context specific and consequently cannot be generalised to other 
contexts. In contrast, Freeman provides a precise definition with universal 
application irrespective of the political environment and character of the amnesty 
granted which this study will adopt as its working definition: 
… an extraordinary legal measure whose primary function is to remove the 
prospect and consequences of criminal liability for designated individuals 
or classes of persons in respect of designated types of offenses 
irrespective of whether the persons concerned have been tried for such 
offenses in a court of law (Freeman (2009: 13).  
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Generally, about four different categories of beneficiaries of amnesty have been 
identified in the literature; armed non-state actors, members of state forces, 
members of domestic political opposition accused of human right violations and 
state agents accused of extreme repression against non-state agents (Olsen et 
al., 2010: 36). 
2.2. Amnesty: Review of Empirical Application and Relationship to 
Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration 
 
Amnesty has been resorted to in different contexts to facilitate the process of 
transition from authoritarianism to a democratic system of governance and from 
war to peace. For example, Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala and El Salvador 
exemplify countries where amnesty was resorted to, to facilitate the process of 
transition from authoritarianism to a democratic system of governance while in 
the case of South Africa from a racist minority rule (apartheid) to an all-inclusive 
democratic society.  
Brazil provides an interesting and successful example of the application of 
amnesty law when compared with other countries within its region. The Brazilian 
version of amnesty was fundamentally different from its conventional meaning, it 
is described as freedom from prosecution for crimes committed mostly by 
totalitarian regimes against their citizens as well as reparations (Abrao and 
Torelly, 2012: 152). In the Brazilian context, amnesty was conceived and 
implemented as ‘…freedom and reparations’ (Ibid.). The Brazilian military junta 
that ruled the country from 1964-1985, while still in power promulgated an 
amnesty law which provided cover for all politically motivated crimes, as well as 
the opportunity for those whose rights had been violated by the state to claim 
reparation (Abrao and Torelly, 2012.: 153). The amnesty law which was reviewed 
over time and its scope widened, received popular support and therefore laid a 
solid foundation for Brazil’s transition to a democratic dispensation (Ibid.: 153). 
The main reason advanced for the success of the Brazilian amnesty law was 
because its promulgation was in response to a demand from a broad spectrum 
of Brazilian civil society organisations instead of being an executive imposition 
(Ibid.: 153). The Brazilian amnesty law was notable because it considered the 
interest of both the perpetrators and victims of human rights’ abuses.  
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Conversely, Argentina provides an example of amnesty law whose content was 
controversial and its implementation characterised by interruptions due to 
changing political dynamics and actors (Engstrom and Pereira, 2012: 97). A 
combination of dwindling economic fortunes, strikes, domestic pressure and 
military incompetence compelled the Argentine military junta to initiate a process 
of relinquishing power by conducting democratic elections on 30 October 1983 
(Ibid.: 99). The military junta at its twilight enacted a blanket self-amnesty law that 
covered all individuals that perpetrated politically motivated and criminal offences 
between 1973-1982 (Engstrom and Pereira, 2012: 99). The amnesty law prohibits 
civil proceedings from being brought against those covered by it. 
However, the self-amnesty law was soon declared null and void as it was resisted 
by human rights organisations, thus the new Alfonsin government, with the 
support of the Argentine Supreme Court, eventually commenced the prosecution 
of members of the ex-military junta (Ibid.). However, the reversal of the self-
amnesty law and the subsequent trial of the military threatened the stability of 
Argentina’s democratic transition process particularly towards the end of 1985 
because the military revolted which compelled the democratic government to limit 
the scope of the trials (Ibid.: 103-104).  
Guatemala and El Salvador are two central American countries that also 
experienced a long history of military dictatorship and insurgencies against the 
state (Braid and Roht-Arriaza, 2012: 183). In the case of Guatemala, the country 
went through a devastating thirty-six-year conflict that started in the 1960s, 
leading to the death of about 200,000 persons, the disappearance of several 
others and acts of genocide perpetrated against persons of Mayan origin (Ibid.: 
183-184). In El Salvador 75, 000 persons were estimated to have been killed 
during the twelve- year war that started in 1979 (Ibid.). In both countries, amnesty 
laws were resorted to strengthen the process of transition from military 
dictatorship to a civilian democratic government.   
 
In Guatemala, a United Nations-mediated peace accord ended the armed conflict 
that culminated in the signing of a peace treaty on December 12, 1996 (Ibid.: 
185). However, six days before the signing of the peace accord, the 1996 
National Reconciliation Law, which provided the legal basis for the reintegration 
of former insurgents into society, was promulgated (Ibid.). An important feature 
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of the law was ‘… “extinguishing criminal responsibility” for crimes committed by 
members of the military, civil patrollers, and politicians between the start of the 
armed conflict and the date of the law’s passage’ (Braid and Roht-Arriaza, 2012: 
185). The Guatemalan amnesty was not a blanket one. For instance, article 8 of 
the Law states that ‘exemption from criminal responsibility will not apply to crimes 
of genocide, torture and forced disappearance’ (Ibid. 186). Nevertheless, there 
were attempts to challenge the legitimacy of the law by various human rights 
organisations but without success as the Guatemalan courts justified its 
promulgation (Ibid.).   
In El Salvador, a United Nations-supervised peace process that lasted for two 
years led to the signing of the Chapultepec Peace Accord on January 16, 1992, 
which ended the country’s twelve-year civil war (Braid and Roht-Arriaza, 2012: 
196).  To address the atrocities of the past, the peace accord established two 
commissions, one of which was the Ad Hoc Commission charged with the 
responsibility of screening officers that perpetrated human rights violations (Ibid.). 
In the same vein, Article 5 of the peace accords empowers the government to 
‘…clarify and stop impunity…’ (Ibid.: 196-197). Consequently, a Truth 
Commission was established and mandated to investigate all alleged atrocious 
crimes and human rights violations committed during the war (Stahn, 2002: 191-
192). The findings and recommendations of the Truth Commission were far 
reaching. 
Regrettably, despite the UN’s support and funding of the commission’s work and 
its endorsement of the report, it was overwhelmingly rejected by the Government 
of El Salvador because it was considered prejudicial and unfair to top military 
commanders and government officials (Popkin, 2001: 13). Given the 
apprehension generated by the report, the then President of El Salvador, Alfredo 
Christiani, proclaimed a blanket amnesty for all crimes committed by the military 
and insurgents through the enactment of the 1993 General Amnesty Law for the 
Consolidation of Peace (Popkin, 2002: 13; Stahn, 2002: 193; Aguilera, 2012: 1-
2; Braid and Roht-Arriaza, 2012: 197).  
 
Similarly, South Africa’s transition from a racist to a democratic all-inclusive 
society, was built on a political deal that gave amnesty for genuinely proven cases 
of politically motivated offences, within the framework of a Truth and 
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Reconciliation Commission (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, n. d and Bois-
Pedain, 2007: 6). South Africa’s amnesty is a relatively successful example of 
amnesty law in political transition that can serve as a model for other societies 
facing similar challenges (Bois-Pedain, 2007: 7 and 2012: 238). As Sarkin (2008: 
1) noted the ‘South Africa’s version of an amnesty has been identified as legally 
the most stringent and politically the most legitimate of amnesties granted in 
transitions to democracy…’. The legal basis for the enactment of South Africa’s 
amnesty law can be traced to the negotiated transitional constitution that ended 
the apartheid regime. The constitution provided that conditional amnesty is 
granted for all politically motivated offences committed during the apartheid era. 
Not only that, it also empowered the country’s democratically elected 
parliamentarians to work out the modalities for its implementation (Bois-Pedain, 
2007: 17).  
 
Consequently, in 1995 the post-apartheid parliament established the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) with a mandate to unravel 
all cases of politically motivated human rights’ violations that occurred throughout 
the apartheid era (Cobban, 2007: 97; Bois-Pedain, 2012: 238; Omar, n. d. and 
United States Institute of Peace, n. d.: 1-2).  The TRC was empowered to 
thoroughly examine the causes, character, nature and extent of human rights’ 
violations committed during the apartheid era, and to determine and recommend 
which cases merit amnesty (Cobban, 2007: 97; Bois-Pedain, 2007: 19 and 
Grange, 2014: 2). 
 
The TRC in the execution of its mandate was subdivided into the committees of 
Human Rights violations, Amnesty, Reparation and Rehabilitation, and a 
supportive investigation team (Cobban, 2007: 99; Bois-Pedain, 2007: 19 and 
Grange, 2014: 2). The amnesty subcommittee was to deal with all cases covering 
the period from 01 March 1960-10 May 1994 (Bois-Pedain, 2007: 20). Amnesty 
was conditional or subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions by the supposed 
beneficiaries. These conditions included submitting an individual or personal 
application for amnesty, the disclosure of the identity of the offender and the full 
disclosure of the offence committed which had to be in pursuit of a political 
objective or official responsibility on behalf of the state (Cobban, 2007: 109; Bois-
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Pedain, 2007: 21 and Bois-Pedain, 2012: 239-240 and University of the 
Witwatersrand, n.d.: 1-3).  
 
Despite its acclaimed success, the legitimacy of the South Africa’s amnesty law 
was challenged in court, but without success, while victims and their families have 
viewed it as an unjust way of responding to the violence meted to them (Bois-
Pedain, 2007: 29-33). Despite this, one can argue that the law has positively 
contributed to South Africa’s process of reconciliation and healing in the post-
apartheid era. South Africa’s amnesty experience is unusual because the 
granting of individual conditional amnesty based on full disclosure constitutes a 
form of accountability (Bois-Pedain, 2012: 2578-258). 
 
Contrary to the above examples, most cases of amnesties offered in other African 
countries, were in the context of destructive civil wars between different non-state 
armed groups or non-state armed groups challenging the legitimacy of the state, 
of which Mozambique and Sierra Leone are two classic examples worth 
examining. In both contexts, amnesty was resorted to as an enticement to 
assuage the security concerns of the insurgents prior to disarmament and 
demobilisation, thereby smoothening the process of transition from war to peace. 
In the case of Mozambique, it went through a destructive civil war that lasted for 
fifteen years (Cobban, 2007:), but peace talks between the government of 
Mozambique and Mozambique National Resistance rebel forces led to the 
signing of a peace accord in Italy that ended the civil war on 4 October 1992 
(Igreja, 2012: 10 & 2015: 1-2). Ten days after the peace accord, the Mozambican 
government promulgated an amnesty law for all crimes committed during the war 
(Ibid.). However, unlike South Africa where a conditional amnesty was offered, 
Mozambique granted a blanket or unconditional amnesty that covered all crimes 
committed by all parties to the conflict (Cobban, 2007:). The goal of the amnesty 
in Mozambique was to put ‘a veil of silence’ and ‘intentional forgetting’ (Ibid.: 5) 
over all forms of crimes and human rights violations committed during the war. It 
is arguable that the conduct of a United Nations-funded DDR of about ninety 
thousand former Mozambique’s combatants may not have been possible without 
the amnesty offer (Igreja, 2012: 10 & 2015: 1-2). Indeed, any attempt to prosecute 
perpetrators of alleged war crimes and egregious cases of human rights 
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violations may well have derailed the implementation of the 1992 peace accord 
(Ibid.).  
In the case of Sierra Leone, after a protracted civil war, the government of Sierra 
Leone and the Revolutionary United Front rebel forces signed the Lome Peace 
Accord in 1999, which granted a blanket amnesty to all the Revolutionary United 
Front fighters (Francis, 2000: 364-368; African Union Panel of the Wise, 2013: 
35-36 and Kroc Institute of International Peace Studies Peace Accords Matrix, 
n.d.). The insertion of the blanket amnesty clause in the peace accord was 
because prosecution would have deterred the Revolutionary United Front fighters 
from signing the peace agreement (African Union Panel of the Wise, 2013: 36).  
The resort to amnesty in the context of war to peace transition raises the question 
of the relationship between amnesty and DDR. My overview of the literature is 
that it is a necessity that oftentimes cannot be avoided to motivate combatants to 
disarm and demobilise, however, others see the linkage as a negative one 
because it shields combatants and other human rights violators from facing 
justice (Mallinder, 2008: 1). For instance, pointing to its necessity Francis 
contends that ‘power sharing and amnesty are often parts of political settlements 
reached in polities bedevilled by civil conflict and military intervention’ (Francis, 
2000: 364). Again, Freeman (2010: 1- 4) reiterates Francis’s position by arguing 
that amnesty receives a positive welcome among DDR practitioners because 
combatants will always be motivated to disarm and demobilise when they are not 
likely to be prosecuted. Thus, oftentimes amnesty is the only option for achieving 
an immediate end to armed conflict (Ibid.). Other scholars who argue in support 
of the positive linkage between amnesty and DDR include Scharf (1999: 507-
512), Naqvi (2010:587), Penman (2007: 8-13), Mallinder (2008: 2), Oluborode 
(2008) and Sriram & Herman (2009: 463). However, others have expressed the 
view that amnesty in the long-term, shields human rights violators from 
accounting for their actions, thereby encouraging further impunity and violations. 
For instance, Mallinder (2008:1) notes that amnesty has been criticised by the 
human rights community for accommodating impunity in order to foster political 
stability; while Pensky (2008: 10-40) and Penman (2007: 8-13) posit that 
domestic amnesties reward impunity, impede accountability and is not consonant 
with international law. It is against this background that the International Centre 
for Transitional Justice (2009: 1-2) advised that ‘amnesty must not equal 
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impunity’. Whether the Niger Delta militants would have agreed to disarm and 
demobilise without the offer of amnesty will be explored further in this case study. 
Nevertheless, the principal focus of this study is on the conflict prevention impact 
of DDR in the Niger Delta rather than the question of amnesty. 
2.3. Conceptualising Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and 
Review of Relevant Literature 
This section examines the concepts of disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration (DDR). It also reviews relevant theoretical and policy-related 
literature in the field of DDR.  
2.3.1. Conceptualising Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
reintegration 
 
Disarmament 
According to Lewis et al., (1999: 129), after the official termination of war, one of 
the principal issues to be tackled is the demobilisation of the various armed or 
militia groups. A further challenge is to ensure that surplus weapons are removed 
from circulation and ideally destroyed (Shibuya, 2012: 24). Furthermore, there is 
the need to restore security and stability in order to avert the resurgence of 
violence and safeguard basic societal functions (Jeong, 2005: 39; World Bank 
Social Development Department- Conflict, Crime and Violence, 2009: 1). In the 
aftermath of an armed conflict, combatants and militia groups could be dangerous 
if left unattended to, as they could ‘spoil’ and undermine the peace process (Alden 
et al., 2011: 14). According to the United Nations, Integrated Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (UN IDDRS), 1. 10 2006: 1) ‘the 
objective of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post-
conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin’. This is 
supported by Spear who contends that there are two reasons to embark on a 
DDR programme in the aftermath of a violent conflict: 
First, to remove the means by which civil wars have been prosecuted and 
thus prevent re-ignition of conflict. Second, to provide an environment in 
which a degree of stability has been achieved and through this to add to 
the process of confidence and security building (Spear, 2007: 2). 
 
Suffice to say that the UN IDDRS (2006) and Spear’s conceptualisation of the 
goal of DDR amounts to a minimalist perspective of DDR which will be explored 
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further in this study. According to Knight (2012: 17) ‘the most comprehensive 
contemporary tools for defining DDR [Disarmament Demobilisation and 
Reintegration] are the United Nations Integrated DDR Standards (UN IDDRS)’. 
These understand disarmament as: 
…collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, 
ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and 
often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the 
development of responsible arms management (UN IDDRS, 1. 10. 2006: 
2). 
 
Two types of disarmament have been conceptualised in the literature; either 
based on command or consent (coercive and co-operative) (Berdal, 1996: 24-38, 
Spear, 2007: 2 & Shibuya, 2012: 32-37). Both Berdal and Shibuya concur that 
coercive disarmament is the use of force, or threat of force, to compel combatants 
to submit to the process of disarmament. While in consent based disarmament, 
the parties willingly agree to disarm. According to Spear (2007: 2), co-operative 
disarmament is associated with negotiated peace settlements, where there is no 
clear victor among the warring parties while coercive disarmament is enforced by 
a victorious party or intervention force. Commonly cited examples of successful 
co-operative disarmament include El Salvador and Mozambique; Angola 
represents a failed case while India in Sri Lanka and US forces in Somalia 
exemplified disarmament enforced by a foreign intervention force (Ibid). Tanner 
(1996: 169-204) goes a step further to argue that: 
Consensual weapons control can be defined as the voluntary action that 
opposing parties agree to take in the aftermath of an armed conflict with 
the purpose of dismantling or constraining their military capabilities. The 
parties explicitly agree to the presence of peace support forces. These 
forces are to monitor, supervise or assist the implementation of such 
disarmament arrangements. Consensual weapons control operations are 
carried out in most cases under Chapter VI of the UN Charter (Tanner, 
1996: 171). 
 
In contrast to the above, he argues that: 
Coercive weapons control or disarmament means that the external forces 
are authorized to use force, if necessary, to implement their mandates. 
This definition does not imply straightforward military intervention, but 
rather the forceful response to non-compliance of parties to live up to 
weapons control commitments. Coercive weapons control or disarmament 
may primarily be used for the disarming of individuals, bandits and 
renegade armed units operating within the confines of a peacekeeping 
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operation. In practice, most coercive weapons control operations have 
been taking place under Chapter VII authority of the UN Charter (Ibid.). 
 
Demobilisation 
Disarmament is immediately followed by demobilisation as the second phase in 
the DDR process. According to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (2000: 7) this is the process whereby members of government armed 
forces or factional forces reduce their numbers or totally disband in the aftermath 
of armed conflict. However, the UN IDDRS (2006) provides a more 
comprehensive definition when it asserts that: 
Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants 
from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization 
may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary 
centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose 
(cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The 
second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package 
provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion (United Nations 
Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards, 1. 
10. 2006: 2).  
 
Demobilisation, as the definition infers, involves a series of interrelated activities 
that need to be carried out and which will finally culminate in the controlled 
discharge or total disbandment of government forces or factional armed groups. 
These activities may include massing of troops at designated locations, 
documentation, medical screening, profiling, briefing and payment of a reinsertion 
support allowance before the combatants are finally transported to their preferred 
places of resettlement.  
Reinsertion 
An important concept and activity that needs to be further defined and explained 
is reinsertion. According to the UN IDDRS (2006): 
Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during 
demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. 
Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic 
needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional 
safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term 
education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-
term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion 
is a short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate 
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needs, and can last up to one year (United Nations Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards, 1: 10. 2006a: 2). 
 
Reinsertion is vital to the overall success of the DDR process because it takes 
care of the vacuum created by the sudden loss of income on the part of 
combatants after their demobilisation and before reintegration, and as provided 
by the UN IDDRS (2006). One can argue that while it is very explicit from the 
above definition that reinsertion is part and parcel of demobilisation, nonetheless 
it sounds contradictory because demobilisation usually takes a short time to 
complete while the above definition clearly states that reinsertion support can last 
up to one year. My general overview of the literature shows that scholars and 
DDR practitioners are divided in their opinions as regard to the actual place of 
reinsertion in the DDR process. Porto et al., (2007: 19) give credence to my 
contention as they argue that, oftentimes in the literature, reinsertion and 
reintegration are conflated. On the contrary, Hazen (2011: 110) notes that ‘the R 
of DDR has in practice represented “reinsertion” not “reintegration”. 
Consequently, while from the point of view of the UN IDDRS (2006) reinsertion is 
an integral part of demobilisation and therefore not a separate phase other 
scholars, however, contend that it is, or should be, a phase and possibly the last 
in the DDR process or part of reintegration (Civic and Miklaucic, 2011:  xix). 
Supporters of the above position argue that it will enable the delinking of 
reintegration from the DDR process and in this case reintegration will be 
concerned with the wider issues of post-conflict peacebuilding (Hazen, 2011: 
121- 123). Looking at the practice of DDR today, I will argue that it may be 
inappropriate to regard reinsertion as an activity within demobilisation, given the 
fact that payment of reinsertion allowance can last up to one year. Meanwhile, 
when demobilisation and reinsertion are compared; demobilisation is a much 
more limited time frame activity. Consequently, for a more effective and result 
oriented DDR, I concur with the school of thought that argues for reinsertion 
becoming the terminal phase of the DDR process while reintegration should be 
made a separate programme focusing on the broader developmental issues and 
challenges confronting post-conflict societies (Ball & Goor, 2006: 3). 
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Reintegration 
Reintegration is the last phase of the DDR process. The UN IDDRS (2006) 
defines it as follows: 
Reintegration is the processes by which ex-combatants acquire civilian 
status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is 
essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, 
primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the 
general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often 
necessitates long-term external assistance (UN IDDRS, 1. 10. 2006: 2). 
 
The current literature shows that reintegration has social, economic and political 
dimensions. Colleta et al., for example, assert that: 
Social and political reintegration is broadly defined as the acceptance of 
an ex-combatant and his or her family by the host community and its 
leaders. Economic reintegration implies the financial independence of an 
ex-combatant’s household through productive and gainful employment 
(Colleta et al., 1996: 18).  
 
It is worth noting that reintegration is a complex multidimensional issue posing 
more daunting challenges than disarmament and demobilisation. On the other 
hand, I am of the strong opinion that the standard linear approach to DDR as the 
UN IDDRS tends to portray it, undermines its effectiveness by making it appear 
like a technical programme instead of a process thereby weakening the mutually 
reinforcing linkages between the different phases of the DDR process. My opinion 
is supported by Hazen (2011: 112) who posits ‘early versions of DDR tended to 
emphasize the process as linear…’ thereby failing to emphasise the mutually 
reinforcing connection between its different phases. Perhaps, it is in cognizance 
of this that the United Nations Security Council (UN SC) (2000: 2) later observed 
that DDR should not be a mere series of occurrences, but rather, a continuum of 
mutually reinforcing and overlapping activities whereby the success of each 
phase depends on, and impacts, on the other. 
 
Before I conclude, an important concept in the DDR debate is demilitarisation. 
Demilitarisation involves a continuing decrease in the numerical size/strength, 
and domineering power and influence of the military in state and society affairs; 
a reduction in the allocation of scarce financial resources to the military sector; 
and its application to civilian needs (Lamb, 2000: 121; Batchelor & Kingma, 2004: 
4 and Porto et al., 2007: 11). Demilitarisation is equally carried out to entrench a 
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culture of peace and a nonviolent approach to resolving conflict (Batchelor & 
Kingma, 2004: 4). It is a difficult concept to operationalize because it has both 
quantitative and qualitative values or dimensions. The quantitative value and 
dimension have to do with the process of reduction in budgetary allocation and 
spending on the military sector in the long term and the numerical downsizing of 
the military which can be measured over time (Ibid.: 5). The qualitative value or 
dimension is more cultural and ideological in nature, such as a reduction in violent 
approaches to resolving conflict (Ibid.).  
 
In my view, the key discerning issue in defining demilitarisation is that its 
implementation may or may not be part of post-conflict peacebuilding orthodoxy. 
Which implies that it can be implemented not necessarily in the aftermath of a 
violent conflict. It aims to right-size the armed forces of a given country with a 
view to cutting down the financial allocation to the military sector and redirecting 
it to human security needs, and taming the overbearing influence of the military 
in state and society affairs. Demilitarisation is not always detrimental to military 
capability and effectiveness when size reduction is intended to contribute to 
improving combat efficiency. However, the connection between DDR and 
demilitarisation is tricky. This is because oftentimes it is tempting to equate DDR 
to demilitarisation even though the successful completion of the technical stages 
of DDR may not be sufficient to result in meaningful demilitarisation in the true 
sense of it. This is particularly the case when DDR involves the merger of forces 
or reintegration of demobilised ex-combatants into the national army which may 
even result in a bloated military force. 
It is also important that the term ex-combatant is properly conceptualised in view 
of it analytical relevance, utility and the recurrent manner it will be used in this 
study. Particularly, as argued by Mcmullin (2013:20) the way the term ‘ex-
combatant’ is used in the DDR literature portrays a homogenous collection of 
former fighters or soldiers. Conversely, he contends that ex-combatants 
represent a heterogeneous group of ex-fighters or soldiers. According to him: 
…the term itself describes a heterogeneous collective of former fighters 
from very different contexts and who differ from one another in key 
respects as well, such as rank, type of military organization in which they 
fought, combat role, political ideology, age, gender, extent of post-war 
disability, ethnicity, and level of educational or professional attainment and 
experience. Literature and practice have coalesced around the conclusion 
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that some ex-combatants are more ‘vulnerable’ than others… (Mcmullin, 
2013: 20). 
 
Consequently, the heterogeneous nature of the group informs the need to 
properly conceptualise it. In this regard, Engeland (2011: 30) defines ex-
combatants in relation to the definition of combatant in Article 4a of the Third 
Geneva Convention (GCIII) and 43 API. The convention defines combatants as: 
1. Members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, as well as 
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. 
2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, 
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a party 
to the conflict and operating in or outside their territory, even if this territory 
is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such 
organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions: 
(a). That of being commanded by the person responsible for his 
subordinates. 
(b). That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance. 
(c). That of carrying arms openly. 
(d). That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war (Ibid.). 
 
 
Similarly, according to Engeland (2011: 30) Article 43 API defines armed forces 
and therefore provides further insight about who a combatant is: 
1. The armed forces of a party to a conflict consist of all organized armed 
forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that 
Party for the conduct… [of] its subordinates… 
2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict… are combatants, 
that is to say, they have the right to participate in hostilities. 
3. … [When] a Party to a conflict incorporates a paramilitary or armed law 
enforcement agency into its armed forces it shall… [be granted the status 
of combatant]. 
 
Against this background, within the context of this study, the above definition of 
combatant will be used while the appellation ex-combatant will be applied to 
denote combatants that have relinquished their combatant status, and have 
undergone or are in the process of undergoing DDR.  
It is also pertinent to further conceptualise the term militia given the recurrent 
manner it features in the definition of who a combatant is. On their part Ikelegbe 
and Okumu suggest that: 
A militia is an armed force of ordinary persons… engaged in combat or 
fighting or that resorts to violence to attain certain objectives. This 
presupposes first that it is a civil force or a privately organised group of 
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armed persons and second that it is largely an informally organised force 
whose structures, hierarchies, commands, procedures and processes are 
usually not fixed and rigid. Third, it is generally mobilised voluntarily on the 
basis of some common identity challenges or general concerns and 
threats (Ikelegbe and Okumu, 2010: 4). 
 
The key characteristics of a militia group include being an irregular force or not 
part of the regular military force, informal, private in nature, illegal, illegitimate, 
and clandestine in nature (Ibid). While in terms of purpose and goals, militias 
usually aim at ‘…projecting or protecting, and fighting for and defending certain 
private, group, communal, ethnic, religious, sectional, regional, national, regime 
or related interest that may concern power and resources struggles, security and 
safety’ (Ikelegbe and Okumu, 2010: 4). However, in my view, Francis (2005: 1) 
provided a more insightful conceptual definition of militia with more empirical and 
analytical relevance for this study when he argues that ‘civil militias have emerged 
as the most vexing security problem faced by contemporary Africa. The problems, 
challenges and implications posed by civil militias have converted them into 
Africa’s intractable security menace’ (Ibid.). Francis categorises militias into two, 
First Generation and Second-Generation militias. According to him: 
 
The First Generation definition of militias presents the view that these are 
an organised group of citizens mobilised to provide military service; that 
they are trained as soldiers, but not part of a regular army, and are 
regarded as a supplementary force or reserve army organised by the state 
or government (my emphasis). In addition, they are composed of non-
professional soldiers, retired, expelled or trained soldiers, often called 
upon in cases of emergency or crisis, or to protect government or 
communities. As an irregular or reserve force, their role is to undertake an 
emergency support task, often of a military nature (Francis, 2005: 2). 
 
Francis argues that the above conceptualisation of First Generation Militias 
suggests certain things; firstly that ‘enlistment is voluntary’ even though he 
acknowledges the fact that in some states such as the United States the 
constitution empowers the state to call physically abled civilians eligible by law 
for military service. But more importantly he posits that: 
Secondly, it assumes that since militias are established by states, they are, 
therefore, regulated and accountable to the state, implying that the state 
has monopoly over… threat, or the use, of force within its territory. Thirdly, 
since they are established by the state for a specific purpose, civil militias 
are based on a state-centric interpretation of security, with the state as the 
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primary security provider with militias never intended to usurp the role of 
the regular forces, or contest the dominance of the state (Ibid). 
 
Suffice to say that Francis’s conceptualisation of First Generation militias clearly 
suggests that they do not pose any threat to state legitimacy and its monopoly of 
force. Conversely, Francis posits that the above traditional or First Generation 
understanding of militias does not fit into ‘… the context of complex political 
emergencies and conflict-prone and weak states in Africa and other developing 
regions of the world’ (Ibid). In other words, ‘the changed conflict and international 
security environment of the post-Cold War period limits the applicability of the 
traditional interpretation of militias’ (Ibid). Thus, giving rise to the new concept of 
Second Generation militias. The main feature of the Second-Generation militias 
is that ‘…it is context specific and applies to conflict-prone, war-torn societies, 
post-conflict or transition societies, and in general weak and failed state’ (Ibid). 
Consequently, he argues that: 
 The Second Generation militias comprise citizens, including young people 
and unemployed youths, marginalised and dissatisfied with the prebendal 
state. Civil militias… are organised by a diverse group of interest and 
stakeholders, including governments or regimes in power, mostly with no 
constitutional provision or legislation legalising their existence. This type 
of militia could be categorised as state or government sponsored. Other 
diverse interests include non-state and sub-national group militias 
(sometimes referred to as ethnic militias) …Whilst those specifically 
established as pro-government auxiliary or reserve forces have some form 
of military training, those organised by other interest groups often do not 
have any military training provision, and even when they do have, it takes 
the form of basic training sometimes limited to the use of small arms and 
light weapons. These types of militias mushroom in weak, failed and 
collapsed states, where the authority and legitimacy of the government or 
the state is contested, and where the state does not have control or 
monopoly of the threat or the use of force…The demonstrable efficacy of 
some of these civil militias in crime and war fighting has led to the situation 
whereby they usurp the security provision of the state and even undermine 
the effectiveness of the security functions of the state (Francis, 2005: 2-3). 
 
Suffice to say that when carefully analysed, Akaruese (2003: 218), Ikelegbe and 
Okumu (2010: 4) conceptualisations of militias is in tandem with Francis’s 
typology and conceptualisation of Second Generation militias. Consequently, the 
concept of militias will be applied in this study in line with the definition provided 
by Francis, and what empirical implication the concept has for the DDR process 
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and indeed the Niger Delta DDR programme will be explored further in 
subsequent chapters of this study. 
2.4. Review of Relevant Disarmament Literature  
Disarmament is the first phase in the DDR process (Özerdem, 2009: 14) and is 
accorded the most priority, most likely because post-conflict societies are in a 
state of what Hayes and Sands (1997: 819) defined as a complex humanitarian 
emergency that requires urgent intervention in terms of security stabilisation. The 
disarmament phase of the DDR process comprises of four main activities, 
namely, the collection of information and operational planning, weapons 
collection operations, stockpile management and destruction (UN IDDRS, 2006). 
A lot of scholarly and policy-related work on disarmament focus on planning 
considerations and challenges to disarmament while others pay attention to the 
kind of incentives that can be used to motivate ex-combatants to disarm and the 
methods by which the weapons collected are to be handled or disposed of. Thus, 
the review here is structured around these key themes. 
2.4.1. Disarmament: Planning Considerations and Implementation 
Challenges  
One important study in this area is Berdal (1996: 9-23) who argues that DDR 
planners should take due cognizance of the environmental context in which 
disarmament is to take place. He asserts that ‘only with a clear appreciation of 
the context of such attempts at disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
can some of the ‘features’ that have made success so ‘inherently difficult’ be 
identified and their negative influence on a peace process be mitigated’ (Berdal, 
1996: 9). A key contextual issue Berdal raises is whether disarmament is to be 
undertaken in an environment of fragmented political authority or near condition 
of a failed state (Berdal, 1996: 10-11). Disarmament in this context will be difficult 
and may require an international intervention force with enforcement capacity if it 
is to succeed. Others have highlighted the challenges involved when DDR is 
undertaken in a domestic environment characterised by a security dilemma, thus 
making securing cooperation between warring parties in the DDR process 
extremely difficult (Jervis, 1978: 167-214 and Nalbandov, 2010: 49). 
Related to this is the question of whether disarmament is to be undertaken in an 
environment of protracted violent communal and ethnoreligious conflict 
characterised by deep-seated issues such as identity, horizontal inequality and 
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power asymmetry among the various conflicting parties (Berdal, 1996: 9-18). As 
Berdal notes, this type of context can undermine the smooth conduct of 
disarmament because it makes the cultivation of mutual trust and confidence 
difficult to achieve between the various armed groups, and even when achieved, 
sustaining it remains a serious challenge. Equally, Berdal maintains that it 
becomes more difficult to implement disarmament if the armed forces to be 
disarmed and the national government were involved in the perpetration of 
human rights violations against each other, making their reintegration into a new 
armed force very difficult (Ibid.).   
 A further contextual issue he notes is that of the economies of conflict that 
develop during a conflict. Berdal postulates that ‘viewed as an ‘alternative 
system’, war and organised violence can powerfully benefit certain groups and 
interests while a transition to peace is likely adversely to affect their privileged 
status’ (Berdal, 1996: 15). This type of environment serves as a disincentive to 
armed groups to submit to disarmament and demobilisation as the key 
beneficiaries work towards sustaining the war. Berdal’s assertion is reiterated by 
Keen (1998: 12) who argues that ‘increasingly, civil wars that appear to have 
begun with political aims have mutated into conflicts in which short-term 
economic benefits are paramount.’  Consequently, in this kind of environment 
‘persuading combatants, and also civilians, to give up their arms is often difficult, 
not least because weapons possession can often be valued for … economic… 
[and] security purposes...’ (Ginifer et al., 2004: 3). 
The implication of these assertions is that it is necessary when planning for a 
DDR to decipher the economic agendas or motivations that underpin combatants’ 
will to fight and devise ways of adequately responding to them, as failure to do 
that could be counterproductive to such an effort. Likewise, it is important to note 
the interest of other beneficiaries of the conflict economy who can act as spoilers 
to undermine the DDR process. This raises the important question of to what 
extent the Niger Delta DDR programme considered ‘illegal oil bunkering’ (oil theft) 
in the region, which the International Crisis Group (2006: i) asserted is the major 
economy that sustains the conflict by providing militants and criminal syndicates 
the money to procure arms.  
Furthermore, when planning for disarmament, cognizance should be taken of the 
extent of arms proliferation, which refers to weapons abundance, circulation and 
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the ease with which they can be obtained from the local, regional and 
international environment (Berdal, 1996: 18 and Spear, 2007: 11-14). Berdal 
contends that disarmament will be ineffective when planners fail to investigate 
the sources of arms proliferation, develop and enforce measures to checkmate 
it. Most often it is difficult to enforce measures against proliferation because of 
the enormous logistical, financial, and political commitment required. Other 
factors that militate against efforts at controlling arms proliferation are the 
decentralised nature of arms manufacturing and trade with over three hundred 
companies spread over fifty countries across the globe all engaged in arms 
production (Berdal, 1996: 18).  
However, apart from the planning stage of disarmament, even at the level of 
execution the environment still presents an important challenge. Important 
studies by Spear (2002: 150-153) and (2007: 11-14) identify different levels of the 
environment and how each one can constitute a serious challenge to the success 
of disarmament and demobilisation. According to Spear (2002: 150-151): 
Analysis of the implementation environment must include several levels: 
individual (the psychological impact that the civil war has had upon both 
combatants and non-combatants), local, national, regional and 
international. In many ways these levels are interconnected, as a failure at 
one level can impact the pursuit of implementation at another level. For 
example, a re-ignition of conflict at the local level might result in withdrawal 
of support for a settlement by regional sponsors and international donors. 
 
Against this backdrop, Spear argues that the cultural role that guns play in the 
local environment can undermine the success of disarmament. Particularly she 
contends that pastoral and hunting societies tend to place a high premium on gun 
ownership. Likewise, Kingma (1997: 157), Spear (2007: 3) and Stibbe (2012: 2) 
all reiterate the fact that disarming a civilian population can be hindered if gun 
possession is viewed as a cultural right or norm. Consequently, implementing an 
ambitious disarmament programme in such societies is particularly challenging. 
Thus, according to Shibuya (2012: 28) both at the level of planning and execution, 
the following pertinent question ‘what “value” does the weapon have in the 
cultural context of the combatants and the larger population…’ must be taken into 
consideration by DDR practitioners.  
In my view, to enhance the prospects of successful disarmament where it is 
confirmed that gun ownership is deeply rooted in a society’s culture, a process of 
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public enlightenment should be pursued concurrently alongside disarmament. A 
similar suggestion is offered by Shibuya (2012: 53) when he argues that ‘a more 
conscious understanding of notions of masculinity and the aspects that can be 
emphasized to reduce violence rather than glorify it would greatly enhance the 
effectiveness of any disarmament program’. In my opinion, public education could 
be complemented with gun control laws that restrict carrying arms to public places 
in order to enhance public safety.  
At the level of the national environment, the instability that characterised the 
national environment in which disarmament and demobilisation are conducted is 
another important consideration (Spear, 2002: 151). According to Spear, in the 
aftermath of war, two dimensions of the national implementation environment are 
critical to disarmament and demobilisation. One, it could be a situation where a 
negotiated settlement has been achieved between the warring parties leading to 
the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement; in this case, there is no clear 
victor. In this type of setting, Spear maintains that power is dispersed, with the 
state very weak and its prerogative of the legitimate use of force contested and 
challenged by several splinter armed groups (Spear, 2007: 12). 
In my view, such an environment poses a serious challenge and difficulty for 
planners to determine and enforce the inclusion and exclusion criteria for entry 
into the DDR process. This was aptly demonstrated in the Liberian DDR process 
where the criterion was strict at the beginning but later weakened in order to 
accommodate more entrants (Paes, 2005: 254; Jennings, 2007: 207-209 & 
Jennings, 2008: 329-330). 
Likewise, at the level of regional security and environment, several studies have 
demonstrated how regional dynamics can undermine disarmament and 
demobilisation programmes. An important study in this regard is Colleta et al., 
who argue that regional security situations can positively enhance or endanger 
the process of disarmament and demobilisation as experiences in Africa have 
shown: 
…regional security developments can promote or undermine a DRP 
[demobilization and reintegration program]. For example, the deterioration 
in relations between Sudan and Eritrea has delayed completion of the 
demobilisation process in the latter. Similarly, increasing security concerns 
on Uganda’s northern border have forced the remobilization of some 
Ugandan ex-combatants into home guards and local defense units, and 
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conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone are linked by armies that know no 
borders (Colleta et al., 1996: 7). 
 
On her part, Spear (2002: 152-153) argues that the result of disarmament will be 
more effective and sustainable if there is a strong regional cooperation that 
ensures that arms will not be supplied to warring parties for them to rearm and 
remobilise. This is because ‘…the market for light weapons is very permissive, 
and without the support of regional…players for an embargo on light-weapons 
supplies into the state undertaking the peace settlement, disarmament efforts 
may be undermined…’ (Spear, 2002:153).  
In another vein, a study by Pugh et al., (2004: 24-35) demonstrates how the 
regional dimensions of conflict can produce a regional war economy and 
insecurity which can undermine the process of post-conflict transformation. Pugh 
et al., also argue that endemic conflict at a wider regional level can produce 
regional conflict complexes and networks of multidimensional activities that in the 
long run can constitute obstacles to the process of post-conflict transformation. 
In their analysis, Pugh et al., assert that the regional elements of conflict 
complexes have four mutually reinforcing interlocking elements, namely, 
economic networks, military networks, political networks and social networks.  
Indeed, Funmi and Alao (2005: 244) demonstrate the potency of the above 
argument by showing how regional conflict complexes in the Mano River Union 
countries (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire) created a regional 
political economy of arms, transnational criminal gangs and the crisscrossing of 
combatants that undermined the DDR process in the region, a position also 
supported by Özerdem (2009: 143-144). 
 
The international environment has been an important challenge to the conduct of 
successful disarmament, and in this regard, Colleta et al., (1996: x) argue that 
critical to achieving demilitarisation in Sub-Saharan Africa is the need to contain 
the extent to which destructive weapons flow into the region from the international 
system. Colleta et al., also suggest that ‘world suppliers of arms continue to sell 
large quantities of military hardware to Sub-Saharan Africa, and this could be an 
obstacle to a rapid transition to peace’ (Colleta et al., 1996: x). Similarly, Spear 
(2002: 153) posits that ‘the failure of the international community to adopt and 
abide by an arms embargo may undermine a peace process.’ Spear cites the 
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case of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebel 
forces who despite being placed under an arms embargo continued to have 
access to sophisticated weapons (Ibid).  
 
Apart from environmental considerations, basic information is required for the 
planning and conduct of successful disarmament (UN IDDRS, 2006). The 
contention here is that prior to the launching of a disarmament programme, a pre-
disarmament census/verification of existing armed groups, their strength, place 
of deployment, weaponry and the various sites they are kept is of critical 
importance. Beyond that, this information is needed to evaluate whether targets 
have been met after disarmament and demobilisation have been concluded. For 
instance, the UN SC (2000: 3) asserts that the success of DDR is dependent on 
the accuracy of information collected from the various parties regarding the size 
and location of their personnel and weapons. The UNSC’s position is further 
supported by Shibuya (2012: 26-27) who insists that ‘disarmament is ineffective 
without proper information collection.’ The veracity of this assertion is 
demonstrated by Asuni’s (2011: 159) examination of a DDR programme initiated 
in the Rivers state Niger Delta region of Nigeria in 2004. The study revealed that 
the absence of reliable data on the various armed groups to be disarmed 
undermined the effectiveness of the programme and eventually resulted in the 
resurgence of violence in the state. Consequently, one pertinent issue to be 
examined in this thesis is the extent to which the current DDR intervention in the 
Niger Delta has guarded against such an error? However, oftentimes the 
possibility of conducting accurate verification and census prior to disarmament 
may be a near impossibility due to the precarious security situation of war-torn 
societies as was the case in Sierra Leone’s DDR (Özerdem, 2009: 130). 
 
An important planning consideration is the need to determine appropriate 
eligibility criteria for acceptance into the DDR process. This has to do with the 
evidence that combatants should be required to present in order to be accepted 
into the DDR process. According to Colleta et al., (1996: 8) the criteria should be 
non-discriminatory in nature so as not to deliberately exclude some armed groups 
based on their ethnicity, region and gender which can, in turn, jeopardise the 
entire peace process.  A further challenge in designing eligibility criteria is the 
issue of child soldiers that emanates from the lack of a common acceptable 
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definition. Wessels (2006: 5-7) points out that the concept of the child soldier has 
cultural relativity and therefore lacks universal definition which can result in the 
exclusion of children and female soldiers from entering the DDR process. My 
overview of the literature shows that agreeing on eligibility criteria has always 
been a serious challenge for DDR planners, and the failure to get it right has often 
produced a problem in the subsequent phases of the DDR process as in the case 
of Liberia (Jennings, 2008: 329-330). Consequently, the question that this raised 
for the study is how the planners of the Niger Delta DDR programme arrived at 
the eligibility criteria and how these criteria impacted upon the subsequent 
phases of the programme?  
 
A peace agreement is a key requirement for undertaking a successful traditional 
disarmament and demobilisation programme (Spear, 2007: 9 & Özerdem, 2009: 
16). Berdal (1996: 9-10) on his part contends that since 1989 most disarmament 
and demobilisation programmes were implemented as part of a comprehensive 
peace agreement usually negotiated with the support of the international 
community and spearheaded either by the UN or the party that achieved military 
victory. Ong (2012: 55-56) argues that a peace agreement contributes to 
successful disarmament because it lays the framework and strategy for achieving 
appropriate results; identifying the armed groups to be disarmed; the extent of 
coverage and eligibility criteria; and the time frame and institutional mechanisms 
for execution. However, the viability of a peace agreement to contribute to 
successful disarmament and demobilisation depends on how inclusive it is in 
terms of addressing the key concerns of the warring parties, the degree of political 
commitment and compliance to the agreement by warring parties, the ability to 
manage ‘spoilers’, the level of international support and the availability of 
resources amongst others (Kingma, 1997: 158-163). Oftentimes, despite all the 
arguments in favour of a peace agreement as a precondition for traditional DDR, 
the seeds for unsuccessful disarmament are in the very peace agreement that 
produces it due to the several conceptual ambiguities contained within it. An 
example of this is the disarmament and demobilisation experience in 
Mozambique (Spear, 2002: 148-149). However, beyond the existence of a peace 
agreement, the success of disarmament and demobilisation very much depends 
on the extent of political will demonstrated by parties that are signatories to the 
agreement (Kingma, 1997: 158 and Knight, 2008: 46). 
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This suggests that irrespective of how comprehensive a peace agreement is, 
what matters, in the long run, is the will and determination of warring parties to 
go through with it. As Colleta, et al., (1996: 1-2) contend ‘strong political will and 
leadership, expressed in terms of commitment, realism, and pragmatism, are 
crucial factors for successful programme implementation.’ Political will is 
pertinent because the implementation of a disarmament and demobilisation 
programme is characterised by several unforeseen circumstances, which can 
weaken and put to test the commitment of the various warring parties. In line with 
this, Spear (2002: 155-156) emphasises that ‘if there is a will for peace, problems 
at other points in the implementation process, for example, resources constraints 
and minor instances of cheating, can be overcome.’ Similarly, the UNSC (2000: 
1) asserts that ‘the foundation of a successful disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration is the political will of the parties to commit themselves to peace.’ In 
response to some of these conundrums, Toft (2010a: 7-36 and 2010b: 1-4) 
reasons that disarmament and demobilisation are more likely to succeed when 
there is an adequate balance of carrots and sticks in the peace agreement. 
Consequently, for a peace agreement to engender successful disarmament and 
demobilisation it must be explicit in terms of the ‘mutual benefit and mutual harm’ 
to warring parties that may comply or fail to comply (Toft, 2010b: 1). In this light, 
Toft advocates for a new strategic framework for ending civil wars and achieving 
disarmament and demobilisation; a hybrid strategy that concurrently integrates 
the elements of negotiated settlement and military victory (Ibid.: 4). Supporting 
Toft’s position, Stankovic argues that: 
DDR programs are often designed to induce combatants’ participation and 
as such rely mainly on providing benefits to ex-combatants. An optimal 
DDR program, however, must ensure not only combatants’ participation 
but also their compliance with program requirements. To meet these 
objectives, it is essential that DDR programs employ robust strategies that 
include both benefits and sanctions. While benefits are efficient in ensuring 
participation, sanctions are crucial in preventing noncompliance 
(Stankovic, 2015: 704). 
 
The extent to which peace agreement if any has influenced the Niger Delta ADDR 
programme will be explored in subsequent chapters of this thesis.  
Finally, a growing body of literature claims that maximising the gains of 
disarmament and demobilisation is contingent on developing a synergy between 
DDR and security sector reform (SSR). Indeed, the linkage between SSR and 
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DDR becomes more important when the state armed forces and other security 
institutions need to be reconstituted and re-professionalised, to enable them to 
face the challenge of providing security in the post-conflict era or if some of the 
demobilised ex-combatants are to be reintegrated into the armed forces and other 
state security services. Some of the leading advocates of maximising synergy 
between SSR and DDR are Bryden (2007: 3) and Bryden and Scherrer (2012: 3-
27) who argue that DDR and SSR share the common goal of re-establishing 
security and stability in post-conflict societies. Consequently, taking full 
advantage of the likely synergy between DDR and SSR is indispensable to the 
restoration of peace, security and stability in post-conflict states (Bryden, 2007: 
3). 
In a similar vein, McFate (2010: 1-15), posits that DDR and SSR are premised on 
the same objective of restoring and strengthening of the state’s monopoly of force 
and rule of law. Indeed, Bryden and Scherrer (2012: 3) maintain that ‘… failure to 
account for the nexus between DDR and SSR can yield negative consequences 
for security more generally.’ Surprisingly, planners of DDR and SSR often work 
in isolation and as a result, the two interventions can be implemented without 
proper and adequate coordination between them. Whenever one succeeds and 
the other fails, the goal of establishing security and stability will be jeopardised 
as the experience in Afghanistan has illustrated (Mcfate, 2010: 2-3). This clearly 
suggests that while DDR may succeed in retrieving arms from militias; the failure 
of the security sector to provide adequate security to the citizenry in the face of a 
security dilemma could trigger a process of re-armament and re-militarisation.  
 
2.4.2. Incentives and Motivations in Disarmament 
 
This section of the review focuses on the kind of incentives to be offered to 
combatants in order to serve as an adequate motivation for them to disarm and 
sustain their commitment to peace and not return to violence. According to 
Douglas, et al (2004: 41) weapons for food/goods, weapons for development and 
the exchange of weapons for cash are the common incentives used in DDR. 
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Similarly, an approach known as weapons in competition for development2 is 
being suggested (Ibid.) However, among these incentives, a commonly applied 
one that has gained popularity has been ‘the weapon buyback’ in other words 
weapons for cash programme. According to Tanner (1996: 185) and Isima (2004: 
3) it is an approach whereby economic incentive, particularly cash payments are 
extended to combatants in order to encourage them to undergo the process of 
disarmament and demobilisation. 
Berdal (1996: 33) has suggested that the practice is premised on the assumption 
that ‘… weapons usually have an economic as well as security value’. As a result, 
monetary compensation should be given to motivate combatants to renounce 
violence and commit to the disarmament and demobilisation process. Its efficacy 
was tested with reasonable success in El Salvador where cash was given in 
exchange for guns (Jeong, 2005: 51). Recent examples of arms buy-back 
disarmament programmes in Africa (albeit not as successful as in the case of El 
Salvador) include Liberia in 2003 and Cote d’Ivoire in 2004 (Omach, 2012: 89). 
Other forms of economic inducement applied include the food for guns’ 
programme implemented in Somalia which recorded a clear success (Tanner, 
1996: 185). As earlier mentioned, another economic inducement mechanism 
highlighted in the literature is the ‘weapons for development programme’ which 
was implemented in Mali in the middle of 1997; whereby the locating of 
community development projects and the distribution of goods and services were 
traded for weapons after the signing of a peace pact between the government 
and rebel forces (Ibid.: 89). 
 
Suffice to say that it is important to take into cognizance the underlying economic 
agendas of warring parties in conflict when determining the appropriate economic 
inducement to be offered to them to disarm. In line with this, Spear (2006a: 168-
189 and 2006b: 63-80) identifies three different levels of combatants with varying 
economic motives behind their involvement in armed violence. The first group is 
the leadership who presides over large fighting groups with numerous 
commanders under their control and engages in high-level economic predation 
in cahoots with national, regional and international criminal networks. The second 
                                                          
2 According to Douglas et al, (2004: 41) weapons in competition for development, ‘…targets two 
communities of similar size and divides the funds available for development proportionally 
between them, according to the percentage of weapons handed in by each community.’ 
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group is the middle-level officers heading fighting units, who exercised command 
and control over fighting forces and so benefit immensely from the war and its 
booty. While the last category is that of the individual fighters (foot soldiers) 
whose motive many argue is often predatory as witnessed during the civil wars 
in Sierra-Leone and Liberia. Wennmann (2011: 24-24) also argues that armed 
violence is lucrative and provides a steady means of living for insurgents and so 
they are less likely to respond positively to a ceasefire that does not offer high 
rewards relative to the option of continuing fighting. Wennmann further argues 
that the basis of initiating any engagement with insurgents to demobilise is not 
the acclaimed ‘mutually hurting stalemate, but a mutually profitable stalemate’ 
(Ibid.: 24). Therefore, both Spear and Wennmann are of the contention that 
disarmament and demobilisation are more likely to succeed if reasonable 
economic incentives are offered, commensurate to the economic benefits 
accruing to the various levels of fighters/leadership in an insurgent movement. 
The debate on economic incentives raises the pertinent question of the extent to 
which the Niger Delta DDR programme adequately attended to the underlying 
economic motives of the various categories of fighters in the conflict. To what 
extent has the economic dividend of peace in the Niger Delta outweighed the 
temptation of returning to violence as a means of livelihood? This question will be 
explored further in this thesis. 
At the same time, though, the effectiveness of economic incentives such as ‘arms 
buy back’ during disarmament and demobilisation has been contested. According 
to Douglas et al, (2004: 41) ‘the effects of buy-back programmes are short-term 
and not sustainable.’. Indeed, the UN IDDRS posits that: 
Recent field report indicates that ‘Buy-back’ schemes rarely have the 
desired effect; instead, old and unserviceable weapons are often 
submitted to allow combatants to enter the demobilisation phase while 
commanders hold on to serviceable weapons as protection in case of the 
failure of the peace process (UN IDDRS, 4. 20. 2006: 5). 
 
Also, Ginifer et al., (2004: 4); Willibald (2006: 325) and Knight (2008: 47) all argue 
that cash payments to ex-combatants during disarmament tends to lift them 
above other victims of conflict in society, thereby creating resentment against 
them which jeopardises their reintegration. Consequently, Knight suggests that: 
 … it is probably better to utilize in-kind assistance or other forms of 
material support that would also have benefits for the community at large 
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and not just for the ex-combatant. When monetary incentives are 
considered necessary, they should be made in small payments over a 
longer period to assure a peaceful resettlement (Knight, 2008: 47). 
 
Other scholars have contested the undue emphasis on monetary inducement 
during disarmament and demobilisation. A leading voice is Walter (1997: 335-
364; 1999: 129-130 and 2002: 3-43) who argues that whenever combatants are 
called to demobilise in the context of a negotiated war to peace transition they 
are confronted with a security dilemma, which revolves around the fact that: 
…civil war opponents are asked to do what they consider unthinkable. At 
a time when no legitimate government and no legal institutions exist to 
enforce a contract, they are asked to demobilize, disarm, and disengage 
their military forces and prepare for peace. But once they lay down their 
weapons and begin to integrate their separate assets into a new united 
state, it becomes almost impossible to either enforce future cooperation or 
survive attack. In the end, negotiations fail because civil war adversaries 
cannot credibly promise to abide by such dangerous terms (Walter, 1997:  
335-336). 
 
In other words, warring factions fear that as they ‘…hand in their weapons, and 
surrender occupied territory, they become increasingly vulnerable to a surprise 
attack’ (Walter, 2002: 21). What Walter suggests in all these assertions is that the 
combatants’ main concern, when asked to demobilise and disarm, is whether 
their personal security can be guaranteed in the absence of a legitimate authority. 
Consequently, Walter contends that given this circumstance, the greatest 
incentive and primary concern for warring parties to disarm and demobilise is, if 
their personal security will be assured during the treacherous demobilisation 
period. According to Walter, ‘the first and most critical is a third-party security 
guarantee to protect against a surprise attack during demobilization’ (Walter, 
2002: 26). She further explains that ‘third party guarantors can change the level 
of fear and insecurity that accompanies treaty implementation and thus facilitate 
settlement... Third parties, …can guarantee that groups will be protected, terms 
will be fulfilled, and promises will be kept…’ (Walter, 1997: 340). Lending 
credence to Walter’s assertion, Nilsson posits that: 
 
 It …is essential to ensure the physical security of ex-combatants when 
they return to civilian life. If this is not done, it will not only be difficult to 
persuade combatants to disarm, there is also a high probability that 
already disarmed and demobilised combatants will rearm themselves 
(Nilsson, 2005: 40). 
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In a related argument, Hill (1999: 57-82) explains that while the resolution of the 
security dilemma is essential, it is not the only incentive needed to woo 
combatants to disarm and demobilise. Instead, the ability of the United Nations 
to ensure the simultaneous implementation of a twin track approach to a peace 
accord is far more significant. The first dimension of the twin track peace accord 
‘…involves overcoming their [referring to the combatants] security dilemmas …’ 
(Hill, 1999: 62), while the second track ‘…addresses the political and economic 
aspirations of the parties, so as to ameliorate to the greatest extent possible the 
root causes of the conflict’ (Ibid.). What this implies is that the greatest incentive 
to disarmament and demobilisation is to guarantee the security of the ex-
combatants’ as well as resolving the underlying socio-economic and political 
grievances that led to the conflict. On the other hand, Hoddie and Hartzell (2003: 
303-320) argue that the best way to address the security dilemma that 
discourages ex-combatants from disarming and demobilising is to ensure that the 
peace accord provides for institutional power sharing arrangements in the post-
war military, political and economic institutions. This will give all the warring 
parties a near equal stake in the post-war political, military and economic power 
dispensation, and so warring parties will feel more secure if all of them have a 
stake in the post-war power equation (Hoddie and Hartzell, 2005: 21-40; 2006: 
155-167 & Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007: 3).  
However, power sharing as a solution to the security dilemma has been criticised 
on the basis that it only empowers ethnic elites or warlords to the detriment of the 
low-ranking members of the warring parties; in essence, it only consolidates 
elites’ power dominance in post-war societies (Rothchild and Roeder, 2005: 28-
82). Corroborating this position, Jennings (2008: 340) argues that appointing elite 
or middle-level commanders into lucrative positions in government and the state 
security apparatus is often a compromise used as an inducement during 
disarmament. However, it undermines the genuine reintegration of foot soldiers 
because ‘the “big men” in command before or during the war continue to assert 
authority and enrich themselves, generating cynicism while reinforcing the 
message already implicit in DDR that conflict is rewarding, especially for those at 
the top’ (Jennings, 2008: 340). Sriram (2008: 1) provides a further critique of the 
supposed motivating and stabilising effect of power sharing by arguing that it has 
the potential to lead to instability instead of stability because ‘... power-sharing 
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and similar incentives can often reify existing cleavages in societies, increasing 
rather than decreasing the risk of conflict.’ Thus, a pertinent question that will be 
explored further in this thesis is to what extent did the Niger Delta DDR 
programme address the militants’ security concerns as well as the underlying 
grievances that led to the conflict? 
2.4.3. Management and Handling of Weapons Collected During 
Disarmament 
 
According to Muggah (2006: 190-205) not much priority is given to the safe 
custody of the weapons collected during disarmament. Reiterating Muggah’s 
assertion, Ginifer et al., (2004: 4) point out that ‘when SALW have been collected 
during DDR programmes they have frequently not been stored in secured and 
safe facilities. Thus, collected arms have often been reclaimed, stolen or recycled 
into criminal networks and militias.’ This has serious implications for security 
because criminal syndicates tend to cash in on the situation, giving credence to 
Muggah’s assertion that the implementation of peace agreements, DDR and 
weapons reduction programmes do not necessarily result in a direct improvement 
in civilian security in the post-conflict era. Furthermore, Shibuya (2012: 42-47) 
contends that disarmament usually results in the concentration of large stockpiles 
of weapons collected in one place, making them a target for potential peace 
spoilers and criminally minded groups in society. Consequently, one way to 
ensure security and confidence during disarmament is the use of the “double key” 
technique (Shibuya, 2012: 43). This is a method whereby the armoury is locked 
with two different keys and two different individuals one from the ex-combatants’ 
commander’s side and government or international observers each holding a key. 
This method ensures that no party can have access to the armoury without the 
other. 
Several alternative options for handling weapons collected have been suggested 
in the literature, one of which is transferring them to newly formed armed forces, 
as exemplified by the 1992 UN Mission in Mozambique (Ibid.: 42). Another 
method of handling weapons collected is for them to be publicly destroyed which 
is highly symbolic in terms of confidence building and restoring a sense of security 
amongst the stakeholders and citizenry (Ibid.: 42-43). Generally, thirteen different 
methods of destroying weapons with varying degree of advantages and 
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disadvantages have been identified in the literature (Gleichmann et al., 2004: 37-
38). Consequently, the extent to which adequate measures were taken to ensure 
that weapons collected during the Niger Delta ADDR programme did not get into 
the hands of unscrupulous persons in society will be explored further in this study. 
2.5. Review of Relevant Literature Demobilisation 
In this part of the review, the debate on demobilisation will be synthesised 
according to the following theme: conventional versus nonconventional 
perspectives on demobilisation, demobilisation with or without cantonment and 
the payment of reinsertion allowance during demobilisation.  
 
2.5.1. Conventional Versus Nonconventional Perspectives on 
Demobilisation 
 
In conventional DDR practice; after combatants are disarmed, they must formally 
demobilise by disbanding their military organisation and existing command and 
control structures, as well as release from the command and control of their 
commanders (Berdal, 1996: 39; Özerdem, 2009: 18-19; Muggah, 2009: 131-132; 
Alden et al., 2011: 14; Omach, 2012: 90). These scholars maintain that failure to 
disband and break the command and control structures could undermine the 
peace process because the ex-combatants could constitute themselves into 
‘spoilers’ by remobilising with the aim of returning to arm violence. Therefore, 
within the framework of conventional DDR, the empirical conduct of 
demobilisation must always aim at achieving absolute disbandment of all existing 
armed groups as well as discharging individual ex-combatants to their respective 
communities. Achieving this is fundamental to the attainment of stability 
particularly when the DDR participants are largely members of Second 
Generation militias as earlier conceptualised in this chapter. 
However, a crucial aspect that is neglected during demobilisation is the 
psychosocial dimension which has to do with demilitarising the mindset of the ex-
combatants. In line with this, Hansen (2000: 42) argues that demilitarisation ‘… 
comprises a psychological dimension that aims at reversing the development 
towards a culture of violence.’ This is equally supported by Malan (2000: 10-11) 
who argues that when it comes to demobilisation, there is undue emphasis on 
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the quantitative dimension. Consequently, Malan stresses the need to transform 
the psychological thinking of former combatants from violent ways of doing things 
instead of focusing on weapons collection and dismantlement of the command 
and control structure and retrieval of military accoutrements. Demilitarising the 
mindset is critical to achieving stability because it is not the number of weapons 
in circulation or finger behind the trigger that determines the level of violence but 
the mindset. Thus, my contention is that; if ex-combatants continuously consider 
violence as a viable means of resolving conflict the possibility of re-mobilisation 
will be much easier even after existing command and control structures have 
been successfully dismantled. This suggests that commensurate emphasis 
should also be accorded to the psychological dimension of demobilisation during 
DDR by de-militarising the mindset of ex-combatants.  
On the other hand, from the nonconventional perspective, some scholars have 
also questioned the assumption inherent in conventional (traditional) DDR that 
demobilisation must aim at the absolute breakup of the combatants’ military 
command and control (C&C) structures. This is because oftentimes their retention 
can enhance the process of their reintegration, as some of the social connections 
established during combat can be helpful in achieving the goal of reintegration. 
For example, Vries and Wiegink (2011: 38-51) contend that the insistence on 
breakup at all costs does not take into cognizance the empirical reality of the 
motivations and processes of recruitment into militia groups. Vries and Wiegink 
contend that the process of militia mobilisation and the motives behind it are 
multifaceted and varies from voluntary mobilisation to conscription, while for 
others, they are mobilised or motivated for security, economic and psychological 
reasons or considerations. Moreover, given that some of the militia groups have 
never gone beyond the frontiers of their local community, it becomes an 
aberration to insist that they must absolutely break up their C&C structures. Even 
if ex-combatants are brought from different communities or backgrounds, their 
years of shared combat experience tends to nurture a strong bond that goes 
beyond any family or community connections (Ibid.: 41-42). Therefore, Vries and 
Wiegink argue that ‘with this bond between individuals enforced by the 
experience of war, it is not surprising that after demobilisation many ex-
combatants choose to stay together’ (Ibid: 42), thus contemplating absolute 
breakup becomes an unrealistic goal. According to Vries and Wiegink, the cases 
 70 
 
of demobilised ex-combatants in Burundi and Sierra Leone exemplified this 
situation as many of them after their demobilisation chose to live together. Also, 
security considerations due to the fragile nature of transitional states are a strong 
factor in ex-combatants deciding to stay together after demobilisation. They posit 
that ‘if violence may resurge at any time, it makes sense not to lose touch with 
your (formerly) armed friends; you may need them for protection someday’ (Vries 
and Wiegink, 2011: 42). Another related issue is that there are strong economic 
incentives and social security reasons to encourage the maintenance of ex-
combatants’ C&C structures after demobilisation. According to them: 
Most of the countries in which DDR programmes occur suffer from high 
unemployment and poverty. The future is uncertain, and ex-combatants 
are one group among many struggling for livelihoods. The absorptive 
capacities of communities of return may be very limited: there may not be 
enough land to provide food for returning fighters, and there may simply 
be no jobs around (Vries and Wiegink, 2011: 42). 
 
Thus, in view of the above reality ex-combatants might have no option than to 
retain their C&C structures after demobilisation. The Mozambican National 
Resistance personnel who collectively sought land in the same location they had 
their encampment for demobilisation represents a good example of ex-
combatants choosing to live together after demobilisation for obvious social and 
economic reasons (Ibid.: 42-43). Ex-combatants may also prefer to stay together 
and remain connected after their demobilisation because of the networks of 
patronage that develop after the conflict which provides social, economic and 
political benefits to the ex-combatants (Ibid.: 43). This has been the case in 
Afghanistan where former militia group commanders maintain strong links with 
their former soldiers (Vries and Wiegink, 2011: 43). They also argue that a major 
determinant of whether ex-combatants may want to retain their C&C structures 
or not is how viable and promising a DDR programme is (Ibid.). This suggests 
that when a given DDR programme holds little or no promise, ex-combatants may 
decide to evade formal demobilisation to take care of their problems, thereby 
encouraging the retention of the C&C structures. In view of all these realities they 
conclude that it may be difficult to achieve an absolute breakup of C&C structures 
through demobilisation.   
In a related study, Themner (2011: 1-9) concluded that even after supposed 
successful demobilisation, ‘…ex-combatants often continue to live quasi-
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militarized lives [sic] long after demobilizing’ (Ibid.: 3). Themner explains that the 
identity formation ex-combatants went through during years of combat makes it 
near impossible to achieve an absolute disbandment of their former C&C 
structures, hence ex-combatants of the same military background in most cases 
live together even after being demobilised. He, therefore, contends that it is more 
rewarding for ex-combatants to remain together than each one going his way: 
Hanging out together, even living in close proximity to each other, means 
that ex-fighters that fought for the same side often constitute a distinct 
social group in society-or an ex-combatant community (all the former 
fighters that used to belong to the same armed faction and who share 
common, horizontal identity based on shared war-and peacetime 
experiences) (Themner, 2011: 3). 
 
The finding from the study equally demonstrates that due to their shared 
experiences, ex-combatants enter the post-conflict period with a unique identity 
that they have acquired and internalised during the war which gets reinforced by 
the dynamic and complex reality of the post-conflict society based on in-group 
and out-group interaction. The in-group articulates the views that ex-combatants 
hold about others in society while the out-group articulates the stereotypes that 
the larger society attributes to ex-combatants, all of which tend to support the 
retention of former command and control structures. Beyond that, the wartime 
acquired identity functions as a coping mechanism when confronted with the 
varied challenges of social integration in the post-conflict era (Ibid.: (2011: 4). 
A study by Hazen (n.d.: 1-11) lends further credence to the difficulty in breaking 
the C&C structures of fighting groups. Hazen argues that the social milieu of the 
war environment is characterised by the disintegration of the larger societal social 
fabric but with a corresponding integration into what she refers to as the ‘war 
family’ (Ibid.). Hazen (n.d. 4) asserts that demobilisation becomes challenging 
because ‘… leaving this familiar setting is both threatening and scary to 
combatants, even those who would prefer to stop fighting, because the “war 
family” is seen as a source of security.’ Thus, Hazen has clearly demonstrated 
that combatants for several reasons may find it very difficult to completely break 
away from their ‘war family.’ I do concur to some extent with the view that wartime 
acquired bonds and identity will subsist beyond demobilisation and may positively 
contribute towards the process of reintegration particularly if the ex-combatants 
comprised of what Gleichmann et al. (2004: 29) refer to as members of 
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conventional armed forces or statutory forces which I earlier defined at the 
beginning of this chapter. I argue so because based on my personal experience, 
the C&C structures of members of conventional armed forces or statutory forces 
do remain although not in the classical sense of it. Instead C&C structures get 
transformed into informal structures and relationships. For example, as observed 
in Nigeria it is a common practice for ex-military (demobilised) personnel to reside 
and pre-dominate an area of a city or community and become regular members 
of certain informal relaxation centres. Similarly, most retired senior military 
commanders tend to employ their former ex-soldiers as domestic and personal 
staffs, such as cooks, cleaners, drivers, private secretaries or personal assistants 
and in some cases managing their businesses. Consequently, through these 
networks and interactions wartime C&C structures are sustained in an informal 
and nonconventional way and could indeed be supportive towards successful 
reintegration. 
Clearly therefore, the question of whether to aim at retaining or destroying the 
C&C structures in absolute terms is a tricky issue. For instance, in my opinion 
given Francis’s (2005: 1-3) conceptualisation that Second-Generation militias 
challenge the State and contest its legitimacy, absolute disbanding of their C&C 
structures is preferable. This is because in the context of Francis’s 
conceptualisation, Second-Generation militias are by their very nature a threat to 
State stability and therefore failure to break their C&C structures would lead to 
the likelihood that the ex-commanders can remobilise and undermine the 
transition process and the new postconflict state if they so desire. Thus, in a DDR 
programme with a caseload of Second-Generation militias as the main 
participants, demobilisation must essentially aim at dismantling their C&C 
structures both horizontally and vertically. This is in order to fundamentally 
weaken their capacity to remobilise and undermine the process of war to peace 
transition or to challenge the legitimacy of the new postconflict state. In another 
dimension, one can argue that the decision to retain or destroy the C&C 
structures should depend on whether the type of armed group being demobilised 
is predatory or community-based. This is when viewed against the backdrop of 
Reno’s (2007: 324-342) characterisation of armed groups as predatory and 
community-based, whereby predatory armed groups engage in predatory 
activities such as pillaging of their communities while their community-based 
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counterparts are protective of their communities. In this case, if the armed groups 
being demobilised are predatory in nature, breakup of the C&C structures will be 
necessary while in the case of community-based armed groups; retaining of the 
structures may not be inimical to State stability and peace consolidation. Yet, in 
another way, given the dynamic nature of conflict and the unpredictable nature of 
human behaviour; whereby conflict that starts because of genuine grievance 
could over time mutate to greed, one could argue that there is no guarantee that 
community-based armed groups will not mutate to predatory armed groups if their 
C&C structures are left intact, thereby making their retention tricky and dicey. 
Therefore, when all these perspectives are juxtaposed, I will argue that for a 
guaranteed and secured postconflict state irrespective of whether an armed 
group is predatory or protective of the community, demobiliation should aim at 
breaking/destroying of the C&C structures. This is pertinent so long as the armed 
group conforms to and can be categorised as Second-Generation militias as 
earlier conceptualised. As for where First-Generation militias stand regarding the 
dismantling of C&C structures, in line with Francis’s (2005: 1-3) 
conceptualisation, they are essentially not a threat to State legitimacy but 
supportive of it. Therefore, the argument for retaining C&C structures in the case 
of First-Generation militia may all other things being equal be stronger. The 
question of where the Niger Delta militants fall in the classification of combatants 
and whether it is necessary to break up or not their C&C structures will be 
explored further in Chapter Five. 
2.5.2. Demobilisation with or Without Cantonment 
In conventional demobilisation, after successful disarmament and prior to being 
released to their respective communities, members of the armed forces, whether 
of the government or of the opposition forces, are assembled in a location for a 
series of activities that will adequately prepare them for civilian life (United 
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations UN DPKO, 2000: 15). Within 
conventional DDR practice such a location is known as cantonment, oftentimes 
referred to as encampments sites, assembly areas or barracks (Ibid).  
According to Colleta et al., (1996: 12), demobilisation consists of cantonment or 
quartering during which activities such as ‘… pre-discharge orientation, 
discharge, transportation, and post-discharge orientation’ are undertaken. 
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Cantonment may also become a necessity when there are large caseloads of ex-
combatants to deal with, allowing for their phased demobilisation, as well as 
providing the receiving communities ample time to prepare for the arrival of each 
cohort of the ex-combatants (Özerdem, 2009: 27-28). Again, cantonment may be 
required because some combatants at the time of demobilisation do not readily 
have a community to return to because some of them were abducted as children 
and so cannot remember their communities, or are scared of returning to them 
because of the atrocities they committed against them during conflict (see 
Kingma, 2002: 183; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2009:59 and Özerdem, 2009: 
28). Similarly, cantonment will be inevitable in a demobilisation process that has 
large caseloads of child soldiers and female combatants because of the need to 
separate them from adult soldiers so as to attend to their unique needs (Fusato, 
2003: 3-7; Douglas et al, 2004: 52 and Özerdem, 2009: 28).  Suffice to say that 
when demobilisation by cantonment involves women, it is important to ensure 
that ‘…cantonment sites [are] women-friendly… [for example,] are women’s 
training needs, their need for childcare, their safety, their need for specific 
sanitary facilities and specialized healthcare, including nutritional needs for 
nursing or pregnant women, recognized [and provided] at the outset?’ (Farr, 
2003: 5). 
Given the centrality of cantonment in the demobilisation process, the UN DPKO 
(2000: 36-37) and Gleichmann (2004:53) point out that care must be taken in 
selecting and constructing the cantonment sites. This is because their suitability 
or otherwise could hinder or enhance the success of the demobilisation process; 
it, therefore, identifies ‘accessibility, security, general amenities, storage 
facilities/armoury and communications infrastructure’ as essential factors to be 
considered and provided when selecting a cantonment site (Ibid.). The above 
suggests that the location of cantonment should not be too far from where troops 
have been concentrated immediately after their disarmament and should be in 
contiguity to major means of transportation such as roads, railways, rivers and air 
transport. The cantonment site location and its entire environs should be well 
secured in order to assure the ex-combatants of their safety and security. The 
location should also be equipped with standard and properly secured armoury for 
the temporary storage of weapons (Ibid.). Likewise, the location must be 
equipped with adequate and reliable communication in order to guarantee 
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constant communication between the various stakeholders in the demobilisation 
process both vertical and horizontal (Ibid.).  
In my view, cantonment is the gateway to civilian life; therefore, how friendly, 
memorable and rewarding the experience is to ex-combatants could go a long 
way in determining the success of the DDR process. It is my contention that a 
rewarding cantonment experience could serve as a morale booster to ex-
combatants, to seriously aspire to return to civilian life while a nasty experience 
could dampen their morale. In line with this, Shibuya (2012: 66) argues that if the 
conditions are oppressive it may lead to the resurgence of violence, all of which 
could lead to the temporary suspension of the programme. Furthermore, in some 
extreme cases, poorly planned and equipped cantonment locations can cause 
combatants to evade formal demobilisation and to self-demobilize. This, in turn, 
can have serious negative security implications, particularly where disarmament 
and demobilisation are coalesced into one activity. This is because self-
demobilisation in this context implies ex-combatants absconding home with their 
weapons and military accoutrements (Douglas, et al, 2004: 48). However, despite 
the necessity of a suitable cantonment environment, caution should be taken to 
ensure that the extent of conduciveness does not encourage the ex-combatants 
to turn it into a permanent place of abode (Shibuya, 2012: 66). 
In terms of activities to be carried out during cantonment, Colleta et al., (1986: 8-
13) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, n.d. 3) have 
identified screening for identifying those eligible for demobilisation as one key 
activity. However, when disarmament precedes demobilisation, such preliminary 
screening ought to have been carried out; it only needs to be properly reviewed 
at this stage (Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) 
Ghana, 2015).3 The screening should be transparently done to eliminate ghost 
soldiers and ensure that fake or non-ex-combatants do not get registered as 
combatants which could inflate budgetary requirements (Colleta et al., 1986: 8-
13 and UNDP, n.d. 3). Where family members and dependents of ex-combatants 
are also going to be beneficiaries, the screening should include them (Ibid.). 
                                                          
3. Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) Ghana (2015). Disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration foundation course lecture 9-20 February. 
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For reintegration planning, information is needed in three key areas; the supply 
side, the demand side and the social environment (United Nations Development 
Programme, n.d.: 43 and Colleta et al., 1986: 9). The supply side refers to 
information pertaining to the characteristics, needs, future aspirations and labour 
market potentials of the ex-combatants (Colleta et al., 1986: 16; Jensen & 
Stepputat, 2001: 12-13; Porto et al, 2007: 16 and Edloe, 2007:16-17). The 
demand side has to do with information on existing opportunities and challenges 
in the labour market while the social environment is the community as a social 
milieu that the ex-combatants are returning to (Colleta et al., 1986: 16). Therefore, 
the cantonment period provides the most appropriate opportunity for this 
information to be collected through surveys. In addition, having spent several 
years in military life and disconnected from civilian life, the cantonment period 
provides an opportunity for ex-combatants to be adequately educated about the 
realities of civilian life that they are about to enter (Ibid.). Against this backdrop, 
Colleta et al. described the significance of pre-discharge information as follows:  
Predischarge information and orientation sessions about what they can 
expect on their return to civilian life have proved beneficial. Such sessions 
should give ex-combatants (and, if present, their partners) information 
about the program in general, health issues, and civil society. In particular, 
ex-combatants should be briefed about their benefits and how these are 
to be provided and about banking and financial matters, civic and 
community duties, training and employment opportunities, access to land 
and credit, income-generating activities, and family and health issues 
(especially AIDS/HIV) (Colleta et al., 1986: 13).4 
 
Similarly, concurring with the above Gleichmann et al., (2004: 56) point out that 
pre-discharge information should include economic information, accommodation 
information, political and legal information, social information, health information 
such as HIV/AIDs awareness and lastly crisis prevention and reconciliation 
information. Nevertheless, the need for all these activities to be carried out should 
not be an excuse to overextend the duration of cantonment (Colleta et al., 1986: 
12). After the successful completion of cantonment activities, ex-combatants and 
their dependants will need to be transported to their respective communities of 
choice (Colleta et al., 1986: 14). Two options that could be used to transport ex-
                                                          
4. See ‘potential support to ex-combatants during assembly and discharge’ in Ball. N. (1997). 
‘Demobilizing and reintegrating soldiers: lessons from Africa,’ in Krishna, K. (ed.). Rebuilding 
societies after civil war: critical roles for international assistance. London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, pp. 85-105. Also, see Banholzer, L. (2014) ‘When do disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration programmes succeed?’ p. 13. Available at: (Accessed 
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combatants have been advanced in the literature; either they are transported 
centrally or payment is given to them to sort out their movement individually 
(Ibid.). However, as Colleta et al., point out when arranging transportation for ex-
combatants, care should be taken to ensure that it does not lead to sudden 
increases in the cost of public transport in the local area, as this could lead to 
resentment against the returning ex-combatants by the locals. Finally, 
cantonment activities are assumed to have been concluded with the successful 
arrival of ex-combatants to their respective destinations and the provision of post-
discharge orientation and briefings (Colleta et al., 1986: 14).  
However, despite the apparent centrality of cantonment during demobilisation, 
several critical views have been advanced against it. Özerdem (2009: 29) 
maintains that while the entire DDR process aims at the total disbandment of the 
armed groups C&C structures; cantonment tends to be a drawback because it 
reinforces them instead of eliminating them. On his part, Shibuya (2012: 67) 
argues that the central issue in demobilisation is about changing the mindset of 
combatants. According to him ‘…demobilization is about the psychological break 
from the militarized mentality stemming from membership in an armed group’ 
(Ibid.). The critical question in his view is: to what extent can the period of 
cantonment succeed in changing the combatant’s violent mindset? According to 
Shibuya, the possibility that demobilisation will succeed depends on whether the 
demobilising troops have experienced what he refers to as war fatigue: 
…where the parties over time have become exhausted with fighting. (More 
critically, the parties are exhausted with the lack of achievement of their 
objectives via military means.). In this situation, the parties may begin to 
look for alternative ways to end the conflict, given that military solutions 
are not viable (Shibuya, 2912: 64). 
 
 This suggests that the goal of demobilisation will be difficult to realise if 
combatants think that they can still achieve victory militarily over their opponents. 
However, demobilisation can also be undertaken without cantonment and an 
alternative option is the use of mobile demobilisation centres, where former 
combatants will be required to report to a centre and register before going to their 
communities. Thereafter, they will be reporting to accomplish the remaining tasks 
in the demobilisation process (Ibid.: 30). According to Özerdem (2009: 30), there 
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is consensus in the literature that mobile demobilisation is best suited when 
dealing with the following conditions: 
First, the caseload is formed by disciplined and recognizable units. In the 
second scenario combatants are already based with their communities, 
therefore, it would not make sense to move them from their communities 
to cantonment areas, and then back to their communities. Finally, in 
environments where combatants are scattered over a big area and the 
majority of them are unwilling to demobilize, then such mobile 
demobilization centres can provide an additional advantage to encourage 
all combatants to demobilize (Özerdem, 2009: 30). 
 
Mobile cantonment shortens the duration of time required for demobilisation and 
is less costly because it is logistically less demanding and is most preferred by 
vulnerable groups that suspect their security will be threatened by staying for a 
very long period at cantonment locations (Ibid.). Mobile demobilisation centres 
are not regimented and coercive in nature and so hasten the breakup of the C&C 
structures of the combatants. However, demobilisation without cantonment has 
some drawbacks when juxtaposed against the numerous advantages of 
cantonment highlighted above. For instance, cantonment provides a rare 
opportunity for ex-combatants that missed surrendering their weapons during 
disarmament to do so. A major disadvantage linked to mobile demobilisation is 
the apparent political and security risk involved in releasing ex-combatants to the 
larger society without gauging their level of commitment to the peace process 
(Ibid.). In the absence of cantonment, it will be difficult to comprehensively 
accomplish routines such as health and voluntary HIV/AIDS screening, 
counselling and other relevant briefing offered to combatants at cantonment sites. 
Finally, I do concur with Özerdem that cantonment has the potential of reinforcing 
vertical and horizontal dimensions of C&C structures that demobilisation is 
supposed to dismantle, especially when the DDR participants are comprised of 
mainly Second-Generation militias. The extent cantonment affected the DDR 
process in the Niger Delta will be explored further in this thesis. 
2.5.3. Payment of Reinsertion Assistance During Demobilisation 
The provision of reinsertion supports to demobilising combatants, is critical to the 
overall success of the DDR process; this is because after demobilisation and prior 
to reintegration, ex-combatants are left without any means of income to take care 
of themselves, families and dependants (Jensen & Stepputat, 2001: 13-14; 
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Özerdem, 1999: 31). Consequently, the provision of reinsertion support becomes 
handy as a safety net that helps ex-combatants to cope with the challenges of 
transiting from conflict as a source of livelihood. Such assistance can last up to 
six to twelve months and should cover their basic needs including families and 
dependants (Colleta et al., 1996: 15 and Kostner, 2001: 1).  
In the immediate aftermath of war, ex-combatants and their dependants’ needs 
can be classified into two broad areas, namely; ‘household consumption, such as 
food, clothes, healthcare and children’s education; and household investment, 
such as shelter, agricultural tools and kitchen utensils’ (Özerdem, 2009: 32). The 
debate in the literature on reinsertion revolves around whether ex-combatants 
should be supported in cash or in material form, or a combination of the two. 
Özerdem et al (2008: 10) argue in support of both when they observe that 
‘reinsertion benefits involve a mix of material and monetary assistance to the 
families of the ex-combatants easing the transition to civilian life; it includes food 
supplements, indemnity payments and cash allowances.’ Ball (1997: 89) and Ball 
(2006: 16) provided a comprehensive list of ‘potential support to ex-combatants 
during assembly and discharge’.5 
According to, Colleta et al., (1996: 15), whether cash or material reinsertion is 
decided is contingent on certain conditions ranging from the relative cost of the 
transaction, the financial capacity of the banking or postal system, and the overall 
logistics capability of the agency responsible for implementation. According to 
Knight and Özerdem (2004: 511):  
...five primary issues must be addressed when planning cash reinsertion 
assistance: the mobilization of funds, differentiation criteria, the amount of 
allowance, financial education and the development of a non-corruptible 
identification system. Alongside the overall challenge for the DDR process 
in general, mobilization of the necessary funds for financial reinsertion 
assistance is obviously the first obstacle to be overcome in this process. 
 
If financial reinsertion support is to be provided, then efforts must be made to 
mobilise adequate funding so that it can be sustained throughout the stipulated 
                                                          
5. According to Ball potential support to ex-combatants during assembly includes: ‘food, shelter, 
clothing, sanitation, medical exams, basic education, leisure activities, orientation on adjusting to 
civilian life, including financial counselling, health counselling, civic duties, income generation (for 
soldiers and spouses, assistance to child soldiers, census, discharge and documentation’. During 
discharge potential support include ‘short-term food supplements, transport, orientation on 
conditions in district of residence and first tranche of reinsertion benefits’. 
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period. This is because any sudden stoppage could trigger a negative reaction 
on the part of the ex-combatants. The eligibility criteria for determining who 
should benefit from reinsertion support should be transparently decided to avoid 
discrimination, particularly against female and child combatants (Knight and 
Özerdem, 2004: 511). Another conundrum that needs to be resolved is the 
correct amount to be paid to ex-combatants; that is, are they to be treated 
homogeneously or differently? I am of the view that the hierarchy of the ex-
combatants and the distance of their respective communities of resettlement will 
warrant the payment of different amounts. Nevertheless, irrespective of these 
considerations the disparity should not be too much so that it will not trigger 
resentment within the ex-combatants which could undermine the demobilisation 
process and the DDR programme in general. Generally, the golden rule is that 
the amount to be paid should not be too high to discourage the ex-combatants 
from seeking alternative sustainable sources of income (Berdal, 1996: 47 and 
Özerdem, 2009: 33-34). Berdal and Özerdem also maintain that it should not be 
far above the general income level in the local community the ex-combatants are 
returning to as it would potentially lead to resentment against them (Berdal, 1996: 
47). In Uganda, a uniform method known as ‘egalitarian differentiation’ was 
applied; a situation whereby ‘it was the same for all former combatants, 
irrespective of their rank, age or years of service’ (Özerdem, 2009: 33). 
Conversely, in Ethiopia, the yardsticks for determining the amount to be paid were 
years of service, intended location of settlement whether urban or rural and the 
level of disability (Knight and Özerdem, 2004: 511). Closely related to the 
question of how much to pay is whether the amount to be paid should be given 
in bulk payment or instalments. Some argue that ex-combatants lack the financial 
experience to prudently manage and utilise bulk amounts paid to them at once 
(World Bank, 1993: 59-68). Given this challenge, for financial reinsertion support 
to be meaningful, payment should preferably be made by instalments, while 
during cantonment a series of financial education lectures and counselling should 
be given to ex-combatants (Knight and Özerdem, 2004: 512 and Özerdem, 2009: 
34). Furthermore, to guarantee against impersonation, it will be appropriate for 
beneficiaries, once they have been registered, to be issued with non-transferable 
identification card with his or her individual picture embossed on the card 
(Özerdem, 2009: 35).  
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Several advantages and disadvantages associated with cash payments have 
been identified; in terms of advantages, cash reinsertion support tends to be 
flexible, reduce overhead costs, is more amenable to transparent handling, and 
is accountable and responsive to the needs of ex-combatants (Fusato, 2003: 7). 
It also has a positive psychological effect because ex-combatants see it as a form 
of empowerment (Ibid.: 7).  
However, some drawbacks associated with cash payments include their potential 
to encourage ex-combatants to turn the cantonment site into a permanent place 
of abode and become nonchalant towards becoming self-sustaining in life (Isima, 
2004: 5). Cash payments may be susceptible to fraudulent abuse and corruption, 
particularly where a good system of accountability is not in place (Ibid.). It is 
equally argued that cash payments to ex-combatants may potentially open a 
floodgate of demands on their part, and when unmet can induce frustration 
leading to protest and ultimately remobilisation (Willibald, 2006: 325). 
Additionally, when payment of cash is made at disarmament and demobilisation 
centres, it has the potential to produce a cash for weapon perception, and this, in 
turn, will trigger corruption, insecurity and regional weapons proliferation 
(Willibald, 2006: 331). In addition, when payment of cash in the entire DDR 
process is targeted at the ex-combatants, be it at disarmament or reinsertion 
stages to the exclusion of other victims of conflict in society, it may potentially 
encourage ex-combatants to perceive themselves as a special group of people 
that must be appeased. This, in turn, can potentially generate resentment against 
them which may jeopardise their reintegration (Ibid.: 332). 
My contention, notwithstanding the evidence in support of cash reinsertion 
support, is that; it should not be considered in complete isolation from material 
support (Özerdem, 2009: 35). In this regard, Colleta et al, (1996: 16-18) identify 
three major forms of material reinsertion support that are critical to the 
stabilisation of ex-combatants. Specifically, ex-combatants need to be assisted 
with basic building materials, such as roofing sheets, cement etc., in order to fast-
track, the process of owning their own shelter (Ibid.). Similarly, in the initial period 
of their settlement, ex-combatants need to be provided with medical services and 
educational support for their children (Ibid.).  
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2.6. Review of Relevant Literature: Reintegration 
Reintegration is the third phase of the DDR process, as contained in the UN 
IDDRS (2006) and the most important and critical phase in the process (Kingman, 
2000: 28 and Shibuya, 2012: 85), yet it is the least funded. Buttressing this point 
further, Shibuya (2012: 85) argues that ‘it is the point where everything comes 
together, placing the former combatants and the larger community on the path to 
long-term peace.’ This suggests that reintegration is the phase when the 
achievements recorded during the disarmament and demobilisation phases of 
the DDR process are consolidated. As argued by Özerdem (2009: 21); it is a long-
term process during which the entire DDR process coalesces with a country’s 
broader national development agenda. Regrettably, Ginifer et al observe that: 
 
The development component of DDR (reintegration) has tended to be 
relatively short-term and under-resourced. There tends to be disjunction 
between the ‘security’ phase of DDR (disarmament/demobilisation) 
implemented primarily by the military and well-funded, and the 
reintegration phase funded from voluntary contributions and implemented 
by international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and 
development agencies with considerably less resources (Ginifer, 2004: 5). 
The review section on reintegration will be structured around minimalist and 
maximalist perspectives on reintegration, the conventional conception and 
approach to reintegration and the nonconventional views. Likewise, the question 
of funding and ownership of the reintegration phase of the DDR process and the 
dilemma of measuring success will also be examined. 
2.6.1. Minimalist and Maximalist Perspectives on Reintegration 
In the conceptualisation of DDR, two divergent schools of thought have emerged 
about how DDR and in particular the reintegration phase has been problematised; 
either as a minimalist agenda of improving security or maximalist agenda of an 
opportunity for development and reconstruction (Özerdem et al., 2008: 4-5 and 
Özerdem, 2009: 45). Muggah expounded the two perspectives in this way: 
In addition to competing definitions of various aspects of DDR…there are 
also deeply rooted philosophical differences associated with the objective 
of DDR itself. Very generally, DDR can be viewed on a continuum: from a 
minimalist (improving security) to a maximalist (as an opportunity for 
development and reconstruction) perspective (Muggah, 2004: 27). 
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Similarly, for Jennings (2008:6) the minimalist DDR approach aims to give former 
fighters something to do after being demobilised while the maximalist tends to 
have a transformative agenda of addressing underlying sources of conflict and 
pre-conflict grievances. Therefore, when a reintegration process is premised on 
minimalist assumptions, it will largely focus on managing ex-combatants as a 
security threat and potential ‘spoilers’ and obstacles to peace and stability, who 
immediately after their demobilisation must be provided with vocational skills and 
jobs so as to keep them busy (Muggah, 2006: 200 and Jennings, 2008: 6-7). 
Conversely, if it is conceived as an avenue for development, reintegration will be 
premised on a socioeconomic transformative agenda that seeks to address the 
underlying sources of conflict in which ex-combatants and their dependants will 
be regarded as a potential source of human capital that can positively contribute 
to the post-conflict peacebuilding process (Ibid.). According to Özerdem (2008: 
4-5) and Muggah (2009: 14), organisations such as the United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKOs) subscribe to the 
minimalist perspective of DDR, while others such as the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and World Bank advocate for a more 
maximalist approach.6 Accordingly, the above conflicting perspectives on 
reintegration has led to conflicting operationalisation and ambiguity in the current 
practice of reintegration across different DDR programmes which Jennings 
(2008: 327-345) has demonstrated using the Liberian reintegration experience as 
an empirical case study. Jennings argues that, in Liberia, the reintegration 
literature was replete with phrases that suggest a maximalist agenda but in 
practical terms, it was implemented as a minimalist project that aimed to achieve 
security stabilisation. Suffice to say that my evaluation of the Niger Delta ADDR 
programme will disentangle which perspective; minimalist or maximalist informed 
its conceptualisation, implementation and why. 
 
                                                          
6. Muggah referred to the World Bank as advocating for a maximalist oriented DDR. However, the 
kind of development agenda it implements which generally falls under the liberal peacebuilding 
agenda and neoliberal market reforms have been heavily criticised as counterproductive to the 
basic needs of societies emerging from violent conflict. See for example 1. Paris, R. (2004). At 
war’s end: building peace after civil conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Sad-
Filho, A. and Johnston, D. (2005). Neoliberalism: a critical reader. (ed.). London:  Pluto Press. 3.  
Newman, E. Paris, R. and Richmond, O. P. (2009). New perspective on liberal peacebuilding. 
(ed.) New York: United Nations University Press.  
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Given my earlier conceptualisation of combatants and militias, I will argue that 
the question of whether ex-combatants are regarded as a security threat and 
potential spoilers of the peace process or as possessing human resource capital 
that can positively contribute to postconflict peacebuilding depend on what type 
of combatants constitute the DDR caseload. In this case, it is my contention that 
if the DDR caseload mainly consists of militias of the Second-Generation type 
(see Francis, 2005: 1-3) then there is a high potential that they may constitute a 
security threat by becoming spoilers of the peace process and transition. This is 
because they generally have more limited human capital skills beyond weapon 
handling that can easily be transferrable to the civilian economy thereby making 
their reintegration into the civilian economy very difficult. However, there may be 
less security threat and the possibility of spoiling or undermining the peace 
process if the caseload consists of combatants from conventional armed forces 
or statutory forces as conceptualised by Gleichmann (2004: 29). I argue so 
because beyond weapon handling skills members of conventional armed or 
statutory forces tend to have more human capital potentials that can easily be 
transferable to the civilian economy thereby making it easy for them to reintegrate 
into the civilian economy. 
 
At this juncture, it suffices to point out that the minimalist versus maximalist 
perspectives of DDR can be subsumed into the broader theoretical debates 
between traditionalist and wideners in the field of security which eventually led to 
a paradigm shift in the conceptualisation of security and the emergence of the 
concept of human security. This, in turn, triggered a new debate regarding the 
nexus between security and development both at the academic and policymaking 
level. At the policymaking level, there was an increasing concern about ‘… [how] 
war’s destructive impact undermined development in both the short and long term 
and the roles of economic and social factors in conflict…’ (Fukuda-Parr, 2010: 
19). This development signalled the merging of security and development in both 
academic and policy arenas.  
 
Hitherto, the traditionalists’ conception and understanding of security dominated 
the field of security during the Cold War era. In this perspective security was 
understood as ‘freedom from any objective threat to the state survival…’ (Sulovic, 
2010:2). However, wideners’ canvassed for the broadening of the security 
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agenda and the understanding of threats to national security to include economic, 
political, social and environmental threats (Ullman, 1983: 129-153; Mathews, 
1989: 162-177; Jones, 1990: 3-7; Booth, 1991: 313-326; Booth, 1997: 83-119; 
Ayoob, 1997: 121-146; Wilkin, 2002: 633-645; Landman, 2006: 21; Tigerstrom, 
2007: 1-5; 7-26; Gromes & Banacker, 2007: 2; Biswas, 2011: 1-22 and Spear & 
Williams, 2012: 11-16 and Dannreuther, 2013: 1-11& 47-48). The broadening of 
the definition of security and security agendas was reflected in the emergence of 
the concept of human security popularised by the United Nations Development 
Programme’s 1994 Human Development Report which defined human security 
as ‘… freedom from fear… [and] freedom from want’ (Ibid.: 24). The report further 
identifies economic security, food security, health security, environmental 
security, personal security, community security and political security as the 
significant threats to human security.  In this case, freedom from fear suggests 
‘… a condition of existence in which human dignity is realized, embracing not only 
physical safety but going beyond that to include meaningful participation in the 
life of the community, control over one’s life and so forth’ (Thomas, 2007: 108-
109). It also connotes ‘… freedom from domination/exploitation…’(Ibid.). 
Similarly, ‘… human security as freedom from want describes a condition of 
existence in which basic material needs are met, and in which there is a 
reasonable expectation that protection will be afforded during any crisis or 
downturn-natural or man-made- so that survival is not threatened’ (Ibid.).  
 
The above suggests that contemporary sources of threat to security are not 
necessarily military in nature but equally development based. The aftermath of 
this dynamism in the field of security studies and the consequent consensus on 
the reconceptualization of security and security agendas was the merging of 
security and development which reinforces the strong nexus between security 
and development both in theory and practice. In other words, it resulted in the 
coalescing of security and development both in academic and policy arenas and 
the recognition of the fact that development can only take place when there is 
security and then development will, in turn, reinforce security (see Stewart, 2004: 
261-288). For instance, in buttressing this contention, the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD, 1997: 1) asserts that ‘wars have set back development 
severely in many countries, including in some of the poorest; excessive military 
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expenditures have too often taken priority over more productive public 
investments…’ Similarly, on its part, the United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development (2005: 7) has observed that ‘…development agencies 
cannot ignore the impact that security threats at all levels-local, national and 
global-have on poor people. At the same time, the world community cannot ignore 
the critical role of poverty and inequality in increasing risks for us all’. This implies 
that dysfunctional security systems can undermine the possibility of achieving 
peace, social and economic development and vice-versa (Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, 2001: 37). Thus, increasingly 
recognition is being given to the reciprocal role and interaction between 
development and security in both academic and policy arenas (Ibid.) Accordingly, 
the overall contention here is that: 
 
Peace is essential for development, and vice versa: development is 
essential for lasting and sustainable peace. Without peace we will not win 
the fight against poverty. Without peace the Millennium Development 
Goals will be… unrealistic promises. Violent conflict leads to and 
exacerbates poverty, and poverty is often a cause of violent conflict. (Also) 
conflicts are a serious threat to development… (Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2004: 10). 
 
Overall, my contention is that the paradigm shift in the re-conceptualisation of 
security has elevated and brought to the front burner the need to prioritise the 
security of individuals, families and communities as against State security. 
Nevertheless, some scholars have expressed critical opinions against the 
securitisation of development in the Global South by external actors from the 
Global North (Mcgrew, 2007: 12). Similarly, many have interrogated the concept 
of human security both as a theoretical and empirical concept. For instance, 
Woods (2005: 394) contends that security concerns have always been a prime 
consideration in rendering development aid, but with the securitisation of 
development ‘new security concerns have rapidly come to dominate foreign 
policy since the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001’. This 
suggests that the moral underpinning behind aid and development assistance 
has been displaced by security considerations. The consequence of this 
displacement is that ‘donors may hijack foreign aid to pursue their own security 
objectives rather than those which would help the poorest’ (Ibid: 393).  
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In the same vein, Duffield (2007: 2) argues that the way multilateral development 
organisations and bilateral donors direct and coordinate their activities aiming 
them at regions of conflict and volatility in the Global South suggests that human 
security has become one of the ‘… technologies in securing the Western way of 
life’. This connotes that, human security is exported to the Global South as an 
antidote to conflict and insecurity for a secured Global North instead of being a 
genuine response to the development concerns of the Global South. Similarly, 
Mcgrew (2007: 13) observes that one apparent danger of securitisation is that it 
‘… may provoke a covert, and sometimes overt, process of militarization’. This 
suggests the likelihood that securitisation can undermine the goal of human 
security by providing justification for external intervention under the pretext of 
advancing the goal of human security. As he notes: 
 
Securitization also harbours the potential risk that legitimate rationales or 
pretexts for, and modes of, external intervention in the domestic affairs of 
developing states are expanded. In this regards the progressive notion of 
human security, or protective security… which is conceived as an 
alternative to orthodox or realist discourses of security, may unintentionally 
widen the parameters of legitimate interventionism. Framing development 
in terms of human security, as is currently the dominant progressive view, 
paradoxically may expose its subject to new insecurities (Ibid.). 
 
Furthermore, even as a theoretical and empirical concept, human security has 
come under heavy criticism. Paris’s (2001: 87-102) seminal article titled ‘Human 
security: paradigm shift or hot air?’ argues that ‘human security does not appear 
to offer a particularly useful framework of analysis for scholars or policymakers’ 
(Ibid.: 96). Consequently, he doubts if the concept of human security can serve 
as a meaningful practical guide both for academic inquiry or at the level of 
governmental policymaking (Ibid.: 88). Indeed, part of the problem he contends 
is that: 
 
… the concept lacks a precise definition… everyone is for it, but few people 
have a clear idea of what it means. Existing definitions of human security 
tend to be extraordinarily expansive and vague, encompassing everything 
from physical security to psychological well-being, which provides 
policymakers with little guidance in the prioritization of competing policy 
goals and academics little sense of what, exactly, is to be studied (Ibid.). 
 
Nonetheless, irrespective of the myriad of criticisms against human security both 
as a theoretical and empirical concept and the potential of its abuse by global 
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hegemonic powers the case for a paradigm shift in the conceptualisation of 
security and a broadening of security agendas is quite compelling. This is 
because contemporary threats to State security are largely due to lack of human 
security and development rather than to external military threats. For instance, 
Nickels in a paper presented at the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (2014: 1) 
argues that Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram all ‘… emerged from 
conditions of relative deprivation and perceived marginalization of specific 
communities… each group exploited local grievances as well as the inability by 
central government to address the sources of social, political and economic 
exclusion’. So also, Salam (2012:150-151) argues in the case of Boko Haram in 
Nigeria. Consequently, to what extent the conceptualisation, planning and 
execution of the Niger Delta ADDR programme take due cognisance of the 
coalescing of security and development will be explored throughout this thesis. 
2.6.2. Minimalist Perspective and Assumptions on Reintegration and 
Counter Views 
 
Within the framework of a minimalist approach to DDR, reintegration is 
conceptualised and operationalised as a security project aimed at ensuring that 
ex-combatants acquire civilian status by reintegrating into their communities of 
choice as well as gaining sustainable means of livelihood. A major implication of 
the minimalist conceptualisation and approach to DDR is the securitisation of 
reintegration (Buzan et al., 1988: 23-24). And in my contention, the securitisation 
of reintegration involves two things. Foremost, in the post conflict era, ex-
combatants may be identified and framed as a potent threat (existential threat) to 
peace and security which therefore requires that extraordinary attention is paid 
to them in order to mitigate the potential threat they pose. Thus, postconflict 
peace and security have become the referent object to be preserved from a 
potential outburst by ex-combatants. Additionally, reintegration is essentially 
implemented as a security project that aims to mitigate these threats through the 
provision of vocational jobs’ skills to ex-combatants. An important example of this 
securitised view of demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants is Collier 
(1994: 343-351), who argues that failure to achieve successful economic 
reintegration of the ex-combatants might trigger micro and macro insecurity 
challenges in the post-conflict era. Collier also argues that macro insecurity 
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challenges might arise because the failure to provide ex-combatants with 
sustainable job opportunities could trigger frustration. Consequently, ex-
combatants would resort to predatory activities on their fellow citizens. This may 
also happen because ex-combatants are highly skilled in the use of arms, which 
gives them a comparative advantage in criminal activities. As Collier notes: 
There are two reasons to expect that demobilization might increase crime. 
Demobilized soldiers are not placed into employment and so start their 
civilian life as unemployed. It is likely that the lack of an income source 
increases the propensity to commit crimes. Additionally, soldiers tend to 
be unskilled, except in the use of weapons, and so might have a 
comparative advantage in criminal activities (Collier, 1994: 344). 
 
On macro-insecurity, Collier states that demobilised but unemployed ex-
combatants are likely to be frustrated and so might at the slightest opportunity 
vent their frustration against the State that represents their source of frustration. 
He contends that ‘demobilisation might affect macro-insecurity through two 
routes. Firstly, demobilized ex-combatants poorly integrated into the economy, 
and therefore disaffected, constitute a pool of potential recruits for a subsequent 
military challenge to the state’ (Collier, 1994: 348). Taking the debate further in 
support of the securitisation of reintegration, Colleta et al., (1996: 18) argue that 
‘…failure to achieve reintegration can lead to considerable insecurity at the 
societal and individual levels, including rent-seeking behaviour through the barrel 
of a gun’. Thus, ‘successful economic reintegration of ex-combatants has become 
crucial to improve security and stability…’ (Cartagenaddr.org, 2009: 60-61). 
The long-term implication of this securitised conceptualisation and approach to 
reintegration is the recurrent security threat label attached to all ex-combatants 
notwithstanding their heterogeneous nature as I earlier conceptualised in the 
beginning of this chapter (see McMullin, 2013: 20). Thus, whether ex-combatants 
would constitute a threat to postconflict peace and security depends on the nature 
of the ex-combatants. For example, demobilising ex-combatants of conventional 
armed forces and statutory military forces who possess immense human 
resource capabilities may not necessarily constitute a source of instability in the 
aftermath of demobilisation. For instance, immediately after the transition from 
military dictatorship to a democratic system of governance in 1999, Nigeria 
carried out a massive demobilisation of members of its armed forces as a way of 
depoliticising and re-professionalising the Nigerian armed forces. However, the 
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demobilisation process did not result in any micro or macro security threats 
neither did the demobilised personnel undermine the process of democratic 
transition and consolidation. Indeed, the demobilised officers and soldiers did not 
find any problem reintegrating into society because of the enormous human 
resource potentials they possessed which made it easier for them to fit into the 
civilian economy and public service bureaucracy. More so, demobilised ex-
combatants of conventional armed forces and statutory military forces are 
economically secured to some extent because they are entitled to gratuity and 
pension payments for the military service they rendered to the State.  
Similarly, Mcmullin (2012: 1-30) takes the concerns about the representation of 
ex-combatants further by positing that the current discourse that informs the 
practice of DDR is replete with narratives of ex-combatants as a security threat. 
The threat and resentment narratives are two narratives that Mcmullin found to 
be consistently mentioned and which have turned out to be counterproductive to 
reintegration. Citing the Liberian reintegration experience, Mcmullin argues that 
a consistent sweeping generalisation was made about ex-combatants as 
common criminals, troublesome and greedy which led to a rigid generalised 
perception of them as the most potent security threat in post-conflict Liberia. 
Equally, the resentment narratives presented ex-combatants as perpetrators of 
violence while the community as a victim and thus the ex-combatants as 
undeserving of any reintegration assistance. Consequently, these reintegration 
narratives reified the dichotomy between ex-combatants and community to the 
level of in-group and out-group distinction which in turn further stigmatised, 
estranged and widened the gap between them and the community while the goal 
is to close it (Mcmullin, 2012: 29). In line with Mcmullin’s position, I do not support 
the sweeping generalisation narratives in the DDR literature that portrays an over 
deterministic and negative world view of all categories of ex-combatants as 
unreformed criminals reminiscent of the classical criminological theories of 
natural born criminals with little possibility of being reformed (see Gottfredson & 
Hirschi, 1990: 47-63 and Haralambos & Holborn, 1991: 582-583 on the natural 
born criminal). This is because such narratives fail to critically interrogate the role 
of the state, existing power structures and relations in society and inequality in 
triggering violent conflict (see Francis, 2006: 34-37 & Williams, 2011: 55-71). Yet, 
I am also of the contention that to some extent the validity of the securitised 
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narrative about ex-combatants cannot be completely disputed or taken for 
granted. This is particularly the case when dealing with a large caseload of ex-
combatants of the Second-Generation type of militias who as Francis (2005: 1-3) 
argues tend to undermine and contest the legitimacy of the state and its monopoly 
of force and lack the skills and human resource potentials to easily reintegrate 
into mainstream society and economy. The above being the case, one could 
argue that the extreme securitisation of Liberian ex-combatants in the DDR 
literature as pointed by Mcmullin was not completely out of place because they 
represented archetypal Second-Generation militias.  
Equally important, Nubler (2000: 45-77) arguing from a human resources 
perspective, criticises the securitised perception of ex-combatants, by contending 
that demobilisation and reintegration provide post-conflict societies with a window 
of opportunity to tap into the enormous human resource capabilities of ex-
combatants for development purposes. This is because demobilisation and 
reintegration release massive human resource potentials hitherto held up in 
military service. Nubler portrays a positive view of ex-combatants against the 
securitised world-view that sees them as a source of destabilisation and 
insecurity that must be kept busy through the mere provision of vocational jobs. 
In Nubler’s contention, ex-combatants are potential key drivers of the 
socioeconomic and political transformation of the postconflict society that can 
immensely contribute to the process of jumpstarting the economy of peace. As 
he notes:  
The ultimate objective of demobilization and reintegration efforts should 
be to improve the welfare of people. At the same time, people and their 
capabilities are considered an important means and instrument in 
achieving the various economic, social and political objectives of 
demobilization and reintegration. Demobilization of combatants frees 
human potentials that can contribute to achieving these objectives if 
available skills and competence are used effectively and if people without 
any skills, or with only few, are endowed with useful skills and 
qualifications (Nubler, 2000: 45). 
 
Again, to some extent I agree with the position advanced by Nubler that 
demobilised members of conventional armed forces and statutory military forces 
have great potential to contribute to socio-economic development, given the 
enormous wealth of experience and training they have acquired during their years 
of military service of which some are transferable to civilian economy. For 
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instance, demobilised military engineers easily reintegrate into the construction 
industry.  Hence, labelling them as a security risk does not reflect the true reality 
about them. To buttress this, the Ghana Armed Forces (n.d.) revealed on its 
website that the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College is ‘… a world 
class college and a regional training centre, not only in Defence and Military 
Studies, but also in Governance and Leadership, International Politics, 
Administration and Management, as well as Crisis and Conflict Management’. 
Suffice to say that a critical look at these courses shows that the knowledge and 
skills to be obtained from the courses can be applied in post-service life. Similarly, 
the British Army (n.d.) stated on its website that: 
The Army is committed to ensuring that serving personnel have 
opportunities to continue their personal development throughout their 
Army careers. There is a wide range of courses available to serving 
personnel and they are at different education and skills’ levels, from basic 
computers to distance-learning degrees… The gaining of qualifications is 
an on-going process that spans… [the entire] career. Many of the Army 
qualifications that can be gained are matched to civilian qualifications (or 
accredited), improving… prospects when leaving the Army (The British 
Army Website, n. d). 
The above clearly suggests that ex-combatants of conventional armed forces and 
statutory military forces have enormous transferable human capital skills that can 
fit into the civilian economy and public service after being demobilised. Indeed, 
this explains why it is possible for one to complete his or her military career, retire 
and become an academic, politician or tycoon; yet difficult for one to retire from 
an academic career and become a military officer. However, while I concur with 
Nubler’s position in the case of ex-combatants of conventional armed forces and 
statutory military forces his position may not be all that correct when dealing with 
ex-combatants of the Second-Generation militias type who in most cases lack 
formal education and military training. This is because as Francis (2005: 1-3) 
pointed they ‘… do not have any military training provision, and even when they 
do have, it takes the form of basic training sometimes limited to the use of small 
arms and light weapons’. Similarly, as pointed out by Ikelegbe and Okumu (2010: 
4) ‘a militia is an armed force of ordinary persons’ which suggests that most of 
them are likely to be uneducated, without formal skills and therefore have very 
little transferable skills that could contribute to socio-economic development 
beyond the subsistence level. Thus, the likelihood for them to resort to rent-
seeking behaviours by the barrel of a gun. 
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In another vein, the conventional approach and practice to reintegration is also 
founded on certain taken for granted assumptions which are inherently faulty and 
which often results in defective programming and implementation as 
demonstrated by Vries and Wiegink (2011: 46). For instance, in the conventional 
approach, ‘it seems to be an underlying assumption of DDR programmes that 
former combatants want to go home after demobilisation’ (Ibid.). But this 
assumption has been contested by Kingma (2002: 181-201) who maintains that 
not all ex-combatants will want to return to their former communities for various 
reasons such as their skills having more relevance elsewhere, the villages from 
which they come from have been destroyed or because of the atrocities they 
committed against their communities during war. Expounding on this, Shibuya 
(2012: 89) argues that the assumption that ex-combatants will want to return to 
their former communities gives the impression of a socially functional society 
waiting for ex-combatants to return while in actual reality most post-conflict 
societies are fragile and dysfunctional in nature.  
Thus, against the backdrop of these assertions, Vries and Wiegink (2011: 44) 
raised the all-important question of reintegration into what? Arguing further, Vries 
and Wiegink (2011: 46) maintain that even after ex-combatants returned to their 
communities, their successful reintegration is not automatically guaranteed but 
contingent on certain factors. For example, the kind of attitudes they exhibit in 
their various localities and expectations their communities and families harbour 
about them will determine whether they will be socially reintegrated or not (Ibid). 
Ex-combatants that return home as benevolent and humble persons reaching out 
to everyone in the community can easily be socially reintegrated (Ibid). But those 
that return with the perception that they have been battle-tested, and hence have 
come of age, and so will not subordinate themselves to traditional authority will 
find it difficult to socially reintegrate and therefore stand the risk of being rejected. 
Vries and Wiegink (2011: 46) contend that in most cases ex-combatants are 
contemptuous of traditional authority which makes it difficult for them to 
reintegrate. In a similar vein, Hazen’s (n.d.: 10) contend that the successful 
reintegration of ex-combatants depends on the level of contrition they show and 
commitment towards the development and growth of society. Failure to 
demonstrate these attributes will lead to friction and frosty relations between the 
ex-combatants and their communities.   
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In another vein, Reno (2007: 324-342) argues that non-state armed groups can 
be classified into two, namely, predatory or community-based. Predatory armed 
groups tend to prey on their fellow citizens and in the process, perpetrate gross 
human rights violations and war crimes, as experienced during the war in Sierra-
Leone and Liberia. Conversely, community-based armed groups are essentially 
protective of their people and therefore do not commit violence against their 
community members (Ibid.). Drawing insight from Reno’s postulation, Podder 
(2012: 186-202) in reference to Liberia debunks the assumption that once ex-
combatants successfully return to their communities their reintegration is a 
foregone conclusion and argues that what determines whether they will 
successfully reintegrate or not is highly dependent on the kind of violence they 
perpetrated against their communities during war. Similar conclusions were 
drawn by Humphreys and Weinstein (2005: 20) in their study of ex-combatants’ 
reintegration in Sierra Leone in which they noted that ‘a combatant’s experience 
of the war – in particular, the extent to which he or she engaged in abusive 
practices – is the most important determinant of acceptance.’ Consequently, the 
extent to which the type of violence perpetrated by ex-militants of the Niger Delta 
impacts on their reintegration process will be further explored in this study.  
More generally, in view of the conceptual ambiguity, programming and 
implementation conundrum that characterises the minimalist reintegration 
approach, a call has been made for its re-evaluation. As argued by Özerdem 
(2012: 51-73), existing literature on reintegration prioritises economic 
reintegration at the expense of social and political because ‘…reintegration 
assistance is seen as a way of contributing to the establishment of post-conflict 
security. Therefore, the assistance package often incorporates mainly economic 
rehabilitation and skills training programmes’ (Ibid.: 58). Thus, in Özerdem’s 
contention, it falls short of genuine reintegration but serves as a palliative that 
merely assists ex-combatants to kick-start their post-conflict lives (Ibid.: 59), 
hence he terms all ex-combatant-based rehabilitative activities as the reinsertion 
approach. Given the inadequacy of the approach, he suggests a new re-
conceptualised model of reintegration that focuses on ex-combatants as 
members of the community whereby their needs and that of the community are 
concurrently addressed instead of treating them in isolation.  
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I am therefore in accord with Özerdem’s suggestion for a re-conceptualised 
approach to reintegration because it has the potential to transform the practice of 
reintegration in a more positive way towards the attainment of lasting peace. 
Again, it can also hasten and enhance the extent to which ex-combatants can be 
accepted by their communities. Similarly, Özerdem’s advocating of treating ex-
combatants needs simultaneously with that of the community means treating their 
grievances together with that of the wider community. This implies empowering 
ex-combatants and other victims of conflict concurrently. 
2.6.3. The Funding and Ownership of DDR 
One of the current issues that have engaged the attention of academics and DDR 
experts, is the financing and ownership of DDR programmes. The contention 
revolves around whether those that fund DDR programmes, in general, such as 
the UN and its agencies, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) and other donor agencies 
should arrogate to themselves the right and power to conceive, design and 
determine the implementation of DDR and reintegration programmes. This is in 
line with the dictum that says, ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune’. Alternatively, 
should the benefiting societies be given the opportunity to take ownership of the 
DDR process particularly the reintegration phase while international agencies 
provide the necessary funding and advice. Accordingly, Colleta et al., (1996: 30) 
state that the reintegration phase of DDR has remained a contested terrain due 
to incompatible agendas between the recipient societies and donors who want to 
impose their agendas, 
Similarly, Shibuya (2012: 123) maintains that ‘every DDR project faces several 
levels of leadership challenges. First, any DDR program with international 
involvement has to deal with the “international vs. domestic” leadership problem.’ 
This implies a possible clash of interest between the national government and 
international partners. It is against this backdrop that Özerdem (2009: 48) asks 
the rhetorical question; is reintegration only meant for the international 
community? He contends that ‘…the current practice indicates that… the 
importance of communities is still not adequately recognised by donors, nor is it 
incorporated into their undertakings’ (Ibid.: 48). In the same vein, Özerdem 
argues that what in most cases is adduced as community-based reintegration 
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programmes, are largely planned and implemented by external financiers and 
donors without any inputs from the beneficiaries; hence they can best be 
described as community-located approaches rather than community-based 
(Özerdem, 2012: 59). According to Berdal (1996: 48), this approach ignores the 
fact that reintegration training opportunities that directly involved beneficiaries in 
the process of planning and implementation has the greatest probability of 
succeeding as experience has demonstrated in Somaliland and Eritrea.  
Furthermore, the implementation of DDR and other post-conflict peacebuilding 
programmes is funded by numerous multilateral and independent funding 
agencies with each of the agencies focused on a different aspect of the DDR 
process in line with its mandate. Consequently, Muggah (2006: 190-205) asserts 
that their commitment to funding is determined by their different mandates and 
agendas. Muggah also posits that while disarmament and demobilisation are 
usually funded by the assessed budget of the United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations the budget does not take care of reintegration. 
Conversely, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) limit their 
funding to demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants and the broader 
postconflict peacebuilding and reconstruction processes (Muggah, 2006: 200). 
According to Muggah this results in ‘…poor appreciation among donors of the 
various dimensions of DDR and weapons reduction programs’ (Ibid.: 200). 
Consequently, agencies such as the United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations focus on security and stabilisation, while the World 
Bank and IMF concentrate on broader issues of development (Ibid: 200). Ginifer 
(1997: 7) corroborates this by arguing that, a major challenge to United Nations 
Peace Missions has been the lack of policy coordination between the Secretariat 
and Bretton Woods’s institutions, resulting in the pursuit of contradictory policies.  
Thus, the conflicting agendas of the various funding agencies, lack of 
coordination and rivalry amongst them can undermine the goals of DDR. Castillo 
(2008: 1-47) buttresses this position by arguing that the main reason for DDR and 
post-conflict reconstruction is political; which is to achieve security and stability 
to avoid a relapse into war. This implies that the political objective is paramount 
and overrides any other consideration such as economic objectives, particularly 
during the immediate post-conflict transition period. This connotes that whenever 
there is a conflict between the political and economic objectives, the political 
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objective must take precedence. Nevertheless, Castillo argues that the kind of 
development priorities that funding agencies such as the World Bank and IMF 
implement are often diametrically opposed and contradictory to the political 
objective of reintegration and DDR in general as experience in El Salvador has 
shown. She contends that in El Salvador, the United Nations Observer Mission 
(ONUSAL) succeeded in implementing a disarmament programme for the 
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) combatants based on its 
mandate. However, the demobilisation and reintegration process was almost 
jeopardised because it was undermined by financial constraints imposed by the 
IMF, the leading financier of the reconstruction programme for fear that over 
budgetary spending on demobilisation and reintegration would trigger inflation 
(Castillo, 2008: 42). This clearly demonstrates the extent to which international 
agencies that fund DDR programmes and post-conflict reconstruction, can work 
at cross-purposes and end up undermining the goal of the intervention.  
It is sufficient to point out that the trend of events highlighted above regarding the 
funding and ownership of reintegration process and DDR in general, is 
summative of the unequal power relations that exist between the financiers of 
interventions and the beneficiaries. This trend, in my view, succinctly conforms to 
Hay’s (2002: 168-182) conceptualisation of the three faces of power, namely, 
power as decision making, agenda setting and preference shaping. Against the 
backdrop of Hay’s three faces of power theorisation, Özerdem (2009: 49-50) 
postulates that it is replicated in the politics of DDR and postconflict 
reconstruction between the international community, ex-combatants and the 
larger postconflict society. Özerdem contends that power as domination over 
others and its zero-sum conception informs the relationship between ex-
combatants and the International Community. Özerdem argues that the 
international community perceives ex-combatants and post-conflict societies as 
a potent threat to international peace and security. Consequently, they must be 
rehabilitated in conformity with the standard and overall interest of the 
international community. Regarding power as agenda setting, Özerdem 
maintains that the international community, being the financier, sets the agenda 
for DDR and post-conflict reconstruction. As he asserts, ‘with the funding 
dependence on external actors [sic], the agenda for the process is often set by 
international actors, leaving almost no room for the involvement of national and 
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local authorities, and of former warring sides’ (Özerdem, 2009: 49). Concerning 
power as preference shaping, Özerdem argues that while implementing DDR 
programmes, the international community imposes certain options on ex-
combatants regarding vocational trades and skills acquisition on the pretext of 
lack of resources and time constraints regardless of the preferences of the ex-
combatants. 
In this circumstance, the ex-combatants have no option than to accept the 
imposed options offered to them, given their condition of powerlessness. 
However, as previously argued, the unequal power relations that characterise the 
politics of DDR processes and post-conflict reconstruction has been called into 
question, and in its place national ownership and participatory approaches are 
often advocated. For example, Castillo contends that national governments 
should be the key driver of the DDR process and post-conflict reconstruction 
while the international community represented by the UN, its agencies and 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) should serve as facilitators and 
coordinators as well as providing technical and funding support: 
Thus, we envisaged war-to-peace transitions in which the sovereign 
government [my italics] would be in the front seat designing and 
implementing policies, with the UN system and the IFIs in the back seat, 
facilitating, coordinating, and monitoring the international community’s 
technical and financial support (Castillo, 2008: 13). 
 
Castilo’s position is supported by studies by Dzinesa (2006: 39-43), Kilroy (2014: 
275-308) and Kilroy (2015: 37-41); all of which demonstrate that participatory 
approaches to DDR and indeed, war to peace transition that involves the 
international community, national government and local communities working 
together is more effective and can potentially lead to better outcomes. In other 
words, participatory approaches envision a situation whereby a broad-spectrum 
of DDR stakeholders are given the opportunity to actively participate in its 
conceptualisation, design and implementation. In line with this, the United 
Nations pointedly highlights the risk involved in DDR funding agencies alienating 
other stakeholders in the design and implementation process when it notes that:  
One of the reasons why DDR operations have failed in the past is a lack 
of local ownership [my italics] resulting in the perception that DDR is 
imposed from outside. The participation of a broad range of stakeholders 
in the development of a DDR strategy is essential to its success, as it 
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provides a basis for effective dialogue among national and local 
authorities, community leaders, and former combatants, and helps define 
a role for all parties in the decision making process. These actors should 
be fully involved in planning and decision making from the earliest stages. 
A participatory approach will significantly improve the DDR programme… 
(United Nations Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
Standards, 4. 30. 2006: 11-12). 
 
It is apposite to point out that the above discussions show the nature of power 
asymmetry that characterises internationally driven DDR programmes. However, 
in terms of how the Niger Delta ADDR programme fits into this debate; I will argue 
that it is supposedly an example of a nationally owned DDR programme fully 
driven by the Nigerian State beginning from conceptualisation, design, 
implementation and funding. I argue that it is supposedly because a fundamental 
component of national ownership is missing in the programme’s 
conceptualisation process which was the failure to give the ordinary DDR 
participants and impacted communities the opportunity to fully participate and be 
drivers of the conceptualisation, design and implementation process. Thus, this 
type of national ownership can best be described as a ‘neopatrimonial elite 
nationally owned DDR programme’.  In this case, one could argue that the 
neopatrimonial Nigerian State assumed the position of the international 
community and an external securitising actor in relation to the Niger Delta. 
Consequently, just as the international community securitised development in the 
global south so also the Nigerian State securitised development in the Niger 
Delta. Thus, development efforts in the region were carried out not as a response 
to the genuine development needs and concerns of the region but as a response 
to the security repercussions that its absence could result in for the Nigerian 
rentier neopatrimonial state. 
2.6.4. Measuring Success in DDR 
A growing body of research in the literature focuses on measuring success in 
DDR and the benchmark to be used to adjudge it as successful or not. An 
important work in this area is by Muggah (2005: 1-2) and Muggah (2006: 190-
205) who argues that there is no consensus with regards to what exactly 
constitutes success in DDR because success is defined differently by the various 
stakeholders based on their mandates and primary motives for engaging in it. As 
Muggah notes ‘success is often defined differently because the objectives (and 
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motives) of numerous actors are widely divergent and even contradictory during 
the post-conflict period.’ (Ibid.: 198). For example, from the perspective of military 
and government stakeholders, success is likely to be defined in terms of the 
number of weapons collected and their symbolic destruction, and the number of 
former ex-combatants demobilised and successfully reintegrated into society. 
Also, important in their view is the extent to which the state prerogative of the 
legitimate use of violence is restored and potential spoilers adequately checked. 
If these indices are rated high, military and government stakeholders are likely to 
adjudge DDR as a huge success.  
Conversely, development agencies evaluate success in DDR not only in terms of 
the extent to which it has addressed micro and macro-insecurity challenges but 
also in the way root causes of the conflict are substantially addressed, resulting 
in a significant improvement in human security and development indices. A 
leading advocate of this perspective is Cockell (2000: 20) who argues that any 
post-conflict peacebuilding intervention should be judged in terms of how it has 
engendered the processes that will lead to the transformation of the hitherto 
socioeconomic and political structures that triggered conflict in society. In a 
similar vein, Shibuya (2012: 120) maintains that DDR has remained a contested 
field between the advocates of security and development when he points out that 
‘the “security vs. development” debate in DDR is a chronic one in the literature.’ 
In my view, the issue of an appropriate yardstick for measuring success in DDR 
once again re-echoes Muggah’s (2004: 27) and Jennings’s (2008: 6-7) minimalist 
(security) and maximalist (development) perspectives that inform the practice of 
DDR earlier highlighted at the beginning of the reintegration debates. That is, 
should DDR aim at achieving security stability in the immediate aftermath of 
conflict or should it incorporate development and transformative agendas by 
aiming to address the underlying sources of conflict and pre-war grievances. 
Suffice to say that I identify with the maximalist perspective and this shall be 
demonstrated in the succeeding chapters of this study. 
2.7. Conclusion 
In this review of relevant literature, I adopted a thematic approach to examine 
both academic and policy-related literature in DDR. Regarding amnesty, the 
current debate about the relationship between amnesty and DDR revealed that it 
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has a positive impact on DDR because combatants will be more willing to disarm 
and demobilise if there is an assurance that they will not be put on trial for the 
infractions they committed against the state. Thus, the argument is that amnesty 
responds to the security dilemma pertaining to combatants’ personal security 
when asked to disarm and demobilise. However, human rights organisations 
contend that amnesty rewards impunity by shielding criminals and violators of 
human rights from prosecution, thereby encouraging further impunity. Therefore, 
the extent to which amnesty responded to the security dilemmas of the Niger 
Delta militants and motivated them to disarm and demobilise will be explored 
further in Chapter Five of this study. 
Disarmament is the first stage in the DDR process, and it is aimed at retrieving 
the means through which violence is perpetrated. The long-term goal of this is 
the prevention of a relapse into violence and promotion of a stable post-conflict 
environment of which two types have been highlighted in the literature; 
consensual and coercive. A consensual disarmament is always preceded by a 
peace agreement, and its overall success depends on the willingness of the 
parties to commit themselves to the process by providing adequate information 
regarding their strength, location of weapons cache and sources. However, in 
coercive disarmament, some level of force is required to ensure compliance. 
There is a consensus in the literature, that various planning and implementation 
factors need to be taken into consideration when conducting disarmament. These 
include different levels of the environments where the disarmament is to take 
place, the level of cooperation secured from the various actors and stakeholders 
in the environment, the kind of economic agendas driving the conflict and 
inducement offered to the combatants. Oftentimes, weapons for cash 
programmes, or arms buy back, is a common form of inducement, the application 
of which can be counterproductive as the literature has demonstrated. Finally, 
adequate mechanisms must be put in place to ensure the safety of weapons 
collected, so that they do not fall again into the hands of unscrupulous elements.  
In the case of the Niger Delta, the extent to which the disarmament phase 
succeeded in substantially retrieving the weapons in possession of the militants, 
and stabilising the security situation in the region will be explored further in this 
thesis. Also, to be studied is the degree to which the planning of the disarmament 
phase significantly complied with planning and implementations factors examined 
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in the literature. Likewise, the kind of incentives offered to the militants and their 
impact on the success of the programme will be assessed. 
Demobilisation is essentially aimed at breaking the existing vertical and horizontal 
command and control structures of armed groups thereby neutralising their 
capacity to remobilise and return to violence. There is also the contention that 
breaking the structures will be insufficient to prevent a relapse into violence 
without demilitarising the mindset of the ex-combatants.  Likewise, the current 
practice of demobilisation has been through the use of cantonment, which again 
has been criticised as reinforcing the command and control structures it is meant 
to destroy. Consequently, the extent to which the demobilisation of the Niger 
Delta ex-militants succeeded in breaking the existing command control structures 
will be examined in Chapter Five of this study.  
Reintegration is the final stage in the DDR process and how successful it is will 
determine whether society can witness lasting peace or a relapse to violence. 
Generally, the debate about reintegration revolves around minimalist and 
maximalist approaches. The minimalist approach argues that if not provided with 
economic opportunities in terms of jobs, ex-combatants will constitute a source 
of micro and macro-insecurity in the immediate post-conflict era. Thus, in line with 
the security perception attached to them, all reintegration support is skewed in 
their favour. In contrast, the maximalist perspective rejects the sweeping 
generalisation and perception of ex-combatants as security threat, seeing them 
instead as potential social capital that can contribute positively to the process of 
post-conflict peacebuilding. Similarly, this perspective advocates that DDR 
should be approached as a process of socio-economic and political 
transformation, aimed at significantly reducing the fundamental sources of 
grievances that originally gave rise to the conflict. In this perspective, the needs 
of the ex-combatants should be taken care of concurrently with that of their family 
members, dependents, and local community within the broader framework of 
post-conflict peacebuilding. Given these contending perspectives, evaluating the 
impact of DDR has also become a contested issue whereby some rely on its 
security and stabilisation impacts to measure its success while others focus on 
the extent to which it has addressed the pre-war grievances that led to the conflict. 
Ultimately, the question of which of the two perspectives, minimalist or maximalist 
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informed the conceptualisation, design and implementation of the Niger Delta 
DDR will be further explored in Chapter Four of this study.   
Overall, the literature review has demonstrated that DDR has become a critical 
component of the post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction orthodoxy. It is 
in this regard that this study has as its overarching research focus the evaluation 
of the extent to which the 2009 Niger Delta ADDR programme succeeded in 
accomplishing its statutory objective, particularly in terms of contributing to 
conflict resolution/prevention in the Niger Delta. 
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Chapter Three 
The Origin, Dynamics and Nigerian State Management of the Niger 
Delta Conflict 
 
3. Introduction 
Oil in commercial quantity was first discovered in Nigeria at Oloibiri (present day 
Bayelsa state) in 1956 (Omeje, 2006: 33; Kashi & Watts, 2008:36; Gilbert, 2010: 
60-61; Obi & Rustad, 2011:4). This discovery marked a turning point in Nigeria’s 
economy (Ibaba et al, 2012:1) as the country assumed the status of an oil 
producing country. This development transformed Nigeria from an agricultural 
based economy to a rentier state largely dependent on oil rents (Obi & Rustad, 
2011: 4). The rentier status of the Nigerian State is illustrated by the fact that over 
80% of its official revenues and 90% of export earnings come from oil (Ibid.).   
The Niger Delta region is the oil producing part of Nigeria (Akpan, 2011: xliv) and 
so it is very critical to the political economy of Nigeria and global energy supplies 
because it accounts for 75% of Nigeria’s oil production and exports to the global 
energy market (Obi & Rustad (2011: 4). Consequently, the Niger Delta has 
become one of the critical fault lines in the political economy of the Nigerian State 
given that it holds the country’s main oil reserves (Aghalino, 2009: 57).   
However, even though the Niger Delta region is very rich in oil resources and 
strategic to the Nigerian economy, it remains a paradox, characterised by 
marginalisation, high level of poverty, lack of basic infrastructure, environmental 
degradation, pollution and high degree of youth unemployment (Douglas, 2005: 
241-242; Aghalino, 2009: 58; Ojakorotu & Gilbert, 2010: 7-19; Omotola, 2010: 91; 
Obi & Rustad, 2011: 7; Obi, 2011: 65-79; Ogundiya, 2011:11-12; Ukiwo, 2011:17-
27; Ako, 2011:42-54; Ibaba, 2012: 1- 4; Watts, 2013: 56). As the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), Niger Delta Human Development Report 
(2006: 9) noted ‘in reality, the Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative 
neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social 
deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic conflict.’ This 
unfortunate situation has led to a violent confrontation between the people of the 
region particularly youth; MNOCs and the Nigerian security forces (Ojakorotu & 
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Gilbert, (2010: 7). For example, the intense conflict situation prompted the 
International Crisis Group to title its Africa Report No 115 (2006) ‘The swamps of 
insurgency: Nigeria’s Niger Delta Unrest’. According to Adetoun, violent agitation 
by the people of the Niger Delta region over oil started with the abortive Isaac 
Adaka Boro’s secessionist revolt in the 1960s:  
It was in 1965 that the late Isaac Boro and his group took up arms to fight 
for a separate nation for the region. The region became more restive after 
1965, but the situation reached the boiling point in 1990 when the region’s 
elite and its youth formed various organizations to protest against the 
marginalization, neglect, oppression, and exploitation of their people and 
resources. Since 1990, the crisis has been violent and militant, often 
resulting in the loss of human lives and properties (Adetoun, 2005: 47).  
 
To understand the origin and dynamics of the oil conflict in the Niger Delta, a 
critical understanding of the nature and character of the contemporary Nigerian 
State is essential. But to fully comprehend this issue, we need to grasp the history 
behind its evolution which dates to when the various regions that made up the 
present-day Nigerian State were forcibly integrated into the orbit of the 
international capitalist system (Omotola, 2006: 6). This process transformed into 
colonialism which produced negative legacies for the contemporary Nigerian 
State (Larry, 1988: 25).  
Similarly, to explain the changing dynamics of the conflict over time, we equally 
need to locate it within the framework of the nature and character of the Nigerian 
State. Additionally, to explain why the MEND phase of the conflict represented 
the era of sustained armed rebellion against the Nigerian State and MNOCs we 
need to locate it within the political economy of armed conflict literature and 
debates particularly the greed theory of civil war and feasibility hypothesis 
articulated by Collier and Hoffler.  
Consequently, the chapter is organised into three main parts.  In the first part, I 
advance my theoretical framework for explaining the origin and dynamics of the 
Niger Delta conflict. Specifically, the theoretical framework analyses three main 
issues; the root cause of the conflict, the key drivers of the conflict’s changing 
dynamics and why the MEND phase of the conflict represents the most sustained 
youth-led violent revolt against the Nigerian State and MNOCs.  In the second 
part of the chapter, I provide a periodisation of the conflict’s life cycle while in the 
third part I examine the Nigerian State’s management of the conflict prior to the 
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introduction of the ADDR programme. The conclusion summarises the main 
issues and arguments examined in the Chapter as well as raising some critical 
questions to be discussed in subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
3.1. Theoretical Framework of Analysis: Explaining the Origin and 
Dynamics of the Niger Delta Conflict 
 
3.1.1. The Precolonial and Colonial Foundation of the Contemporary 
Niger Delta Oil Conflict 
 
In this section, I will examine the pre-colonial and colonial foundations of violent 
conflict in the Niger Delta region. This will be achieved by showing how the 
historical process of integrating the region into the international capitalist system 
through the Trans-Atlantic slave trade and so-called legitimate trade influenced 
the evolution of the contemporary Nigerian State and violent conflict in the Niger 
Delta region. 
3.1.2. Pre-colonial Foundations of Violent Conflict in the Niger Delta  
Sesay (2006: 134) has aptly demonstrated the positive correlation between 
weapons proliferation and violent conflict in the Niger Delta region. However, this 
dynamic relationship should be understood within the ‘historical realities, 
conditions and experiences of the region’ (Ukeje, 2006: 1-2). According to Ukeje, 
this is critical for two reasons: 
First, placing the proliferation of weapons in the proper historical 
perspective makes it easier to decipher the many underlying factors and 
dynamics driving the phenomenon in the Niger Delta both past and 
present. Second, such rich insights from history can help demonstrate the 
point that small arms and light weapons proliferation have firm roots in past 
circumstances and conditions… (Ibid.: 2).  
 
Similarly, Akpan (2011: 35) posits that the history of crises and conflicts in the 
Niger Delta region dates back to the pre-colonial period when the region was 
incorporated into the international capitalist system via the Trans-Atlantic slave 
and legitimate trade.  While Ukeje (2006: 11) argues that ‘in tracing the 
proliferation of firearms in the Delta region, it should be borne in mind that guns 
and ammunition were historically major articles of trade in exchange for slaves, 
and much later, palm oil’. Therefore, within this period, the proliferation of guns 
becomes a significant feature of the Niger Delta slave economy as arms were 
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either used to acquire slaves through invasion or as deterrence against attacks 
for the purpose of slave acquisition (Akpan, 2011: 17). The trade had significant 
implications for weapons acquisition, proliferation and conflict in the Niger Delta 
because it introduced an epoch of intercommunal violence among the various 
Niger Delta ethnic groups and communities for the purpose of capturing slaves 
by the various slave merchants and local chiefs. 
However, following the banning by Britain of its citizens from engaging in the 
international slave trade in 1807 and efforts to prohibit citizens of other nations in 
1815, palm oil within a very short time supplanted slaves as the region’s main 
economic export (International Crisis Group, 2006: 3). Consequently, the Niger 
Delta region became a major supplier of palm oil to Europe, and ‘on account of 
the large tonnage of the products lifted from the region, it was called the Oil Rivers 
Coast (my italics)’ (Akpan, 2011: xvi). But then the era of legitimate trade further 
heightened arms proliferation and the cycle of violence in the Niger Delta region 
because European trading companies engaged in monopolistic practices to gain 
absolute control of the trade which eventually led to violent conflict between them 
and the palm oil trading merchants and traditional chiefs of the Niger Delta region. 
The resistance by the region’s traders and community leaders led to the 
application of direct violence such as deposition7, forceful exile or outright attacks 
on recalcitrant traditional leaders’ and traders as a means of enforcing 
compliance. The experience of two prominent Niger Delta community leaders 
Jaja of Opobo and Nana Olomu of Itsekiri who were lured into signing protection 
and trade treaties with Britain is a case in point (Tamuno, 1965, 271-294; Osha, 
2007: 62-63 and Falola, 2009: 39). This development was further captured by 
Falola and Heaton as follows: 
Even Ja Ja signed a treaty, although warily and with reservations. In 1885, 
Hewett declared the setting up of the Oil Rivers Protectorate (my 
emphasis) in the name of the United Kingdom. When Ja Ja later violated 
the terms of the treaty of protection by continuing to deny British traders 
access to his hinterland markets, he was deposed and exiled to the West 
Indies as a warning to other local rulers of the consequences of 
insubordination. A similar fate met Nana, the Itsekiri governor of the river 
Benin, who was deposed and deported in 1894 after refusing British 
traders access to the Urhobo market of his hinterland (Falola and Heaton, 
2008: 98). 
 
                                                          
7. Deposition is to forcibly remove a person from office, power or position of authority. 
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A Niger Delta academic expert reiterated the above view by contending that ‘first 
of all the slave trade and the imposition of the new legitimate trade all had their 
own cycle of violence’8 in the region. He additionally explained that violent conflict 
in the region did not start with the contemporary oil conflict in the Niger Delta, it 
only represents a phase in the trajectory of violent conflicts that the region has 
been enmeshed in over time. While the respondent’s point of view espouses a 
kind of historical determinism, I would contend that the contemporary conflict over 
petroleum resources and complaints of marginalisation over benefits accruing 
from it certainly echoes the past conflict and resistance over the control of palm 
oil trade. The latter certainly helped shape and influence a long-standing culture 
of using armed violence to resist outside exploitation. The precolonial conflict 
history of the Niger Delta has continued to resonate in the contemporary oil 
conflict in other ways too. For example, former Niger Delta militant commanders, 
particularly Asari Dakubo have constructed a meta-narrative of the current armed 
struggle as a replication of the one waged by early Niger Delta chiefs against 
European conquest and domination in the 19th century. For instance, according 
to Asari Dokubo: 
The arms struggle has been the tradition of Ijaw people. It is in built in us 
because if you read Ijaw history… the Ijaws were the only people in Africa 
that fought the British and defeated the British. No other people in this part 
of Africa… fought, but it was only the Ijaws that fought the Akasa battle 
when the Royal Niger Company was given concessionary right by the 
British Crown...9 
 
3.1.3. Colonial Foundations of the Niger Delta Conflict 
The Nigerian State was created through colonial fiat after many brutal battles of 
conquest and resistance were fought between the British hegemonic imperialist 
forces and various territories that were forcibly brought together in 1914 to form 
the entity called Nigeria (Osaghae, 1998: 4; Graf, 1988: 7 & Dibua, 2006: 54; 
Falola and Heaton, 2008: 85-109). Prior to the successful imposition of colonial 
rule, what constitutes Nigeria today was made up of different independent polities 
ranging from centralised kingdoms mostly in the Northern part of Nigeria, the 
                                                          
8. Respondent 045, December 2013. 
9. Quoted from a transcription of a live television interview with Asari Dokubo on TVC News titled 
‘Straight Talk with Asari Dokubo’. Available at: http://www.tvcnews.tv/?q=article/straightalk-asari-
dokubo (Accessed: 03 September 2015). 
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powerful kingdoms of today’s Western Nigeria and the mostly Igbo, Ijaw and Efik 
acephalous societies of contemporary Eastern Nigeria (Dibua, 2006: 54). 
Therefore, as Dibua noted, the period 1900 to 1914 was significant in the creation 
of the Nigerian State by British imperialist forces:   
The period is crucial because it marked the historical beginnings of the 
factors that shaped Nigeria’s history throughout the colonial period into the 
postcolonial period. It was during this period that various administrative, 
economic, and social institutions that significantly affected Nigeria’s history 
were put in place. This period also marked the historical roots of the 
modernization project in Nigeria. By 1906, the territory that eventually 
became Nigeria comprised the Lagos Colony, the Protectorate of 
Southern Nigeria inclusive of the Niger Delta and the Protectorate of 
Northern Nigeria. In 1906, the Lagos Colony and the Protectorate of 
Southern Nigeria were merged with Lagos as capital (sic). This 
development was largely based on economic considerations, as the funds 
from the larger and more endowed Southern protectorate were needed for 
the construction of infrastructures like harbours and railways, which were 
crucial for the exploitation of Nigeria’s resources. In January 1914, the 
Southern and Northern Protectorates were amalgamated to form a single 
country under the administration of a governor-general. Again, economic 
considerations provided the primary motive for the amalgamation (Dibua, 
2006: 57).  
 
An important issue that can be deduced from Dibua’s assertion with significant 
implications for the contemporary petroleum oil conflict in the Niger Delta was the 
contention that the 1914 amalgamation was essentially informed by the need to 
use resources from the resource endowed Southern Protectorate which the Niger 
Delta was part of to construct the urgently needed colonial infrastructures. It is 
notable that this kind of political economy is still present as today’s petroleum oil 
resources from the Niger Delta region are being appropriated to develop 
infrastructure in other parts of the country particularly northern Nigeria10 
(Adetoun, 2005: 50).  
 
Colonialism has fundamental implications for the evolution and development of 
conflict in contemporary Nigeria and precisely the oil conflict in the Niger Delta in 
several ways. One such implication was the lopsided geographical and ethno 
numerical composition of the Nigerian State (Osha, 2007:24). For instance, as 
noted by Osaghae, one of the strong legacies of colonialism in connection to the 
propensity for conflict in Nigeria was the vastness of the Northern region in terms 
                                                          
10. This view was equally reiterated by respondent 037. 
 110 
 
of geographical size and population in comparison to the other two regions that 
made up the Nigerian State at independence. Thus, in Osaghae’s contention, the 
geographical size and population of Northern Nigeria conferred on it undue 
political advantages that paved the way for it to politically dominate and 
marginalise the other two regions in the post-independence era. In particular: 
… granting the Northern region 50 per cent of the seats in the House of 
Representatives (this was later increased to 52 per cent) and leaving intact 
its preponderant size and population which were more than those of the 
Southern regions put together, meant that the region could single-
handedly obtain the dominant position under the majoritarian system the 
country inherited at independence (Osaghae, 1998: 6).  
 
Similarly, Naanen (1995:46-78) noted that the Niger Delta predicament is a 
consequence of ethnic minority domination and marginalisation within the larger 
context of the lopsided Nigerian postcolonial state imposed by the forces of 
colonial imperialism. He further adds that the Northern region and other favoured 
ethnic group (s) emerged at independence as hegemonic giving rise to what he 
termed internal colonialism: 
 
Internal colonialism began in Nigeria, not through economic 
domination…but through political penetration deriving from a skilful pursuit 
of political control, aided crucially by numerical preponderance. This power 
was then used to transfer resources from the numerically weaker groups 
to develop the dominant areas, creating in the process an economically 
advantaged and powerful core and an impoverished and weak periphery 
(Naanen, 1995: 49-50). 
 
Therefore, one of the enduring legacies of colonialism’s crafting of the Nigerian 
State is the creation of internal colonialism. A situation whereby elites from 
hegemonic ethnic groups control the contemporary Nigerian State and 
manipulate the distribution of benefits accruing from petroleum resources derived 
from the homelands of ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta in their favour. This 
imbalance in power was compounded by the balkanisation of Southern Nigeria 
into two administrative divisions prior to independence while the Northern region 
was left intact (Dibua, 2006: 62). This structural division was further consolidated 
by the 1946 Richards Constitution that broke Nigeria into three administrative 
regions, namely, North, West and East with serious implications for conflict as 
noted by Dibua: 
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…the internal administrative division fostered ethnic particularism by 
ensuring that people from the same ethnic group were brought under one 
region while each region was controlled by one of the three dominant 
ethnic groups in the country. The bulk of the Igbo were in the Eastern 
region, the bulk of the Yoruba were in the Western region and the bulk of 
the Hausa-Fulani were in the Northern region (Dibua, 2006: 62). 
  
Thus, one of the significant repercussions of the balkanisation was that in all the 
regions there is a hegemonic ethnic group that holds sway with a motley of 
minority ethnic groups under its tutelage (Obi, 2002: 104). The subjugation of 
minority ethnic groups by the hegemonic ones heightens minority consciousness, 
resentment and agitation thereby increasing the potentials for conflict as 
Osaghae has noted: 
The other problematic structural feature of colonial rule was the problem 
of minorities. This derived from the anomalous constitution of the regions 
whereby each had a core major ethnic group-Igbo (Eastern region), 
Yoruba (Western region), and Hausa/Fulani (Northern region) and 
‘periphery’ of numerical minorities…These minorities, which make up the 
bulk of the country’s 250 or more ethnic groups, occupied distinct 
territories apart from the majority groups, and this encouraged the 
development of separatist agitations… These demands were based on 
claims of discrimination, neglect and political as well as cultural domination 
by the majority groups… (Osaghae, 1998: 10). 
 
This ethnic minority consciousness has become a mobilising factor in the 
contemporary petroleum oil conflict because by sheer coincidence of geography 
oil in commercial quantities was discovered in the homeland of the Niger Delta 
minority ethnic groups in the then Eastern region. Consequently, the 
development further intensified ethnic minority consciousness and resentment in 
the Niger Delta against the Igbo hegemonic ethnic group that is politically 
dominant in the Eastern region.  
 
The nexus between colonialism and contemporary Niger Delta petroleum oil 
conflict also lies in the fact that the distinct nature and character of the 
contemporary Nigerian State is deeply rooted in its colonial history and heritage. 
In particular, the repressive and authoritarian nature and character of the colonial 
state was replicated in the post-colonial state. Osaghae also reiterated the same 
argument by contending that: 
The basic points about the post-colonial state in Nigeria are that it 
originated under colonial rule, and that the perceptions and attitudes which 
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attended the latter subsist in disturbing ways in the post-colonial period... 
The post-colonial state, like its colonial progenitor, is primarily a law and 
order state, and this has remained its most abiding attribute…This law and 
order orientation underlies the reliance on instruments of coercion to 
sustain state power, and authoritarian tendencies on the part of rulers… 
(it should be remembered that the colonial state was an authoritarian one 
par excellence (Osaghae, 1998: 19). 
 
This, in part, explains why violence has formed part and parcel of the way in which 
the Nigerian State has responded to agitations from the Niger Delta region and 
indeed other conflicts. Additionally, Osaghae maintains that an attribute of the 
Nigerian colonial state that subsists in the post-colonial era is the negative 
perception of the state by the citizenry. The colonial state he argues was 
perceived as ‘alien’, superimposed from Europe and designed to serve the 
interest of the colonialist. Consequently, even after independence, this perception 
persisted because the state was still largely seen by most of the citizenry ‘…as 
an instrument of accumulation and patron-client ties … mode of political relations’ 
(Osaghae, 1998: 19-20). Graf (1988:11-12) also highlights another perspective 
on the negative perception of the Nigerian postcolonial state and its alienation 
from the majority populace by positing that the system of education introduced 
by colonialism succeeded in nurturing two distinct social classes namely the 
ruling class and the ordinary masses. Graf (1998: 11-12) likewise contends that 
members of the ruling class negotiated for independence from the colonial ruling 
elite but the independence they negotiated was for the handover of privileges 
from the colonial elites to the indigenous ones, with a commitment on the part of 
the indigenous ruling elite to maintain the existing privileges and structures of 
capitalist accumulation through unrestricted transfer of profit to the metropolis. 
The long-term consequence of this negative development was the replication of 
the entire colonial superstructures in the post-colonial era:  
…nationalist movement could not be mobilised through a popular 
revolutionary struggle nor motivated by unifying ideological slogans of 
‘equality’ or ‘social justice’. Instead, independence largely amounted to a 
negotiated settlement a gentlemen’s agreement-between the colonial elite 
and the emergent Nigerian elites. The wishes, involvement or long-term 
interests of the masses scarcely played a role in the 
movement…Independence, then, entrenched the ruling structure 
produced under the colonial regime and further sharpened the already 
well-developed distinction between the elites and the masses (Graf, 1988: 
11-12). 
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 Thus, the crystallisation process of the Nigerian State as an instrument of 
accumulation and patron-client ties as the main type of political relation has its 
roots in both colonialism and the actors of the early post-colonial state. Similarly, 
the rentier nature and character of the contemporary Nigerian State has its roots 
in the colonial economy. First and foremost, as a producer and exporter of 
primary agricultural commodities and later petroleum oil and gas. This was 
because petroleum as a commodity was discovered when Nigeria was still under 
British colonial domination and so as a commodity it was meant to serve the 
interests of the colonial state and MNOCs (Azaiki, 2003: 85). 
 
The British hegemonic colonial state centralised and monopolised the production 
and distribution of oil as a commodity through the promulgation of the colonial 
Minerals Ordinance Edict in 1945 which provided that ‘the…control of all minerals 
and mineral oil, in, under, or upon any land in Nigeria, and of all rivers, streams, 
and watercourses throughout Nigeria, is and shall be vested in the CROWN’ 
(Omoruyi, 2001: 2). The CROWN here refers to Britain but personified in this 
context by the British colonial state in Nigeria and when the contemporary 
Nigerian State became the successor to the colonial state on 1 October 1960, 
such mineral rights were automatically transferred to the Nigerian post-colonial 
state. Indeed, the post-colonial state built on its predecessor’s role as a source 
of accumulation: 
To facilitate its regulatory and extractive roles [my italics], the post-colonial 
state centralises the ‘production’ and distribution of national resources, 
and in the context of state capitalism this encourages the perception of the 
state as an instrument of accumulation and patron-client ties as the 
dominant mode of political relations (Osaghae, 1998: 19-20).  
 
To conclude the discussion on the colonial foundation of the Niger Delta conflict, 
the origin of the rentier neopatrimonial nature and character of the Nigerian State 
is rooted in its colonial past. The contemporary crisis and contradictions of rentier 
neopatrimonial accumulation, in turn, produced the condition of relative 
deprivation such as poverty, environmental degradation, underdevelopment and 
the resultant frustration that manifested in violent conflict in the Niger Delta 
region. Similarly, the violent way the contemporary Nigerian State responded to 
the conflict replicates the way the colonial state violently dealt with those that 
resisted it. 
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3.1.4. The Contemporary Nigerian State and the Roots of the Niger 
Delta Conflict 
In the preceding section, I demonstrated the various ways that colonialism formed 
the basis of the evolution of the contemporary Nigerian State and the Niger Delta 
conflict. In this section, I will examine its contemporary nature and character. At 
independence, the Nigerian State emerged both in nature and character as a 
rentier neopatrimonial state, whereby the state has been constructed as a means 
of private accumulation by an indigenous neopatrimonial ruling elite that 
negotiated independence from the colonialist (Graf, 1988: 11-12). The concept of 
the rentier state was first theorised by Mahdavy (1970: 428) and its critical 
discerning feature as he asserts is the stupendous amount of foreign exchange 
it generates from the exports of its natural resources. According to Mahdavy: 
Rentier States are defined here as those countries that receive on a 
regular basis substantial mounts (sic) of external rent. External rents are 
in turn defined as rentals paid by foreign individuals, concerns or 
governments to individuals, concerns or governments of a given 
country…oil revenues received by the governments of the oil exporting 
countries can also be external rents (Mahdavy, 1970: 428). 
 
Thus, in an oil rentier State, other sectors of the economy are virtually dormant in 
terms of income generation because ‘oil revenues received by the governments 
of the oil exporting countries have very little to do with the production processes 
of their domestic economies’ (Mahdavy, 1970: 429). As Mahdavy further argues 
most rentier states are generally confronted by poor economic growth indices 
despite the enormous resources at their disposal. As he notes: 
Perhaps one of the more crucial problems that needs to be studied is to 
explain why the oil exporting countries, in spite of the extraordinary 
resources that are available to them, have not been among the fastest 
growing countries in the world. For most underdeveloped countries, lack 
of savings or shortage of foreign exchange constitute some of the major 
constraining factors in economic growth. No such limitations beset Rentier 
States (Mahdavy, 1970: 432-434). 
 
Beblawi (1990:85) advances the rentier concept further by arguing that rent is 
‘the income derived from the gift of nature,’ of which oil is a classic example.  
Beblawi further postulates that an oil rentier state shows the dynamic interaction 
between oil, state and society by identifying four fundamental characteristics of 
the rentier state. Thus, according to Beblawi a rentier state is one: 
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…where rent situation predominates.…a rentier economy is an economy 
which relies on substantial external rent…in a rentier …economy-only few 
are engaged in the generation of this rent (wealth), the majority being only 
involved in the distribution or utilisation of it …in a rentier state the 
government is the principal recipient of the external rent in the economy 
(Beblawi, 1990: 87-88). 
  
He further posits that a rentier economy creates a rentier social class which he 
conceptualises in this way: 
A rentier is thus more of a social function than an economic category and 
is perceived as a member of a special group who, though he does not 
participate actively in the economic production, receives nevertheless a 
share in the produce and at times a handsome share. The distinguishing 
feature of the rentier thus resides in the lack of or absence of a productive 
outlook in his behaviour (Beblawi, 1990: 86). 
 
The implications of Beblawi’s assertion are many, one of which is that the rentier 
elites do not see any need to engage in productive investments and ventures in 
order to reduce over-dependence on external rents but rather prefer to preside 
over the distribution of rent through profligate ventures and projects. Second, the 
rentier mentality connotes a state of mind on the part of the elites which is 
characterised by a lacklustre attitude to productivity and development (Yates, 
1996: 21). This suggests that members of the rentier ruling elite prefer sharing 
state resources (rents) through contract awards between patrons and clients 
(prebendal accumulation). Consequently, given that the rentier state is controlled 
by the ruling elites, it then means that they will continue to appropriate the rents 
for their own personal needs at the expense of the greater majority in society.  
In another vein, a pertinent character of the contemporary Nigerian State is its 
characterisation as neopatrimonial. Regarding neopatrimonial state, Bratton and 
van de Walle (1997: 61) contend that in African states ‘authority is entirely 
personalized, shaped by the ruler’s preferences rather than any codified system 
of laws’. Similarly, Williams (2011: 55-71) postulates that it is a complex network 
of state-society relations whereby the modern bureaucratic state is infused with 
traditional ideas about patronage and clientelism: 
Neopatrimonialism regimes are hybrid, uncertain, unstable and usually 
authoritarian systems of governance. They are a hybrid mix of legal- 
rational bureaucracy and personalized systems of power involving 
clientalism and patronage. They produce a significant degree of 
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uncertainty over which of these two systems will dictate the decision-
making process in any given situation (Williams, 2011: 56). 
 
The key discerning issue here regarding neopatrimonialism as argued by 
Williams is that the leader administers the modern bureaucratic state based on 
his personal wishes and desires. There is no clear distinction between the 
personal interest of a leader and the state. Thus, as Clapham notes 
neopatrimonialism is:  
…a form of organisation in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial 
type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally 
constructed on rational-legal lines. Officials hold positions in bureaucratic 
organizations with powers which are formally defined, but exercise those 
powers…as a form…of private property (Clapham, 1985: 48). 
 
Put simply, a neopatrimonial system represents a modern state where public and 
private interests are intertwined (Gazibo, 2012: 3). It is on this basis that 
Sandbrook (2000: 59) attributes Africa’s crisis of underdevelopment to ‘the private 
appropriation of the state’s powers’. He further posits that ‘neopatrimonial rule 
inhibits economic development by subordinating economic objectives to short-
run exigencies of political survival…’ (Ibid: 2000: 97). In a related argument, 
Evans (1994:84) has posited that a neopatrimonial state becomes predatory 
when it becomes an obstacle to development in society because of the rapacious 
character of the ruling elites who personalise the state machinery and transform 
it into a despotic institution for accumulation. The predatory state is more effective 
in repression and brutalisation of its citizenry than in the provision of the dividend 
of good governance (Evans, 1995: 43). Evans goes further to compare the 
predatory state and developmental state and asserts as follows: 
Juxtaposing “predatory” and “developmental” states focuses attention on 
variation defined in terms of developmental outcomes. Some states 
extract such large amounts of otherwise investable surplus while providing 
so little in the way of “collective goods” in return that they do indeed impede 
economic transformation. Those who control these states plunder without 
any more regard for the welfare of the citizenry than a predator has for the 
welfare of its prey (Evans, 1995: 44). 
 
Bach (2011: 279) advances a similar position by contending that in a 
neopatrimonial predatory type of state, the state, its institutions and resources 
have been so personalised to the extent that it produces an institutional failure or 
de-formalisation of the State. The predatory neopatrimonial state is therefore 
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characterised by ‘…the absence of a public space, and of any capacity to produce 
‘public’ policies. Indeed, the privatisation of the public sphere is carried to such 
an extreme that it becomes conducive to its dissolution…’ (Ibid.). This is 
comparable to the criminalisation of the state in Africa theorised by Bayart et al, 
(1999: 1-25-31), a situation whereby the state machinery has been personalised 
for the purpose of perpetrating criminality for personal gain by the elites that 
control it. And in line with that, Reno (1999: 2) argues that the criminalisation of 
the state has led in some cases to the emergence of a ‘shadow state’, a strong 
informal system within the state system that revolves around patronage and 
illegality and which in turn suffocates and holds the ideal bureaucratic state 
captive making it highly dysfunctional. 
 
Against the backdrop of this theoretical exposition, I contend that the Nigerian 
State is an archetype rentier, neopatrimonial state which has subsequently 
degenerated into a predatory one. I argue so, because, since the discovery of oil, 
Nigeria became an oil-dependent state almost solely reliant on oil rents to finance 
its developmental activities. In consonance with my assertion, Ibeanu (2000: 21) 
notes that in Nigeria ‘…petroleum provides over eighty percent of government 
revenues annually. This makes oil production very central to the survival of state 
officials as most public works contracts [sic] and the continued functioning of 
government agencies depend on it’. Omeje provides an apt description of the 
Nigerian rentier neopatrimonial state that expounds on Ibeanu’s assertion when 
he posits that: 
 
Nigeria has a mono-economy in which oil rent plays a dominant 
part...Based on the nature of its political economy, Nigeria is described as 
a ‘rentier state’, largely dependent on oil mining rents, taxes and royalties 
paid by transnational oil-producing companies (TNOCs), and on profits 
from its equity stakes in the TNOCs investment…A self-serving 
hegemonic elite, whose interests in rent seeking and ‘prebendal 
accumulation’ determine a range of state policies… and institutional 
practices, dominates most rentier states such as Nigeria. Prebendalism is 
a political tradition in which states offices are regarded as prebends that 
can be appropriated by office holders, who use them to generate material 
benefits for themselves and their constituents and kin groups (Omeje, 
2006:212). 
 
One could further argue that given the current state of affairs in the Niger Delta 
and Nigeria, in general, it is apparent that the Nigerian State has gone beyond 
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being a rentier neopatrimonial state to a predatory one just as Lewis has 
asserted: 
As a special form of political and economic domination, predatory rule 
should be distinguished from the prebendal relations traditionally prevalent 
in Nigeria, in which patron-client links were more diffuse and individual 
authority comparatively limited (sic). Predation embodies a reconfiguration 
of neo-patrimonial rule, towards more despotic and rapacious control 
(Lewis, 1996: 99). 
 
This suggests that the Nigerian State has become an institution of personal 
accumulation by a rapacious ruling elite resulting in the alienation of its citizens 
as well as becoming an obstacle to their human security development. As 
Okonjo-Iweala notes: 
The years of military rule were politically and economically disastrous for 
Nigeria. Institutions of states were severely undermined as meritocracy 
gave way to mediocrity. Corruption, already burgeoning under the early 
politicians, became entrenched under military rule, and a kleptocratic elite 
with a very limited vision of the future of the country came into being. That 
elite remains largely intact today, even under democracy, and may 
constitute one of the biggest stumbling blocks in the way of Nigeria’s 
progress. (Okonjo-Iweala, 2012: 2). 
 
Contextualising Okonjo-Iweala’s assertion to the Niger Delta, Watts (2013: 56-
57) argues that ‘… the kleptocratic and venal system of state politics has stolen 
and squandered what many in the Delta felt to be their rightful heritage’ In my 
view, what can be deduced from all these assertions is that, empirically the 
Nigerian State has become a vehicle through which the ruling elites engage in 
massive looting of state resources (kleptocracy). Bishop Mathew Hassan Kukah 
echoes the same when he contends that: 
I have said it over and over, we have to have a country before these 
cowboys can have access to loot the treasury [my emphasis] and head to 
Dubai for their sickening orgies. Tragically, we have no political class. All 
we have are men and women who are out like vultures circling around the 
carcass [my emphasis] of the Nigerian State (Aworinde, 2014: 4). 
 
Both established and alleged cases of corruption can be cited to buttress the 
credibility of such postulations. For example, Human Rights Watch (2012:1-64) 
reports that ten nationally prominent political figures were charged by the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)11 between April 2003 and 
                                                          
11. EFCC, is the acronym for Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, an agency established 
by an act of the Nigerian parliament. ‘The Act mandates the EFCC to combat financial and 
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December 2007, another four were charged between January and June 2008 
and sixteen were charged between June 2008 and July 2011. It further reported 
that the EFCC secured a conviction on Tafa Balogun a former Nigerian Inspector 
General of Police (NIGP) whose assets, worth over $150 million, were seized by 
the state (Human Rights Watch (2012:1-64). In another case, when Diepreye 
Alamieyeseigha former governor of Bayelsa state (one of the nine oil producing 
states and the epicentre of militancy) but highly impoverished was arrested by 
the British authorities in London, the Metropolitan Police discovered £1million 
cash at his home and consequently charged him with money laundering (Ibid). 
While on bail he escaped to Nigeria but subsequently was impeached as 
governor and charged with embezzling about $55 million of public funds (Ibid). 
Similarly, Lucky Igbinedion, a former Edo state governor (one of the Niger Delta 
States) was charged by the EFCC and convicted for syphoning more than $25 
million of public funds (Ibid.). 
 
Pertinent is the case of James Ibori, two-term former governor of Delta state (one 
of the nine oil producing states and a hotbed of militancy) against whom the EFCC 
brought 170 criminal charges (Ibid). Particularly, ‘one count of the indictment 
alleged that Ibori had given then EFCC chairman, Nuhu Ribadu, a $15 million 
bribe in an attempt to get the case against him dropped. Nuhu Ribadu, in turn, 
handed $15 million in cash over to the Central Bank of Nigeria for safekeeping 
as evidence… [sic]’ (Human Rights Watch, 2012: 38). Ibori escaped to Dubai and 
was subsequently extradited to London where he was tried for money laundering 
and jailed for thirteen years by a Southwark Crown Court London in 2012 (BBC 
News, 2012). Judge Pitts while sentencing Ibori, observed that ‘it was during 
those two terms that you turned yourself in short order into a multi-millionaire 
through corruption and theft in your powerful position as Delta State Governor’ 
(Ibid.). Additionally, BBC News (2012) reported that Ibori bought the following 
properties from the proceeds of his corrupt dealings: 
 
A house in Hampstead, north London, for £2.2m. A property in 
Shaftesbury, Dorset, for £311,000.00. A £2m mansion in Sandton, near 
                                                          
economic crimes. The Commission is empowered to prevent, investigate, prosecute and penalise 
economic and financial crimes and is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the provisions 
of other laws and regulations relating to economic and financial crimes, including: Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission Establishment act (2004). (Information sourced from: 
https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/index.php/about-efcc/the-establishment-act).  
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Johannesburg, South Africa. A fleet of armoured Range Rovers valued at 
£600,000.00. A £120,000.00 Bentley. A Mercedes Maybach for 
407,000.00 euros that was shipped directly to his mansion in South 
Africa.12 
 
All these pieces of evidence buttress why the enormous oil revenue that accrued 
to the Nigerian State over the years has not been translated into proportionate 
improvements in the material well-being of the citizenry because so much of it 
has been frittered or stolen and stashed away by rapacious ruling elites and 
bureaucrats. As Campbell (2011: xv) contends the grim reality of 
underdevelopment and grievances against the Nigerian State by people of the 
Niger Delta region reflects the fact that ‘…the population has benefited little from 
billions of dollars produced by oil…’ A situation Hill (2012: 16) refers to as the 
‘…failure of governance, the unwillingness of political leaders and regimes to 
provide all of their citizens, rather than a fortunate few, with the public goods they 
have a reasonable right to expect’.  
In conclusion, the nature and character of the Nigerian State and its 
contradictions is what gave rise to the functional failure of its core functions to its 
citizens and the Niger Delta oil-producing minorities, which in turn generated the 
relative deprivation and frustration that eventually resulted in a rebellion against 
the state. Functional failure suggests that even though the Nigerian State exists 
as a sovereign geopolitical entity and is accorded diplomatic recognition in the 
global community of nations it is nevertheless at the domestic level failing in the 
performance of its core functions as a state to its citizenry (Naanen and 
Nyiayaana, 2013:112). All this lends credence to the contention by the former 
Nigerian Central Bank governor Sanusi Lamido Sanusi that: 
The fundamental character of the Nigerian State is that, for decades, since 
we found oil it has existed not to serve the people but as a site for rent 
extraction to serve a tiny minority in the country’s political power. And it 
doesn’t matter where this group comes from-whether it is north or south or 
Muslim or Christian or military or civilian. The state has always been a site 
for rent seeking… (Uko, 2014: 5). 
 
                                                          
12. See same story by SJ- The Street Journal tilted ‘Judgement day: Ibori bags 13 years’ 
imprisonment’. Available at; http://the streetjournal.org/2012/04/judgement-day-ibori-bags-13-
year… (Accessed: 08 September 2015).  
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Thus, as I will later demonstrate in this study my position is in consonance with 
the TCND’s assertion that ‘the failure of development in the Niger Delta is largely 
as a result of the absence of good governance frameworks that can effectively 
strengthen the use of political power and resources’ (Movement for Survival of 
Ogoni People, 2009:65).  
 
3.2. Theorising the Changing Dynamics, Post-Kaiama Declaration and 
MEND’s Era of the Niger Delta Conflict 
Now that I have provided the historical backdrop to the Niger Delta conflict, I shall 
attempt to explain two key issues in the final part of this section. These are the 
drivers and accelerators of the changing dynamics in the Niger Delta’s petroleum 
oil conflict and why the post-Kaiama declaration and MEND’s era of the conflict 
constitute the most sustained period of violent revolt against the Nigerian State 
and MNOCs.  
 
3.2.1.  Changing Dynamics of the Niger Delta Conflict 
Again, I argue that the key driver and accelerator of the conflict’s changing 
dynamics lie in the nature and character of the Nigerian State which I have 
highlighted in the previous section. In view of the rentier and neopatrimonial 
nature and character of the Nigerian State, oil has been securitised (Buzan et al, 
1998: 23-24) and elevated to the status of a national asset that must be 
safeguarded from any act capable of undermining its steady flow. It is apposite 
to argue that this character of the Nigerian State not only led to but accentuated 
contradictory perceptions and understandings of security between the Nigerian 
State and oil-producing communities of the Niger Delta which ceaselessly 
exacerbated and aggravated the conflict (Ibeanu, 2000: 25-26; Onuoha & Ezirim, 
2012: 38). As noted by Ibeanu, these contradictory understandings of security 
revolve around the fact that:   
At the heart of conflicts in the Niger Delta, therefore, are different meanings 
of security attached to crude oil. For oil-bearing communities, security 
means the maintenance of the carrying capacity of the fragile Niger Delta 
environment. It is the realization that an unsustainable exploitation of crude 
oil, with its devastation of farmland and fishing waters, threatens resource 
flows and livelihoods for both individuals and communities as 
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collectives…To state officials and petrobusiness, security is defined as an 
uninterrupted production of crude oil at “competitive” costs…their concern 
is to boost state revenues and company profits, irrespective of 
environmental consequences and indeed, irrespective of long-term 
economic irrationality (Ibeanu, 2000: 25-26). 
 
A member of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta (TCND) reiterates the 
conflicting understanding of security between the Nigerian State and the oil 
producing communities when he notes that: 
 
Now you will also find one thing…I always talk about…when the people are 
saying look the exploitation of oil resources is done in a manner that is killing me, 
it is affecting my means of livelihood. Government response is that wait, we 
cannot develop you unless there is peace and so you need to wait. Now people 
are not hearing themselves. The people are saying no a situation of peace for 
them is a situation in which…their means of livelihood is guaranteed. But they 
now hear what government is saying, look wait…let me kill you more…before I 
come to develop you. So even though they are all talking of peace, they are not 
saying...the same thing…this misconception of peace...appears to be a 
fundamental issue that I have found all through.13 
 
Consequently, given the above conflicting meaning of security between the two 
parties, the Nigerian State has consistently viewed every threat to oil production 
in the Niger Delta as a threat to its very existence as rightly noted in this assertion:   
… government sees the activities of the protesting oil communities and the 
armed militias as acts of economic sabotage on the main source of 
national revenues and a challenge to its power in the Niger Delta. The 
activities of some of the armed groups are also interpreted as acts of 
criminality as well as a threat to national stability and security…any act 
capable of resulting in the disruption of oil production is perceived as a 
threat to the survival and wellbeing of the country (my emphasis) (Obi, 
2009: 107). 
 
Thus, given the nature and character of the Nigerian State, petroleum became 
securitised and elevated to the level of a referent object that must be protected 
(Buzan et al, 1998: 23-24), a situation the above member of the TCND refers to 
as a false construct of what national security is.14 This explains why the Nigerian 
State over-relied on the use of military force to protect oil production and assets. 
The over-reliance on violence by the Nigerian State led to the spiralling of the 
conflict in line with the conflict spiral model of escalation articulated by Pruitt & 
                                                          
13. Respondent 008, October 2013. 
14. Ibid.  
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Kim (2003: 96). In the context of the Niger Delta, this suggests that ‘state violence 
leads to resistance by targeted groups, which leads to more state violence and 
more resistance’ (Ibeanu, 2000: 25). In consonance with the above assertions a 
member of the Ogoni Solidarity Forum noted that: 
 
I think the key trigger number one is because government’s responses to 
agitations or demands has always been violent ones (sic). Ken Saro Wiwa 
did not carry arms yet they militarised the area, chased people into the 
bush, shooting and killing people at site. You will see buses with people 
travelling they will just stop the bus… hey every Ogoni young man come 
down and they will execute everybody, for what? So, people now said ok 
since they now speak the language of gun it was better that we are also 
armed, so that was exactly why people started carrying guns because 
government’s response has always been violent.15 
 
Another factor responsible for the spiralling of the conflict and which also revolves 
around the neopatrimonial nature and character of the Nigerian State was the 
alleged massive corruption that undermined the effectiveness of all past and 
present development intervention agencies established to develop the Niger 
Delta region. Several respondents shared the consensus that if the agencies had 
been effective, the Niger Delta conflict would not have escalated to the level it did 
in 2009 when the Nigerian State was compelled to embark on an ADDR 
programme.16  
3.2.2. Theorising the Post-Kaiama Declaration and the Sustained 
Armed Rebellion by MEND against the Nigerian State 
 
 The last issue I will be addressing in the theoretical debates section is to advance 
an explanation as to why the post-Kaiama declaration and MEND phase of the 
Niger Delta conflict represented an era in which the conflict intensified in terms of 
weaponry and sustained violent revolt against the Nigerian State predominantly 
championed by Ijaw youth. Cesarz et al. capture the new sophistication that 
characterises the post-Kaiama declaration and MEND’s era as follows: 
…militants have displayed new lethal capacities, and a willingness and 
skill in using them. They acted swiftly, with astute timing…They brought to 
the confrontation new assets: rocket-propelled grenades, AK-47s, 
machine guns, satellite phones, and speedboats. They demonstrated a 
willingness, and ability, to kill oil company and Nigerian military personnel 
                                                          
15. Respondent 015, November 2013. 
16. Respondent 032, November 2013. Reiterated by respondent 004 and 005. 
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and credibly threaten oil sector infrastructure. Quickly, they proved their 
dominance of Delta waterway and ability to impede the passage of security 
agents (Cesarz et al., 2003: 2). 
 
It is therefore important to theoretically comprehend and explain this fundamental 
escalation in the conflict. To comprehend the escalation of the conflict and the 
prolonged armed rebellion experienced during the MEND’s era, I will use Collier 
and Hoeffler greed theory of conflict and Collier’s theorisation on the economic 
causes of conflict as my explanatory framework. However, it is apposite to say 
that I am conscious of the controversy and critiques that the work of Collier and 
Hoeffler have generated and which indeed compelled them to subsequently re-
examine and shift their original position. Nevertheless, I contend that as important 
as these criticisms are, they do not completely invalidate the theory’s analytical 
and explanatory potency. Furthermore, in using the theory as an explanatory 
framework to elucidate the dynamics of the MEND’s era of the conflict, I am not 
in any way elevating it to an explanatory framework for the onset of the Niger 
Delta conflict. However, it is my view that irrespective of the apparent flaws in the 
greed theory, discarding it in its entirety means ‘throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater’. Consequently, I shall discuss the theory, the criticisms against it and 
thereafter demonstrate its relevance in understanding the dynamics of the MEND 
era of the conflict using both secondary and primary evidence resulting from my 
fieldwork. 
 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998: 563-573), Collier (2000: 91-111), Collier and Hoeffler 
(2002: 1-38), Collier and Hoeffler (2004: 563-595), Collier (2006a: 1-24), Collier 
et al., (2009: 1-39) greed theory of conflict was perhaps one of the most 
controversial theories of conflict. In their greed theory, Collier and Hoeffler 
debunked the contention that conflict is informed by grievance, by arguing that 
they have investigated on a global level, large scale armed conflicts using 
statistical methods but did not find any direct positive correlation between 
grievance and the occurrence of civil war. Rather, what they found was that 
economic agendas were more central in terms of causation. They therefore 
arrived at the conclusion that, civil wars and armed conflicts were not caused by 
grievance emanating from social conditions of relative deprivation and denial of 
basic human needs but were because of greed or direct desire to capture and 
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control the exploitation of lootable natural resources such as diamonds, timber 
and drugs. In elaborating the greed theory or explanation for civil war or rebellion, 
Collier develops quantifiable proxies as a measurement of greed. The most 
important proxy he argues is the exports of primary commodities which is 
measured in terms of the level of primary commodity exports as a proportion of 
gross domestic product (Collier, 2006b: 5). Other proxies for greed related 
rebellion is the youth bulge-measured in terms of many uneducated and 
unemployed youth (Ibid.: 6). Collier contends that the combination of these 
proxies in a primary commodity based export economy can trigger armed 
rebellion because uneducated and unemployed youth can easily be motivated to 
join rebellion. Collier argues that he reached this conclusion because having 
correlated the proxies for greed to that of grievances such as ethnic or religious 
hatred, economic inequality or lack of political rights as the causes of civil war, 
the evidence was overwhelmingly convincing that greed rather than grievance 
was more important in the causation of rebellion. As Collier noted: 
 
I have investigated statistically the global pattern of large-scale civil conflict 
since 1965, expecting to find a close relationship between…grievances 
and the incidence of conflict. Instead, I found that economic agendas 
appear to be central to understanding why civil wars start. Conflicts are far 
more likely to be economic opportunities than by grievance. If economic 
agendas are driving conflict, then it is likely that some groups are 
benefiting from conflict and that these groups therefore have some interest 
in initiating and sustaining it (Collier, 2000a: 91). 
 
Consequently, Collier posits that the narrative of grievance as motivation for 
armed rebellion is only a cover for the real reasons behind armed rebellion 
because ‘rebel organisations have to develop a discourse of grievance to function 
and succeed. Grievance is to a rebel organisation what image is to a business 
(Collier, 2007:199).  Thus, rebel organisations will naturally wrap their greed 
motive within a powerful narrative of grievance as a way of legitimising their 
rebellion. However, as I earlier noted, Collier’s straitjacket single factor 
explanation of conflict attracted heavy criticisms which compelled a shift in the 
argument.  
 
Therefore, a new theory of civil war ‘feasibility hypothesis’ (Collier et al, 2009: 2) 
was advanced which investigated and tested a comprehensive range of factors 
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that predisposes a country to rebellion as against focusing on a single hypothesis 
that centres on rebels’ greed motive. In this regard, Collier argues that ‘the two 
most obvious material conditions for rebellion are financial and military’ (Ibid.: 4). 
Thus, he argues that ‘regardless of why the organization is fighting, it can only 
fight if it is financially viable during the conflict’ (Collier, 2006a: 3). In buttressing 
this assertion, Collier drew an analogy on two militia organisations when he notes 
that: 
 
The Michigan Militia, which briefly threatened to menace peace in the 
USA, was unable to grow beyond a handful of part-time volunteers, 
whereas the FARC in Columbia has grown to employ around 12,000 
people. The factors which account for this difference between failure and 
success are to be found not in the ‘causes’ which these two rebel 
organizations claimed to espouse, but in their radically different 
opportunities to raise revenue. The FARC earns around $700m per year 
from drugs and kidnapping, whereas the Michigan Militia was probably 
broke (Collier, 2006a: 1). 
 
In another vein, Collier and Sambanis (2005: xiii) contend that ‘… it is not political 
and social grievance per se that leads to civil war, but rather, for given levels of 
grievance, it is the opportunity to organize and finance a rebellion that determines 
if a civil war will occur or not’. Consequently, one important risk factor for rebellion 
is primary commodity dependence and availability; which when captured will 
provide rebels with a steady source of income to start and fund a rebellion.   
 
Suffice to say that both the greed motivation and the feasibility hypothesis 
explanation of conflict and rebellion have provided us with valuable analytical 
insights to comprehend conflict. In particular, the pure greed explanation of armed 
rebellion and the feasibility hypothesis put forward by Collier and Hoeffler to some 
extent enhances our understanding of the dynamics of contemporary armed 
rebellion and how greed can undermine conflict resolution efforts and post-
conflict peacebuilding. This is when war making becomes a business venture and 
ending violence and making peace on the part of insurgents become less 
attractive. Nonetheless, the works of Collier & Hoeffler and their associates have 
been highly criticised by other scholars.  
 
Some of the criticisms raised against the theory centres on methodological flaws 
while others argue that the theory lacks analytical validity and utility. I will first 
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focus on the criticisms that address the analytical flaws in the theory followed by 
those on methodological flaws. Regarding analytical flaws, I am of the contention 
that Collier and his co-travellers failed to do enough to distinguish between 
conflict instigating factors and factors that escalate and complicate conflict. This 
is because often conflict can start based on genuine and objective conditions of 
relative deprivation but greed motives among rebel leaders can later predominate 
and complicate the dynamics of the conflict. In some cases, there may be 
complete goal displacement, a situation whereby rebel leaders completely derail 
from their original reasons for fighting to the pursuit of pure economic agendas 
(Malone and Nitzschke, 2005: 6). Malone and Nitzschke also note that contrary 
to Collier and Hoeffler’s findings, economic motivations or opportunity does not 
provide sufficient explanation for the onset of the conflict. Instead, they argue 
that: 
 
… the onset of violent conflict was triggered by the interaction of economic 
motives with long-standing grievances over the mismanagement or 
inequitable distribution of resource wealth, exclusionary and repressive 
political systems, inter-group disputes, and security dilemmas 
exacerbated by unaccountable and infective states… (Malone and 
Nitzschke, 2005: 6).  
 
 On their part, Ballentine and Sherman (2003: 4) kicked against an extreme 
emphasis on economic agendas above all other causes of rebellion arguing that 
‘while there is a growing agreement that economic factors matter to conflict 
dynamics, there is little consensus as to how they matter, how much they matter, 
or in what ways’. And in line with the above, Pugh et al, (2004: 45-89) 
demonstrated in the case of Afghanistan that war economies are complex in 
nature. In the case of Afghanistan, they argue that war economies have different 
dimensions such as combat, shadow and coping economies of which not all are 
driven by greed as Collier and co sweepingly generalised in their greed theory of 
conflict. They state that in the case of Afghanistan many were engaged in war 
economies nevertheless not all were motivated by greed. Thus, they argued that: 
 
There is a tendency to assume that those who have been involved in Poppy 
farming or the opium trade are either “greedy” entrepreneurs or profit maximising 
farmers. In fact, for the majority, involvement in the opium economy is motivated 
by the need to cope or survive in adverse circumstances (Pugh et al., 2004: 66). 
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Also, debunking Collier’s sweeping generalisations, Cramer (2006: 134) 
contends that conflict involves a complex interaction between grievance and 
greed. He argues that a sharp distinction between grievance and greed as 
advanced by Collier will not permit us to have a nuanced understanding of conflict 
because the two are not necessarily independent of each other. According to 
Cramer: 
 
While some leaders and soldiers may be essentially greedy, their 
prospects of satisfying greed depend on the participation of many others 
driven by grievance, resentment and rage or desperation. Second 
grievance may be at the origin of many people’s interest in fighting a war 
but then may elide with greed as opportunities become available. Third, 
greed and grievance may be internally related, inseparable motivations. 
Greed may in other words be a product of grievance and might not exist 
without that grievance. And the grievance, in turn, is likely to be 
relational… (Cramer, 2006: 134). 
 
Consequently, all these clearly suggest that determining how much of greed or 
personal economic agendas are involved, particularly in explaining the onset of 
a conflict is a complex task and depends on the dimension of the conflict economy 
in question and not a straitjacket issue of greed as Collier and co posited. 
Similarly, the interaction between the two is complex. Ballentine and Sherman 
raise further issues regarding Collier’s straitjacket economic explanation of 
rebellion including the claim that: 
… Limiting the inquiry to the predatory activity of rebel groups yields a 
partial view that not only risks casting all insurgencies as an extreme form 
of common criminality, but effectively forecloses examination of the 
conflict-promoting effects of corruption and rent-seeking on the part of 
state agents and other important actors (Ballentine and Sherman, 2003: 
7).  
 
 
 Ballentine and Nitzschke have similarly criticised Collier for being overly rebel 
centric in his analysis of rebellion by deliberately failing to analyse the role of 
other actors in armed conflict. According to them: 
 
… much of the early research, and explicitly that of Collier, was overlay 
“rebel centric”, neglecting the role of the state both as an actor and 
institution in causing or prolonging conflict. The unexplored assumption 
was that “rebels-not state actors cause conflict”, leading to a pro-state bias 
in analysis and policy action... Neglecting an analysis of state behaviour 
may in fact legitimise repressive and corrupt state elites who may also 
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profit from war at the expense of the population (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 
2005:4). 
 
Corroborating Ballentine and Nitzschke assertion, Kandeh (2005: 84-106) has 
debunked the greed theory using the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
insurgency in Sierra Leone as a case study. Kandeh maintains that the elite’s 
greed of primitive accumulation precipitated a near collapse in Sierra Leone, 
which triggered an insurgency based on widespread grievance and resentment 
against the state. However, the intrusion of greed motives among the rebel 
leaders later led to the criminalisation of the insurgency. In another vein, 
Ballentine and Sherman (2003: 8) note that by its very nature, conflict is dynamic 
and highly fluid which suggests that ‘… conflicts transform, mutate, degenerate, 
or consolidate. The longer the conflict, the more likely that it has evolved through 
many stages and more likely that the factors that sustain it are different from those 
that provided the initial trigger’. They also contend that in the long run when the 
economic dimensions of armed conflict are taken into cognizance in relation to 
state capacity it is ‘… the relative capacity of the state to perform core functions, 
including the provision of security, effective governance throughout its territory, 
and the equitable distribution of public goods…’ (Ibid.: 9) that determines whether 
a country can descend into violence. This suggests that what leads to conflict is 
the existence of natural resources in a weak and failing state and not their mere 
availability in any kind of state. In another vein, Stewart (2008: 3) has 
demonstrated in her work that grievance based rebellion cannot be discounted 
particularly where there are objective horizontal inequalities which she 
conceptualised as ‘… inequalities in economic, social, or political dimensions or 
cultural status between culturally defined groups’. As she further noted 
‘…horizontal inequalities are inequalities between culturally defined groups or 
groups with shared identities…These identities may be formed by religion, ethnic 
ties or racial affiliations, or other salient factors which bind groups of people 
together… (Ibid.: 12-13). Against this background, Stewart identified four 
dimensions of horizontal inequalities such as discrimination in terms of political 
participation, economic exclusion, social inequality in terms of lack of access to 
education, health, water and sanitation while cultural status inequality is 
measured in terms of how cultural groups are recognised or discriminated against 
or not in society (Ibid.: 13). Langer et al have also argued that: 
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… an important underlying cause of violent conflict is the presence of 
horizontal inequalities… or group-based inequalities in access to political 
power and economic resources. Severe His can provoke feelings of 
frustration and discontent, which may cause violent group mobilization and 
conflict along ethnic, religious, or regional lines… Support for this view has 
been provided by numerous case studies that document the importance 
of socio-economic and political His in provoking violent conflict… (Langer, 
et al.: 2012: 1). 
 
Another pertinent question that Collier and his associates fail to answer 
convincingly is if natural resource dependent countries are more likely to descend 
into an armed rebellion then how do we account for armed rebellion in non-natural 
resources dependent countries? Conversely, why is it that not all countries 
endowed with natural resources experience violent conflict or armed rebellion in 
their development history? In this regard, Wennmann (2007: 430) observes that 
‘… resource abundance and scarcity are neither a necessary nor sufficient criteria 
for conflict. There are resource abundant countries (Botswana, Norway, 
Australia) … that develop without experiencing armed conflict’. Consequently, 
Wennmann observes that ‘…what matters is not whether natural resources are 
simply present, but how they are managed’ (Ibid.). Keen also raise several cogent 
criticisms based on methodological and operationalisation flaws he identified in 
Collier’s approach: 
 
… Collier’s conclusions-though appearing on the surface very scientific 
because of the numbers and the algebra… sometimes rest on very shaky 
foundations. For example, in the work suggesting that ‘greed’ was a much 
more important cause of civil wars than ‘grievance’, the proxies for greed 
and grievance were questionable. Lack of access to education is taken as 
a proxy for greed. But we know from many countries, including Sierra 
Leone, that a key grievance motivating many fighters has been lack of 
access to education (Keen (2012: 761). 
 
Keen further notes that Collier and his associates use low per capita income and 
slow economic growth as proxies for the feasibility of rebellion but these ‘… might 
equally or better be seen as proxies for grievance. Of course, if you change the 
meaning of proxies, you get a completely different conclusion’ (Ibid.: 762). Keen 
has also taken issue with Collier’s assertion that when it comes to the risks of civil 
war, countries of the bottom billion are largely too small to be States and therefore 
stand the risks of experiencing civil war. This is suggesting that large size is a 
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recipe for peace and stability and vice-versa. However, before we embrace such 
a faulty conclusion Keen observes that: 
And before we rush to embrace large size as a recipe for peace, we might 
also want to consider the disastrous civil wars in Nigeria, Ethiopia and 
Angola, to say nothing of the large-scale violence in Algeria, and South 
Africa. Conversely, before we rush to dismiss small states as unviable and 
a source of civil war, we should consider the relatively peaceful paths of 
Botswana, Mauritius, Ghana and Gambia, among many others (Keen, 
2012: 762). 
  
On his part, Tar (2008: 43) faults Collier’s use of ‘arbitrary language and 
measurement tools’. This is because: 
 
…a restrictive tool is used in defining largely contested concepts such as 
‘conflict’ ‘war’ and ‘violence’. For instance, conflict is quantitatively 
described by the existence of 1,000 or more battle-deaths in a year… this 
effectively excludes lower but significant figures (e.g. 999!) (Tar, 2008: 43). 
 
Tar contends that this raises serious questions about how to empirically 
operationalise Collier’s concept of war. For example, how would a war with 999 
battle-recorded deaths which is 1 death less Collier’s measurement of what can 
be regarded as conflict be classified? Tar also points out that Collier’s greed 
theory is characterised by ‘misleading configuration of variables’ (Ibid.: 43). Tar 
posits that the greed theory is based on two fundamental variables- civil wars 
(dependent variable) and natural resources (causal). This type of analysis 
completely neglected ‘… the role of intervening variables such as corruption, 
predation, prebendalism, lack of fiscal discipline, [and] lack of rule of law, etc’. 
(Ibid.). 
 
However, even though the work of Collier and co have generated a lot of 
criticisms they are not the only ones to have highlighted the important role 
economic agendas play in conflict. For instance, according to Kaldor, new wars 
are ‘…characterized by a rise in crime, so that often it is difficult to distinguish 
between criminal and political violence. Hostage-taking, kidnapping, smuggling, 
loot and pillage are all ways in which political violence is financed, and, at the 
same time, political causes provide a cover for purely criminal acts’ (Kaldor, 2006: 
viii-ix). Kaldor further asserts that the new wars ‘…involves a blurring of the 
distinctions between war and crime…’ (Ibid.). Similarly, Reno (2011:163-205) 
contends that a new feature of violent conflicts in Africa in the 1990s and early 
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2000s in places such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’ Ivoire and Gunea-Bissau 
as well as in Congo and Somalia was the emergence of warlord rebels etc. In this 
type of situation warlord rebels violently capture state power under the pretence 
of correcting the ills of the society. However, in actual reality, these warlord rebels 
do not have any clear agenda of political transformation (Ibid.). Instead, when 
they succeed in capturing political power they constitute a bunch of greedy, 
oppressive and violent politicians. According to Reno: 
 
A key feature of warlord rebel leaders is that they were products of the 
systems of political authority that they fought. Even as they fought to 
overthrow regimes to become their country’s new political leaders, there 
was little that was even vaguely reformist in their public agendas. As they 
fought, they just appropriated the existing instrument of political power and 
used them in even more intensive ways at the expense of building 
bureaucratic institutions (Ibid.: 164). 
 
 
Similarly, Collier’s feasibility thesis was equally advanced by Wennmann (2011: 
5) but in a subtle way, he posited that individuals or groups aspiring for armed 
rebellion or conflict must overcome certain primary challenges such as 
recruitment, control, and financing of which financing is the most formidable one. 
In a similar vein, in her book ‘What rebels want: resources and supply networks 
in wartime’ Hazen (2013: 53- 59) identified military resources such as arms, 
ammunitions, logistics training and manpower, the financial means to sustain the 
war effort and political resources such as support from political patrons as key 
resources needed to sustain any rebellion. Additionally, she argues that military 
and economic resources are the most important ones and in particular economic 
resources are key to the acquisition of military resources which suggests that 
Hazen concurs with Collier’s postulation that financial viability is essential to the 
emergence and success of any rebellion. 
As I earlier argued, the greed/feasibility theory may not have provided a valid 
theoretical explanation for explaining the onset of the Niger Delta conflict, it 
nonetheless can serve as a valid theoretical framework for understanding the 
behaviour of MEND commanders or actors and the overall dynamics of the 
conflict in that phase. I therefore contend that both primary and secondary 
evidence emanating from this study adequately supports the fact that the MEND 
era of the conflict can best be explained by Collier and Hoeffler greed /feasibility 
hypothesis. In other words, MEND commanders were from the onset primarily 
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motivated by the pursuit of personal economic agendas. Nevertheless, these 
personal economic agendas were embedded and wrapped in a powerful and 
captivating narrative of grievance publicised through skilled media campaigns 
that legitimised MEND’s violence against the Nigerian State. Supporting the view 
that MEND actors were mainly driven by greed, a military officer that served with 
the Joint Task (JTF) deployed in the Niger Delta notes that during the MEND era 
of the conflict:  
 
It was like a business arrangement, you decide an area, set up your own 
camp, buy your arms or acquire arms however, get your own boys… 
whatever oil installations was within that locality was deemed under your 
control. So, you could decide now to either by direct intimidation, 
extortion…directly go and sabotage… or anything that could be seized by 
way of hijack of tankers you know and ransom payment… anything that 
you could do within that territory to raise money you know...17 
 
Additionally, the prominence of greed as a motivating force during the MEND era 
was further corroborated by Edward Udowei, an ex-militant commander who 
lamented how his income drastically dropped after the renunciation of militancy. 
Edward Udowei complained that: 
 
When I was in the forest, I made more than three million naira ($20,000) 
per month. I can call the oil companies ‘Hey My boys are hungry, bring two 
million naira’, and they will answer me quick quick…What I am now being 
paid per month is what I spend in two or three hours in the bush on my 
boys…In the bush, I enjoy better than this. I get more money than this. The 
N65, 000 is too small for me as a leader (SomaliPress.com, 2010: 1).18 
 
Edward Udowei’s lamentation clearly suggests that the pursuit of a grievance 
may not be his main motivation for joining the rebellion against the Nigerian State 
but rather monetary gain which the rebellion offers him. Perhaps, the prominence 
of greed as the driving motivation suggests why MEND remained a coalition of 
several militia commanders with independent camps across the creeks of the 
Niger Delta instead of being a highly-structured rebel movement under one 
unified command structure. It is apposite to say that if the various commanders 
were really motivated by shared political grievance, forming a structured rebel 
movement would have been easier for them and could have provided a more 
effective rebellion against the Nigerian State. In addition, a former staff member 
                                                          
17. Respondent 009, October 2013. 
18. SomaliPress.Com is an open access online news platform. 
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of the Foundation for Partnership Initiative in the Niger Delta suggests that if the 
grievance was genuinely the motivation behind the MEND led rebellion, then the 
rebellion ought to have escalated to a more ferocious dimension now.19 This is 
because the grievances still persist and indeed have even worsened in 
comparison to the pre-MEND era of the conflict and ADDR programme and more 
so the ADDR programme did not address the grievances MEND claimed to be 
fighting for.20 This suggests that other motives may be responsible for MEND 
actors acquiescing to disarm and demobilise even when the grievances they 
claimed to be fighting for remain unaddressed (see chapter 5). Correspondingly, 
a member of the Ogoni Solidarity Forum expressed the opinion that MEND 
commanders were essentially motivated by greed instead of development based 
grievance: 
 
… if they were struggling I will see what they were struggling for. So, what 
were they fighting for, if it was a struggle…? So, what have you received 
that is making you drop the arms? (sic) So they were just fighting for their 
stomachs as far as I know. Because just show me one thing (sic). I can 
show you that Shell is not taking oil in Ogoni because of that struggle. Just 
show me one thing that you were fighting for, that you got that made you 
to drop the guns (sic). So, it was just a struggle for the stomach, when they 
settle you, they give you one pipeline contract, they give you maritime 
contract, they give you this or that contract… No more resource control. 
We are no more even hearing about the resource control struggle.21 
 
Again, what this respondent suggests is that if the MEND struggle was primarily 
to attract development to the Niger Delta and not for personal gain, then the 
conflict ought to have escalated because the ADDR programme has not brought 
any tangible development to the Niger Delta. Evidence from the current literature 
also reinforces the view that the conflict during the MEND era mutated from 
grievance to a loot seeking rebellion (greed). For instance, Gilbert (2007 cited in 
Ojakorotu 2008) notes that: 
 
Regardless of its original justification, the current militancy in the Niger 
Delta appears to have been perverted, misdirected and criminalized by 
opportunists. It appears that the recent upsurge and attraction to armed 
conflict and violence by ethnic militias, may have been motivated by crass 
economic opportunism and profiteering, through hostage taking for 
                                                          
19. Respondent 028, November 2013. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Respondent 015, November 2013. 
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ransom and through illegal oil bunkering with external commercial 
networks (Gilbert, 2007 cited in Ojakorotu, 2008: 3). 
 
Reinforcing Gilbert’s position, Ikelegbe (2011: 134) argued that ‘the kidnapping 
and abduction for ransom of expatriates and Nigerian staff of non-oil companies 
such as Michelin in 2007 and Julius Berger in 2008 were clearly criminally bent, 
as these companies are not oil MNCs’ but are companies contributing to the 
economic development of the Niger Delta region. However, one of the most 
convincing argument affirming the fact that the Niger Delta conflict mutated from 
primarily grievance-based to greed-driven rebellion was Collier who argues that: 
 
I do not want to overstate… [that]… the disputes in the delta started out 
as justified environmental protests by people living in a region that was 
bearing the brunt of damage without seeing the benefits of oil revenues. 
But over time the situation has evolved…Grievance has evolved over the 
course of a decade, into greed (Collier, 2008:31). 
 
Similarly, in line with Collier’s feasibility hypothesis earlier discussed, MEND’s 
ability to maintain and sustain a prolonged military campaign against the Nigerian 
State can be explained from the point of view of conflict financing denoting the 
ability to mobilise adequate finance for the procurement of arms, uniforms, 
sustenance and the upkeep of fighters. MEND’s ability to generate funds to 
finance its operations in terms of procurement of sophisticated weapons, recruit 
able-bodied foot soldiers, pay them a salary, feed and provide them with uniforms 
and other logistics was responsible for MEND’s long confrontation with the 
Nigerian State and not a reflection of grievance. The ability of MEND to generate 
this funding was made possible by the conflict economy that flourished in the 
Niger Delta, particularly illegal oil bunkering (Onuoha & Ezirim, 2012: 39; Watts, 
2013: 58) and the kidnapping of oil workers for ransom and imposition of taxes 
(Wennmann, 2011: 5). Mr Seriake Dickson the governor of Bayelsa state 
demonstrates the connection between illegal oil bunkering, small arms and light 
weapons proliferation and conflict financing in the Niger Delta when he states 
that: 
 
Let me tell you that all the violence, brigandage and criminality that we 
experience in the Niger Delta states, particularly Bayelsa where I know 
more, have their roots in the activities in the creeks. It is from there they 
have easy funds to recruit followers; it is from these activities of crude oil 
theft and illegal refining that people are able to sustain such large numbers 
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of youths and put them into various cult groups. What is going on has direct 
effect on the proliferation of small and light weapons because they need 
an army of youths to protect their territories, to be able to withstand the 
onslaught of legitimate security personnel (Premium Times, 2013: 2).22  
 
The positive correlation between illegal oil bunkering, exponential increase in 
arms proliferations and armed militancy in the Niger Delta particularly during the 
MEND era has also been well researched and documented by Human Rights 
Watch (2005: 8); International Crisis Group (2006: 8); Joab-Peterside (2007:13-
15); Asuni (2009a: 10); Asuni (2009b: 1-19; Watts, 2013: 58). But beyond that, a 
key leader of MEND interviewed provided further insight that reinforces the 
connection between conflict financing and the ability of MEND to sustain its 
prolonged military campaign against the Nigerian State. The MEND leader noted 
that: 
 
What was actually happening then, my place…camp 5…is a channel to 
ships and vessels and some other boats. In fact, is the opening to Nigeria; 
the escavor estuary...So first and foremost, what we did was to get a fee 
from those ships, so as we are getting the fee from them we are able to 
feed. Secondly… there are some rich people that bring in vessels to load 
in crude oil and in the process our people will go to them just because we 
are with arms and they are able to give us some money to feed and 
arrange ourselves…23  
 
Similarly, another MEND commander while responding to a question on how he 
was able to fund his operations notes that: 
 
Like I said earlier…If you raise arms against these oil companies that is 
when they will pay attention to you, you understand. So, by the time we 
came together and come up with the idea of raising arms against the oil 
companies they pay attention to us, they give us whatever thing we 
demand from them.24 
 
Clearly, the above array of evidence suggests that the degree of grievance may 
not be an adequate explanation of why MEND could engage in a prolonged and 
sustained rebellion against the Nigerian State. Rather, it was their financial 
capability which derives from the opportunities to engage in predatory activities 
such as illegal oil bunkering, kidnapping for ransom and imposition of illegal tolls 
                                                          
22. Premium Times is a private Nigerian online open access news platform with an expertise in 
investigative journalism. 
23. Interview with respondent 038, November 2013. 
24. Interview with respondent 039, November 2013. 
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which the conflict offers. However, this does not completely discount the fact that 
there are genuine grievances in the Niger Delta region which gave some level of 
community legitimacy and protection to MEND actors (See figure 3.1).  
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        Pre-1960s                           1960s   1970s-1980s       Early 1990s-Mid 1990s    Late 1990s-Early 2000     Mid 20005s-2009 
 
S
Pre-
Independence 
Niger Delta 
minority 
agitations 
The 1967 Isaac 
Adaka Boro’s 
Revolt 
The era of 
community 
based agitations 
Movement for 
the Survival of 
Ogoni People 
(MOSOP) 
The Kaiama 
Declaration and 
the Emergence 
of Ijaw Youth 
Council (IYC) 
Movement for 
the 
Emancipation of 
the Niger Delta 
(MEND) 
Principally driven 
by fear of minority 
domination and 
marginalisation 
by hegemonic 
ethnic groups. 
Principally driven 
by grievances of 
marginalisation, 
deprivation and 
underdevelopme
-nt perpetrated 
by hegemonic 
ethnic groups 
that control the 
Nigerian State. 
Principally driven 
by grievances of 
marginalisation, 
deprivation 
underdevelopme
-nt, poor 
response by 
MNOCs to 
complaint of oil 
spillage, 
environmental 
degradation and 
the demand for 
infrastructure. 
Principally driven 
by grievances of 
environmental 
degradation, 
underdevelopme
-nt and 
marginalisation 
perpetrated by 
hegemonic 
ethnic groups 
that control the 
Nigerian State 
and MNOCs. 
Principally driven 
by grievances of 
decades of 
marginalisation, 
relative 
deprivation, 
poverty, 
environmental 
degradation and 
lack of control of 
over oil 
resources and 
sharing of 
revenue 
accruing from it.  
Mutation of the Conflict 
from grievance to greed 
Principally driven 
by greed but 
wrapped in a 
powerful 
metanarrative of 
grievance that 
served as a 
cover up and 
means of 
legitimisation 
and galvanising 
of community 
support, 
solidarity and 
protection.  
 
Source: Developed by Researcher 
Figure 3.1: Phases/Periodisation in the Niger Delta Conflict and the Corresponding Drivers of the Conflict 
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However, at this juncture, it is pertinent to highlight an interesting similarity 
between the Nigerian State and MEND; as representing two-sides of the same 
coin in the conflict because both survive on rent collection using violence in 
different ways. While the Nigerian State relies on the use of violence to safeguard 
MNOCs and oil installations thereby guaranteeing the continuous flow of oil rents, 
MEND uses violence to extort rents from MNOCs, ransomed kidnapped oil 
workers and international vessels.  Thus, MEND mirrors the Nigerian rentier 
neopatrimonial state and both represent two sides of the same coin. 
 
Against this backdrop, it is appropriate to consider why the Niger Delta conflict, a 
violent rebellion against a rentier-neopatrimonial state ended up as a replica of 
the same state it was originally meant to confront. In other words, why did the 
conflict whose original goal was premised on genuine political grievances mutate 
during the MEND era to a loot seeking rebellion where all and sundry became 
preoccupied with pecuniary gains. Boas (2011: 116) contends that the Niger 
Delta conflict and the emergence of MEND is a product of the crisis and 
contradictions of a dysfunctional neopatrimonial system as manifested in the 
region’s experiences of long years of poverty, corruption, abuse of power and 
office. Drawing insight from his argument one could posit that the mutation 
suggests that MEND commanders have been infected by the vices of the same 
dysfunctional society that produced it and the conflict in general. This argument 
is apt when viewed against the fact that there is hardly any Nigerian institutional 
setting (micro and macro) that is not affected by these neopatrimonial vices.  
In another vein, the mutation could be explained from the dynamics of violent 
conflict or rebellion which makes it very difficult for conflict and conflict actors to 
keep to their declared political grievance or ideological commitment; which clearly 
fits into the contention that ‘increasingly civil wars that appear to have begun with 
political aims have mutated into conflicts in which short-term economic benefits… 
[become more] paramount’ (Keen, 1998: 12). Additionally, as Collier argues the 
possibility of grievance resulting in armed rebellion depends on access to funding, 
and in the case of MEND since there is no record of diaspora support the only 
option is to resort to criminal avenues for raising funds with illegal oil bunkering, 
kidnapping for ransom and illegal tolls readily becoming viable options.  
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In addition, as argued by Ross (2012: 147-153), the oil industry is ‘extortion’ 
friendly for three reasons. First, they operate in areas of high-security risks where 
the national government is unable to provide adequate security. Secondly, the oil 
companies have a strong tendency to remain in operation despite the level of 
security risks and thirdly because oil companies have money, they can afford the 
security cost to their business. Therefore, this makes oil companies ‘…more 
willing to strike deals with the military or insurgents…’ (Ibid: 152). Therefore, given 
that all these variables empirically fit the Niger Delta situation, they provide a 
strong explanation as to why the conflict mutated from grievance to greed during 
the MEND era. This is because one could argue that from the onset MEND 
commanders as rational greedy actors have gauged and were convinced of the 
fact that MNOCs would always be willing to strike deals.   
3.2.3. Summary of Theoretical Arguments 
 
In conclusion, the origin of the Niger Delta conflict is linked to the crisis and 
contradictions of a dysfunctional rentier-neopatrimonial state which Nigeria 
exemplifies. However, understanding the contemporary nature of the Nigerian 
State as well as the conflict in the Niger Delta requires a nuanced understanding 
of the region’s precolonial history and the colonial foundation of the Nigerian 
State. In terms of pre-colonial linkages, I argued that the contemporary conflict 
over petroleum resources has similarities with the precolonial conflict between 
the Niger Delta region and foreign palm oil merchants that resulted in a violent 
confrontation with local chiefs and palm oil dealers. Here, the principal difference 
is that petroleum has become the source of contestation while European 
merchants have now been replaced by MNOCs. Similarly, the Niger Delta region 
as a regional block, together with insurgent youths have replaced former local 
chiefs as a party to the conflict. Likewise, conflict over ownership and control of 
oil is part of a longer history of conflict in the region that stretches back to the 
precolonial intercommunal conflict between Niger Delta communities for the 
acquisition of slaves. This then morphed into violent resistance by local chiefs in 
the Niger Delta against European domination and manipulation of the palm oil 
trade that still resonates in the legitimising narratives of contemporary militants’ 
commanders in the region particularly Asari Dokubo. Similarly, the rentier 
neopatrimonial character of the Nigerian State and its violent tendencies and 
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responses to the conflict are both a product of colonialism and partly responsible 
for the escalation of the conflict.  
The emergence of MEND and its ability to confront the Nigerian State could be 
attributed to its capacity to acquire the military, economic and political resources 
to confront the Nigerian State and not simply a function of grievance. However, 
the mutation of the conflict from grievance to greed and other loot seeking 
behaviour during the MEND era of the conflict reflects the extent to which the 
movement has been infected by the pathologies of the dysfunctional 
neopatrimonial state that produced the conflict generally. Nonetheless, the 
mutation of the conflict during the MEND era also shows the complex and 
dynamic nature of the interaction between grievance and greed and vice versa in 
explaining the causation and dynamics of conflict.  
3.3. Genesis and Periodisation in the Niger Delta Conflict 
 
In this second part of the chapter, I shall examine the historical stages of the 
conflict in the Niger Delta. Specifically, I will consider the extent to which the 
genesis and dynamics of the conflict fit into the framework highlighted above. 
3.3.1. The Pre-independence Agitation of Minorities of the Niger Delta  
At independence, the British colonialists bequeathed a Nigerian State that was 
highly susceptible to conflict and instability in a number of ways. For instance, the 
vast geographical size of the northern region and its population size in 
comparison to the western and eastern regions gave the northern region the 
leverage to politically dominate the Nigerian State. Apart from that, the Nigerian 
State was created in such a way that in each of the three regions there was a 
hegemonic ethnic group that dominated the politics of the region amidst several 
marginalised minority ethnic groups (Oyerinde, 1998: 59-63). Particularly 
pertinent to the Niger Delta conflict was the emergence of the Igbos as the 
politically hegemonic ethnic group in the eastern region which conferred on them 
political dominance over the Niger Delta oil-producing minorities. 
Considering the above, the first manifestation of the conflict was during the pre-
independence era when fear of ethnic domination and marginalisation was 
expressed by the Niger Delta and other minority ethnic groups against the 
hegemonic ethnic groups that dominated the incipient Nigerian rentier 
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neopatrimonial state. During this era, Harold Dappa Biriye, a Niger Delta minority 
rights activist led a delegation of ethnic minorities from the Niger Delta region and 
other parts of Nigeria to a London pre-independence constitutional conference to 
express their fears of domination and marginalisation in the emerging post 
independent Nigerian State (Simbine, 2006: 47; Etemike, 2009: 154-156; Epelle, 
2010: 24; Adeyemo & Olu-Adeyemi, 2010: 46; Ojakorotu, 2010: 109; Ibaba et al., 
2012: 1-2). The demand of the Niger Delta minorities at this stage revolved 
around having a state of their own in order to avert the obvious political 
domination and plundering of their resources by the Igbo hegemonic ethnic group 
that was politically dominant in the Eastern region. The Niger Delta minorities’ 
delegation to the conference made a case for the creation of Calabar-Ogoja-
Rivers state from the then eastern region and the right to control their resource 
(Epelle, 2010: 26). Thus, the whole gamut of pre-independence minority agitation 
of the Niger Delta (and which equally persisted even in the immediate post-
independence period) revolved around these issues: 
The logic of…minority agitations in Nigeria runs as follows: access to 
power determines personal and group enrichment. Possession of power 
itself is determined by numerical superiority. Political mobilization for 
capturing state power is rooted in ethnicity. Majority ethnic groups have 
used their numerical superiority to corner political power in the country. 
With such power, they have expropriated economic resources that 
naturally belong to ethnic minorities. With their numerical inferiority, 
minority groups will never get their hands on the levers of political 
power…Without a fundamental restructuring of the country, political power 
will always accrue to the ethnic majorities since the game of political 
numbers is in their favour, Thus, with ethnic minorities’ numerical 
disadvantage, they will continue to be marginalized (Agbese, 2003: 245-
246). 
 
The above minority consciousness was further heightened in the Niger Delta after 
the discovery of petroleum in commercial quantities by Shell-BP in Oloibiri 
(present day Bayelsa state) in 1956 (Obi & Rustad, 2011: 5). However, the fact 
that the conflict continued to spiral upward demonstrates that the issues in 
contention were not adequately addressed either by the departing British colonial 
regime or the immediate post-colonial Nigerian State (Ojakorotu, 2008: 94). 
3.3.2. The 1967 Insurrection (the Twelve Days’ Revolution) 
The unaddressed pre-independence minority grievances reverberated a few 
years after Nigeria’s independence in the 1960s, when Isaac Adaka Boro from 
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the Ijaw ethnic group and leader of the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) led 
an armed insurrection known as the twelve days revolution that declared the 
Niger Delta region a sovereign Republic (Azaiki, 2003: 80; Obi & Rustad, 2011: 
6). The revolt was significant because it signalled the first violent attempt by youth 
from the Niger Delta region to reject their marginalisation and exploitation by the 
Nigerian State (controlled by hegemonic ethnic groups). It also signified an 
attempt by the Ijaw segment of the Niger Delta minorities to assert the region’s 
rights to self-determination and control over petroleum resources found in their 
land (Azaiki, 2003: 80; Obi, 2010: 225 & Obi & Rustad, 2011: 6). Adaka Boro 
encapsulated the reasons for the insurrection as follows: 
 
Today is a great day, not only in your lives, but also in the history of the 
Niger Delta Perhaps it will be the greatest day for a very long time. This is 
not because we are going to bring heavens down, but because we are 
going to demonstrate to the world what and how we feel about 
oppression…Therefore, remember your seventy-year-old grandmother 
who still farms before she eats; remember also your poverty stricken 
people; remember too your petroleum which is being pumped out daily 
from your veins (sic); and the fight for your freedom (The Adaka Boro 
Centre, n. d.: 2). 
 
Boro’s speech clearly suggests that beyond the quest for self-determination, 
poverty and fear of marginalisation and underdevelopment, the control of 
petroleum resources discovered in the region had now become a major issue of 
contention. However, the fact that the attempted revolt was militarily crushed and 
the grievances not dealt with lends credence to my argument that the postcolonial 
Nigerian State, like its colonial progenitor, was primarily a law and order state that 
relied on the instrument of coercion to sustain itself and suppress grievances 
instead of constructively addressing them. Even though it was short-lived, Boro’s 
revolution has left one enduring legacy in the trajectory of minority struggle in the 
Niger Delta as a model after which the Kaiama Declaration and MEND phases of 
the conflict were framed. A Niger Delta academic expert observed that ‘if you go 
to a typical Niger Delta activist home you… [will] see a photograph of Saro Wiwa 
and the photograph of Adaka Boro because they are regarded as heroes of the 
Niger Delta struggle’.25  
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3.3.3. The Era of Community Based Agitations 1970s- 1980s 
In the aftermath of the successful military crushing of Adaka Boro’s revolt in 1967, 
the period from the 1970s up to the late 1980s was characterised by a shift in the 
tactics of agitation adopted by ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta. For instance, 
according to Osaghae (1995: 332) within this period ‘…the main redressive 
mechanisms for oil-producing communities in their demand for improved 
conditions and better treatment have been petitions and delegations to the federal 
and state government as well as the oil companies [sic]’. Agitations were equally 
pursued by socio-cultural groups, community leaders and elders who usually 
negotiated the resolution of grievances with MNOCs on behalf of their 
communities, as well as with state and federal governments (Osaghae et al., 
2008: 21-23).  
The tactics adopted during this period included sending a delegation to the 
government and MNOCs to negotiate, the calling of press conferences and the 
issuing of press statements highlighting the region’s grievances. The demand by 
oil producing communities at this stage centred on the need for the payment of 
compensation for community property destroyed in the process of oil exploration 
activities, environmental despoliation caused by oil spillage, gas flaring and their 
negative effect on and destruction of agricultural and aquatic sources of livelihood 
as well as demand for the provision of social amenities (Ibaba et al., 2012: 2). 
The slow and inadequate response of the MNOCs often caused communities to 
resort to peaceful blockades of oil flow stations and roads leading to the stations 
(Ibid.). Most times this development angered the MNOCs who in turn resorted to 
repressive actions by inviting members of the security forces to disperse the 
peaceful crowds of agitators instead of engaging them in constructive dialogue. 
For instance, in the 1980s the people of Umuechem community in Rivers State 
organised a peaceful protest against Shell Petroleum Development Company 
(SPDC) demanding compensation for damages incurred and provision of 
infrastructure such as electricity and roads but were brutally dispersed and 
repressed by security personnel resulting in several deaths and destruction of 
property (Mochizuki, 2009: 214).  
The fact that community-based peaceful agitations continued until the late part of 
the 1980s means that the conflict entered a period of de-escalation. One reason 
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for this that can be deduced from the literature was that, following the crushing of 
Isaac Adaka Boro’s revolt, he and his compatriots were charged and tried for 
treason and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Aguiyi Ironsi led military 
government. However, they were later granted amnesty by the military junta led 
by General Yakubu Gowon, a Northern minority military officer. The same regime, 
in order to weaken the Eastern region’s secessionist revolt, created new states 
with Rivers state specifically created for the Niger Delta oil-producing minorities 
(which was one of their longstanding demands). These two gestures by the 
Nigerian State within a short span of time may have given the Niger Delta 
minorities a new ray of hope that the Nigerian State was beginning to be 
genuinely committed to addressing their grievances. However, a Niger Delta 
academic expert argues that the seeming calmness recorded was because the 
creation of Rivers State co-opted Niger Delta minority elites into the broader 
Nigerian rentier neopatrimonial State ruling class coalition.26 Likewise, a member 
of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta (TCND) argues that the tempo of 
Boro’s violent revolt could not be sustained because it was not based on a 
community-wide grassroots mobilisation but was a sporadic reaction against the 
failure of the Nigerian State in the Niger Delta, driven by a combination of 
grievances, youthful exuberance and displays of bravery.27 Additionally, the 
member of the TCND argues that it could not be sustained because the separatist 
vision of the Niger Delta was limited to the current Ijaw speaking Bayelsa state 
instead of the broader geographic Niger Delta as conceptualised in Chapter 
One.28 Thus, the revolt did not draw its support base from the numerous ethnic 
nationalities that made up the Niger Delta region. 
3.3.4. The 1990s Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) 
The repressive way the Nigerian State responded to nonviolent community-
based agitations provided the basis in the early 1990s for the formation of a Niger 
Delta ethnic minorities social movements such as MOSOP against the Nigerian 
State and MNOCs (Ibaba, et al., 2012: 3). MOSOP ‘… [was] a nonviolent, 
peaceful, and humane, environmental rights and cultural organization aimed at 
organizing and educating the Ogoni nationals on their rights, the need to 
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zealously demand for them, and also serving as a model for other oppressed 
minorities’ (Ikari, 2006: 56). The formation of MOSOP, and Ken Saro-Wiwa’s role 
as its leader in the 1990s marked an important turning point in the history of the 
Niger Delta conflict and struggle by oil producing minorities (Osaghae, 1995: 326; 
Azaiki, 2003: 81; Okonta, 2008: 179; Epelle, 2010: 25; Adeyemo & Olu-Adeyemi, 
2010: 41). The Ogoni are a minority ethnic group in Rivers state, scattered across 
three local government councils, and endowed with about fifty oil wells and host 
to Nigeria’s first oil refinery at Lesa Eleme (Osaghae, 1995: 327-329). MOSOP 
as a social movement was able to ‘…transform Ogoni from an ethnic group-in-
itself to an ethnic group-for-itself’ (Ibid: 329). This suggests the conscientisation 
of the Ogoni ethnic group from a mass ethnic nationality to a highly politically 
conscious one that was prepared to fight the decades of marginalisation and 
underdevelopment it had been subjected to by the Nigerian State and MNOCs. 
As noted by Osaghae in the mid-90s: 
For the oil producing ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta and especially the 
Goonish of Rivers state, it was time to confront the federal state on 
fundamental issues of the injustice of ‘killing the goose that lays the golden 
egg’. For a long time, these communities have had serious grievances 
which have not been well addressed. Foremost is that although the bulk 
of crude oil, the country’s main source of revenue, is derived from their 
lands, they belong to the ranks of the most backward, and politically 
marginalized groups in the country. Their leaders attribute this injustice to 
the fact that they are minorities, and accuse the ethnic majority groups of 
using oil wealth to develop their areas at the expense of the areas from 
which oil is derived. Another is that several years of oil exploration and the 
hazards of spillage and gas flaring which accompany it has degraded their 
environments (sic) and left their communities desolate. Not only having 
(sic) farming and fishing, the major occupations of these mostly riverine 
minorities been decimated, their territories have continuously lacked basic 
infrastructure and amenities-electricity, roads, schools, hospitals, potable 
water and so on (Osaghae, 1995: 325). 
 
In terms of tactics and strategies of engagement with the Nigerian State, MOSOP 
conducted massive grassroots sensitisation campaigns that raised the level of 
consciousness and awareness of Ogoni people to the state of injustices, 
deprivations and environmental degradation they had been subjected to over the 
years by the Nigerian State and MNOCs (Ibid.). In pursuit of the Ogoni struggle 
MOSOP collaborated with the National Youth Council of Ogoni People (NYCOP) 
and the Ethnic Minority Rights Organisation of Africa (EMIROAF), two other 
Ogoni grassroots organisations that shared a common perspective on the 
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predicament of the Ogoni people (Osaghae, 1995: 333 and Raji, 1998: 117). 
Naanen elaborates on MOSOP tactics and strategies of engagement when he 
posits that: 
…the whole Ogoni people had to be mobilised in order to eradicate the 
spirit of despondency and fatalism which decades of perceived 
exploitation and psychological pressure had imposed on them. The people 
had to be made to know their rights and realise that these would not be 
conceded to them without a struggle. The struggle had to be a non-violent 
one in the tradition of the 1960s American civil rights movement. It was 
apparent that armed struggle would get nowhere, except perhaps to bring 
about the extermination of the Ogoni…alienate potential local and 
international support. Second, to make the Ogoni case an international 
concern since it involves fundamental issues of human rights and the 
environment (Naanen, 1995: 68-69). 
 
The declaration and presentation of the ‘Ogoni Bill of Rights’ in October 1990 to 
the government and people of Nigeria and the international community marked 
MOSOP’s first passive resistance and contentious engagement with the Nigerian 
State (Naanen, 1995: 69; Osaghae & 1995: 335). The Ogoni Bill of Rights, which 
summarises the grievances of the Ogoni people against the Nigerian State and 
MNOCs was considered highly confrontational by the state and MNOCs, (Okonta, 
2008: 180-188). The Ogoni Bill of Rights summarised the essential grievances of 
the Ogoni people as follows: 
WE, the people of Ogoni…numbering about 500,000 being a separate and 
distinct ethnic nationality within the Federal Republic of Nigeria, wish to draw the 
attention of the Governments and people of Nigeria to the undermentioned facts: 
• …That oil was struck and produced in commercial quantities on our land 
in 1958 at K. Dere (Bomu oilfield) ... (sic). 
• That in over 30 years of oil mining, the Ogoni nationality have provided the 
Nigerian nation with a total revenue estimated at over 40 billion Naira 
(N40billion) or 30 billion dollars. 
• That in return for the above contribution, the Ogoni people have received 
NOTHING (sic). 
• That today, the Ogoni people have: 
(i) No representation whatsoever in ALL (sic) institutions of the Federal 
Government of Nigeria; 
(ii) No pipe-borne water; 
(iii) No electricity; 
(iv) No job opportunities for the citizens in Federal, State, public sector or 
private sector companies; 
(v) No social or economic project of the Federal Government… 
• That the Ethnic policies of successive Federal and State Governments are 
gradually pushing the Ogoni people to slavery and possible extinction… 
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• That the search for oil has caused severe land and food shortages in 
Ogoni one of the most densely populated areas of Africa… 
• That neglectful environmental pollution laws and substandard inspection 
techniques of the Federal authorities have led to the complete degradation 
of the Ogoni environment, turning our homeland into an ecological disaster  
• That Ogoni people lack education, health and other social facilities. 
• That it is intolerable that one of the richest areas of Nigeria should wallow 
in abject poverty and destitution. 
• That successive Federal administrations have trampled on every minority 
right enshrined in the Nigerian constitution to the detriment of the Ogoni 
and have by administrative structuring and other noxious acts transferred 
Ogoni wealth exclusively to other parts of the Republic (Movement for the 
Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), 1991: 4-5). 
 
Apart from highlighting their grievances, the Ogoni Bill of Rights further articulated 
some key demands to the Nigerian State as a precondition for lasting peace in 
Ogoni land: 
…That the Ogoni people be granted POLITCAL AUTONOMY (sic) to 
participate in the affairs of the Republic as a distinct and separate unit by 
whatever name called, provided that this autonomy guarantees the 
following: 
(i) Political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people; 
(ii) The right to the control and use of a fair proportion of OGONI economic 
resources for Ogoni development; 
(iii) Adequate and direct representation as of right in all Nigerian national 
institutions… 
(iv) The right to protect the OGONI environment and ecology from further 
degradation (Ibid: 5-6). 
 
Furthermore, the year following the declaration was characterised by a series of 
press conferences and communiqué that mobilised the broad-spectrum of 
Nigerian pro-democracy groups towards supporting the Ogoni struggle 
(Osaghae, 1995: 336). Within the same period, MOSOP issued a 30-day 
ultimatum via a letter to MNOCs operating in its homeland asking them to attend 
to their demands or risk having their operations disrupted through mass action. 
As Osaghae notes: 
 …in December 1992 MOSOP leaders wrote to Shell, Chevron and NNPC, 
the three oil companies operating in Ogoni land, demanding: (1) payment 
of US $6 bn for accumulated rents and royalties for oil exploration since 
1958; (2) payment of US $4 bn for damages and compensation for 
environmental pollution, devastation and ecological degradation; (3) 
immediate stoppage of environmental degradation and in particular gas 
flaring in Yorla, Korokoro and Bomu; (4) immediate covering of all exposed 
high pressure oil pipelines; (5) initiation of negotiations with Ogoni people 
‘with a view to reaching meaningful and acceptable terms for further and 
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continued exploration and exploitation of oil from Ogoniland and to agree 
on workable and effective plans for environmental protection of the Ogoni 
people (Osaghae, 1995: 336). 
 
The failure of the MNOCs to meet the above demands triggered a major 
demonstration on January 4 1993 that expressed the Ogoni’s resentment against 
the Nigerian State and Shell (Naanen, 1995: 69). The demonstration was initially 
preceded by a series of activities such as a memorial service and a visit to the 
graveside of Paul Birabi, a prominent hero of the Ogoni struggle during which 
fiery speeches were made by various Ogoni activists to justify the struggle 
(Naanen, 1995: 69 and Raji, 1998:117). In addition to the January 
demonstrations, MOSOP arranged a mass vigil on 13 March 1993 during which 
prayers were offered to God to intervene in the predicaments confronting the 
Ogoni people and which ended with a procession during which respondents 
chanted demanding the liberation of Ogoni people from the shackles of the 
Nigerian State (Osaghae, 1995: 337). The zenith of the Ogoni’s contentious 
engagement with the Nigerian State was the total boycott of June 12, 1993, 
Nigerian presidential election by the entire Ogoni people (Naanen, 1995: 70). 
From 1991, contentious engagements with the Nigerian State were pursued side 
by side with a global campaign to draw the attention of the international 
community to the precarious situation in Ogoni land (Naanen, 1995: 70 and Obi, 
1997: 144). MOSOP engaged the international community by maximising every 
opportunity available to it particularly ‘...the highly favourable international climate 
for the success of democratic forces over authoritarianism’ (Osaghae, 1995: 339). 
MOSOP succeeded in making presentations to international organisations such 
as the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva in 1992 and the 
United Nations Human Rights Conference held in Vienna 1993 (Naanen, 1995: 
70-71). Through these constructive international engagements, MOSOP brought 
the plight of the Ogoni people and Niger Delta to global attention.  
The robust international engagement by MOSOP yielded several positive impacts 
to the extent that ‘at its 43rd session, held in Geneva in August 1993, the United 
Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination appointed a 
special rapporteur on Ogoni after the Ogoni delegation presented its case’ 
(Naanen, 1995: 70). Also, ‘a crucial factor in the international campaign…[was] 
the admission of Ogoni in January 1993 to The Hague-based Unrepresented 
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Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO)’ (Ibid: 70-71). Subsequently, the 
UNPO mobilised global support for the Ogoni people by embarking on a massive 
and sustained international media enlightenment campaign that attracted human 
and environmental rights organisations such as Amnesty International and 
Greenpeace to join the Ogoni international campaign. Specifically, the coming of 
Greenpeace into the Ogoni global environmental campaign resulted in 
considerable publicity and attention being given to the Ogoni situation in the 
ecology media (Ibid. 71). The campaign prompted several international 
environmental rights organisations such as the London Rainforest Action Group 
to embark on a field visit to Ogoni land which resulted in pressure on the Nigerian 
State to respect the right of the Ogoni people to self-determination (Obi, 1997: 
144-145). The global campaign in support of the Ogoni also attracted the 
attention of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group. The Group chairman 
wrote to Shell and the British Government drawing their attention to several cases 
of alleged human rights violations in Ogoni land and imploring them to take 
adequate steps to ensure that the situation did not degenerate into full blown 
violent conflict (Osaghae, 1995: 337 & Naanen, 1995: 7). According to Naanen a 
positive impact of MOSOP’s global engagement was ‘the publicity given to the 
Ogoni cause in the wider international press…’ (Naanen, 1995: 71). 
The significance of the MOSOP era in the Niger Delta struggle can be seen in 
several ways. First, at the domestic level, it was able to mobilise pro-democracy 
movements, academics and media to join in the non-violent crusade and 
advocacy to salvage the Ogoni people and the Niger Delta. Second, according to 
Obi (1997: 145), the activities of MOSOP succeeded in crippling the operations 
of MNOCs in Ogoni land. In an affirmation of Obi’s assertion, a member of the 
Ogoni Solidarity Forum noted that MOSOP succeeded in sending Shell 
Petroleum out of Ogoni land.29 Third, the organisation also succeeded in 
internationalising the plight of the Ogoni people and the entire Niger Delta region. 
The achievement recorded by MOSOP can be attributed to several factors one 
of which was the recalcitrant attitude exhibited by the Nigerian government and 
the MNOCS to their plight.  This recalcitrant attitude emboldened the Ogoni 
people to mobilise against the state and MNOCs (Osaghae, 1995: 333). Another 
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factor had to do with the quality of leadership Ken Saro Wiwa provided in MOSOP 
and its affiliates (Ibid.).  
Finally, the success MOSOP achieved in the international arena is largely 
attributed to the global tempo of emerging discourses on issues of human, 
environmental rights as well as minorities’ right to self-determination (Obi, 1997: 
145). Reiterating this same view, a staff member of the Africa Centre for 
Corporate Social Responsibility argues that MOSOP was successful because 
‘this was when the issue of the environment was becoming important, human 
rights discourse was upscale, democracy, minority rights and everything… [sic].30 
This sudden development was because the end of the cold war paved the way 
for western liberal ideas to become influential and the MOSOP leadership was 
able to strategically connect these discourses to generate international support 
and sympathy for the predicament of Ogoni people.  
However, MOSOP came to a sudden end in the mid-1990s due to a few reasons, 
one of which was the violent way the Nigerian State responded to the struggle. 
The state responded using military might, a situation exacerbated by the fact that 
Nigeria was at that time governed by a military junta. The second factor was the 
conflict over strategy among its key leadership. One of the ways this manifested 
itself was the debate between the hardliners who insisted on MOSOP maintaining 
an extremely radical and uncompromising stand in its engagement with the 
Nigerian State and MNOCs while the moderates pushed for flexibility and 
compromise where necessary. According to Okonta this internal dissension 
within the MOSOP’s leadership cadre became apparent to the extent that: 
 
During the crucial Abuja negotiations from February through May 1993, 
Saro-Wiwa adopted a hard-line position, insisting that an “Ogoni State” 
and at least 50 percent of the oil revenue from the Ogoni oil wells were the 
irreducible minimum that would be acceptable to his people…Garrick 
Leton, Edward Kobani, Albert Badey, and Bennett Birabi were, on the 
other hand, considered the “moderate” wing of the MOSOP negotiating 
team. They were prepared to be flexible with respect to the Ogoni core 
demands as outlined in the Ogoni Bill of Rights (Ibid.). 
 
Unfortunately, the dispute resulted in a failure by the two groups to reach a 
consensus concerning how much compensation Shell Petroleum and Wilbros 
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were to pay in order to resume pipeline work in Ogoni land (Okonta, 2008: 223). 
The moderates argued that One Million Naira was enough compensation but Ken 
Saro-Wiwa insisted that it was inadequate and claimed to have negotiated a One 
Million-Dollar compensation from Wilbros International in the US (Ibid.). The 
leadership conflict in MOSOP reached a climax when the hardliners and the 
moderates could not reach a consensus on whether the people of Ogoni should 
participate in the June 12, 1993, presidential election or not (Naanen, 1995: 70; 
Osaghae, 1995: 337; Osha, 2007: 89; Osha, 2006: 32 & Okonta, 2008: 225). At 
the end of the day, the disagreement was put to a vote and the hardliner's faction 
of the expanded MOSOP steering committee, mostly youth loyal to Ken-Saro 
Wiwa defeated the moderates, which resulted in the boycott of the June 12, 1993, 
presidential election by the entire Ogoni people (Okonta, 2008: 225). This 
development further deepened the polarisation within the Movement which 
snowballed into the killing of four members of the moderates during a meeting at 
the palace of the traditional ruler of Giokoo by youth allegedly loyal to Ken-Saro 
Wiwa on 21 May 1994 (Ibid: 229). While on the surface, this might suggest the 
collapse of MOSOP can simply be attributed to irreconcilable differences over 
strategy within the leadership cadre, my contention is that the incentive behind 
the difference emanated from perceived pecuniary gain on the part of both the 
moderates and hardliners.  
Following the tragic killing of the moderates, the late General Sani Abacha-led 
military regime established the Ogoni Civil Disturbances Special Tribunal 
(OCDST) in October 1995 to try Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others for murder. 
They were found guilty and executed by hanging on 10 November 1995 (Okonta, 
2008: 229). Thus, one could argue that the state hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and 
other leaders of the Movement marked the end of the Ogoni Social Movement. 
Yet, ‘after his execution…he became an international symbol for the rights of all 
indigenous peoples in the Niger Delta’ (Yates, 2015: 69). Similarly, his execution 
became a turning point in the Niger Delta struggle because it convinced the ethnic 
minorities of the region that a nonviolent approach would not attract the requisite 
government attention to their grievances. 
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3.3.5. The Kaiama Declaration and Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) 
As argued above, the repressive and violent way the Nigerian State responded 
to the Ogoni phase of the Niger Delta nonviolent resistance movement convinced 
other ethnic nationalities in the region that the state would not condone any 
nonviolent threat to its monopoly control and access to oil rents in the region (Obi, 
2010:228 & Ibaba et al., 2012: 3). Consequently, the nature of the state response 
and the excruciating effect of poverty inspired youth from the Ijaw ethnic group to 
take up the challenge of confronting the Nigerian hegemonic state in a more 
assertive way. In December 1998, youth from the Ijaw minority ethnic group 
drawn from 40 clans across six different states in the Niger Delta assembled in 
Kaiama (the hometown of Isaac Adaka Boro, martyr of the Ijaw struggle) to 
establish the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and issue the Kaiama Declaration 
(Onduku, 2008: 267; Obi, 2010: 228; Obi & Rustad, 2011: 8; Ibaba et al., 2012: 
3). This declaration, signed by Felix Tuodolo and Timi Ogoriba, signified the 
emergence of a generational power shift in the Niger Delta resistance movement 
from local chiefs and elites to youth (Obi & Rustad, 2011: 3). It also took the Niger 
Delta struggle to a new and violent dimension (Onduku, 2008: 267). Therefore, 
one could argue that the Kaiama Declaration catapulted the conflict to a new 
dimension by practically changing the conflict dynamics to a militarised one 
(Thovoethin & Yusuf, 2010: 5). 
The Kaiama Declaration reflects the opinion held by Ijaw youth regarding 
decades of marginalisation, relative deprivation, underdevelopment and the 
environmental degradation of their homeland as follows: 
That the quality of life of Ijaw people is deteriorating as a result of utter 
neglect, suppression and marginalisation visited on Ijaws by the alliance 
of the Nigerian State and transnational oil companies. That the political 
crisis in Nigeria is mainly about the struggle for the control of oil mineral 
resources (sic) which accounts for over 80% of GDP, 95% of national 
budget and 90% of foreign exchange earnings (sic). From which 65%, 75% 
and 70% respectively are derived from within the Ijaw nation. Despite 
these huge contributions, our reward from the Nigerian State remains 
avoidable deaths resulting from ecological devastation and military 
repression…That the degradation of the environment of Ijawland by 
transnational oil companies and the Nigerian State arises mainly because 
Ijaw people have been robbed of their natural rights to ownership and 
control of their land and resources through the instrumentality of 
undemocratic Nigerian State legislations…That the principle of Derivation 
in Revenue Allocation has been consciously and systematically obliterated 
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by successive regimes of the Nigerian State...(See Sources of Niger Delta 
Studies in Journal of ND Studies, 2000: 65). 
 
In a similar vein, the IYC in the declaration went on to state that: 
All land and natural resources (including mineral resources) within the Ijaw 
territory belong to Ijaw communities and are basis of our survival. We 
cease to recognise all undemocratic decrees that rob our 
peoples/communities of the right to ownership and control of our lives and 
resources, which were enacted without our participation and consent…We 
demand the immediate withdrawal from Ijawland of all military forces of 
occupation and repression by the Nigerian State. Any oil company that 
employs the services of the armed forces of the Nigerian State to “protect” 
its operations will be viewed as an enemy of the Ijaw people. Family 
members of military personnel stationed in Ijawland should appeal to their 
people to leave the Ijaw area alone. Ijaw youths in all the communities in 
Ijaw clans in the Niger Delta will take steps to implement these resolutions 
beginning from the 30th of December, 1998, as a step towards reclaiming 
the control of our lives. We, therefore, demand that all oil companies stop 
all exploration and exploitation activities in the Ijaw area. We are tired of 
gas flaring; oil spillages, blowouts and being labeled (sic) saboteurs and 
terrorists …we advice (sic) all oil companies staff and contractors to 
withdraw from Ijaw territories by the 30th December, 1998 pending the 
resolution of the issue of resource ownership and control in the Ijaw area 
of the Niger Delta…We agreed to remain within Nigeria but demand and 
work for Self Government and resource control (See Sources of Niger 
Delta Studies in Journal of Niger Delta Studies, 2000: 65-66). 
 
The Kaiama declaration marked a turning point in the historical trajectory of the 
Niger Delta conflict because it signalled the beginning of a new era of violent 
confrontation between Ijaw youth, the Nigerian military and the MNOCs. In its 
pre-violent confrontation stage, the IYC mobilised Ijaw youth in December 1998 
to embark on Operation Climate, which was a non-violent protest aimed at 
peacefully enforcing its earlier declaration that all MNOCs must vacate the Niger 
Delta before the end of December 1998 (Obi, 2010: 228). However, the Nigerian 
State responded in a militarised manner by declaring a state of emergency in the 
Niger Delta and then proceeding with a massive deployment of armed security 
forces to protect oil installations and disperse the protesting IYC members (Obi, 
2006: 96; Joab-Peterside, 2007: 17-18; Ibaba, 2008:14; Onduku, 2008: 268; 
Arowosegbe, 2009: 584; Obi, 2010: 228; Obi & Rustad, 2011: 8).  
The Nigerian State’s penchant for a militarised response to agitations was 
demonstrated in 1999 when its military personnel, conveyed in Chevron Texaco 
helicopters, allegedly fired and killed two protesters at one of its oil platforms (Obi, 
2006: 96). Yet another case was the razing of Odi town (an Ijaw community in 
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Bayelsa state) by military personnel while searching for criminals alleged to have 
murdered seven policemen.  During the invasion over two thousand residents 
were reported to have died and several others wounded (Ibid.). Such events 
affirmed the Nigerian State’s readiness to apply ruthless deterrence to checkmate 
any likely threat to oil and non-oil interests in the Niger Delta region (Obi, 2006: 
96 and Omeje, 2006: 154). In reaction to this militarization, youth from the region 
resorted to armed confrontation (Joab-Peterside, 2007: 18). Thus, the Kaiama 
Declaration heralded the contemporary tactic of violent resistance and the 
demand by Niger Delta minorities for control over oil resources exploited from 
their homeland (Ebienfa, 2011: 639). It is therefore not surprising that the 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta emerged in 2006. 
3.3.6. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) 
According to Ploughshares (2009) ‘a new rebel faction, the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), emerged in early 2006 and seeks 
independence for the region’s 14 million Ijaw people. Its favoured tactics 
reportedly include sabotaging oil production in the Delta region as well as 
kidnapping foreign workers.’ MEND succeeded in escalating the Niger Delta 
conflict to a new dimension by crippling oil production and revenue (Ikelegbe, 
2010: 40) with devastating consequences for the Nigerian rentier state and 
MNOCs. MEND further claimed to be fighting for the liberation of the Niger Delta 
region from over 50 years of political and economic slavery, given that the region 
had peacefully expressed its grievances for several years without any positive 
response (Kashi, 2008: 27). MEND in an electronic mail communication with 
Ross asserted its grievances, objectives and tactics in this way: 
The Movement for the Emancipation of the ND [Niger Delta] (MEND) is an 
amalgam of all arm bearing groups in the ND fighting for the control of oil 
revenue by indigenes of the ND who have had relatively no benefits from 
the exploitation of our mineral resources by the Nigerian government and 
oil companies over the last fifty years…We are spread across the 6 states 
of the ND … Our aim on inception was to attract international attention to 
the plight of the people of the delta and the injustice the world has been 
turning a blind eye to…we have progressed to the next stage of our 
campaign which is limited attacks on oil installations and administrative 
facilities…we are now considering the next phase which will be a more 
ruthless approach to our objective (Ross, 2007: 1). 
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In terms of organisational structure, Oriola argues that MEND ‘…operates as an 
amorphous, multifaceted amalgam of insurgent groups and displays an 
unprecedented precision in executing its intentions. MEND’s major ambition is to 
cripple the capacity of the Nigerian rentier petro-state to produce crude oil’ 
(Oriola, et al., 2013: 70). Thus, the MEND’s era marked a fundamental shift from 
the MOSOP era in terms of tactics of engagement with the Nigerian State from 
passive resistance to violent resistance. MEND, through kidnapping, hostage 
taking of expatriate and none expatriate oil workers and the bombing of oil 
installations attracted global attention to the plight of Ijaw (Obi, 2010: 230) and by 
implication the entire Niger Delta. According to Duffield (BBC News, Lagos, 2010) 
through its activities MEND ‘…cut Nigeria’s oil production by one-third causing 
spikes in the global oil price’.   
The MEND era further internationalised the Niger Delta conflict that started during 
the MOSOP era albeit in different ways. For instance, Oriola et al., (2013: 75) 
argue that among the factors which contributed to MEND’s success was its robust 
media engagement which extended to both domestic and international media 
organisations. A point reiterated by Duffield (BBC News, Lagos: 2010) who 
argues that ‘the group was successful, partly because of a sophisticated media 
strategy’. However, unlike MOSOP, MEND’s mode of interface with the 
international system was not through direct engagement at international forums 
but through massive propaganda using the internet to reach out to as wide an 
audience as possible (including internationally reputable electronic and print 
media organisations).31  
3.4. Comparing the Impact of the MOSOP and MEND Eras of the Niger 
Delta Conflict 
The MOSOP and MEND eras of the Niger Delta conflict were very significant and 
so it is pertinent to compare the impact of the two organisations both at the 
international and domestic level. At the international level, MOSOP succeeded in 
attracting global attention through its robust engagement in international fora. 
MOSOP was more effective because it adopted a constructive intellectual and 
nonviolent approach to pursuing its grievances, which was compatible with the 
                                                          
31.  Respondents 001- member disarmament and demobilisation Committee, October 2013 and 
038-former MEND commander, November 2013. 
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global democratic and environmental rights discourses of the time and also 
coincided with the UN declaration of the International Year of the World’s 
Indigenous People.32 Consequently, it attracted more positive global attention 
and sympathy for the Niger Delta oil-producing minorities as seen in the number 
of international nongovernmental human and environmental rights organisations 
that became concerned about the plights of the Niger Delta oil-producing 
minorities.  
In terms of MEND, one could argue that it was also successful at the international 
level albeit in a different way. MEND, though faceless at international fora 
attracted global attention to the Niger Delta through its skilful use of information 
and communication technology to make known its alleged grievances as well as 
through it destructive activities on oil production infrastructure which sent leading 
buyers of Nigerian crude oil panicking.  
However, while the global attention MOSOP attracted was positive and 
supportive of its cause the international attention MEND attracted was negative. 
For instance, former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown informed journalists at 
the 2008 G8 Summit held in Japan that the UK would assist Nigeria to ‘deal with 
lawlessness’ in the Niger Delta (BBC News, 2008) while Ploughshares, (2009: 2) 
reported that ‘the US government was reportedly providing military training as 
well as technical assistance to the distressed Delta region’. This suggests that 
unlike MOSOP, the global attention that MEND attracted was counterproductive 
to its cause. Similarly, at the domestic level, MOSOP succeeded in bringing the 
Niger Delta’s predicament to the front burner of the Nigerian development 
discourse and attracted the attention of Nigerian academics and non-
governmental organisations.  I would also argue that one positive enduring legacy 
of MOSOP’s struggle at the domestic level was that it contributed to the return of 
Nigeria to a democratic system of governance. I argue so because the global 
pressure and sanctions imposed on Nigeria because of the execution of Ken 
                                                          
32. The United Nations General Assembly decided that the International Day of the World's 
Indigenous People shall be observed on 9 August every year. The goal was to strengthen 
international cooperation for solving problems faced by indigenous people in such areas as 
human rights, the environment, development, education and health (United Nations, n.d. 
http://www.un.org/en/events/indigenousday/background.shtml). A group is regarded indigenous 
if they are inhabitants of a place prior to colonial invasion, maintain close tie to their land 
economically and culturally and suffers economic and political marginalisation due to their minority 
status. 
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Saro-Wiwa and others helped in compelling the Nigerian military junta to return 
the country to democratic rule. 
On the other hand, MEND could be adjudged as successful to the extent that it 
succeeded in crippling the operations of MNOCs, general economic activities in 
the Niger Delta region and flow of oil rents to the Nigerian rentier-neopatrimonial 
state, prompting the Nigerian federal government to embark on an ADDR 
programme (Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Amnesty Programme, 2011: 
22). Particularly, the government had to extend a hand of patronage to the top 
commanders and a reintegration support package to the foot soldiers (see 
chapter 4). Thus, within the context of a dysfunctional neopatrimonial state where 
corruption and self-enrichment are virtues highly celebrated and cherished, 
MEND could be regarded as extremely successful. However, measured in terms 
of having the original grievances that triggered the Niger Delta conflict addressed 
by attracting development to the Niger Delta, current realities in the region 
suggest that MEND has been a failure because the only legacy it has left is the 
relics of communities destroyed during clashes with security forces.  
Overall, the impact of the MEND insurgency was felt in three spheres, namely, 
loss of oil production, human impact and lost opportunity (Ibid.). In terms of lost 
production, as of May 2009, Nigeria was recording a shortfall of over one million 
barrels per day in relation to projected daily production; while the Shell Petroleum 
Development Company declared a force majeure33 of 0. 25 million barrels per 
day (Ibid.). It was further asserted that within the same period (2009), Nigeria was 
losing 8.7 billion naira daily (58 million US dollars), while in 2008 Nigeria lost over 
twenty billion US dollars due to the MEND oil insurgency (Federal Government 
of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme, 2011: 22). Similarly, the Nigerian 
Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) company recorded a loss of over two billion dollars 
in 2009, representing 53 percent of its installed capacity (Ibid.). In terms of human 
impact, 128 people were reportedly kidnapped from January 2008 to January 
2009, with over one thousand people killed in 2008 (Ibid.).  
In terms of lost opportunity, construction work on the East-West road a major road 
project in the Niger Delta was abandoned for two years due to insecurity while 
                                                          
33. Declaring Force majeure suggests that Shell Petroleum reported an unintended compulsory 
drop in its daily production capacity due to the prevailing security situation caused by the activities 
of MEND. 
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Michelin had to fold up its activities in the region and lay off its 1,500 staff, ditto 
for Julius Berger and Wilbros (Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta 
Amnesty Programme, 2011: 22.). In the same vein, small and medium 
enterprises also pull out from the Niger Delta with critical oil and gas pipelines 
infrastructure damaged (Ibid.). Similarly, given the high security risk involved for 
cargo ships coming to the Niger Delta, about 90 million dollars’ premiums was 
being charged per annum to insure ships sailing to Nigeria, while MNOCs 
operating in the Niger Delta Region were spending 3 billion dollars for protecting 
their facilities and installations (Ibid.). The above reflected the empirical reality in 
the Niger Delta region as at June 2009 when President Umaru Musa Yar’adua 
officially proclaimed an ADDR programme as a national response strategy to the 
protracted Niger Delta conflict.  
In conclusion, it is apparent that MEND represented the most organised and 
ferocious phase of the Niger Delta conflict. However, the ability of MEND to 
engage the Nigerian State in a prolonged and sustained military campaign was 
not a reflection of the intensity of grievance per se but the pursuit of personal 
economic agendas by its actors combined with the feasibility of a rebellion 
financed by oil and kidnapping of oil workers for ransom. Thus, the conflict 
economy, more than the verbalised grievances were what provided the 
motivation and resources for MEND to execute the most prolonged and sustained 
military campaign against the Nigerian State and MNOCs in the historical 
trajectory of the Niger Delta conflict.  Ikelegbe described the conflict economy in 
this way: 
An economy of conflict has emerged [in the Niger Delta] characterised with 
an intense, violent and bloody struggle for the appropriation of oil resources 
and benefits from the oil economy and a thriving market of illegal trading and 
smuggling of arms, crude and refined oil (Ikelegbe, 2005: 209). 
 
3.5. The Management of the Niger Delta Conflict by the Nigerian State 
Tamunosaki (2012: 10-14) has contended that at the early stage of Nigeria’s 
independence (1960s), its popular strategy of managing the conflict was 
‘avoidance and confrontation’ a situation Obi (2002: 99) describes as ‘…to sweep 
the complaints of the ethnic minorities under the carpet’. This suggests that the 
Nigerian State failed to recognise or constructively engage the people of the Niger 
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Delta region over their grievances but rather pretended there were no agitations 
at all. Tamunosaki contends that the frustration triggered by the state avoidance 
approach was what led to Adaka Boro’s revolt in 1966, approximately six years 
after independence. Tamunosaki’s view was corroborated by Albert who argues 
that the Nigerian State generally prefers the avoidance and confrontation 
approach as a way of managing conflict which resulted in the proliferation of 
various forms of community and governance related conflicts in Nigeria: 
The proliferation of community and governance conflicts in Nigeria stems 
from the fact that… [Nigeria] generally favour avoidance as a style of 
conflict management. At community and national levels, groups that feel 
aggrieved about certain issues complain very loudly about their 
predicaments but hardly get listened to by their adversaries or those that 
have the statutory responsibility to give them attention. The ignored groups 
soon take to violence…Once a community becomes violent in Nigeria the 
first thing government does …is to deploy some policemen to keep peace 
in the area (Albert, 2004: 37). 
 
The above assertion clarifies why the Nigerian State resorted to violence in 
crushing the first revolt by Adaka Boro and subsequent ones in the Niger Delta 
instead of negotiation. Subsequently, I will argue that the management of the 
conflict was premised on minimalist and maximalist perspectives. The maximalist 
perspective recognises the fact that the grievances that led to agitations in the 
Niger Delta region are rooted in its underdevelopment and difficult topography, 
which makes it a special development challenge because as George-Ukpong 
(2012: 56) observes ‘the Niger Delta region is indeed a peculiar region of Nigeria. 
The peculiarities lie in the…problem of naturally imposed harsh environmental 
conditions…’. A member of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta (TCND) 
refers to the situation as the classic Niger Delta problem.34 This perspective has 
its root in the submission of the Willinks Commission of 1958 (Movement for the 
Survival of Ogoni People, 2009: 15-16). Conversely, the minimalist perspective 
views the Niger Delta oil-producing minorities’ agitations as a threat to national 
stability and security (Ikelegbe, 2010: 39). From the minimalist perspective, the 
situation, if left unchecked could undermine the stability of the Nigerian State, 
hence the need to coercively deal with it using military deterrence as summarised 
below: 
                                                          
34. Respondent 008, October 2013). By classic Niger Delta problem, the respondent implies that 
apart from the region being marginalised and underdeveloped the difficulties of its terrain poses 
an additional development challenge. 
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…the crisis in the Niger Delta does pose a threat to the security, unity and 
territorial integrity of the Nigerian State, the lives and property of the 
residents of the region and the booming petro-business which has direct 
link or bearing with the national economy (sic) (Emmanuel & Maurice, 
2012: 166). 
 
The two perspectives of the conflict have given rise to a carrot and stick approach 
as the dominant strategy used by the Nigerian State to manage the conflict 
(Mustapha, 2010: 122). The carrot and stick approach is premised on the 
assumption that a cessation of violence will be achieved by responding to some 
of the grievances that informed the agitation (Ekpo, 2004:  Omeje, 2006: 147-
153; Ogundiya, 2011: 15-17; Adeyemo & Olu-Adeyemi; 2010: 46-55 and Ibaba, 
2012: 1-4) while concurrently applying deterrence measures. Emmanuel and 
Maurice (2012: 167) elaborate on the carrot component of the strategy in this 
way:  
Apart from this military option, government has at some other times 
employed a developmental approach to solving the problem. Thus, various 
development intervention agencies [have been created] such as the Niger 
Delta Development Board, River Basin Development Authority, Oil Mineral 
Producing Area Development Commission and recently, the Niger Delta 
Development Commission set up in 2001 by the Obasanjo 
administration…The aim has been to use these agencies for the 
development of the region (Emmanuel and Maurice, 2012: 167). 
 
The development agencies highlighted above were purposely set up to address 
the state of underdevelopment, infrastructural decay and environmental 
despoliation prevalent in the Niger Delta (Ibaba, 2012: 1-4). The first was the 
Niger Delta Development Board in the 1950s which metamorphosed into the 
Niger Delta Basin Development Authority in the 1980s (Ekpo, 2004: 65-69). The 
most recent creation was the Ministry of Niger Delta in 2008 (Ministry of Niger 
Delta Website, n. d.). Also, as part of the carrot approach, additional states and 
local governments in the Niger Delta were created as part of a strategy to bring 
governance and development closer to the people and to integrate indigenes of 
the Niger Delta into mainstream Nigerian politics, national leadership and public 
service (Agbese, 2003: 254, Omotola, 2006: 16-17 and Ogundiya, 2011: 16). In 
addition to the above, an increase in revenue allocation from the federation 
account to the Niger Delta states has been implemented (notably the granting of 
13% derivation to the oil producing states) as a way of enhancing their capacity 
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to execute development programmes (Amnesty International, 2005: 32-33; 
Omotola, 2006:16-17; Ibaba, 2012: 1- 4). 
On the other hand, in conformity with the stick component of the management 
approach, the Nigerian State has consistently applied deterrence (violence) to 
neutralise agitations from the Niger Delta region through the massive deployment 
of security forces. Moreover, while the Nigerian State’s development approach 
was haphazard and lacking coordination, it appears to be consistent and diligent 
in its application of deterrence. For instance, Adaka Boro and his fellow 
compatriots who staged the first revolt in the region were militarily countered, 
arrested, tried and found guilty of treason and sentenced to death (Azaiki, 2003: 
80; Obi, 2009: 118). Similarly, MOSOP which took the Niger Delta struggle to the 
next phase through its non-violent agitation ‘…was literally crushed largely 
through the use of state military force, and the hanging after a controversial trial 
and verdict, of nine of its leading members, including…Ken Saro Wiwa…’ (Obi, 
2009: 119). In response to the Kaiama Declaration by the IYC, the Nigerian State 
responded swiftly by declaring a state of emergency in the region, deploying 
several troops and anti-riot policemen to protect oil installations and disperse the 
riotous Ijaw youth, which resulted in several deaths (Arowosegbe, 2009: 584). 
The application of the stick reached a crescendo in 1999 when the Nigerian State 
deployed battle-ready soldiers to Odi town in Bayelsa state in search of Ijaw youth 
alleged to have killed seven policemen deployed to the town (Omeje, 2004: 432). 
Thereafter, the Nigerian State declared ‘Operation Hakuri II’ with a mandate to 
protect lives and property, oil platforms, flow stations, oil pipelines and refineries 
in the Niger Delta region (Ibid.).35 Subsequently, Operation Hakuri II mutated into 
a composite Joint Task Force (JTF) thereby further strengthening the stick 
approach. The JTF since its establishment has been engaged in countless violent 
encounters with MEND fighters. For instance, while the ADDR programme was 
proclaimed in the month of June 2009, the JTF in May launched a well-
coordinated attack and aerial bombardment on Gbaramatu kingdom and 
communities such as Okerenkoko, Oporoza, Kurutie, Kokodiagbene and 
Kunukuma with the aim of capturing or killing some of the MEND ringleaders (Obi 
& Rustad, 2011: 203).36 
                                                          
35. Respondent 043, December 2013. 
36.  The attack by JTF on Gbaramantu kingdom and communities within it was equally confirmed 
by respondent 048 in an interview (December 2014). The respondent viewed the attack as a 
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The effectiveness of the ‘carrots and sticks’ conflict management approach was 
undermined because the Nigerian State failed to equitably balance between the 
‘carrots and sticks’ in empirical application, as it over-relied on the use of threat 
and military force to subdue every agitation from the Niger Delta. Moreover, 
regarding the provision of carrots, a respondent in this study argues that the 
question that needed to be answered is ‘how adequate was the carrot given in 
response to the demand for it.’37 Therefore, the management approach failed 
because even though it was anchored on the interplay of development and 
security in a concurrent manner, the entire process was lopsided towards the 
provision of security, law and order and the marginalisation of the development 
component. Consequently, the human security and development dimensions of 
the conflict were neglected with the conflict regarded and treated as primarily a 
security problem. However, the over-reliance on a military solution to the conflict 
was in tune with the previously highlighted law and order nature and character of 
the Nigerian State. 
  
Furthermore, a Niger Delta academic expert contends that development 
agencies such as the Oil and Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission 
(OMPADEC), the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the 
Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs set up as part of the ‘carrots’ component were 
ineffective because they were superimposed from above and lacked any input 
from those whose grievances led to their establishment.38 The expert further 
contends that they were also underfunded and mired in corruption because funds 
allocated for development were syphoned through political patronage.39 The 
agencies eventually became a means of prebendal accumulation by the Niger 
Delta minority elites co-opted into the coalition of the national ruling class and 
appointed to manage them as noted by an academic expert who contends that 
the development agencies set up for the Niger Delta were a façade and a way of: 
Creating opportunities for elites of the Niger Delta to benefit more…there 
was the Niger Delta River Basin Development Authority but it never really 
                                                          
deliberate sabotage by the military to undermine the ND peace process given that the attack was 
carried out within the same period that the President announced the setting up of the amnesty 
planning Committee. 
37. Respondent 014, October 2013. 
38. Respondent 004, October 2013 and 037, November 2013. 
39. Ibid. 
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did anything with all the money that went into it and it was run by elite of 
the Niger Delta mainly; so, it was a way of accommodating them…40 
 
Similarly, Okonta and Douglas (2003: 32-36) describe OMPADEC as the cult of 
corruption while a staff member of the Nigerian Office of the Search for Common 
Ground concurs with the above opinions and argues that despite the enormous 
budgetary allocation to the NDDC, it is unable to effectively execute its statutory 
mandate of bringing development to the Niger Delta because its budget is usually 
treated as a slush fund.41 According to the respondent the main reason for the 
non-performance of NDDC was because monies budgeted for projects execution 
are diverted for other purposes and into the private accounts of political elites and 
bureaucrat manning the commission.42 Ultimately, agencies such as the Ministry 
of Niger Delta Affairs and NDDC have been undermined by a rapacious 
bureaucracy and elected governing elites. For example, according to Daniel 
(2015) a former minister for Niger Delta Affairs and two accountants of the 
ministry are being investigated in connection with the illegal withdrawal of N1. 5 
billion cash from the ministry’s account with the Central Bank of Nigeria. Also, 
Olokor (2015) reported that the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related 
Offences Commission (ICPC) arraigned five ex-directors of the Ministry of Niger 
Delta Affairs for alleged N670m fraud. In a similar vein, Udo (2015) reported that 
a special audit report by the Office of the Accountant General of the Federation 
established that the NDDC allegedly diverted the sum of N183bn meant for the 
development of the Niger Delta region. According to Udo (2015) the alleged 
indictments were contained in three special reports covering the period 2008-
2012. The reports established the following misappropriations: 
a. The total of N183.7 billion discovered missing during the period 
covered by the audit report. 
b. About N70.4 billion paid as mobilisation to various contractors who 
never showed up at the project site. 
c. N90. 4 billion was discovered to be illegal extra-budgetary 
expenditure for unauthorised sub-heads. 
                                                          
40. Respondent 045, December 2013. 
41. Respondent 010, October 2013.  
42. Ibid.  
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d. N10 billion was recorded as tax deducted but without evidence of 
remittance to the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS). 
e. N5.8 billion paid to contractors for jobs not done. 
f. N1. 2 billion taxes not deducted from contractors. 
g. N785 million out of N1.1 billion for the supply of furniture to various 
schools in Delta state paid for without any evidence of being supplied. 
 
 In addition, Daniel and Nwagbuhiogu (2015: 9) alleged that ‘…the sum of N1.3 
billion was approved and released for NDDC Christian Fellowship and NDDC 
Children and Disabled families end of the year parties. While the Christian 
Fellowship reportedly received N500 million, the NDDC children and disabled 
families got N800 million, an expenditure clearly outside the commission’s 
mandate. They further report that a few weeks from the 2015 general elections 
‘the Commission is also said to have inexplicably moved the sum of N100 billion 
from its Access Bank account on Agip Road branch to an undisclosed location…’ 
(Ibid.)  fuelling suspicion that the money was used to fund the Peoples 
Democratic Party (PDP) campaign for the 2015 national elections in the Niger 
Delta. 
Creating more states and local governments as a means of bringing governance 
closer to ethnic minorities and integrating them into Nigeria’s mainstream politics 
has been criticised as merely serving the interests of privileged minority elites. 
This was because it only serves as a means of co-opting them into the national 
neopatrimonial ruling elites to the detriment of masses from the region. This is 
because as Suberu (2013: 79) argues ‘…the fragmentation of Nigeria into 
…subnational state and local governments has vastly expanded and multiplied 
the access points and conduits for the individual and sectional appropriation of 
public power and resources.’ Thus, the exercise only provided more avenues for 
prebendal accumulation for the privileged minority elites co-opted into the 
national neopatrimonial ruling elite coalition. 
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3.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter is central to this study because to critically interrogate the 
effectiveness of the Niger Delta ADDR programme as a conflict prevention 
strategy, an understanding of the conflict’s origins, dynamics and management 
by the Nigerian State is necessary. The central arguments I advanced in the 
chapter is that the origin of the Niger Delta conflict is fundamentally rooted in the 
dysfunctional rentier neopatrimonial nature and character of the Nigerian State 
which over time became predatory. The nature and character of the Nigerian 
State gave rise to crisis and contradictions of accumulation which produced a 
conflict of security between the Niger Delta oil-producing minorities and the 
Nigerian State. Whilst the Nigerian State defines security in the Niger Delta as 
the protection of oil installations and MNOCs; the people of the region described 
security as improvement in their material condition and a healthier environment. 
The coercive nature of the Nigerian State underscored the violent way it 
responded to the conflict which in turn became one of the main drivers of the 
conflict’s changing dynamics. The mutation of the conflict from grievance to greed 
and the concomitant intrusion of economic agendas into the conflict during the 
MEND era enabled it to execute a prolonged violent revolt against the Nigerian 
State and MNOCs.  
As I argued in the chapter, this thesis is an evaluative case study that aims to 
interrogate the effectiveness of the Niger Delta ADDR programme as a national 
response to the conflict. The goal of the chapter was to provide an understanding 
of the historical origins and dynamics of the conflict and its management prior to 
the implementation of the ADDR programme. Consequently, in the first part of 
the chapter, I advanced a framework for explaining the origin and dynamic of the 
Niger Delta conflict. Specifically, the framework addressed two main issues; (i) 
the origin of the conflict, (ii) its changing dynamics and why and how the post-
Kaiama and MEND era of the conflict represented the most organised and violent 
revolt by Niger Delta youth against the Nigerian State and MNOCs. The second 
part of the chapter examined the periodisation in the conflict life cycle while the 
third and final part addresses the Nigerian State management of the conflict prior 
to the implementation of the ADDR programme. 
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The management of the Niger Delta conflict was based on carrots and sticks. 
Nevertheless, given the nature and character of the Nigerian State it was unable 
to balance the application of carrots and sticks to the extent that the state over-
relied on the use of violence (sticks) as a conflict containment strategy. Similarly, 
the effectiveness of development agencies established to ameliorate the crisis of 
underdevelopment in the region was hamstrung by corruption as they became 
avenues of prebendal accumulation. 
Thus, the nature and character of the Nigerian State vis-à-vis its role as a primary 
source and driver of conflict in the Niger Delta as well as other underlying issues 
that underpinned the conflict raises the all-important question of the extent to 
which an ADDR programme can serve as an effective national response. 
Consequently, the extent to which the ADDR programme effectively addressed 
the realities that underpinned the conflict will form the basis of my analysis in 
Chapter Five. 
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Chapter Four 
The Niger Delta Amnesty Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration 
Programme: Conceptualisation, Negotiation, Planning and 
Implementation 
4. Introduction 
This chapter examines to what extent the politics of conceptualisation, planning 
and implementation of the Niger Delta Amnesty, Disarmament Demobilisation 
and Reintegration (ADDR) programme affected its success or otherwise. This will 
be achieved by looking at how the conceptualisation, negotiation, planning and 
implementation conformed to the United Nations Integrated Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (UN IDDRS 2006) and the broader 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) theoretical and policy 
literature.  The chapter is central to the overall study because, to evaluate the 
extent to which the programme has achieved its objectives, a thorough 
understanding of the politics that underpinned its conceptualisation, design and 
implementation are necessary.  
The aim of the chapter is to demonstrate the contention that the politics of how a 
DDR programme is conceptualised, negotiated, planned and implemented can 
have serious implications for its overall outcome. The main argument I advance 
is that the conceptualisation of the Niger Delta ADDR programme was informed 
by conflicting conceptual perspectives and understandings of the conflict, which 
gave rise to security versus development agendas for the ADDR programme, but 
eventually it was the security agenda that informed the entire conceptualisation, 
negotiation, planning and implementation process. In terms of negotiation, I 
argue that the ADDR programme was achieved neither through negotiated 
settlement or outright military defeat of the militants but through a peace deal that 
combines the features of both peace enforcement and negotiated settlement, 
whereby top militant commanders with a high capacity to perpetrate violence and 
undermine oil production formed the nucleus of the negotiation. I equally assert 
that the conceptualisation and negotiation of the ADDR programme were 
influenced by the nature and character of the Nigerian State and its interest. I 
likewise contend that the planning and implementation of the programme did not 
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conform to the basic benchmarks provided in the UN IDDRS (2006) and the 
broader DDR theoretical and policy literature. I also argue that the implementation 
of the programme was undermined by four factors (i) the nature and character of 
the Nigerian State which revolves around its two distinguishing characteristics 
namely rentier-neopatrimonialism and it law and order nature (ii) the 
dysfunctionality of the Nigerian State (iii), competition between leading security 
agencies of the Nigerian State (military, police and state security service) and (iv) 
geographical impediment. Structurally, the chapter is divided into two main 
sections. The first section examines the conceptualisation, negotiation, planning 
and implementation of the Niger Delta ADDR programme; the second section 
highlights the problems and challenges that characterised the process that can 
serve as lessons for future DDR programming and implementation. The 
concluding section summarises some of the main arguments in the chapter.  
4.1. The Niger Delta amnesty, Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration Programme and the Politics of Conceptualisation 
As I noted in the introduction, the conceptualisation of the Niger Delta ADDR 
programme was premised on development versus security understandings of the 
conflict which resulted in the development versus security and stability agendas 
of the programme. The development perspective and understanding of the 
conflict, as well as the agenda of the ADDR programme, can be traced to the 
report of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta (TCND) set up by the 
Nigerian government. The TCND contended that: 
A fundamental perspective on resolving the Niger Delta crisis is 
governance. The failure of development in the Niger Delta is largely as a 
result of the absence of good governance frameworks which can 
effectively strengthen the use of political power and resources...The 
Committee is of the view that a crucial factor in resolving the Niger Delta 
crisis is dealing with the problem of militancy within a governance 
framework. It notes that when the principle of good governance is 
undermined, it precipitates opposition, alienation, resistance and 
disillusionment. Similarly, bad governance has allowed for the growth in 
violent behaviours and restiveness… (Movement for the Survival of Ogoni 
People, 2008: 65). 
 
In the light of the above, the TCND suggested that the Nigerian government 
should grant amnesty to all genuine militants as a prelude to a successful 
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disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme. Consequently, it 
recommended that the following steps should be taken: 
1. Establish a credible and authoritative DDR institution and process, 
involving international negotiators to plan, implement, and oversee the 
DDR programmes [sic] at regional, state and local government levels. 
2. Provide for open trial and release on bail (with a view to eventual release) 
of Henry Okah43 and others involved in struggles relating to the region. 
3. Grant amnesty to all Niger Delta militants willing and ready to participate 
in the DDR programme. 
4. Address short-term issues arising from amnesty to militants, by promoting 
security for ex-militants and rebuilding communities destroyed by military 
invasion. 
5. Work out long-term strategies for human capacity development [my italics] 
and reintegration for ex-militants. 
6. Reflect on a timeline with adequate funds for the DDR programme. 
7. Stop the illegal demands put on youths by prosecuting the suppliers of 
small arms and light weapons and those involved in oil bunkering, instead, 
the government should identify highly placed persons in and outside of 
government who are engaged in sponsoring violence for economic and 
political reasons. 
8. Exclude from amnesty, but criminalise those militants not committed to the 
DDR process and unwilling to surrender their arms. 
9. Ensure that signatories to the DDR programme show a clear commitment 
to the entire process (Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People, 2008: 
66). 
 
As can be seen, the TCND clearly recognised the fact that the Niger Delta conflict 
is essentially rooted in the crisis of bad governance and neopatrimonialism which 
precipitated underdevelopment with all its ramifications that eventually resulted 
in disillusionment, alienation and resistance. Consequently, in the eyes of the 
TCND if DDR was to contribute to lasting peace it had to incorporate the 
governance reforms highlighted above. In other words, it must be framed on a 
maximalist/transformative perspective (Muggah, 2004: 27; Özerdem et al., 2008: 
4-5 & Jennings, 2008:6). 
 
However, beyond the TCND’s recommendation, other members of the Nigerian 
State security architecture also recommended an ADDR programme to the 
Nigerian government even though not in the all-inclusive way the TCND did. The 
ADDR programme recommended by members of the Nigerian security 
architecture was to be implemented as a security stabilisation or containment 
                                                          
43. Henry Okah is one of the founders and leaders of the Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND).  
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strategy. For instance, one of the members revealed that at the peak of the 
insurgency he wrote a position paper to President Yar’Adua on the imperative of 
granting amnesty to the Niger Delta militants as a strategy for ending the security 
challenges brought about by militancy.44 Prior to writing the position paper he 
held preliminary discussions with Ateke Tom leader of the Niger Delta Vigilante 
regarding his intention to recommend amnesty for Niger Delta militants to the 
President.45 According to him during one of the meetings he had with Ateke Tom 
he explained to him that: 
 
I want to propose amnesty to the government but amnesty can have no 
meaning unless you yourself agree to it. He said what does amnesty 
mean? I say lay down your weapons and government will compensate 
you… he said it is ok. If I lay down my arms what of the boys, I said, the 
government will look after your boys (sic).46 
 
Similarly, a member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation 
Committee traced the programme to the position paper submitted to the President 
and National Security Adviser by the then Chief of Defence Staff. According to 
the respondent:  
… a lot of people had suggested that option but I think it did not go down 
well with the National Security Adviser, so not much of it came out of the 
suggestions and writings that people had made until the then Chief of 
Defence Staff said that he has to intervene, he had to do something, pick 
one option and see how it works. So he too was sold on the idea of 
disarmament, wrote a paper which he now took to the President, which the 
President now worked on. So I would say a lot of people will tell you that 
they wrote, that it was their paper that was important, but I can tell you 
categorically: it was the paper and the push given to the paper by the Chief 
of Defence Staff, Air Marshall Paul Dike that resulted to the amnesty 
programme.47 
  
Against this background, the recommendation of the TCND and that of the 
members of the Nigerian State security architecture clearly suggest that the 
conceptualisation of the Niger Delta ADDR programme was premised on two 
different and conflicting perspectives. Firstly, as I said, the TCND viewed the 
conflict and the resultant insecurity in the Niger Delta as a consequence of the 
                                                          
44. Respondent 049- former member of the Nigerian security architecture, January 2014.   
45. Ibid. 
46. Ibid.    
47. Respondent 042-member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, 
December 2013.  
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lack of human security, development and good governance and so 
recommended the implementation of a holistic DDR as an opportunity to 
simultaneously address the development and security challenges confronting the 
Niger Delta region. It also suggested that the ADDR should conform to the basic 
normative standards provided in the UN IDDRS (2006).  Thus, the TCND notes 
that ‘the need to provide an international perspective to the DDR requires that 
international standards on DDR as described in the United Nations Integrated 
DDR Standards (IDDRS) are applied’ (Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People, 2009:66). 
On the other hand, members of the Nigerian State security architecture viewed 
militancy as a security challenge and therefore pushed for an ADDR programme 
that prioritised security over development with scarce attention to the underlying 
human security and development issues that led to the conflict. Similarly, neither 
conforming to the basic tenets of the UN IDDRS (2006) or the normative 
standards in the broader DDR literature. The primary concern was to implement 
a DDR programme that responded to the emergency imperative of security 
stabilisation in the Niger Delta. As noted by one of the Committee members ‘the 
amnesty was not to solve the problem of the Niger Delta… the amnesty was a 
containment strategy, it was to contain the situation.’48 Thus, when the two 
perspectives are compared, it was evident that members of the Nigerian State 
security architecture in their conceptualisation did not demonstrate a deeper 
understanding of the complex nexus between development, conflict and security 
(also see Tschirgi, et al., 2010:1-6). Alternatively, they deliberately failed to 
appreciate this relationship and the fact that the 21st Century is characterised by 
the merging of security and development or the securitisation of development and 
developmentisation of security (see Chapter Two paragraph 2.6.1). Thus, their 
understanding of DDR is characterised by a bifurcation between security and 
development.  
Therefore, in line with the debates between traditionalists and wideners in 
security studies and the merging of security and development (securitisation of 
development and developmentisation of security) examined in Chapter Two, I will 
argue that the stand of the Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee (PAPC) 
                                                          
48. Respondent 050- member of the Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee, January 2014. 
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reflects the traditionalist’s school that pushed against the broadening of the 
sources of security threats. While the TCND’s recommendations mirror the 
widener’s position who are canvassing for a broader understanding of threats to 
security and the ultimate merging of security and development. Arising from the 
above discussion is that while internationally driven DDR implies the 
securitisation of development by external actors in post-conflict societies an 
interesting dimension of this case study is the securitisation of development by 
an internal/external actor, namely the Nigerian State. In this case, the Nigerian 
State arguably an internal but external actor to the Niger Delta has succeeded in 
securitising development in the region. This suggests that the provision of 
development in the Niger Delta is increasingly tied and linked to its security 
implications or the consequences that its absence may trigger; which as I 
previously argued raises the moral question of whether the Niger Delta deserves 
not to be developed if not for the security consequences that its absence will 
result in. 
Thus, from the perspective of the PAPC, the primary concern of the ADDR 
programme was to achieve the restoration of the Nigerian nation’s capacity for 
the legitimate application of force (Muggah, 2010: 221) in the Niger Delta. This 
was a necessary condition for restoring oil production and rents accumulation 
which had been undermined by militancy as noted by a member of the 
Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee: 
… because of the increasing militancy in the Niger Delta… solutions had 
to be found; and people thought one of the easiest ways or one of the 
options available to government is to grant amnesty to the militants, you 
know, so that we can get them out of the creeks, disarm them, reduce the 
arms in circulation, and move on from there because… the militancy was 
virtually crippling the Nigerian economy: oil production fell to about as low 
as eight hundred thousand barrels a day from [a] peak of about two point 
four million barrels per day. So it was… very necessary that resolution is 
found to the militancy at that time (sic).49 
 
The above conflicting understandings of the concept and agenda of DDR to be 
implemented in the Niger Delta was again exacerbated at the level of planning 
because the PAPC was dominated by members of the Nigerian State security 
architecture, and protagonists of a minimalist DDR. The Committee understood 
                                                          
49. Respondent 042, December 2013.  
 174 
 
the conflict from a security perspective and threat to oil production. This 
eventually resulted in a conceptual somersault that led to the abandoning of the 
idea of a maximalist/transformative DDR as an opportunity for development in 
favour of a minimalist DDR programme that focused on security stabilisation. As 
one member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation, Implementation Committee 
noted, the PAPC members ‘… concentrated mainly on the disarmament [aspect 
of the DDR programme].’50 However, it is my contention that, a broader and more 
nuanced DDR process could have been achieved if the conceptualisation and 
planning had been premised on the recommendations of the TCND. Thus, as will 
be substantiated in Chapter Five, the conceptualisation of the Niger Delta ADDR 
programme had serious implications for its overall success.  
The conflicting understandings that informed the ADDR conceptualisation 
process has led to differing judgements on its outcome. For instance, academic 
experts on the Niger Delta as well as environmental rights and development 
based civil society organisations (CSOs) tend to evaluate the programme from 
the perspective of the TCND’s conceptualisation adjudge it as a failure. This is 
because fundamental grievances that underpinned the conflict have not been 
addressed, communities destroyed have not been reconstructed or victims 
rehabilitated, except those that perpetrated violence.51 Conversely, members of 
the Nigerian State security architecture tend to see the programme as a huge 
success having reduced the level of threat to the Nigerian State’s legitimate 
application of force in the Niger Delta which resulted in a phenomenal increase 
in oil production.  As noted by a member of the PAPC:  
But hostilities stopped; did it not stop? As at you [As you are] interviewing 
me now, is there any hostility in the Niger Delta region? So if anybody says 
amnesty did not succeed, that person is an idiot; he doesn’t know what 
he’s saying; because by the time amnesty was offered them, all the 
expatriates had left the Niger Delta region … Oil production had dropped 
from … to seven hundred thousand barrels a day; and by the time I left as 
[Mike of Delta]… in March 2010 oil production had shot back to two point 
one million barrels a day; kidnapping had stopped; in fact it had reduced 
to the barest minimum in the entire Niger Delta region.52 
 
                                                          
50. Respondent 042- December 2013. 
51. Respondent 032- Niger Delta expert, November 2013. 
52. Respondent 050, January 2015. 
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It is appropriate to explain why and how the Niger Delta ADDR programme found 
itself in this conceptual conundrum. One reason for this can be extrapolated from 
the very nature and character of the Nigerian State. For instance, the country’s 
over-dependence on oil rents (Omeje, 2006: 212) and the crippling of its 
production by militancy made the Nigerian economy comatose53. Consequently, 
in view of the obvious menace that militancy posed to the survival of the Nigerian 
rentier state, it was stampeded into proclaiming an ADDR programme in order to 
checkmate the threat it constituted to oil production. Thus, the ADDR programme 
was premised and driven by the need to stabilise security in the Niger Delta in 
order to restore oil production and the flow of oil rents to the state. As one Niger 
Delta, academic expert observes: 
 
First and foremost, I do not think that the intention of the government for 
introducing the Amnesty was to solve the Niger-delta crisis, far from it. That 
was not the intention, and if that was the intention then the operational 
framework of the policy was faulty. There was violence, oil production had 
dwindled and it affected both states and federal government. The state 
governments…and federal government were losing revenues so there 
was convergence of interest that look if this continue[s] like this we may 
not have money to fund our activities let’s see if we can end violence, so 
the amnesty was to end violence to ensure that attacks on our oil 
infrastructure will seize and oil production will rise…54 
 
The respondent’s position is credible when viewed against a comment made by 
the Special Adviser to the President on the Niger Delta and Coordinator of the 
Amnesty Programme regarding the programme’s achievements. The adviser 
maintains that the ADDR programme has saved the Nigerian economy from 
imminent collapse: 
 
The amnesty programme is on course. It has recorded huge success. 
Violence has been stopped to a large extent in the Niger Delta region and 
this is having positive effects on the economy of the nation. Oil production 
came down to about 700,000 barrels per day before the amnesty 
programme was initiated. It was so difficult to finance the budget then 
because of this. But from the midnight of October 4, 2009, when the 
programme ended, oil production has risen from 700,000 barrels per day 
to around 2.5 million barrel (sic) per day (Makinde, 2013: 18). 
 
                                                          
53. Respondent 042, December 2013. 
54. Respondent 032, November 2013. 
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A second possible reason for the conundrum was provided by a military officer 
serving with the JTF, who posited that the problem of conflicting conceptualisation 
arose because those involved in the process were appointed, based on political 
expediency and not necessarily because they had any expert technical and 
theoretical knowledge of DDR.55 This was further corroborated by a former staff 
member of the Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta who 
argues that when the Nigerian government finally decided to embark on an ADDR 
programme in the Niger Delta ‘…there was never an attempt to learn from a 
country with best practices and experience in this regard’.56 
 
 A third possible explanation was the apparent lack of continuity in terms of 
membership of the TCND and the PAPC, more so there was no effort by the 
PAPC to reach out to the TCND members during the planning process.57 
Similarly, the report of the TCND did not in any way serve as a framework for the 
Planning.58 This clearly suggests that there was no conceptual congruity between 
the TCND and the PAPC. 
 
Fourthly, the non-inclusion of local communities, members of civil society 
organisations (CSOs) and academics further re-enforced the conceptual 
dichotomy that characterised the Niger Delta ADDR programme.59 For the ADDR 
programme to have maintained its initial development agenda, all relevant 
stakeholders ought to have been involved in the conceptualisation process. 
Indeed, a participatory approach60 to its conceptualisation should have been 
adopted, whereby local communities, CSOs, academics and other relevant 
stakeholders are given the opportunity to actively participate in the process. 
However, this was not the case, as explained by a community leader and member 
of the Oloibiri Traditional Council of Chiefs in Bayelsa state: 
                                                          
55. Respondent 012, October 2013. 
56 . Respondent 028, November 2013.  
57. Respondent 008, October 2013. 
58. Respondent 050- member Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee, January 2014. He 
disclosed that though he was privileged to see the TCND’s report but it was not in any way 
officially given to the Planning Committee as a framework for the ADDR planning. 
59. Respondent 004- Niger Delta academic expert, October 2013. 
60. Participatory Action Research (PAR) is an approach to research that emphasizes communities’ 
participation and action. It seeks to identify, understand and find solutions to problem in a 
collective and collaborative way. It is concerned with finding solution to real life situation and in 
the process, those affected by the problem are mobilised to take an active role in it (see Carroll, 
2004: 276- 280.) 
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But say as a community…the community does not …even know what the 
…whole thing is all about. We don’t know and…government 
agencies…have not come to discuss with the community and say, look 
because of this struggle we want to do this or do that for your …children 
who were in the struggle. But we know … we are reading from the paper 
that there are amnesty programmes, disarmament … all that and all that, 
but as a community, we are not feeling the impact (sic).61 
 
His explanation was corroborated by a staff member of a home-based 
nongovernmental organisation (NGO), who asserted that they ‘were not carried 
along.’62 When further probed, she emphasised that ‘there was, in fact, no 
involvement, there was no involvement… So the active civil society organisations 
here just sat behind and watched the drama go on in Abuja [sic].’63 The exclusion 
of these critical stakeholders in the conceptualisation process strengthened the 
security cum stabilisation agenda of the ADDR programme. Overall, the PAPC’s 
understanding of the conflict, as well as its concept of security and DDR is 
compatible with the Nigerian State’s concept of peace in the Niger Delta which in 
turn is synonymous with the absence of threat to the optimal operations of 
MNOCs and flow of oil rents. Overall, the security stabilisation conceptualisation 
of the ADDR programme underplayed the fundamental issues that led to the 
conflict which was emphasised by the TCND. As one academic respondent 
noted, the Nigerian government by securitising the DDR ‘… succeeded at 
sweeping a lot of things under the carpet [sic].’64  
 
4.2. The Niger Delta ADDR Negotiation 
There are conflicting accounts regarding how the Nigerian government 
negotiated the Niger Delta ADDR programme. One of the members of the 
Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee pointed out that the 
negotiation was based on a framework known as the Stakeholder Matrix.65 He 
contends that negotiations were carried out with selected top militant 
commanders based on their relative power and interest in the conflict and the 
                                                          
61. Respondent 029-November 2013.  
62. Ibid. 
63. Ibid. 
64. Respondent 045, December 2013. 
65. Respondent 001, October 2013.  
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extent of influence and credibility they commanded within the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Accordingly, the matrix categorised the 
militant commanders into groups A and B. Group A, he asserts, was comprised 
of top militant commanders with characteristics such as high power, high interest 
and high credibility. In contrast, those in group B were commanders considered 
to have low power, low interest and low credibility. The negotiation was 
predominantly carried out with commanders in group A who were regarded as 
the topmost and most influential in MEND, which also suggests that the Group A 
commanders were believed to have the manifest capability to threaten oil 
production. Likewise, the most capacity to deliver on any deal. 
 
A military officer serving with the Joint Task Force (JTF) corroborated this when 
he clarified that, during the negotiations, the ‘government only picked key leaders 
who they think at that material time can solve the problems [sic].’66 Again, 
‘problems’ here is construed by the respondent in the sense of ‘threats to oil 
production’. A former aide to president Yar’ Adua corroborated this when he noted 
that ‘[There were negotiations].  But the negotiations were with the commanders 
not with the foot soldiers.’67 However, a conflicting account was given by two other 
members of the same PAPC. The first one asserts that:  
 
There was no negotiation, negotiating with what for what?... I was one of 
those who believed we don’t need to negotiate; they take it or they leave 
it. We never negotiated with anybody. Amnesty was proclaimed they gave 
us time to go out and talk to them; advise them [to] take this amnesty. You 
only have six weeks to take it, after that you will be a criminal. We did not 
negotiate, negotiate with who for what.68 
 
The second member of the Committee spoke in the same vein by positing that 
as far as the ADDR programme was concerned:  
 
It was a unilaterally …determined program; that is; the government 
decided they were going to give amnesty… It is not as if … it is a typical 
disarmament thing where … like you have in Rwanda; where there would 
be negotiations, terms of surrender or terms of this …no …  this is a 
unilateral thing. The President just got up and said, ok, those of you who 
want to surrender your arms, we are ready to give you amnesty; although 
you have carried arms against the state, with these implications, we are 
                                                          
66. Respondent 012, October 2013. 
67. Respondent 048, January 2014.  
68. Respondent 047, member Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee, December 2013. 
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going to waive all those infringements and even assist you to return to 
normal life. So, it was unilateral, there’s no prior discussions and written 
agreement or whatever; it is take it or leave it; and with it there was a 
ninety-day window, you have to take it within those ninety days’ window, 
and after that ninety days’ window, the window closes and the options 
available to government …would be exercised; namely military options … 
you know, there were a lot of options that the government was considering 
(sic).69 
 
Interestingly, Berdal (1996: 9-10) maintains that, in armed conflict, there are three 
ways, but not mutually exclusive, through which DDR can be initiated. Firstly, 
DDR programmes can emerge out of a comprehensive peace agreement (peace 
accord), a form of negotiated settlement between conflicting parties in most cases 
supervised by the UN. In the second instance, he states that DDR can be initiated 
by a victorious party70 in an armed conflict, and thirdly it can be initiated through 
‘coercive disarmament’ a form of peace enforcement as was the case in Somalia 
in 1993 (Ibid.). Arguing on the same lines, Tanner (1996:169-173) maintains that 
disarmament can be initiated through consensual or coercive means. A 
consensual disarmament is when adversarial parties voluntarily commit to a 
disarmament process, while coercive means results in parties being forced or 
threatened to undergo the process. While in the context of the UN IDDRS (2006), 
a peace agreement remains the most appropriate means of achieving DDR. 
 
Consequently, in the light of these theoretical positions and evidence from the 
field, it is my contention that the process of negotiating the Niger Delta ADDR 
programme was achieved neither through negotiated settlement nor absolute 
military defeat of the militants by the Nigerian State. Rather, the negotiation 
process integrates the features of both negotiated settlement and military 
enforcement, giving rise to what I will term in this study a pseudo compellence-
negotiated type of DDR, one that straddles peace enforcement and negotiated 
settlement nonetheless tilting more towards compellence. As one Niger Delta, 
academic expert noted, prior to the commencement of negotiations, the Nigerian 
State inflicted maximum violence on the Niger Delta militants by attacking Camp 
5 at Oporoza, Gbaramantu Kingdom of Delta state and the headquarters of 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). He contends that 
                                                          
69. Respondent 042- member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, 
November 2013. 
70. In an armed conflict, victorious party refers to the party that succeeded in defeating its 
opponent.  
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even though the attack did not successfully crush the MEND’s headquarters, it 
compelled the militants to bargain with the state which resulted in the amnesty. 
According to the academic expert compellence was applied as a prelude to 
negotiation in this way:  
 
What the government did was this, similar to what is happening in the 
North now. First, was to bring violence to the people like what happened 
in the Gbaramantu area. Now, the government did that as a way of 
creating the condition for the people to unwillingly [my italics] accept the 
offer of amnesty, which in their view will lead to the cessation of violence. 
So that was the first step the state did, and then the amnesty was 
announced … Thereafter, stakeholders all came on board and move from 
one major camp to another to talk with the militants’ leaders to explain to 
them the need to accept the amnesty for the interest of Nigeria and 
particularly to avoid the reoccurrence of the kind of violence the state 
visited several communities in the region…and then of course money was 
dangled and people saw the money they could make…71 
 
A former personal aide to President Yar’ Adua corroborated the above position. 
According to him, the military force exerted on the militants was impactful 
because ‘it brought them [militants] to the negotiating table, for it shows very 
clearly… [to them] that if force is what they wanted the military was able to deal 
with the situation.’72  
 
These submissions strengthen the suggestion that a form of negotiation did take 
place, but it was not a mutually cooperative process. Rather, it was a one-way 
traffic whereby the Nigerian Government imposed its non-negotiable options on 
the militants in a charged and intimidating atmosphere. This suggests that the 
programme was an executive amnesty; a form of imposition by the Nigerian State 
(see Ogundiya, 2011:6-32), reminiscent of the Argentine government executive 
amnesty discussed in Chapter Two. In other words, the Niger Delta amnesty 
mirrors and shares certain common features with Argentine government 
executive amnesty as both were a unilateral declaration. The only difference was 
that in the case of Argentina, the outgoing military junta granted amnesty to itself 
while in the case of the Niger Delta the Nigerian State enforced amnesty on 
militant youth that challenged the basis of its survival; the flow of oil rents and 
monopoly of violence in the region. Thus, in both Argentina and the Niger Delta 
                                                          
71. Respondent 032, November 2013. 
72. Respondent 048, January 2014. 
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the amnesty was not an outcome of a robust engagement with all the relevant 
stakeholders.  
 
However, despite the executive nature of the amnesty and the highly charged 
and intimidating atmosphere of the so-called negotiation, the government also 
used huge monetary inducements to mollify selected top militants’ commanders. 
For instance, Joab-Peterside et al., (2012: 12), provided figures of the monetary 
patronage extended to some of the top commanders. According to them ‘the 
breakdown showed that Governor Ekpumopolo received the lion’s share of $22.5 
million yearly, while former warlord, Dokubo Asari, collects $9million every year 
to keep his estimated 4000 soldiers at bay. Ateke Tom and Ebikabowei Boyloaf 
Victor Ben each collect $3.5million apiece.’ Eventually, the pseudo-compellence 
form of negotiation and monetary inducement applied led to a ‘purchased 
renunciation of militancy.’ At the end of the day, the whole process culminated in 
an individualised signing of renunciation of a militancy bond that paved the way 
for the ADDR programme. The fact that the process neither conforms to the basic 
tenets of negotiated settlement, or outright military defeat, but integrates both 
elements lends credence to the position expressed by a key member of the PAPC 
that the entire process ‘…was original to Nigeria; we didn’t read it in any book; 
what we wanted to do was to restore peace.’73   
 
However, the most auspicious way of initiating DDR is through a peace 
agreement, which should set the timing and scope for carrying out disarmament, 
the proportion of forces to be disarmed and the manner for disposing of the arms 
(UN IDDRS, 2006 and Özerdem (2009: 16). By implication, it seems necessary 
that the peace agreement preceding any DDR should be all-inclusive or 
comprehensive in nature. Indeed, to achieve a comprehensive peace agreement, 
there is ‘…the need to invite the widest possible spectrum of parties to the 
negotiation table…’ (Dudouet, 2008: 13). Steenkamp reiterated the same position 
when he argued that for a peace agreement to lead to an effective DDR, it must 
be comprehensive in nature: 
 
                                                          
73. Respondent 050, January 2014. The respondent’s reference to peace is in the minimalist 
sense of the absence of war. 
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…the accord has to include at least the main protagonist in the conflict and 
generally be as inclusive as possible in terms of its respondents, and 
address the resolution of the substantive, root causes of the violent 
conflict. Its ultimate aim is to create the framework for the substantial and 
comprehensive economic, social and political overhaul of society in order 
to create conditions that allow for future conflict to be dealt with peacefully 
(Steenkamp, 2009: 5). 
 
However, the process of negotiating the Niger Delta ADDR fell significantly short 
of being all-inclusive or comprehensive, because it did not include all the key 
stakeholders whose participation was critical to the resolution of the conflict. For 
example, a member of the PAPC revealed that 79 militant commanders were 
identified prior to the commencement of the negotiation, but only 10 of them 
formed the nucleus of the negotiation.74 Similarly, communities were completely 
sidelined in the process even though durable resolution of the conflict is far more 
difficult to achieve without their active involvement.75 A military officer serving with 
the JTF asserted that even the opinion leaders from the Niger Delta involved in 
the process merely served as intermediaries between the Nigerian government 
and top militant commanders.76 Thus, the negotiation fits into what Lederach 
(1997: 44-45) has described as a top-down approach to peacebuilding which 
revolves around the idea that ‘…the primary responsibility for achieving peace 
resides with the representative leaders of the parties to the conflict. If these 
leaders can agree, that sets the stage, the framework, and the environment for 
delivering the rest of society in the implementation of the agreement that will end 
the war.’  
 
Focusing on selected top militants’ commanders for negotiation clearly 
demonstrated a lack of understanding or disregard for the horizontal and vertical 
inequality that exists between and within the Niger Delta top militant 
commanders, groups and camps. I argue so because the Niger Delta militants do 
not constitute a monolithic and homogeneous movement, but operate a highly 
segmented, loose and fluid structure (Oriola et al., 2013: 67-96). Their flexible 
command and control structure explained why each commander operated as a 
                                                          
74 . Respondent 047, December 2013. 
75. Respondent 029- community elder and member Oloibiri Traditional Council of Chiefs, 
November 2013. And respondent 031- community Development Chairman Southern Ijaw Local 
Government Council, November 2013. 
76 . Respondent 012, October 2013. 
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self-independent ‘general’ with his own fighters and closely protected area of 
operational supremacy.77 A member of the PAPC corroborated this when he 
noted that:  
 
Intelligence at our disposal in the course of planning revealed that they 
[the militants] operated in clusters; they did not have a common front; 
although they were agitators but each had his own camp; they had their 
own groupings; each wanted to be recognized.78 
 
 Therefore, the negotiation completely side-lined the less powerful top 
commanders and middle-level commanders as well as the foot soldiers. 
However, the failure posed serious implications for the overall outcome of the 
DDR particularly when viewed against the backdrop of Spear’s (2006a:70-77 and 
2006b: 169-172) typology of hierarchies within an insurgent group or movement. 
In her work, Spear categorises insurgents into three: individual fighters, middle-
level officers heading fighting units and leaderships with each of the layers critical 
to the success of DDR and the entire peace process.  
 
Negotiating with a few selected top generals would inevitably have a negative 
impact on the DDR process. This is because there is no assurance that the top 
generals can guarantee the commitment of their middle-level commanders and 
soldiers to the peace deal given that in the Niger Delta DDR programme much of 
the peace dividend went to the top commanders. Keen (1998: 46) lends credence 
to this in his analysis of ‘conditions for bottom-up violence’ when he argues that 
amongst other reasons, those from the bottom can trigger violence when the 
government cannot guarantee them economic security, or when they are 
marginalised. Therefore, given that the process marginalised them and the 
dividend of the peace deal favoured top commanders, it was likely that it would 
trigger the emergence of ‘peace spoilers’ from the bottom or middle-level 
commanders that would undermine the process. Analysis of how this omission 
affected the overall outcome of the ADDR programme will form part of the 
discussion in Chapter Five.  
 
                                                          
77. Respondent 009-military officer serving with JTF, October 2013. According to this respondent 
to become a militant commander, what you need to do was to buy arms, recruit boys and set up 
your own camp. What makes you a top commander is the number of boys, sophisticated weapons 
you have and the vastness of the area you control operationally. 
78. Interview with respondent 050, January 2014. 
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Notwithstanding, the apparent lapse in the way the peace deal was 
accomplished, it could be argued that the way the Niger Delta ADDR programme 
was negotiated represented something of an innovation when compared to the 
standard approaches recommended in the literature on peace processes and 
DDR negotiation. In the context of the Niger Delta, one may also argue that it had 
an unintended positive consequence. For instance, a member of the PAPC noted 
that the non-signing of a peace agreement with the militants was what led to the 
quick restoration of peace because ‘… if we did, [if the PAPC had signed a peace 
agreement with the militants] implementation of the amnesty, and restoration of 
immediate peace would have been difficult.’79 Additionally, the PAPC member 
explained that ‘If we had signed a document [peace agreement] the agitation 
would have continued now; President Jonathan would have been in trouble 
now…’80 What this implies is that, if a peace agreement had been signed, failure 
by the Nigerian government to implement its provisions could trigger violence. In 
other words, one thing that has contributed to sustaining the peace up to now is 
that there is no concrete agreement that the ex-militants can hold on to and 
accuse the government of non-implementation. Nevertheless, the government 
had succeeded in compelling them individually (using coercion and patronage) to 
sign a renunciation of militancy bond that made them liable to prosecution in the 
event of a violation. 
4.3. The Planning and Implementation of the Niger Delta ADDR 
Programme  
In the preceding paragraphs, I examined how the ADDR programme was 
negotiated by the Nigerian State. In this section, I shall examine how the planning 
and implementation took place. The main purpose of this section is to show to 
what extent the planning and implementation conformed to the UN IDDRS (2006) 
and the best practices advocated in the DDR literature and how that has impacted 
on the overall success of the programme or otherwise. The key argument I 
advance here is that the planning and implementation failed to conform with the 
provisions of the UN IDDRS (2006) and the broader DDR theoretical and policy 
                                                          
79. Respondent 050, January 2015. 
80. Ibid. 
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literature, particularly the approach recommended in the maximalist/ 
transformationalist literature on DDR. 
4.3.1. The Planning Process of the Niger Delta ADDR Programme 
Prior to the formal creation of the PAPC, Adeniyi states that ‘the initial 
preparations were done by the NSA [National Security Adviser] who co-opted the 
service chiefs into the committee as they worked out the plans and logistics 
towards the entire process’ (Adeniyi, 2011: 71). This was further evidence that 
security stabilisation had taken centre stage in the ADDR programme design. 
Thus, the formal planning of the ADDR programme commenced immediately 
after President Yar’Adua established an ad hoc81 committee known as the 
PAPC.82  
The original members of the PAPC, as contained in the convening authority, were 
18 with a retired major-general appointed as chairman. However, in order to 
facilitate its work the panel co-opted seven other members.83 A critical 
examination of the list shows that the members of the main committee were 
drawn from key government establishments, with a stake in the resolution of the 
Niger Delta conflict and representatives from the 7 Niger Delta states affected by 
the crisis.84 Other members of the Committee included the then Chief of Defense 
Staff (CDS), Nigerian Inspector-General of Police (NIGP), and an Assistant 
Inspector- General of Police (AIGP)85 as well as representatives from the State 
Security Service (SSS). Out of the seven co-opted members, four were serving 
senior military officers and a retired colonel. This again clearly shows an over-
militarisation of the PAPC and process, and the complete exclusion of 
Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs), local governments, home-based 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), and community-based organisations 
(CBOs) who had been engaged in the Niger Delta conflict for a very long time. 
The composition of the PAPC strengthened the fact that the programme 
                                                          
81. The ad hoc committee refers to the committee set up by the President to plan the ADDR 
programme instead of a more stable National DDR Commission. 
82. Sourced from the executive summary of the report of the Presidential Amnesty Planning 
Committee. 
83. Ibid. 
84. Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
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prioritised security stabilisation over human development challenges in the Niger 
Delta region.  
Even though some of the members of the Committee were known to be seasoned 
serving or retired members of the Nigerian State security, it was not known in the 
public domain if any of them had any cogent experience or background in DDR. 
A Lieutenant-Colonel serving with the JTF posits that ‘the fact that you are a 
military officer is not enough for you to understand DDR. You have to go through 
a process because DDR is a systematic procedure that requires specialist 
training.86 This is another proof that the planning process deviated from the 
recommendation of the TCND that a DDR commission should be established to 
plan and implement the ADDR programme.87 Apart from that, it also did not 
conform to the UN IDDRS (2006) which requires the national government to 
establish a National DDR Commission for policy direction and to also coordinate 
the implementation process.88 While it is apparent that the planning committee 
represents the Nigerian equivalent of a DDR commission and to some extent 
functions like one; establishing a statutory DDR commission would have made a 
difference because the enabling law establishing it would stipulate the 
qualification and experience required of the key personnel that would head the 
commission. In this case, a National DDR commission headed and staffed by 
technocrats would have been more likely to plan the DDR in a more systematic 
way than a spontaneous impromptu planning committee comprising of non-DDR 
experts. Similarly, a DDR commission should be responsible for planning and 
implementation of the entire phases of the DDR programme as well as 
implementation instead of having separate committees for planning and 
implementation. The extent to which the absence of a properly constituted 
National DDR Commission undermined the implementation of the reintegration 
training of the ex-Niger Delta militants in 2015 will be examined in the last section 
of this chapter. 
                                                          
86. Respondent 012, October 2013. 
87. Respondent 008- key member of the TCND, October 2013. 
88 . See OG 3. 30: National Institutions for DDR in Operational Guide to the Integrated 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (2014: 79-85). 
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4.3.2. The PAPC Terms of Reference and the Planning Process 
The PACP was tasked with the following terms of reference89:  
✓ To prepare a step by step framework for amnesty and complete DDR in 
the Niger Delta with appropriate timelines. 
✓ To ensure that those with criminal records do not take advantage of the 
amnesty. 
✓ To work out the cost to the government of DDR of the ex-militants. 
To facilitate its work, the PAPC divided itself into the following sub-committees, 
each with sub-terms of reference: amnesty, disarmament and demobilisation, 
publicity and liaison, rehabilitation and reintegration.90 The amnesty sub-
committee terms of reference (TOR)91 included defining and operationalising 
amnesty within the provision of the Panel’s TOR. It was also to determine the 
categories of people to be granted amnesty. Additionally, it was to define the 
exact procedure for the granting of amnesty, identify and recommend reporting 
and screening centres. It was also to recommend a mechanism for the 
establishment of a comprehensive database of militants that could be accessed 
for planning purposes.  
The disarmament and demobilisation sub-committee was assigned the 
responsibilities for recommending procedures for disarming all the militants that 
would accept the amnesty offer. It was also to recommend procedures for 
demobilisation, documentation, storage and disposal of arms and ammunition to 
be recovered and the location of holding camps for the militants after they had 
been disarmed.92 The publicity sub-committee was to liaise with government 
agencies and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), engage in activities 
relevant to the panel’s terms of reference (TOR) as well as identify and liaise with 
all relevant stakeholders including oil and gas majors. It was also to develop a 
framework for liaison with all media agencies, both private and government-
owned particularly those in the Niger Delta. The publicity sub-committee was to 
                                                          
89. This information was sourced from the executive summary of the report of the PAPC made 
available by a former aide to let President Yar’Adua.  
90. Ibid. 
91. Ibid. 
92. This information was sourced from the executive summary of the report of the Presidential 
Amnesty Planning Committee made available by the Media spokesman to President Yar’Adua. 
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provide maximum publicity for the Panel’s activities and respond to negative 
media coverage as well as recommend who should be appointed as the overall 
media spokesperson for the Amnesty Planning Committee.93 Accordingly, the 
Committee maintained that for the DDR to be successful, a positive perception 
must be cultivated in the hearts and minds of the militants and other segments of 
the Nigerian society. To achieve this, a member of the PAPC pointed out that the 
Committee needed to ‘mount a very powerful hearts and minds campaign’94 the 
aim was to mobilise public support for the programme even before its 
implementation.95 
The subcommittee on rehabilitation and reintegration was to work out the 
modalities for the rehabilitation and reintegration of the ex-militants, and liaise 
with, and collate the views of NGOs on how best to implement the reintegration 
of the ex-militants. It was also to identify vocational centres where ex-militants 
could acquire skills.96 Although the PAPC was granted six weeks to develop the 
ADDR action plan it completed and submitted its report to the President within 
four weeks.97 Overall, the report was in two parts, one of which focused on the 
modalities for implementing the ADDR, while the other recommended an 
alternative course of action to restore peace to the Niger Delta were the ADDR 
programme to fail which the respondent said he would not divulge to me for 
security reasons.98 However, based on the interview I had with a former 
presidential aide to late President Yar’Adua, the unrevealed alternative course of 
action referred to was military action against the militants.99 
The PAPC observed that a successful DDR in the Niger Delta could not be 
achieved if the means of procuring arms were not permanently blocked, which it 
linked to illegal oil bunkering. It therefore suggested that effective monitoring 
through adequate policing and law enforcement would checkmate illegal oil 
bunkering. The report further argued that this strategy was fundamental to 
achieving arms control and conflict prevention in the Niger Delta.100 The PAPC 
                                                          
93. Ibid. 
94. Respondent 050, January 2013. 
95. Ibid. 
96. Ibid. 
97. Respondent 050 –member Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee, January 2014.  
98. Ibid. 
99. Respondent 048-former aide to President Yar’Adua, January 2014. 
100. This information was sourced from an executive summary of the report of the Presidential 
Amnesty Planning Committee made available by a former aide to President Yar’Adua. 
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also emphasised the need to adequately equip the Nigerian Navy (NN) and the 
JTF to effectively discharge their statutory responsibilities in the Niger Delta.101 
The PAPC’s reference to the nexus between illegal oil bunkering and arms 
proliferation in the Niger Delta suggests that it had taken due cognizance of the 
economy of conflict that sustained the Niger Delta crisis.  
Furthermore, at the commencement of planning, the Committee tried to generate 
basic intelligence information necessary for proper planning and the conduct of 
disarmament. In this regard, the Department of State Service (DSS) performed 
the task, which initially revealed the existence of 35 militant camps. Further 
investigation revealed the existence of 75 camps and 79 leaders.102  One issue 
that confronted the committee was the number of militants expected to undergo 
the ADDR process, which a key member of the PAPC explained was decided 
based on extrapolation of a minimum of 2000 militants per the six Niger Delta 
states affected by militancy albeit this figure could be more or less.103 
The above disclosure clearly demonstrates that the planning process did not 
conform to the basic requirements of DDR planning in terms of proper pre-DDR 
screening and verification to determine the numerical strength of genuine 
combatants and their sources of weapons (Spear, 2002: 156; Özerdem, 2009:16-
17 and Operational Guideline to the IDDRS, 2014:44-45). Another issue was that 
the PAPC developed a renunciation of militancy form which effectively substituted 
for a comprehensive peace agreement (see appendix 3). A member of the PACP 
explains that by signing the renunciation of militancy form, each militant 
committed not to engage in any further act of aggression against the federal 
government of Nigeria and agreed that violation would result in forfeiting any 
rehabilitation opportunity that was available and the amnesty granted104 
 
The PAPC also established 10 reporting centres to serve as disarmament centres 
and to be manned by majors of the Nigerian Army.105 The Committee also 
earmarked all state hospitals as potential collection centres because it anticipated 
                                                          
101. Ibid. 
102 Respondent 001- member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, 
October 2013. 
103. Respondent 050, January 2014. 
104. Ibid. 
105. Ibid. 
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that some of the militants would surrender with injuries given that they might have 
been fired at and wounded in the process of confrontation with the military.106 The 
signing of the renunciation of militancy form was to be observed by all militants 
at each of the collection centres while the weapons and ammunitions collected 
were to be properly documented and transported to the Headquarters of 82 
Division of the Nigerian Army Enugu, the disarmament phase operational 
coordinating headquarters. 
 
In addition, the PAPC ensured that the ADDR programme was not 
internationalised both at the level of planning and implementation. For instance, 
efforts by international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) such as Doctors 
Without Borders to provide medical support were rejected by the Committee.107  
A member of the PAPC observed that he ‘… had the onerous advantage of 
ensuring that it was not internationalised’108 which suggests that inputs from 
international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) with DDR expertise and 
experience were not sought or were rejected when offered.  
 
It is difficult to establish a definitive explanation as to why outside support was 
rejected, albeit, certain explanations can be suggested. First, Nigeria’s leadership 
role in the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone during the 90s 
(Obi, 2009: 120-122; Elizabeth, 2013: 41-49; Hamman et al, 2013: 42), as well 
as its position as a leading Troop Contributing Country (TCC) to United Nations 
Peacekeeping operations (Sule, 2013: 1-30 and Adeniyi, n. d.,) could have led to 
an overbearing sense of self- confidence on the part of the PAPC. In other words, 
there was a belief that Nigeria could handle its DDR without international expert 
assistance. This is further strengthened by the fact that Nigeria in the 1960s 
successfully undertook its post-war reconstruction without any foreign assistance 
(Jeong, 2005: 1-2).109 Moreover, unlike the 1960s demobilisation, which was 
undertaken after a major civil war, the Niger Delta conflict and ADDR programme 
                                                          
106. Ibid. 
107. Respondent 050, member Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee, January 2014. 
108. Ibid. 
109. See publication on Nigeria’s post-war demobilisation and reintegration by Ojeleye, O. (2010).  
The politics of post-war demobilisation and reintegration in Nigeria. Surrey. Ashgate Publishing 
Limited. 
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can be equated to a peacetime DDR programme ‘... where there is a clear 
authority in power…it is peace time or there is only a small scale internal 
conflict…’ (Özerdem, 2009: 3). Thus, unlike in post-war Liberia for example, 
where state authority had become dysfunctional or collapsed (Sherif, 2008: 26), 
there was relative state capacity in Nigeria to undertake the programme without 
any foreign assistance. 
 
The reluctance to seek foreign assistance may also be connected to Nigeria’s 
concern to guard its sovereignty. In the same vein, Nigeria’s decision may have 
been informed by its experience in the 1990s, when the international community 
displayed open sympathy for minority agitations and movements from the Niger 
Delta region particularly the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (see 
section on periodisation in Chapter Three). Thus, there may have been a fear 
that allowing the international community to influence the Niger Delta peace 
process could result in a peace accord that favoured the militants.  
 
Another possible explanation was that Nigeria was confident that it was capable 
of mobilising the requisite financial resources to run its own DDR programme. 
Therefore, it could be argued that the decision not to internationalise the 
programme was more a function of economic capability whereby it was confident 
that it did not need funding from donor countries and agencies in order to execute 
the DDR programme. The salience of this argument was reinforced by an official 
in the Office of the Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta who argued 
that after disarmament, and with the rapid increase in oil production, the entire 
annual budget of the ADDR programme was equivalent to one day of oil 
production lost.110 Nevertheless, a Niger Delta scholar contended that, 
irrespective of the possible reasons behind rejecting foreign assistance ‘… people 
will still tell you that were the UN, were more groups, more experienced in doing… 
[DDR] have been brought in, we would have had an improved result from the 
process’.111 However, as an alternative to allowing for full participation, the PAPC 
                                                          
110. This view was expressed in a live TV programme by Mr Lawrence Pepple, Technical Assistant 
on the Presidential Amnesty Program & Head Reintegration Department Office of the Special 
Adviser to the President on ND. The interview was titled ‘ND presidential amnesty program 
assessment: the journey so far’. The interview was anchored by Femi Adefila. (Accessed:25 
December 2014 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7BSWte1Oidg). 
111. Respondent 014-November 2013. 
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in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a briefing session for 
heads of diplomatic corps’ and missions in Nigeria.112  
 
4.4. The Implementation of the Niger Delta Amnesty Disarmament 
Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme 
The implementation of the Niger Delta ADDR programme commenced after the 
Council of State113  approved the Committee’s recommendation on 25 June 2009, 
which culminated in the amnesty proclamation by the President (Adeniyi, 2011: 
72-73): While proclaiming the amnesty, the president asserted that: 
The offer of amnesty is predicated on the willingness and readiness of the 
militants to give up all illegal arms in their possession, completely 
renounce militancy in all its ramifications unconditionally, and depose to 
an undertaking to this effect… The offer of amnesty is open to all militants 
for a period of sixty days.114  
 
The phases of the DDR programme and key activities to be undertaken and time 
frame for delivery is shown in Table 4.1.   
                                                          
112. Respondent 050- member Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee, January 2014. 
113. The Council of State is an advisory body to the Nigerian President on major national and 
policy issues. It was established under section B Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. 
114. Quoted from ‘Remarks by His Excellency, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, GCFR at the 
proclamation of amnesty for Niger Delta militants on 25 June 2009. 
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Table 4.1: Phases of the DDR Programme and Key Activities to be Carried out 
DISARMAMENT DEMOBILIZATION/ 
REHABILITATION 
REINTEGRATION 
Duration: Aug 6 – Oct 
4, 2009 
Duration: 6 to 12 Months Duration: Up to 5 Years 
Key Activities Key Activities Key Activities 
• Collection of Arms 
and Ammunition, 
explosives, etc.  
• Documentation 
and Biometrics 
• Ex-Militants Report 
to Camp  
• Verification and 
Documentation  
• Transformational 
Training  
• Peace building & 
conflict resolution  
• Counselling  
• Career Guidance  
• Wellness 
Assessment  
• Reintegration 
classification  
• Education and 
Vocational 
placement  
• Graduation & 
Demobilization 
• Knowledge and Skills 
Acquisition  
• Financial 
Empowerment  
o Placement 
Programs  
o Micro-credit  
• Education  
• Reconciliation with 
local community  
• Conflict Resolution 
Framework/ 
Mechanism  
• Monitoring and 
Evaluation  
• Exit of Amnesty  
Key Enablers 
• Disarmament 
Camps  
• Massive 
Campaign  
Key Enablers 
• Transformational 
Training Centres  
• Rehabilitation 
Camps 
Key Enablers 
• Partnering 
Government 
Agencies, NGOs and 
Private 
Organizations, OGIs  
• Tracking and Support  
• Framework 
Source: Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme website. 
Available at: www.nigerdeltaamnesty.org  (Accessed:  10 August, 2015). 
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4.4.1. The Implementation of the Disarmament Phase 
To successfully execute the disarmament and demobilisation phases of the 
programme, a separate disarmament and demobilisation committee was 
established, headed by a major general with representatives from other Nigerian 
security services.115 Immediately the amnesty was proclaimed, announcements 
filled the airwaves, using both the federal and state media agencies calling on the 
Niger Delta militants to report to the nearest disarmament centre to their camp 
locations to surrender.116 However, according to a member of the Disarmament 
and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, the smooth take off of the 
disarmament process was stalemated because, after the proclamation, the 
president suddenly fell ill, resulting in a delay in the release of funds.117 
Consequently, the ten collection centres earmarked by the Planning Committee 
could not be utilised, necessitating the use of all the Federal Government 
Colleges across the Niger Delta as alternative centres.118 At each of the collection 
centres, the military coordinator superintended arms collection, documentation, 
movement and general security; while his civilian counterpart handled the issues 
of food and accommodation.  
 
However, the sudden changing of the collection centres seriously undermined the 
disarmament process because some of the militant commanders and their 
soldiers learned about the new locations through the electronic media which 
created a state of anxiety and confusion regarding where to submit their 
weapons. A member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation 
Committee explains that it got to the extent that ‘some of the militants were 
coming with their arms into towns from the creeks... [Saying,] you said you are 
giving us amnesty here we are come and collect your arms…’119 
 
One of the immediate tasks undertaken by the Disarmament and Demobilisation 
Implementation Committee after the amnesty proclamation was a sensitisation 
                                                          
115. Respondent 042- member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, 
December 2013.   
116. Respondent 050- member Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee, January 2014. 
117. Respondent 042-December 2013. 
118. Respondent 042- member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, 
December 2013.   
119. Respondent 042-December 2023. 
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visit to all the Niger Delta State Governors, some of whom were becoming 
uncooperative towards the programme.120 Several explanations have been 
offered for the Governors’ behaviour. One was their unsuccessful effort to hijack 
the programme in their respective states.121 Perhaps, this is because most of the 
Niger Delta governors had direct links to most of the militant groups and so many 
of them wanted to use the programme to favour those that were loyal to them. A 
Niger Delta academic expert explains that many of the ex-militants started as 
political thugs and were used by the Niger Delta governors to help rig elections 
before mutating into militants 122 Another possible reason was the unnecessary 
competition and rivalry that existed between the federal and state government, 
whereby, instead of the federal government and the states working in unity to 
achieve mutually beneficial goals they engaged in unhealthy competition.123 
Indeed, at one point, the governors threatened to withdraw their cooperation 
because they believed that the then Minister of petroleum, Dr Rilwanu Lukman 
(a northerner) was working against the interest of the Niger Delta, given his 
alleged plan to relocate the proposed University of Petroleum from Effurun in 
Delta State, to Kaduna State in north western Nigeria (Adeniyi, 2011:75).124 
Similarly, their action was likely informed by the belief that the Federal 
Government lacked a clearly articulated post-amnesty action plan (Ibid.).  
 
The disarmament process was carried out in three phases125 and the number of 
militants disarmed, quantity of weapons, ammunitions, unexploded ordinance 
(UXO), D-caps, dynamites and magazines recovered during the phase 1 of 
disarmament that lasted from 6 August-4 October 2009 is shown in Table 4.2. 
Although no disarmament programme succeeds in withdrawing all the illegal 
weapons in circulation (Muggah (2005: 239-252), and not all the Niger Delta 
militants were engaged in direct combat roles, it is naïve to believe that the 
number of weapons recovered from the Niger Delta militants was in any way a 
                                                          
120. Ibid.  
121. Respondent 001, September 2013- member Disarmament, Demobilisation Implementation 
Committee, October 2013.  
122. Respondent 032-November 2013. 
123. Respondent 045- Academic expert, December 2013. 
124. The establishment of the Petroleum University is not part of the ADDR programme. However, 
the people of the region view it as part of the broader efforts of bringing development to the region 
as well as giving the people of the region sense of belonging. 
125. Respondent 001- member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, 
October 2013. 
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significant representation of what was in their holding and used in the stand-off 
with the Nigerian military. 
Table 4.2: Number of militants Disarmed and Quantity of Weapons, 
Ammunitions, Unexploded Ordinance (UXO), D-caps, Dynamites and 
Magazines Recovered 6 August-4 October 2009 
State Registered 
ex-militant 
Weapons 
Collected 
Ammunition UXO, D-
Caps & 
Dynamite 
Magazines 
Bayelsa 6,961 951 130, 877 54 1,585 
Imo 300 149 7, 758 0 299 
NDDC Ex-
militants 
600 0 0 0 0 
Delta 3, 361 449 52,958 1,556 414 
Rivers 6,997 1,009 82,406 102 1,048 
Ondo 1,200 198 9,725 0 0 
Edo 450 82 722 77 29 
Akwa Ibom 163 51 959 5 41 
Cross River 160 20 9,748 59 38 
Total 20, 192 2,909 295,153 1, 853 3,454 
Source: Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme: assessing 
the dynamics of the Niger Delta amnesty programme-a presentation to the House 
Committee on Niger Delta, 2011: 32. 
 
The low level of arms collected could be a function of several factors; the mistrust 
between the Nigerian State and the militants earlier highlighted in this chapter 
and lack of pre-DDR verification by the PAPC. It could also be due to how the 
programme was exploited as a means of extending patronage by politicians to 
their supporters who were never militants (Joab-Peterside al., 2011: xxii).126 
 
The second leg of disarmament took place in 2010, during which 6,166 
militants127 were supposedly disarmed. While in the third round which happened 
                                                          
126.  Also, reiterated by respondent 014- Niger Delta academic expert, November 2013. 
127. Interview with respondent 001- member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation 
Committee, September 2013. Also, corroborated in a commentary written by Murphy Ganagana 
in a special report titled ‘Three Years of Amnesty Implementation: The Facts, The Figures’ 
contained in a quarterly newsletter Published by the Presidential Amnesty Office Vol. 1 No. 3. An 
anniversary edition of the quarterly newsletter published by the Presidential Amnesty Office. 
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in late 2012, a total of 3,642 militants purportedly surrendered their weapons128 
bringing the total number of militants that disarmed in the entire programme to 
30,000. The final figure is 18,000 above the estimated 12,000 by the PAPC, and 
this could be attributed to the manipulation of the process by officials and militant 
commanders and the failure to carry out pre-DDR verification highlighted above. 
However, suffice to say that all my efforts to ascertain the quantity of weapons 
and ammunitions recovered during the second and third phases proved abortive. 
The phase two and three disarmament programme became necessary because 
of two reasons. One, a few of the militants refused to disarm during the first phase 
because they suspected the government was going to kill them after surrendering 
their weapons.129 Consequently, few of them that disbelieved chose to self-
demobilise.130 A situation whereby some of them absconded into the community 
with their weapons. However, when they were eventually convinced of their safety 
and security, they embarked on a series of protests and threats of returning to 
the creeks if the government refused to grant them the opportunity to enlist in the 
programme, and in order to prevent them from becoming peace spoilers the 
Nigerian government capitulated to their demands.131 A former staff member of a 
nongovernmental organisation Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger 
Delta corroborated this by suggesting reasons why some of the militants chose 
to self-demobilise in this way:  
 
… as a matter of fact many of the core militants didn’t return their arms. 
The reason being that, I have spoken to a lot of them one-on-one when I 
went to the creeks; a lot of them were skeptical about the honesty of the 
Nigerian government. They thought it was a ploy to capture them, kill and 
prosecute them. Based on this anxiety it was only a few of the militants 
that handed over their arms.132 
 
                                                          
128. Murphy Ganagana- ‘Three Years of Amnesty Implementation: The Facts, The Figures’ 
contained in a quarterly newsletter Published by the Presidential Amnesty Office Vol. 1 No. 3. An 
anniversary edition of the quarterly newsletter published by the Presidential Amnesty Office. 
129. Respondent 043-senior management staff Office of the Special Adviser to the President on 
Niger Delta, December 2013. The respondent reiterated that the possibility of this category of 
militant to undermine the peace process compelled the Nigerian Government to reconsider its 
decision which resulted in the second and third phases of disarmament. 
130. As defined by Douglas, et al. (2004: 48) this is ‘… when combatants demobilise themselves. 
In this scenario, armed forces disband in a disorderly fashion after a defeat, and the ex-
combatants, with no command structures in place, try to return to their home regions. Many flee 
to neighbouring countries in fear of pursuit’. 
131. Ibid. 
132. Respondent 028, November 2013. 
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The above explanation was corroborated in a Focus Group Discussion held with 
some ex-militants who explained that ‘… a lot of the groups were very reluctant 
and careful in joining [the programme] … Because we were always doing 
comparative analysis of our course.’133 This suggests that a few of them refused 
to disarm until after a careful assessment of the government’s sincerity and 
commitment as well as the assurance and conviction that they would not be 
harmed. The second reason was that the third phase was allegedly carried out 
due to political expediency in order to satisfy a major ethnic group in the Niger 
Delta region who complained that its youth were completely excluded from the 
programme in favour of youth from a particular ethnic group in the region134 
Hence, a figure was approved for the ethnic nationality by the president.135 This 
again provides another possible explanation for the low number of weapons 
recovered despite a large number of persons registered in the programme 
purportedly as militants. Precisely, this is because the inclusion criterion used in 
the third phase was not strictly based on weapon surrender but being nominated 
by the concerned unified ethnic nationality association.  All these issues suggest 
that in the long-term, the pseudo-compellence negotiated settlement adopted 
was counterproductive to the ADDR programme. The various ways in which the 
lack of inclusion, the use of inducement and the emergence of peace spoilers 
impacted on the ADDR Programme will be fully examined in Chapter Five. Other 
activities carried out during disarmament included documentation and capturing 
of the militants’ biometrics.136 All weapons collected were finally destroyed on 25 
May 2011, and137 table 4.3 shows the top militant groups that disarmed during 
the first phase which lasted from 6 August-4 October 2009. 
  
                                                          
133.  FG Discussion held with ex-militants of the third phase of the ADDR Programme, November 
2013.  
134.   Respondent 043-senior management staff office of the Coordinator Niger Delta Amnesty 
Programme, December 2013. 
135 . Ibid. 
136.  See report tilted ‘Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme: assessing 
the dynamics of the Niger Delta amnesty programme-a presentation to the House Committee on 
Niger Delta’, 2011: 26-34. 
137. Respondent 042- member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, 
December 2013.  
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Table 4.3: Names and Locations of high-profile Militants’ Groups Disarmed 
6 August-4 October 2009 
 
S/N Militant Group Location Date Disarmed 
1.  • Soboma George Port Harcourt, Rivers 
State 
August 13, 2009 
2.  • Kenneth Opusinji (kula 
Community) 
Port Harcourt, Rivers 
State 
August 22, 2009 
3.  • Kile Selky Torughedi  
(a.k.a. Gen.Young Shall 
Grow) 
Azuzuama, Bayelsa 
State 
September 6, 2009 
4.  • Ezekiel Akpasibewei 
(Deadly Underdogs) 
Warri, Delta State September 28, 
2009 
5.  • Franklin Duduku (a.k.a. 
Gen Franklin) 
Bakassi, Cross River 
State 
September 25, 
2009 
6.  • Ebikabowei Victor Ben 
(aka Gen. Boyloaf) 
• Africa Ukparasia 
• Paul Ezizi (a.k.a.Comdr. 
Ogunbos) 
• Pastor Reuben Wilson 
• Joshua Macaiver 
Yenagoa, Bayelsa 
State 
                 
                   
         
 
August 22, 2009 
7.  • Chief Ateke Tom 
• Farah Dagogo 
• Ferdinand Amaibi (a.k.a. 
Busta rhymes) 
• Tamunegiyeifori Proby 
(a.k.a. Egbele) 
Port Harcourt, Rivers 
State 
October 3, 2009 
8.  • Bonny Gawei 
• Aboy Muturu 
• Nabena John 
Ogbotobo, Delta State August 15, 2009 
9.  • Government Ekpemupolo 
(a.k.a. Gen. Tompolo) 
• Chief Bibopre Ajube (a.k.a. 
Shoot Aside) 
Gbaramantu, Delta 
State 
Arugbo, Ondo State 
October 4, 2009 
10.  • Henry Binidodogha 
(Egbema 1) 
Ofiniama, Edo State August 28, 2009 
Source: Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme: assessing the 
dynamics of the Niger Delta amnesty programme, a presentation to the House 
Committee on Niger Delta, December 12, 2011: 31. 
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4.4.2. The Implementation of the Demobilisation Phase  
In the original plan, demobilisation was envisioned to commence immediately 
after disarmament, at the various disarmament centres and to last for 30 days.138  
As elaborated by a member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation 
Implementation Committee, the plan informed why military and civilian 
coordinators with equal status were assigned in each of the camps: 
 
And the intention was after the disarmament, the military component is 
supposed to be stood down, and then the civilian coordinators are 
supposed to continue. So I put in that structure so that there would be 
continuity: you don’t bring fresh people and they don’t know where we are; 
these people know right from the day these people were disarmed and 
they could even start knowing the militants by name right from day one 
instead of just using the military, we finish, and it is time for the second 
phase and you bring in civilian and they…are not even familiar with the 
way the militants behave (sic).139 
 
However, this initial plan did not work because the camps were in a poor condition 
owing to inadequate logistics arrangements as encapsulated in this assertion:  
 
So because of this…lack of logistics support to put it generally, you know, 
a lot of the things that we would do, we couldn’t do, we couldn’t do. So 
we… kept… improvising, improvising, improvising just…what do we do 
with that respect? People came; they were supposed to be in camp, there 
were no camps… there were no camps; so what do we do? We collected 
the weapons, and we said, ok, you guys should go back to your 
villages…140 
 
A military officer serving with the Joint Task Force explained that the poor 
conditions in the camps led to their abandonment by the disarmed militants, 
necessitating the indefinite suspension of the demobilisation programme, which 
ultimately led to a series of protests by the militants both at the regional level and 
in Abuja.141  The officer further claimed that after the abandonment, the few 
recreational facilities provided at the centres were carted away, or vandalised, by 
members of the public and personnel coordinating the amnesty programme.142 
                                                          
138 . Respondent 042- member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, 
November 2013. 
139.  Ibid. 
140. Respondent 042-member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, 
December 2013. 
141. Respondent 012- military officer serving with the JTF, October 2013. 
142. Ibid. 
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Another attempt at demobilisation commenced in June 2010 at Obubura, the 
Cross Rivers State National Youth Service Corps permanent orientation camp.143 
Thus, demobilisation was effectively delayed for about eight months, due to the 
lack of a clear institutional framework to coordinate its planning and 
implementation. A staff member of a nongovernmental organisation testified to 
the compartmentalised and unintegrated way the programme was planned as 
partly responsible for this ugly situation: 
 
… and again, it was… we’re going to do a disarmament but without any 
plan of what happens next … and like I said to you … when I attended this 
training in Holland we knew how long it took to plan out a proper DDR 
process so you don’t start one part of it until the other part is planned 
otherwise you get exactly what you got here…144 
 
The demobilisation programme first covered the 20,192 militants that disarmed 
during the first phase of disarmament;145 but as of December 2011, a total of 
23,358 militants had been demobilised.146 This consisted of 20,192 militants from 
the first phase of disarmament and another 3,166 from the 6,166 that disarmed 
during the second phase.147 Nevertheless, these figures contradict the 
submission of a key member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation 
Implementation Committee, which suggested that only the 20,192 militants that 
disarmed during the first phase successfully went through the process of 
demobilisation and were officially issued with a signed certificate of 
demobilisation.148 The respondent further asserted that the Office of the Special 
Adviser to the President on Niger Delta Amnesty allegedly insisted that the entire 
30,000 disarmed militants had been successfully demobilised.149 If the 
                                                          
143. Respondent 001-member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, 
October 2013.     
144. Respondent 027, November 2013. 
145. Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme: assessing the dynamics 
and sustainability of the Niger Delta amnesty programme- a presentation to the House Committee 
on Niger Delta, December 2011: 55. 
146. I arrived at this figure by adding up the number of those that demobilised in phase 1 which is 
20, 192 and in phase 2 which is 3,166 as provided in the report ‘Federal Government of Nigeria 
Niger Delta Amnesty Programme: assessing the dynamics and sustainability of the Niger Delta 
Amnesty Programme- a presentation to the House Committee on Niger Delta, December 12, 
2011: 77.    
147. Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme: assessing the dynamics 
and sustainability of the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme- a presentation to the House Committee 
on Niger Delta, December 2011: 77: 
148. Interview with respondent 001- member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation 
Committee, October 2013.  
149. Ibid. 
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respondent is correct, the implication is that either 9,808 disarmed militants are 
yet to be demobilised, or had skipped demobilisation and progressed to the 
reintegration phase. It could also be that they have been illegally substituted. 
Alternatively, if the figure of 23,358 provided by the programme as at December 
2011 were to be taken as the correct number of those that demobilised, it then 
means that 6,642 from the 30,000 that disarmed have not officially demobilised 
or have progressed to reintegration without undergoing demobilisation. This 
conflicting information was reinforced during a Focus Group Discussion held with 
some ex-militants who claimed that they were yet to demobilise and were not 
sure if they would be allowed to do so. They were also unsure whether they would 
benefit from reintegration training opportunities before the programme’s alleged 
2015 exit date.150 All these contradictory submissions plainly reflect the muddled 
manner in which the programme was implemented. 
 
During demobilisation, the ex-militants were taken through a series of activities 
comprising the following:151 
 
✓ Verification and documentation. 
✓ Wellness assessment. 
✓ Transformational nonviolence training. 
✓ Peacebuilding and conflict resolution. 
✓ Counselling and career guidance. 
✓ Reintegration classification. 
✓ Graduation and demobilisation. 
The demobilisation of members of the first batch of 20,192 disarmed militants 
was conducted in batches 1-17 from June 2010-September 2011 and is displayed 
in table 4.4. However, a record of when the demobilisation of those that disarmed 
in phases 2 and 3 took place was not readily available at the time of my fieldwork 
in 2013, which further lends credence to earlier suggestion that only members of 
the first phase of the ADDR programme officially demobilised. Meanwhile, a staff 
member of a nongovernmental organisation that served at the demobilisation 
                                                          
150. Views expressed during a Focus Group Discussion with held with ex-militants that disarmed 
in the third phase of the ADDR, November 2013. 
151. Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme-assessing the dynamics and 
sustainability of the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme: a presentation to the House Committee on 
Niger Delta, December 2011: 44.     
 203 
 
camp suggested that the camp has remained closed since September 2010.152 
On the whole, 38 not for profit agencies and organisations performed various 
roles at the demobilisation camp.153 A nongovernmental organisation, known as 
Foundation for Ethnic Harmony in Nigeria (FEHN) was contracted to handle the 
nonviolence training and transformational aspects of the demobilisation and 
rehabilitation process.154  
Table 4.4: The demobilisation of 20, 192 militants that disarmed during the 
first phase of disarmament held from 6 August – 4 October 2009 
 
Batch States Duration Classification 
Data 
Batch 1 All 9 states from the 
Niger delta region 
28th June 2010 to 10th July 
2010 
1785 
Batch 2 Delta, Edo, Ondo and 
Imo states 
1st August 2010 to 10th 
August 2010 
687 
Batch 3 Bayelsa state 14th August 2010 to 
25th August 2010 
1003 
Batch 4 Rivers state 1st September 2010 to 12th 
September 2010 
999 
Batch 5 Akwa-Ibom, Cross 
River, Edo and Ondo 
States 
15th September 2010 to 27th 
September 2010 
1045 
Batch 6 Delta State 4TH October 2010 to 17th 
October 2010 
1200 
Batch 7 Bayelsa and Ondo 
States 
19th October 2010 to 31st  
October 2010 
1199 
Batch 8 Rivers State 2ND   November 2010 to 12th 
November 2010 
1196 
  
                                                          
152. Respondent 020, November 2013. 
153 . The statistic was provided by respondent 045 during an interview, December 2013. 
154. This information is available at Foundation for Ethnic Harmony in Nigeria (FEHN) website 
http://www.fehnnigeria.org/Highlights_%20Presidential%20Amnesty%20Programm.html 
(Accessed 29 December 2014). 
Transformation Camp Details (Phase 1) - Batch 1-17 
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Batch9 Bayelsa State 14th November 2010 to 24th 
November 2010 
1200 
Batch 10 Delta State 28th November 2010 to 8th 
December 2010 
1299 
Batch 11 Females (Niger delta 
states and NDDC)and 
Males 
11th December 2010 to 21th 
December 2010  
1344 
Batch 12 Rivers State and NDDC 26 February 2011 to 11 
March, 2011 
1219 
Batch 13 Bayelsa State 3rd May 2011 to 16th May, 
2011 
1200 
Batch 14 Rivers State 23rd June,2011 to 5th July, 
2011 
1200 
Batch 15 Bayelsa State 30th July 2011 to 12th August 
2011 
1500 
Batch 16 Rivers State 15th August 2011 to 27th 
August 2011 
1500 
Batch 17 Bayelsa State and 
Females 
18th September 2011 to 25th 
September 2011 
616 
 20,192 
Source: Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme: assessing 
the dynamics of the Niger Delta amnesty programme- a presentation to the House 
Committee on Niger Delta, December 12, 2011: 73. 
 
4.4.3. The Implementation of the Reintegration Phase 
According to a member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation 
Committee, the reintegration of the Niger Delta militants was not given adequate 
priority at the level of planning because the focus of the Planning Committee was 
on disarmament.155  Additionally, a key issue that is glaring in the planning was 
that it was not based on a synergy between all the critical stakeholders that are 
essential for realising a successful reintegration of the ex-militants. The focus of 
the reintegration planning was on providing vocational skills and educational 
advancement opportunities to the ex-militants, a situation Jennings (2011: 159-
172) refers to as the securitisation of reintegration. This revolves around the 
contention that idleness is a cause of youth involvement in insurgency and 
                                                          
155. Respondent 042, December 2013. 
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therefore keeping them occupied becomes the ultimate solution to militancy. 
Again, the securitisation of reintegration in the Niger Delta suggests that 
reintegration lacks any maximalist/transformational development agenda in terms 
of addressing the fundamental grievances that led to the conflict beyond providing 
vocational and educational opportunities to the ex-militants. Similarly, despite the 
securitisation of reintegration, a Niger Delta scholar observed that the planning 
did not pay attention to where the trained ex-militants would apply their newly 
acquired skills. According to him: 
… like I said to you, I think if …we are developing man-power [reintegration 
programme] … generally … you [will] also want to create the opportunities 
for them to come back to; and my sense is that I don’t think we’ve done 
enough of that. What I expected was that, yes the amnesty is a federal 
government project, but the amnesty office ought to have worked with 
state governments… … [For example,] Rivers State… [is] training X 
number of pilots; we are training Y number of this … what can we do 
together to create some kind of expanded opportunities so that when these 
people come [they can be absorbed] … amnesty is a federal project but 
the reintegration will happen in the states… So we ought to have created… 
not a federal amnesty programme, but a national amnesty programme 
where you have the states as part of … in fact what I would have set up is 
a body with some kind of governing structure that includes the states so 
that they are constantly having discussions about… what will happen … 
that is, how to reintegrate. The people will not be reintegrated in Abuja they 
will be reintegrated in Rivers, in Bayelsa, and so on; have we had that kind 
of conversation?... the communities will be critical because that’s where 
they will reintegrate. The oil companies that are going to lead the 
expansion of these opportunities are they part of these discussions? And 
so on … So to that extent the reintegration has a big question mark for 
me…156 
 
Nevertheless, during demobilisation the ex-militants were provided with 
information regarding existing opportunities in various vocations and career areas 
that could help them make the best-informed career choice that matched their 
abilities and preferences.157 The career aspirations and preferences of the ex-
militants were to be met through education, vocational skills acquisition and 
entrepreneurship as shown in figure 4.1.158 
  
                                                          
156. Respondent 045- December 2013. 
157. Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme-assessing the dynamics and 
sustainability of the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme: a presentation to the House Committee on 
Niger Delta, December 12, 2011: 60.   
158. Ibid. 73. 
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Source: Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta amnesty programme: 
assessing the dynamics of the Niger Delta amnesty programme, a presentation 
to the House Committee on Niger Delta, December 12, 2011: 73. 
 
As of 2011, a total of 8,169 demobilised159 militants have been sent to training 
institutions both home and abroad, out of which 2,547 were in local institutions160 
and another 5,622 deployed161 or about to be deployed to imminent offshore 
                                                          
159. Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta amnesty programme-assessing the dynamics and 
sustainability of the Niger Delta amnesty programme: a presentation to the House Committee on 
Niger Delta, December 12, 2011: 81.   
160. Ibid.  
161. Ibid. 
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Figure 4.1: Key areas of Meeting Career Aspirations of the Demobilised 
Militants 
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destinations162 shown in table 4.5. In summary, as of December 2011, a total of 
91 local training centres and 59 foreign ones had been contracted to participate 
in the reintegration training of the demobilised militants.163  
Table 4.5: Foreign Countries where Demobilised Ex-militants were 
Deployed or about to be Deployed for Reintegration Training as of 
December 2011 
 
 
CONTINENT COUNTRIES 
DEPLOYED TO 
IMMINENT OFFSHORE 
DESTINATIONS 
 
AFRICA • Benin Republic 
• Ghana 
• South Africa 
• Namibia 
• Zambia 
• Mauritius 
• Kenya 
AMERICA • USA 
• Trinidad & 
Tobago 
• Brazil 
• Canada 
ASIA  • India 
• Malaysia 
• Philippines 
• UAE 
• Vietnam 
• China 
• South Korea 
EUROPE • Russia 
• Cyprus 
• Poland 
• Israel 
• Greece 
• Belarus 
• Italy 
• Romania 
• Republic of Ireland 
• Germany 
Source: Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta amnesty programme: assessing the 
dynamics of the Niger Delta amnesty programme, a presentation to the House 
Committee on Niger Delta, December 12, 2011: 84. 
 
 As at June 2013, three years after the commencement of reintegration training, 
the number of ex-militants undergoing training in both formal and vocational skills 
at local and foreign institutions had increased to 14,029 while the number of 
                                                          
162. Imminent offshore destination- suggests countries where the process of deploying ex-
militants for reintegration training has reached an advanced stage as at December 2011 but not 
yet deployed. 
163. Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty programme-assessing the dynamics and 
sustainability of the Niger Delta amnesty programme: a presentation to the House Committee on 
Niger Delta, December 12, 2011: 81.   
Global spread of offshore centres 
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foreign countries contracted had also significantly increased.164 The summary of 
all these and other major achievements recorded in the reintegration training of 
the demobilised ex-militants as at June 2013 is presented in table 4.6 below. 
Table 4.6: Quick Facts on Reintegration as at June 2013 
Enlistment A total of 30,000 enlisted in the first, second, and final phases 
of the Presidential Amnesty Programme [ADDR Programme]. 
822 female delegates. 
Deployment 
 
14,029 delegates have been deployed to local and foreign 
training centres for skills acquisition programmes and formal 
education. 
Skills Acquisition 4,608 delegates undergoing training onshore and offshore 
ranging from marine technology, heavy duty operations, 
welding, diving, agriculture, boat building, oil and gas 
technicians (sic), automobile technology, and aviation. 
690 female delegates placed in specialised centres for 
training in Fashion Designing, Hotel & Catering, 
Cosmetology, and Hair Dressing. 
Formal Education 
 
2,500 delegates studying Law, Political Science, Business 
Management, Mass Communication, International Relations, 
Public Administration, Medicine, Engineering, Applied 
Sciences, Building and Construction, Information and 
Communications Technology, among other courses in 
onshore and offshore universities and colleges. 
Graduation A total of 11,700 delegates have graduated in various fields 
such as Agriculture (239), Automobile (207), Welding and 
Fabrication (2,204), Entrepreneurship (2,798), Carpentry and 
Plumbing (298), Oil Drilling and Marine related courses (964), 
Electrical Installation (89), ICT (273), Crane and Heavy Duty 
Operations (1030), Boat Building (299), Pipeline Fitting (250), 
Entertainment (60) and others (618). 50 delegates at the 
                                                          
164. Sourced from an article written by Murphy Ganagana, Coordinator of the Amnesty News 
Team titled ‘Three years of amnesty implementation: the facts, the figures.’ Contained in 
Amnesty News, Vol. 1. No. 3, Amnesty Programme @3 Anniversary edition of the quarterly 
newsletter published by the Presidential Amnesty Office. 
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Petroleum Training Institute in Effurun, Delta state, made 
history as the first persons to be trained in terminal operations 
as a specialised area in Nigeria’s oil industry. 
17 delegates have graduated as Commercial Licensed Pilots 
while 106 are in training in South Africa, Dubai, Greece and 
Jordan. 
Direct Employment 222 delegates have been offered direct employment in 
various public and private establishments within Nigeria and 
abroad. 
Empowerment 2000 delegates are currently being empowered with business 
start-up packages as part of the programme’s post-training 
entrepreneurship and empowerment initiative. 
Source: The information inputted in this table was adopted verbatim from a commentary 
titled ‘Three years of amnesty implementation: the facts, the figures’ written by Murphy 
Ganagana Coordinator of the Amnesty News Team and featured in Amnesty News, Vol. 
1. No. 3, pp. 5-9. a quarterly newsletter published by the Presidential Amnesty Office. 
This edition was published as part of the three years’ anniversary of the Amnesty 
Programme.  
 
It is pertinent to note that during demobilisation women registered in the 
programme indicated an interest in pursuing various skills acquisition 
programmes including further education.165 Notwithstanding, the skills acquisition 
column in Table 4.6 indicates that 690 female delegates (83.94%) of the 822 
registered166 in the programme were placed in specialised centres for training in 
Fashion Designing, Hotel & Catering, Cosmetology, and Hair Dressing as at June 
2013. While three years after, there is no evidence to show what kind of training 
opportunities have been offered to the remaining 132 (16.06%) registered female 
delegates. When compared to the different kinds of opportunities given to former 
male ex-militants it suggests a lack of gender mainstreaming and inclusiveness 
in terms of access to training opportunities. Thus, one of the unintended 
consequences of the reintegration programme was that it worked to reinforce 
existing gender binaries in the Niger Delta.   
 
                                                          
165. Federal Government of Nigeria Amnesty programme -assessing the dynamics and 
sustainability of the Nigerian Amnesty Programme: a presentation to the House Committee on 
Niger Delta, December 12, 2011: 71. 
166.  Federal Government of Nigeria Amnesty programme -assessing the dynamics and 
sustainability of the Nigerian Amnesty programme: a presentation to the House Committee on 
Niger Delta, December 12, 2011: 65. 
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To facilitate the implementation of the reintegration phase of the programme, 
state amnesty offices were established.167 These offices were to monitor, 
evaluate and provide community relations and communications. They were also 
to provide general support and mental health services.168 The Monitoring and 
Evaluation Department of the states’ offices were to develop a monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E) framework,169 conduct periodic field visits to inspect 
programme implementation, analyse performance, develop remedial actions and 
issue periodic reports. The Community Relations and Communications 
Department was to develop a community outreach strategy and plan, implement 
as well as ensure programme implementation and reporting.170 The Reintegration 
Support Department was to establish job banks, provide support in job placement 
for the trained ex-militants, support those interested in establishing their business, 
personal and business mentoring.171  
 
The Referrals and Mental Health Services Department had as its major function 
the development and monitoring of up-to-date data on the health status of ex-
militants and monitoring the level of progress of those undergoing medical 
treatment.172 The Referrals department was also to provide referrals for health 
and wellness assessments when necessary, especially with reference to women, 
children and disabled ex-militants.173 Finally, the Support Services Department 
was to generate and maintain a database of all ex-militants, maintain a helpdesk 
and caseload management, provide registration services as well as 
administration, human resource (HR), logistics and information technology (IT) 
support.174  
 
However, all efforts to trace the state’s amnesty offices in Port Harcourt and 
Yenagoa - capital cities of Rivers and Bayelsa states respectively - proved 
abortive. The state amnesty offices may theoretically exist but in reality, they 
                                                          
167. Ibid.: 100. 
168. Ibid.: 100. 
169. Ibid.: 100 
170. Ibid.: 100 
171. Ibid.: 100 
172. Federal Government of Nigeria amnesty programme -assessing the dynamics and 
sustainability of the Nigerian Amnesty Programme: a presentation to the House Committee on 
Niger Delta, December 12, 2011: p. 100.   
173. Ibid.:  p. 100. 
174. Ibid.:  p. 100 
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appear to be non-existent which strengthens the opinion expressed by a Niger 
Delta academic expert that the failure of the ADDR programme to have functional 
offices at the state and local government levels where the ex-militants were 
expected to reintegrate undermined the prospect of their successful 
reintegration.175   
 
4.5. Summary of Key Arguments: Conceptualisation, Negotiation, 
Planning and Implementation 
In the first part of this chapter, I examined the politics that underpinned the 
conceptualisation, negotiation, planning and implementation of the Niger Delta 
ADDR programme with a view to understanding the extent to which it affected the 
success or otherwise of the programme. I used the UN IDDRS (2006) and the 
DDR theoretical and policy literature as a framework for analysis. Evidence 
derived from the field and secondary sources analysed, show that the 
conceptualisation of the Programme was initially premised on two conflicting 
perceptions of the conflict; which eventually gave rise to the security stabilisation 
versus development agendas of the ADDR programme. However, in the long run, 
the security stabilisation agenda which reflects the rentier character and interests 
of the Nigerian State dominated the entire process. The peace process that 
resulted in the ADDR programme was achieved through a pseudo-compellence 
negotiated settlement, which integrated the elements of both negotiated 
settlement and peace enforcement as well as the use of patronage. The planning 
and implementation process was not holistic but compartmentalised as each 
segment of the ADDR programme was planned in isolation from each other, and 
much emphasis placed on disarmament. Thus, the conceptualisation, 
negotiation, planning and implementation of the programme did not conform in 
fundamental ways to the provisions of the UN IDDRS (2006) and the broader 
DDR theoretical and policy literature thereby resulting in several challenges and 
problems that negatively undermined the overall success of the programme. The 
analysis of some of these challenges and problems will be the next focus of this 
chapter. 
 
                                                          
175. Respondent 045, December 2013. 
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4.6. Challenges, Problems and Lessons to be Learned from the Niger 
Delta ADDR Programme    
In the history of DDR, every case is characterised by challenges and problems 
associated with its design and implementation, which illuminate lessons to be 
learned for future DDR best practice (Jennings, 2008: 5). Thus, in this section, I 
will examine some of the key challenges and problems experienced in the Niger 
Delta ADDR programme that could serve as useful lessons for future DDR 
programmes. Understanding these challenges and problems is important against 
the backdrop of the call by Governor Kashim Shetima of Borno State176  for a 
similar programme for Boko Haram insurgents’ presently unleashing havoc in the 
north-eastern part of Nigeria (Daily Trust, 2015: 49). 
As I argued in the introductory section of this chapter, the challenges and 
problems that undermined the effectiveness of the Niger Delta ADDR programme 
can be subsumed under 4 explanatory frameworks which are not mutually 
exclusive. Nonetheless, they are adopted because they explain particular 
challenges and problems. I am therefore cognisance of the fact that there is a 
degree of overlap in my conceptual categorisation of the challenges and factors 
that undermined the programme. Generally, the challenges and problems can be 
explained in terms of: (i) the nature and character of the Nigerian State; which 
revolves around its two discerning features rentier-neopatrimonialism and its law 
and order nature (ii) the dysfunctionality of the Nigerian State, (iii), competition 
between leading security agencies of the Nigerian State (military, police and state 
security service) and (iv) geographical impediment. 
  
                                                          
176. Borno state with its capital in Maiduguri is the original base of the Boko Haram terrorists and 
remains the epicentre of their activities.  
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4.6.1. Challenges and Problems due to the Nature and Character of 
the Nigerian State (Rentier Neopatrimonialism and Law and 
Order Nature of the Nigerian State)  
 
In Chapter Three I argued that the contemporary Nigerian State is essentially a 
rentier neopatrimonial state. I asserted that as a rentier neopatrimonial state, 
petroleum has become a referent object (national asset) that must be 
safeguarded from any threat that can undermine its production in the Niger Delta. 
Thus, the very nature and character of the Nigerian State led to a conflicting 
understanding of security between the Nigerian government and the Niger Delta 
communities (Ibeanu, 2000: 25-26). For example, a scholar with expertise on the 
Niger Delta summarises the Nigerian State concept of security in the Niger Delta 
in this way: 
 … the state, rather than subscribe to the security of the people, 
subscribed to the security of the transnational oil companies. The security 
of the people did not matter, what mattered was that the oil companies 
were there, and they continued to produce. So they privileged oil 
production and the safety of the oil companies that produced oil above the 
communities.177 
 
Against this backdrop, the rentier nature and character of the Nigerian State 
principally explained why the Niger Delta ADDR programme was conceptualised, 
designed and implemented as a security stabilisation project without any serious 
concern regarding the underlying issues that gave rise to the conflict. The rentier 
interest of the Nigerian State overrode the developmental needs of the Niger 
Delta communities in the conceptualisation process. This explains why another 
Niger Delta academic expert noted that ‘…the DDR stopped short of addressing 
wider socio-economic and political issues [affecting Niger Delta communities], 
instead focussing in the narrow threats posed by militants to oil production’.178  
Furthermore, the security stabilisation agenda of the ADDR programme produced 
additional challenges and problems that undermined the programme. One of 
these challenges was in the area of determining eligibility criteria for entry into the 
programme. The determination of eligibility criteria is critical to the success of 
DDR (Özerdem, 2009: 14). According to Özerdem the criteria must be all 
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inclusive, which in essence means it should not be discriminatory in terms of sex, 
race, religion, nationality and ethnicity. Similarly, it should not be too strict to the 
extent of excluding eligible persons, neither should it be too relaxed which could 
result in its abuse or manipulation by parties to the conflict (Ibid.). For instance, 
one of the PAPC’s terms of reference states that it is ‘to ensure that those with 
criminal records do not take advantage of the amnesty.’179  However, in view of 
the overriding goal of security stabilisation in the Niger Delta, the Planning 
Committee recommended the relaxation of eligibility criteria to include all known 
criminals in the Niger Delta, who were in possession of arms and willing to 
surrender them. As revealed by a key member of the Planning Committee: 
All those who committed crimes and were on police watch list known by… 
[Mike Oskar]180 and presented… were included in the grant of amnesty… 
all of them and Mr. President agreed… late President agreed that all of 
them including known criminals because we wanted to restore law and 
order. So everyone who came, surrendered his weapon, signed that form 
was granted amnesty (sic). 181 
 
The over relaxation of the eligibility criteria in order to advance the goal of security 
stabilisation led to an exaggerated number of disarmed militants which in turn 
resulted in serious complications for demobilisation and reintegration because no 
commensurate logistics planning was made for encampment and reintegration 
training. For instance, while Table 4: 4 indicates that demobilisation officially 
ended on 25 September 2011, some militants who disarmed still complained 
during a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) that they were yet to be called to camp 
for demobilisation, and had no idea of when or if they will be given the opportunity 
to attend. According to them: 
Another worrisome aspect of the programme is that our batch is just 
coming and it is said that our fate would be decided by the next coming 
administration at the Federal Government level... There would be 
deliberation on whether to stop or proceed on the third phase of these 
agitators, which my group belongs to. Because we have just been 
documented… and the programme only allotted two years’ period for 
training and adoption into full employment for all candidates. The question 
then is that can they (government) take us to training, bring us back and 
provide jobs for us within the space of time available?182  
 
                                                          
179. Se the terms of reference of the Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee in this Chapter. 
180. This is a pseudo name to provide anonymity.  
181. Respondent 050, January 2014. 
182. Focus Group discussion held with ex-militants, November 2013.  
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Another issue emanating from the over relaxation of the eligibility criterion was 
that given the inadequate intelligence on the militants’ numerical strength, easy 
access to arms and the high rate of youth unemployment, the ADDR programme 
effectively became a free-for-all Niger Delta youth joblessness intervention 
programme.  Ironically, this meant that many Niger Delta youth with no previous 
criminal records manoeuvred to get enlisted into the programme as substantiated 
by a key member of the TCND.183 The over relaxation of the eligibility criterion 
clearly demonstrates the securitised goal of the programme which was essentially 
to remove the instruments of violence used in threatening the operations of 
MONCs rather than addressing the causes of grievances that led to the conflict. 
This was also the case in Liberia whereby in order to advance the goal of security 
stabilisation the eligibility criteria were relaxed in order to capture as many idle 
males as possible given the perception that male idleness was a cause of 
insecurity in Liberia (Paes, 2005: 254 and Jennings, 2009: 475-494). Eventually, 
the relaxation undermined the reintegration phase of the programme (Ibid.). 
However, in the case of the Niger Delta ADDR programme, the fact that youth 
with no criminal record tried to get enlisted suggests that the programme may 
have had some unintended positive consequence if assessed as a job creation 
initiative. 
 
Furthermore, in DDR programme design, it is important that women associated 
with fighting forces (WAFF), girls associated with fighting forces (GAFFs) and 
children associated with fighting forces (CAFFs) or as victims of conflict are 
adequately catered for (Knight, 2008:44-45). However, throughout the planning 
phase of the Niger Delta ADDR programme, reference was scarcely made to 
women and children.184 The framing of the eligibility criteria marginalised women, 
girls and children and other victims of conflict because the possession of a 
weapon was the criterion for eligibility for the programme. This may explain why 
women constituted only 822 out of the 30,000 militants that disarmed in the entire 
programme, which translates to 2.74%. A female civil society respondent noted 
that the majority of women ‘… didn’t carry arms or adopt violent methods … [and 
so] because the women didn’t carry arms, the government didn’t include them in 
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the whole amnesty project...’185  In Liberia, Sherif (2003: 28) revealed that, 
WAFFs and GAFFs ‘altogether... comprised 30-40% of all fighting forces, or 
approximately 25,000-30,000 in number’ captured in the Liberian DDR 
Programme. But notwithstanding the number, Jennings (2009: 475-494) presents 
an appalling gender critique of the Liberian DDR programme. Jennings argued 
that it privileged men both by design and content because it was premised on the 
assumption that male idleness was equivalent to instability, so men’s participation 
in the DDR was considered far more vital to the restoration of peace in Liberia.  
However, if the number of females captured in the Liberian DDR programme is 
taken as a benchmark it suggests that the Niger Delta case may represent one 
of the worst cases of the marginalisation of women in DDR. As in Liberia, this 
marginalisation was not accidental but a consequence of the security stabilisation 
agenda of the ADDR programme which emanated from the very nature, character 
and interest of the Nigerian State. In the security stabilisation agenda of the Niger 
Delta ADDR programme women were not seen as a potent threat but men and 
so their participation was considered more critical to the restoration of stability. 
Similarly, even though the use of child soldiers in the Niger Delta conflict was not 
given any prominence by academic researchers (Oriola et al, 2013: 87-88), it is 
very likely that children have been used as informants, spies and errand boys in 
the various camps. Oddly enough, throughout the entire planning and 
implementation process, no reference was made to children which obviously 
means that they were denied access to the programme and the empowerment 
opportunities offered to its participants. Once again, the marginalisation of 
children was not accidental but predicated on the fact that they were not seen as 
constituting any threat to security capable of undermining the operations of 
MNOCs and flow of oil rents to the state. 
 
 In a neopatrimonial state like Nigeria, Joseph (1987: 55-58) argues that the state 
and political elites very much rely on the use of patronage to achieve political 
legitimacy and stability. Therefore, it is a common practice for such a state to use 
patronage to suppress or placate contentious social forces threatening its 
stability. And in line with this, a fundamental challenge that undermined the 
effectiveness of the ADDR programme was the way the Nigerian government 
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resorted to the use of patronage as inducement which a member of the PAPC 
described as a policy of patronage and exclusion.186 This may be better described 
as neopatrimonial DDR. The patronage was extended to selected top militant 
commanders with high capacity to undermine the operations of MNOCs and flow 
of oil rents to the state.187 However, as I will demonstrate in Chapter Five, the 
policy was counterproductive to the goal of demobilisation because it helped in 
the perpetuation of the command and control structures that demobilisation is 
supposed to destroy.  
Furthermore, extending patronage to selected powerful commanders with high 
capacity to threaten MNOCs’ operations and flow of oil rents to the state sent a 
negative message that violence pays (incentivise violence). The emergence of 
Kelvin Ibruvwe in 2013 as the leader of Liberation Movement for the Urhobo 
People (LIMUP) an ethnic nationality in Delta state was a clear case of how 
patronage sowed the seeds of further conflict and instability in the Niger Delta by 
encouraging youth to resort to violence as a means of drawing government’s 
attention (Orosevwotu, 2013: 2). Kelvin claimed that this was what youth from the 
Ijaw ethnic nationality did to secure patronage from the Nigerian government. 
Again, a Niger Delta human rights activist noted that patronage contributed to 
arms proliferation in the Niger Delta by strengthening the economy of conflict 
because disgruntled ex-militants who felt marginalised and excluded from the 
patronage resorted to illegal oil bunkering and refining as a means of enhancing 
their income or ventilating their frustration against the state.188 He further noted 
that nonviolent youth who felt cheated also resorted to illegal oil bunkering and 
refining.189  Overall, the patronage applied in the programme reinforced the 
economy of conflict that drives the Niger Delta conflict. Consequently, a great 
lesson coming out of this is ‘how not to use inducement in DDR’ and how the lack 
of understanding of the economic agendas of all the different categories of 
combatants can undermine the goal of DDR and generate the potential for further 
conflict and instability. Similarly, another important lesson coming from this study 
                                                          
186. Respondent 047, December 2013. 
187. Respondent 028- Former staff member of the Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the 
Niger Delta, November 2013. Interview with respondent 027-member Presidential Amnesty 
Planning Committee, December 2013. 
188.  Respondent 017, November 2013. 
189.  Ibid. 
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is the fact that neopatrimonial DDR cannot lay the foundation of lasting peace but 
short-term panacea. 
Another problem with its roots in the neopatrimonial nature and character of the 
Nigerian State and which undermined the programme was how the ADDR 
programme turned into a battlefield for high-level politicking between leading 
politicians in the Niger Delta particularly in Bayelsa State which almost scuttled 
the ADDR process in the state. For instance, Adeniyi observed that: 
 
But because Alaibe was a prominent person within the Niger Delta 
equation, the president appointed him an honorary special adviser with a 
mandate to act as his representative on the amnesty issue. While this was 
a strategic move designed to help in the coordination of the amnesty 
process, it was not well received by the governor of Bayelsa, who 
apparently saw Alaibe as a potential future gubernatorial opponent, who 
should not be given any visible role (Adeniyi, 2011: 77-78). 
 
Similarly, the neopatrimonial nature and character of the Nigerian State where 
governance has become synonymous to prebendalism is certainly perceived by 
many to have undermined the effectiveness of the ADDR programme. In 
particular, there have been widespread allegations of corruption such as illegal 
substitution of candidates,190 short payment of candidates191  and outright denial 
of reintegration opportunities for some demobilised militants.192 Indeed, a 
member of the Nigerian Anti-Corruption Network suggested that not only was 
corruption the root cause of the Niger Delta conflict, but the effectiveness of the 
ADDR programme was undermined by corruption.193 For example, funds 
budgeted for the programme were allegedly diverted into private pockets, while 
the award of contracts and hiring of service providers and foreign experts at a 
very high premium has raised doubts about how transparently such contracts 
were awarded and determined. As noted by one civil society respondent: 
Oh…we talked before about the corruption in this country, and it is 
absolutely the same thing with the amnesty program… I’ve been told that 
about two-thirds of the money for the amnesty program is actually going 
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191. Ibid. 
192. Respondent 039- Ex-MEND commander, November 2013. 
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to the organizers and the contractors who benefit and not to the boys 
themselves.194 
 
It is pertinent to acknowledge that hard evidence to demonstrate how corruption 
has undermined the effectiveness of the Niger Delta ADDR programme was 
difficult to come by, and perception does not necessary represent empirical 
reality. Nevertheless, when these allegations of corruption are viewed against the 
backdrop of established cases of corruption in Nigeria earlier highlighted in this 
study such an allegation cannot be completely ignored. 
 
As I argued in chapter three the Nigerian State is equally a law and order state; 
and like its colonial progenitor is authoritarian in nature. Accordingly, the above 
character of the Nigerian State informed the pseudo-compellence nature of the 
Niger Delta ADDR programme ‘negotiations’ whereby the ADDR programme was 
launched without any ceasefire or peace agreement in place. It also explains the 
myopic nature of the conceptualisation and negotiation style of the ADDR 
programme which was bereft of any robust engagement with the underlying 
issues that led to the conflict beyond mollifying the militants to surrender their 
weapons. Thus, disarmament was launched and undertaken in an atmosphere 
of mutual distrust between the Nigerian Government and the Niger Delta 
militants. A former staff member of a nongovernmental organisation Foundation 
for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta explains that the nature of the peace 
process and the tension that characterised it and the concomitant mistrust the 
militants had with regard to the Nigerian Government explains why many of them 
initially refused to participate in the programme.  
4.6.2. Challenges and Problems Due to the Dysfunctionality of the 
Nigerian State (Incompetent/Ineffective Nature of the Nigerian 
State) 
 
I argued in Chapter Two that Nigeria as a neopatrimonial state has become 
predatory in nature and which I also contended is the worst form of 
neopatrimonialism. Similarly, Bach (2011: 279) posited that in a neopatrimonial 
predatory state, the state is highly dysfunctional because public resources have 
been personalised by the political elites to the extent that the state lacks the 
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capacity to produce and implement basic public policies. Consequently, the 
Nigerian State has become ineffective in terms of producing and executing basic 
policies and programmes for the well-being of its citizenry. In line with this, a Niger 
Delta academic expert explains that the dysfunctional nature of the Nigerian State 
became an impediment to the ADDR programme in terms of the inefficiency that 
characterised the whole process. According to him: 
Has the Nigerian State been very efficient? Has the Nigerian State been 
very effective in its projects, in its programming…has it been successful? 
Have there been…problems about corruption and all that in the amnesty? 
Is it not characteristic of the Nigerian State? Then look at the initial period 
of the amnesty there was…absolute lack of coordination and all that 
between the federal government and the states …195 
 
In a similar vein, another Niger Delta scholar maintains that the Nigerian State is 
a highly in-disciplined one that lacks policy consistency and the tenacity to 
execute a given programme in a thorough manner and to its logical conclusion 
irrespective of whether the policy is good or bad.196 He maintains that in most 
cases policies are halfway implemented irrespective of how well conceived they 
are.197 This description was reflected in the lack of adequate planning that 
characterised the ADDR process as noted by a military officer serving with the 
Joint Task Force: 
 
Well it was well intended but it was wrongly planned, haphazardly 
implemented or it was rushed. The planning was rushed and of course, if 
you rush a thing you make mistakes and some of the mistakes will be to 
such an extent that it should not have even started in the first instance 
…The whole thing, success or failure is hinged on detailed planning and 
sincerity of purpose. We did it the Nigerian way and it served us for the 
time it served. Whether it will continue to serve, I don’t know198    
 
This was exemplified by the way Disarmament was planned and implemented 
without any concrete plan for demobilisation and reintegration.199 Indeed, a 
member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee 
revealed that the first batch of the demobilisation programme was carried out for 
political expediency, and not necessarily because the Obubura camp was 
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operationally ready. There were no facilities and security in place, resulting not 
only in a camp riot but an attack on the Special Adviser (SA) to the President on 
the Amnesty Programme while on an official visit to the camp.200 Again, the 
obvious reasons that triggered the camp riot was evidence that the DDR 
programme was kick-started without adequate logistics arrangements in place, 
which is clearly in contrast to the provisions of the UN IDDRS (2006) and the 
DDR theoretical and policy literature which all argue that the successful 
implementation of any DDR programme is a function of adequate logistics 
planning. The disarmament and demobilisation phases of the programme were 
also marred by the problem of funding. However, a member of the Disarmament 
and Demobilisation Implementation Committee explained that the funding 
problem, to some extent, was accidental because the President became sick 
immediately after he proclaimed the amnesty, which made it difficult for the 
Committee to access the necessary funds for the conduct of disarmament.  As 
explained by the Committee member:  
 
…it was like the president just announced the amnesty and his health just 
continued to deteriorate, deteriorate, deteriorate. So we now had the 
problem of even getting access to him, getting feedback from him; even 
applying … releasing funds was a problem. You know...when the amnesty 
was announced there was a six-week window for me to get ready to start 
operating. By the …fourth week, no kobo had been given to me; no money 
had been released, you know, so it was so frustrating, so… to get funds 
we had to do things that I would say off the record…201 
 
Nevertheless, a competent and effective state would have been able to deal with 
the problem of the president’s ill-health. A further indicator of the ineffective 
nature of the Nigerian State was the lack of adequate planning that characterised 
the programme whereby it was launched not based on sound and reliable 
intelligence information, particularly the disarmament phase. For instance, 
estimates of the number of militants to be disarmed were based on extrapolation, 
and initially put at 12,000 militants202; whilst 30,000 militants were eventually 
disarmed under the programme.203 A member of the Disarmament and 
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203. Respondent 001, member Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, 
October 2013. 
 222 
 
Demobilisation Implementation Committee attested that ‘from what I could see, 
nobody really knew who the armed groups were; and so nobody knew whether 
the real groups were being disarmed or not.’204  This was further buttressed by a 
military officer serving with JTF who explains that: 
 
So when it comes to the issue of knowing how many militants each 
person had, how many arms were collected I want to say that 
government may not have had any say over it because it was a 
matter of what they brought.205 
 
For example, at the initial planning stage, the State Security Service (SSS) 
confirmed the existence of 35 militants’ camps and leaders;206 while the planning 
Committee claimed to have identified 75 militants’ camps and 79 leaders’ during 
its pre-disarmament fact finding.207 Suffice to say that the problem of conflicting 
and unreliable intelligence that characterised the conduct of the ADDR 
programme was a further evidence of the failure to conduct an in-depth pre-DDR 
stocktaking to generate the needed data for the programme which is a necessary 
precondition for successful DDR (Spear, 2002:149; Asuni, 2011: 159; Shibuya, 
2012: 28 and Ong, 2012: 15-22). A further indication of the incompetent nature 
of the Nigerian State was that stock-taking and verification that should have been 
done at the planning stage was rather left for the implementation Committee. For 
instance, a member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation 
Committee noted that my: 
 …strategy of executing the mandate was, within the ninety-day period, we 
were to engage with the militant leaders in their camps: we would go there, 
we would take the statistics of the personnel that they had, we would take 
the statistics of the weapons they had, and we would transfer those 
weapons away from the camp. So, we would know that, ok, we are dealing 
with Ateke Tom and by so and so date we are going to disarm Ateke Tom 
in his camp; before that day of official disarmament, we have got all the 
data regarding the arms, the ammo, the personnel, the fighters, the non-
fighters, and the cooks … So …by the time we start collecting their arms 
all the necessary documentation as to     renunciation of violence, we have 
all these forms that we have designed, you know, that they were supposed 
to do; we would have done it camp by camp; not the way it turned out 
eventually, because, eventually, we couldn’t do that…(sic).208 
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The Committee member further observed that it became extremely difficult to 
ascertain whether or not those that disarmed were truly militants and if they had 
surrendered all the arms in their possession. The Committee member noted:  
 
Even they themselves will tell you that they couldn’t bring everything. 
So…some of the leaders voluntarily came to me that they know where the 
arms …have been hidden they are ready to show it to me but that I should 
give them… some welfare209 
 
Another serious challenge of implementation and also a reflection of the 
dysfunctional nature of the Nigerian State and which manifested in the 
inadequate planning that characterised the ADDR programme was that 
disarmament which was initially planned to take place at static collection centres 
had to be combined with mobile collection.210 The combination of static and 
mobile collection simultaneously means that some commanders and their fighters 
surrendered at the designated collection centres, while others were disarmed in 
their various camps. In some cases, the militants pulled out from camps to 
surrender at the nearest collection centre.211  The chaotic way the militants 
surrendered made it extremely difficult to verify what they brought. Additionally, 
given that a pre-DDR census was not conducted, the militant commanders had 
the liberty to determine the quantity and quality of weapons they surrendered 
which may explain the low percentage of weapons recovered in the first phase of 
disarmament (see Table 4: 2). Suffice to point out that the Operational Guide to 
the UN IDDRS (2014: 126) provides that disarmament can be conducted as 
static, mobile or a combination of both. However, whichever is adopted, the 
decision must be based on sound planning and careful assessment of the 
suitability of the option adopted to the DDR environment. In the case of the Niger 
Delta ADDR programme, the decision to combine the two was unplanned and not 
based on any informed interrogation of the pros and cons. 
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According to Muggah (2002: 156), DDR and weapons reduction programmes are 
not the magic bullet they are construed to be, especially in terms of their ability to 
maximally retrieve all illegal arms from circulation in one disarmament 
programme. This was particularly the case in the Niger Delta where the 
programme was based on inadequate planning. This means that arms mop up 
should be carried out immediately after the official completion of disarmament in 
order to retrieve those arms not captured during the official process of 
disarmament. A key member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation 
Implementation Committee revealed that it was agreed in the main plan that, a 
mop up exercise will be carried out immediately after disarmament is completed. 
But as he noted this did not take place:  
…immediately after disarmament, after ninety days, of course the military 
has to take over the all those camps and establish presence in those 
camps and mop up whatever it is that is left there whether their boats or 
whatever that they didn’t bring… So, follow up actions… were not done, 
were not done.212  
 
Another challenge arising from the inept nature of the Nigerian State was 
reflected in the prolonged delay between disarmament and demobilisation. The 
first phase of disarmament ended in October 2009 but demobilisation did not start 
until June 2010213 leading to a series of protests during which militants blocked 
the Lokoja - Abuja express road as a way of demonstrating their frustration 
against the Nigerian government.214 Others reportedly returned to petty illegal oil 
bunkering and sundry criminal activities as a way of sustaining themselves.215 
Consequently, ‘some of the militants lost faith in the process, and there were open 
complaints and…threats of going back to the creeks…’216 Apart from the delayed 
commencement of demobilisation, the haphazard manner in which the 
demobilisation was carried out was another problem that undermined the 
effectiveness of the ADDR programme. A staff of a nongovernmental 
organisation that served at the Obubura demobilisation camp notes that 
‘…initially, they were staying up to two weeks; but they kept cutting down … ten 
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days … nine days …’217 Hence, the time allotted to some of the batches was too 
short to achieve any meaningful transformation and for them to reasonably 
appreciate the importance of nonviolent resolution of conflict. Thus, the 
psychological dimension of demobilisation which Shibuya (2012: 63) described 
as ‘mental demobilisation’ was hardly achieved. In addition, the timing for 
demobilisation did not take into cognisance the educational qualifications and 
ability of the ex-militants to assimilate within a short time, because many of them 
were school dropouts without effective learning skills. A staff of a 
nongovernmental organisation involved in the psychosocial counselling and 
profiling of the ex-militants’ soldiers contended that of those she interviewed ‘90% 
of them managed to finish secondary school but could not read nor write.’218 As 
rightly noted by one Niger Delta scholar, ‘merely putting people in a classroom, 
some could not write, people of different levels of education, you put them in the 
same classroom and train them to become nonviolent would certainly not achieve 
the objective it should have achieved’.219 
The role of information and education both to participants and beneficiaries in a 
DDR programme is very necessary if success is to be achieved.  In particular, the 
success of a DDR programme can be undermined by poor ‘management of 
expectations’ (Muggah, 2008: 199). As Muggah notes ‘if DDR or weapons 
reduction are undertaken without an effective communication or public 
awareness strategy, the consequences can be disastrous’ (Ibid.). Also, the 
International Peace Academy reiterated the fact that: 
For successful implementation of DDR programs, it is crucial to seek a 
balance between managing the often very high expectations of ex-
combatants and addressing resentment of “favouritism” among the rest of 
the population. Flexible programming and an effective public information 
campaign are key in achieving this goal (International Peace Academy, 
2002: 1). 
 
However, a major challenge in the Niger Delta ADDR programme was that 
information management was poorly handled, as key stakeholders such as 
militants and Niger Delta communities were not well informed and educated about 
what the programme was all about. A member of the Disarmament and 
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Demobilisation Implementation Committee explained that with the over-
militarisation of the planning process, the media subcommittee was suppressed 
and not given the liberty to function220 which resulted in a serious communication 
gap with participants and beneficiaries. During a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) 
held with some disarmed militants it became very clear that they were not 
properly educated about what the ADDR process entailed, as issues such as 
duration and exact entitlements were not properly explained to them, for example, 
many of them were not well informed of the programme’s exit date. They were 
also ignorant of the exact termination date of the reinsertion allowance they are 
being paid. However, when it was made known to them that information gathered 
from the Amnesty Office in Abuja suggested that the programme would terminate 
in 2015 they all clamoured for its extension beyond the 2015 exit date. For 
instance, one of their key submissions during the Focus Group Discussion was 
for: 
 
…government to…continue with the amnesty programme beyond 2015, 
even if it would be giving the programme another name entirely. Because 
as it has started already, a man who has been given for instance N1.00 
today cannot afford to stay hungry tomorrow. 221 
 
Their submission supports Muggah’s (2006: 201) warning that without adequate 
education and enlightenment, ‘there is a persistent danger that DDR and 
weapons reduction schemes will continue to be viewed exclusively as an 
‘entitlement’ for former soldiers, instead of as a mechanism to improve the 
security of, and the level of development in, traumatized communities.’ A careful 
analysis of the Niger Delta ADDR programme indicates that it suffered from 
bloated expectations on the part of the ex-militants because of poor information 
management. The dashing of these expectations poses serious implications for 
longer-term security stabilisation in the Niger Delta.  
 
The ineptness of the Nigerian State was also reflected in its launching of the 
programme without a clear established national institutional framework for its 
implementation. In contrast, for instance, the UN IDDRS (3. 30. 2006: 9) 
recommends that a national DDR Commission consisting of all stakeholders 
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should be established to superintend the planning and implementation of a DDR 
programme. However, in this case, the programme was superintended by a 
political adviser to the president instead of a DDR commission manned by DDR 
experts. As noted by a staff member of a nongovernmental organisation: 
 
And then ask yourself, why is the amnesty a committee, not a 
commission? Or an agency? Or a council? ... So you could see the ad hoc 
nature and unsustainability of some of the structures. Even look at the 
leadership crisis: amnesty started effectively in 2009; 2009 to 2013 give or 
take is four years? In four years they’ve had three leaders Godwin Abbey, 
Timi Alaibe and now Kuku, which means an average of one chairman per 
annum. And why is it that you wanted to do something on amnesty, you 
consistently choose politicians to head it when it is supposed to be a 
technical professional show.222 
 
The importance of expertise highlighted above strengthens the contention that 
‘the success and sustainability of a DDR programme depends on the ability 
of…expertise to complement and support a nationally led process’ (UN IDDRS 
(3. 30. 2006: 1). Thus, assigning a politician who is not an expert on issues 
concerning DDR, and whose tenure is linked to that of the president undermines 
the effectiveness of the programme. For instance, following the transition of 
power from President Goodluck Jonathan to President Muhammadu Buhari after 
the 2015 national elections the tenure of Mr Kingsley Kuku the Special Adviser to 
the former President on Niger Delta Affairs and coordinator of the programme 
ended on 29th May 2015. From May – July 2015 the ADDR Programme was 
without leadership which led to the stoppage of payment of monthly allowance of 
the ex-militants while some overseas training institutions temporarily stopped 
their reintegration training due to none payment of tuition fees.223 While money 
was available in the Amnesty account, there was no signatory to the account 
because the former adviser’s tenure had legally ended with that of the former 
president on 29th May 2015.224 This could have been averted if a properly 
constituted DDR commission was in place because the tenure of the headship 
would not be determined or depend on that of the president.225 
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4.6.3. Challenges and Problems due to Competition Between 
Leading Security Agencies of the Nigerian State 
The conduct of DDR involves and requires serious coordination, collaboration 
and synergy among multiple agencies and departments (Knight, 2008:46-47). 
However, coordination of the Niger Delta ADDR programme was a major 
challenge because it was characterised by interagency rivalry and egotism 
among the leading security agencies of the Nigerian government as they tried to 
outwit each other, particularly in the disarmament phase. A key member of the 
Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee explains the 
situation like this: 
.. a lot of organisations felt that they had been in contact with these 
militants all this while, that naturally…they should be allowed to participate 
…  not bringing … [Papa Tango]226 an innocent bystander as far as they 
are concerned, being a new person, into it; they had been involved, they 
should be the ones to do this (sic)… Even when [Papa Tango] was 
appointed… [and] was trying to set up… staff and … needed people from 
SSS, but before they could release staff to [Papa Tango] … it was a 
problem. And when they grudgingly released one… they refused to give 
him the information that they have concerning the militants… So we 
virtually [the Committee] had to circumvent the system, the channel, to get 
the information that we wanted… So you could see the rivalry, police want 
to take some credit for it, SSS want to take credit for it … the army, they 
think that… they are the ones to do it not an [Alpha Foxtrot Officer]227 so 
the army people were even antagonistic to [Papa Tango]!228  
 
Likewise, a staff member of Search for Common Ground (SFCG) in Nigeria posits 
that a negative consequence of this rivalry was the early hijacking of the 
programme by the Nigerian military which shifted the focus of the DDR 
programme to disarmament at the expense of demobilisation and reintegration: 
 
Different people wanted to grab it. The military grab it and that they were 
doing the disarmament (sic), but the issue is that DDR is more than 
disarmament, it means demobilisation, and it means reintegration or 
rehabilitation. But they grabbed it and dominated it…229  
 
The various leading security agencies even attempted to carry out separate 
disarmament. For instance, the above key member of the Disarmament and 
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Demobilisation Implementation Committee revealed that ‘…. [Whisky Oskar]230 
went to Warri and collected some arms from some people… I don’t know where 
he took the arms to…SSS disarmed some and the arms are with them, you 
know.’231 This unhealthy competition undermined the conduct of disarmament 
and the ability to properly account for the arms collected from the militants.   
4.6.4. Challenges and Problems due to Geographical Impediment 
Shibuya (2012: 26-27) argues that previous DDR experiences revealed that how 
porous a country’s borders are has serious implications for arms inflows and the 
overall success of disarmament. Similarly, Jeong (2005: 51) argues that 
disarmament will be futile in the absence of an arms embargo managed by tight 
border control enforced by statutorily authorised security agencies in a state. In 
consonance with Shibuya’s position, the PAPC suggested that ‘the JTF should 
equally be empowered to checkmate and control the proliferation of light weapons 
in the Niger Delta before and after the proclamation of amnesty’.232 However, 
respondents from this study have demonstrated that disarmament was 
conducted amidst continued arms inflows due to the porous nature of the Nigerian 
maritime border. A retired military general noted that, even as weapons were 
being retrieved, new ones were being smuggled into the region, which posed a 
serious challenge to the disarmament process. According to the retired military 
general: 
Even as weapons are being collected more are still coming in because a 
lot of people are engaged in illegal activities; a lot of oil bunkering is taking 
place with ships that bring in arms that are exchanged for illegal oil. Also, 
our maritime domain is vast and I don’t think the Nigerian Navy can 
singlehandedly monitor it and the Air Force cannot also give adequate 
cover to the Navy…Until there is adequate policing of our waters arms 
would continue to find its way into our communities and affect the overall 
success of the amnesty programme. A lot of arrests have been made over 
the years and on a daily basis too of ships involved in oil bunkering on 
Nigerian waters, efforts should be made to make it unprofitable in order to 
stop arms proliferation.233 
Therefore, Nigeria’s vast and porous maritime border and difficult terrain would 
certainly have posed a significant natural impediment to any effort at retrieving 
illegal weapons coming into the Niger Delta notwithstanding other factors 
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highlighted above. These include the rentier-neopatrimonial, law and order nature 
and character of the Nigerian State, its dysfunctionality and the competition 
among its leading security agencies. However, as the above respondent 
suggests much success might have been achieved if there were adequate 
policing of the border and equipping of the security forces and synergy between 
the Nigerian Navy and Air Force as a way of checkmating illegal arms proliferation 
in the Niger Delta. Thus, given the natural impediment to efforts at checkmating 
arms proliferation in the Niger Delta, the concern of the Nigerian government 
should have been to maximally reduce the socio-economic and political 
conditions that encourage the demand for weapons and violent behaviour. This 
means that a more realistic approach would have been to implement a maximalist 
DDR as recommended by the TCND which would radically ameliorate the socio-
economic and political factors that induce armed conflict or social unrest that 
motivate individuals and groups to acquire weapons.  A maximalist DDR could 
then be complemented with improvement on existing policing capacity in the 
Niger Delta.  
 
4.7. Conclusion 
This chapter examined the politics of how the 2009 Niger Delta ADDR 
programme was conceptualised, negotiated, designed and implemented by the 
Nigerian government. The chapter is based on the assumption that to evaluate 
the extent to which the ADDR programme has achieved its objective requires a 
thorough understanding of how it was conceptualised, designed and 
implemented. I argued in the chapter that the conceptualisation was premised on 
a security versus development understanding of the conflict, which gave rise to 
the development and security stability agendas of the ADDR programme. 
However, in line with the rentier neopatrimonial nature, character and interest of 
the Nigerian State, which prioritised the security of MNOCs instead of the security 
of communities, the security stability agenda of the programme became the 
overriding goal of the programme as well as its design and implementation. I also 
argued that the ADDR programme was achieved neither through negotiated 
settlement nor outright military defeat of the militants but via a pseudo-
compellence negotiated settlement; a peace deal that combined the features of 
peace enforcement, negotiation and the use of patronage. Top militant 
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commanders who had a high capacity to undermine rents accumulation formed 
the nucleus of negotiation which eventually resulted in an individual signing of a 
renunciation of militancy bond form by each militant. Consequently, the process 
defies existing frameworks for negotiating traditional first-generation DDR as 
provided in the UN IDD-RS (2006) and the broader DDR theoretical and policy 
literature, but nevertheless added a new amateur yet innovative approach to DDR 
and peace processes.  In terms of its planning and implementation too, I argued 
that the ADDR programme did not conform to the UN IDDRS (2006) and the DDR 
theoretical and policy literature. Overall, the conceptualisation, planning and 
implementation of the programme reflect the interest of the Nigerian State. 
Similarly, the way the Niger Delta ADDR programme was conceptualised, 
negotiated, designed and implemented was also marred by several challenges 
and problems. These challenges and problems emanated from the inherent 
nature and character of the Nigerian State, the dysfunctionality 
(incompetent/ineffectiveness) of the Nigerian State, competition among leading 
Nigerian security agencies, and natural impediment due to the porous nature of 
the Nigerian maritime boundary. Overall, I argued that the conceptualisation, 
design and implementation of the ADDR programme had serious limitations that 
negatively undermined its goal. However, the question of whether the programme 
succeeded in achieving its statutory goals will form the subject of a more detailed 
discussion in Chapter Five. 
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Chapter Five 
The Niger Delta Amnesty Disarmament Demobilisation and 
Reintegration Programme and Goal Accomplishment 
 
5. Introduction 
In Chapter Four, I examined how the Niger Delta Amnesty Disarmament 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (ADDR) programme was conceptualised, 
designed and implemented. In this chapter, I critically evaluate the extent to which 
it has accomplished its statutory objectives. As I argued in the preceding chapter, 
the programme was premised on two conflicting conceptualisations. The TCND 
conceptualized a maximalist Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
(DDR) programme that aimed to address the crisis of militancy within a broader 
framework of socioeconomic transformation while in contrast, the Presidential 
Amnesty Planning Committee conceptualised, designed and implemented a 
minimalist DDR that aimed at security stabilisation. Consequently, this resulted 
in a conceptual somersault whereby security stabilisation instead of security and 
development became the programme’s main statutory objective. As noted in this 
statement from the government, ‘the DDR provision approved by the Federal 
Government of Nigeria under the Amnesty programme was… conceived as a 
national response to stabilise security conditions in the Niger Delta… (Federal 
Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme, 2011: 24).  
 
The main argument I advance in this chapter is that the amnesty/disarmament 
phase of the programme succeeded in stabilising the deteriorated security 
situation in the Niger Delta in the short-term. However, there is a high capacity to 
remobilise and activate vertical and horizontal command and control structures 
amongst the Niger Delta militants; because the demobilisation process failed to 
ensure the breakdown of C&C structures. The high capacity to remobilise was 
reinforced by the failure to economically reintegrate the ex-militants by providing 
them with legitimate employment opportunities after training. Consequently, the 
risk that militants will return to rents seeking behaviour through the barrel of a gun 
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remains high and has been further worsened by the failure to address the 
grievances of underdevelopment that gave rise to the conflict.  
The chapter is structured into three main sections; the first section evaluates the 
programme as a security stabilisation intervention in the Niger Delta and the 
second part examines the programme from the perspective of a maximalist all-
inclusive DDR recommended by the TCND as well as the maximalist DDR 
literature. The third section summarises the key arguments advanced in the 
chapter. 
5.1. The Niger Delta ADDR Programme and Security Stabilisation  
As I pointed out in the previous section, the main statutory goal of the programme 
was to stabilise the security situation in the Niger Delta. Consequently, in this 
section, the role of amnesty and each phase of the DDR programme will be 
examined in terms of how it has achieved or contributed to the attainment of this 
goal in the Niger Delta region. This approach is adopted because each phase of 
the DDR process has a distinct but mutually reinforcing role to play towards the 
accomplishment of security stabilisation.  
5.1.1. Amnesty and Security Stabilisation in the Niger Delta  
Varied mechanisms can be adopted by societies undergoing violent conflicts to 
end violence and stabilise the security situation.  Oftentimes amnesty is resorted 
to when DDR is contemplated in the absence of military defeat. For instance, 
Walter (1997: 335-364 and 2002: 3-43) posits that the primary concern of warring 
parties, when asked to disarm, is not the question of how to reach a consensus 
over land, power sharing or the underlying grievances that led to the war but 
instead the fear of whether their personal security will be guaranteed during and 
after demobilisation. Walter’s assertion was further supported by Scharf (1999: 
508-509). In line with this, Freeman (2009: 37) posits that ‘amnesties are usually 
seen as one of the key incentives or preconditions for a successful DDR 
program.’ Accordingly, a top MEND commander noted that without being offered 
amnesty they would not have agreed to go through the DDR process because of 
the significant risk it posed to their lives. According to him: 
…at some point, we got fed up that we could not even continue again. But 
another point too [was that] even though we are bored and tired of the 
struggle there is no way we can just keep the arms or throw them away 
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and…walk in the communities or come to Warri and walk …as free men… 
[For] somebody like Tompolo...any day… [the government] get him they 
won’t even be going to court they have to kill him the way they killed Yusuf 
that Boko Haram guy…so how can such a person leave the struggle and 
come [out from the creeks]. It was just to continue until one day when God 
have something good for us…234  
 
What this response illustrates is that even though the Niger Delta militants were 
war fatigued they were not willing to go through disarmament and demobilisation 
without the safety of their lives guaranteed. The recourse to amnesty has certainly 
been criticised by organisations such as the Amnesty International (n. d.: 2008a 
and 2008b), Human Rights Watch (2008: 1-3) and the International Criminal 
Court (Obura, 2011: 19-20 and Laplante, n.d: 935). Nevertheless, evidence from 
this case study suggests that in the context of negotiated settlement amnesty 
may be a necessary evil needed to navigate the war to peace transition in war-
torn societies.  
5.1.2. Disarmament and Security Stabilisation in the Niger Delta 
This section interrogates the extent to which the disarmament phase of the ADDR 
programme contributed to security stabilisation in the Niger Delta. Essentially, 
‘disarmament should achieve the removal of the means by which civil wars have 
been executed and lead to the creation of a stable environment, thus 
strengthening confidence and security building among combatants, the 
government and the population’ (Alden, et al, 2011: 14). A point also reiterated 
by Meek and Malan (2004: 23). However, a vivid account of how the disarmament 
phase was conducted in the Niger Delta provided by a military officer serving with 
the Joint Task Force (JTF) demonstrates that it fell far below the minimum 
standards of disarmament highlighted in Chapter Two. According to him:  
What… took place was that prior to the amnesty programme, leaders of 
each camp…were identified, they were now told to compile names of 
people that were under their supervision. So it is possible that a lot of sharp 
practices might have taken place… they were just at liberty to submit 
whatever names they wanted… The veracity of the names they submitted 
as their boys would be in dispute because no one knew, whatever I tell 
you was the size of my camp is [what] you take because you weren’t there. 
So that also might have affected the quantity of arms that were recovered. 
Even after the amnesty, there were still insinuations that look what they 
recovered in terms of arms wasn’t even up to half of what the holdings of 
these boys were… So when it comes to the issue of knowing how many 
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militants each person had, how many arms were collected I want to say 
that government may not have had any say over it because it was a matter 
of what they brought…So I think it was just a matter of good faith, bring 
your arms and they brought it…235 
 
Corroborating the above, a retired military general that participated in the 
disarmament and demobilisation processes argues that due to Nigeria’s porous 
maritime boundary which the Niger Delta region occupies, even as disarmament 
was going on, small arms and light weapons were continually being smuggled 
into Nigeria.236 Therefore, given the way the disarmament phase was handled 
and the quantity of weapons recovered as shown in Table 4: 2 it would be difficult 
for it to have led to any measure of security stability in the region. But, despite 
the observed irregularities, a Niger Delta academic expert noted that the 
disarmament phase succeeded in ‘…reducing tension in the region by way of de-
escalation of violence which has brought peace237 to most people and made 
people to feel safer in some respects’.238   
Therefore, my contention is that the improvement in security was more a 
consequence of the symbolic significance of the amnesty proclamation and 
disarmament ritual than the number of weapons recovered. This is because the 
pseudo-compellence negotiated settlement reached signified an informal social 
contract between the militants and the Nigerian State. This informal social 
contract symbolically ushered in an era of fragile trust between the Nigerian State 
and the Niger Delta militants. In this case, the Nigerian State granted forgiveness 
to the militants and promised to rehabilitate and empower them as well as 
address the crisis of underdevelopment in the region. On their part, the militants 
renounced militancy and affiliations to any militant group and committed to 
faithfully support, protect and defend the constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria by respecting all constituted authorities.239 This, in my contention, 
explains why even though the Niger Delta region was still littered with hidden 
arms caches, the security condition was tremendously improved in the immediate 
aftermath of the disarmament programme. Additionally, the fact that the granting 
of amnesty emboldened the militants who hitherto were in the creeks to come out 
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as freemen strengthened the symbolic significance of the programme in terms of 
stabilising the security situation in the Niger Delta region.  
This case study therefore suggests that oftentimes security stabilisation in the 
short-term may not always be the direct consequence of how successful a 
disarmament programme was or the number of weapons recovered. It can also 
depend on the symbolic meaning and significance of the exercise to the 
participants, beneficiaries and other stakeholders involved in the process and 
affected by the conflict. Therefore, in the context of the Niger Delta ADDR 
programme, irrespective of how disastrously the disarmament phase was 
conducted, its confidence building significance in terms of contributing to security 
stabilisation in the short-term cannot be underrated. 
5.1.3. Demobilisation and Security Stabilisation in the Niger Delta 
As a recap of the DDR conceptual debate in Chapter Two, the UN IDDRS (1. 10 
2006: 2) explains that demobilisation is the formal and controlled discharge of 
combatants from active service whether from the armed forces or any armed 
group, and its main objective is to reduce or totally break up the armed forces or 
armed group. Likewise, Alden et al (2011: 14) and Vries and Wiegink, (2011: 40) 
argue that demobilisation is aimed at breaking the command-and-control 
structures under which combatants operate thereby making it difficult for them to 
return to armed rebellion. This suggests that for demobilisation to contribute to 
security stabilisation in the Niger Delta it must lead to the dismantlement of the 
command and control structures and personal loyalties existing between the top 
generals, middle-level commanders and foot soldiers and also relations between 
foot soldiers as peers so that the capacity to re-mobilise will be significantly 
neutralised. Suffice to say that, breaking the C&C structures of the Niger Delta 
militants was a critical prerequisite for achieving security stabilisation because 
theoretically and empirically they exemplify Second Generation militias which 
Francis (2005: 1-3) refers to as Africa’s intractable security menace. However, 
despite this necessity, opinions expressed by several respondents in this study 
suggest that demobilisation has not successfully achieved this primary objective 
mainly because of the miscalculation of paying the foot soldiers through their 
former commanders. A Niger Delta specialist notes that as far as the command 
and control structure is concerned: 
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It is intact, nothing has changed; the structures are intact. By design… you 
pay the followers through their leaders so if I am a leader and I have three 
hundred boys you pay the boys through me. What does that mean; those 
boys are still loyal to me. So the structures are intact it is just that now they 
are dormant they can be activated if they decide to (sic).240 
 
Another member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Committee 
corroborates this statement: 
In a demobilisation programme, the whole idea is to return the individual… 
to his individuality; go back to the way you were…[But] you see right now 
what we are doing is dangerous, and I fear because down the road the 
government is…paying the boys through their leaders…So if you keep 
paying them through their leaders it means you did not demobilise 
them…241 
 
The above respondent further elaborates on the logical consequence of paying 
the ex-militants through their former commanders: 
…the so-called militants that they had demobilised still form a body of 
militants under command of their former leaders. So you have not 
demobilised them; so tomorrow now, all they will need; it’s just…get a few 
arms now, say, ‘boys let’s start again’, you know…those leaders are still 
in control and if you [want to] see them, all you have to do is go to social 
occasions that these militants’ leaders attend and see the kind of crowd 
that follows them.242 
 
The failure to successfully achieve the goal of demobilisation means that the 
mutually reinforcing connection between disarmament and demobilisation critical 
for long-term security stabilisation was missed in the Niger Delta DDR process. 
Furthermore, another explanation why demobilisation could not achieve its 
supposed goal centres on the manner inducement was applied in the ADDR 
process. Generally, incentive is meant to encourage and sustain the commitment 
of combatants to the DDR process and the overall peace process to the extent of 
not contemplating a return to violence. As a recapitulation of the debates on 
incentives in Chapter Two, Özerdem (2009: 26) posits that within the United 
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKOs) DDR framework, 
incentive is understood as ‘…methods of bargaining for, or trading in, weapons’. 
As he pointed out, such thinking led to the doctrine of weapons for cash 
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programmes as one of the popular method of inducement applied by the UN, a 
situation whereby combatants exchanged their weapons for cash. Examples of 
DDR programmes where this doctrine was applied include El Salvador, Haiti, 
Liberia, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Somalia (Tanner, 1996:169-204 and World 
Bank, 1993: 1-101). However, some fundamental issues need to be determined 
when cash is used as an inducement in disarmament particularly the amount to 
be offered per weapon (Özerdem, 2009: 26). In this regard, Faltas (2001: 211-
230) recommends that the price to be paid per weapon need not be the exact 
market value of the weapon but reasonable enough to motivate the combatants 
to submit their weapons.  
However, in the context of the Niger Delta ADDR programme, inducement was 
applied in such a crude way that it became counterproductive to the goal of 
effective demobilisation. This was because the Nigerian government resorted to 
the selective distribution of monetary incentives to some select powerful 
commanders instead of a reasonable monetary inducement distributed across 
the board to all the top militant commanders. Consequently, what the Nigerian 
State did was to identify and concentrate on key commanders with the largest 
followers of foot soldiers and high capacity to threaten oil production and offer 
them huge monetary compensation through contract awards243 which 
empowered them economically. A retired federal permanent secretary and a key 
member of the Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee described the doctrine 
of inducement used by the Nigerian government as a policy of patronage and 
exclusion.244 She pointed out that the government limited its sharing of payoffs to 
selected powerful militant commanders while those considered less powerful 
were completely excluded and alienated from the patronage distribution. 
Consequently, the less powerful and middle-level commanders with their foot 
soldiers were left to survive on the monthly cash reinsertion allowance of sixty-
five thousand naira (an amount that falls within the range of $450-500 as per the 
rate naira exchanged to a dollar in late 2009). A former staff member of the 
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Foundation for Partnership Initiatives (PIND) in the Niger Delta opines that the 
assumption behind this policy was that the powerful commanders would gag the 
less powerful ones and their soldiers.245 According to him: 
 … what the government seemed to have done was to settle the real 
powerful people so that they can hold the others to ransom and checkmate 
them. The government had done this through dishing out of undue 
contracts to these powerful people.246 
 
However, before analysing how counterproductive the policy of patronage and 
exclusion was to the DDR process, it is pertinent to note that it represents the 
extending of neo-patrimonial logic into the DDR process given rise to what I refer 
to as neopatrimonial DDR. Indeed, the manner in which patronage defined the 
relationship between the militants and the Nigerian State actually reinforced the 
existing politics of patron-clientelism that propels the Nigerian State. Also, it 
mirrors the character of a rentier-neo-patrimonial state that relies on the use of 
patronage and co-optation to preserve the existing status quo, suppress and 
placate contentious social forces that threaten its stability instead of genuinely 
addressing the issues in contention. It also reflects a crude understanding of the 
economic agendas propelling the different levels of fighters in the Niger Delta 
militancy. A Niger Delta academic expert argues that the designers of the 
programme conceived the foot soldiers as merely paid employees of the ‘top 
generals’ without any personal agenda of their own and therefore saw no need 
for any inducement to be paid to them beyond the reinsertion allowance.247  
One consequence of this on demobilisation as noted by an expert on the region, 
was the likelihood that the relative security stability achieved in the Niger Delta 
was not a direct consequence of a successful demobilisation in the normal sense 
of the term but of the neopatrimonial DDR approach adopted which ensured that 
patronage was extended to the ‘top generals’.248 The second implication was that 
it strengthened the economic dependence of the so-called demobilised foot 
soldiers on their former commanders for coping. This was because the reinsertion 
allowance was too inadequate to sustain their previous standard of living that the 
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war economy provided them. A former staff member of the Foundation for 
Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta noted:  
If you are able to go to the creeks and the camps, you will be able to 
understand that the life of a militant is much more lucrative to venturing 
into any kind of business. This is because the market that fuels this 
militancy is oil bunkering.  And at the moment the only market that is more 
lucrative in the world today than oil bunkering is cocaine. This is 
understandable because you are not buying the products you are selling. 
You just get into the pipelines, tap or burst it and start pumping what is 
supposed to be for the masses and start making billions of naira! So for a 
logical individual, why should he leave the seamless millions he is earning 
for a meagre salary of monthly N50.000.00 per month? You just don’t have 
any reason to do so. Furthermore, during elections, these people (the 
militants) are those relied upon to do the rigging of elections. So they are 
perpetually in control of power and are more influential in the region. So, 
there is more carrot in being a militant than coming to participate in the 
amnesty programme.249  
 
According to this respondent, the foot soldiers disarmed and demobilised into 
relative impoverishment while some selected ‘top generals’ were economically 
empowered, facilitating their co-option into the neo-patrimonial economic and 
political power elites. Consequently, the only way for those excluded from the 
ADDR patronage to mitigate and cope with the effect of a sudden fall in their 
standard of living was to continually depend on their commanders which 
strengthened the existing line of command and control structures and loyalties 
between them. What this implies is that the selected ‘top generals’ militants’ 
camps may have been disbanded but the command and control structures remain 
intact. In the long-term, this suggests a serious threat to security stabilisation in 
the Niger Delta because it offers the selected ‘top generals a high capacity to 
remobilise. A Niger Delta academic expert reiterated that the selective application 
of patronage ensured the existence of ‘networks that can be reactivated at very 
short notice…So when people say, oh if something doesn’t happen in the Niger 
Delta we will go back…they are not joking. They are not joking because they 
know that the networks are still intact.’250   
In fairness to the reinsertion allowance paid to the less powerful commanders, 
middle-level commanders and foot soldiers, the International Crisis Group Africa 
Report No 231 (2015: 3) notes that ‘…the 65,000-naira monthly stipend paid to 
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the ex-militants is well above the 18,000 naira ($90. 50) national minimum wage 
and most entry-level salaries…’ in Nigeria. Thus, in comparison to the monthly 
earning of an average Nigerian worker the stipend still looks fairly generous for 
those excluded from the DDR patronage system. However, the practice of 
channelling the payment of the less powerful commanders, middle-level 
commanders and foot soldiers through their former top commanders, who in turn 
short-changed them in the process further reinforced a sense of exclusion and 
frustration on the part of the middle-level commanders and foot soldiers. It is 
important to highlight the fact that the Operational Guide to the UN IDDRS (2014: 
27) asserts that ‘special packages for commanders may be necessary to secure 
their buy-in to the DDR process…’ However, the Niger Delta ADDR programme 
has applied the concept of commanders’ special packages to the extreme with 
serious negative implications for the demobilisation process and the long-term 
goal of stability in the Niger Delta. While demobilisation failed in the long-term 
due to the paying of the ex-militants through their former commanders and the 
way the ADDR patronage was applied, it nonetheless served the needs of the 
Nigerian rentier neo-patrimonial state in the short-term, by keeping the militants 
in checked thus resulting in the immediate restoration of oil production and 
revenue to the state. Thus, the Niger Delta ADDR represented a neopatrimonial 
approach to DDR and how that can engender long-term stability in the Niger Delta 
will be explored further. 
Despite the failed demobilisation and the high capacity to remobilise on the part 
of the top commanders one can argue that the ADDR patronage and peace 
dividend has produced an unintended positive consequence that reduces the 
potential for conflict recurrence in the Niger Delta constructed around the 
narrative of regional grievance. This is because the manner in which the ADDR 
patronage or peace dividend goes to the top commanders and excludes local 
communities, victims of the conflict and nonviolent youths has exposed the fact 
that the original motive of Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND) commanders was to pursue their personal economic agendas under the 
cover of regional grievance. This again lends credence to my contention that 
irrespective of criticisms, Collier’s greed thesis provides a potent explanatory 
framework for understanding the behaviour of MEND actors and dynamics of the 
conflict during that era. Hence, it would be difficult for them to re-mobilise and 
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gain community support in the future. Similarly, it has potentially deprived likely 
future rebel commanders of the same legitimacy among communities as there 
was during the MEND era when they were seen as heroes of the Niger Delta 
struggle. In this regard, the view expressed by a member of the TCND is 
pertinent: 
 …but one of the things that you have seen is that there is more of an 
increasing awareness in the Niger-Delta that these people are doing what 
they are doing for themselves… what has happened now is that there is a 
partnership between those individuals, the criminals [militants but 
specifically the top commanders] and the government [while] the 
communities are left, so when you come back and you want to construct 
this thing as a community issue you don’t get that sort of feeling [support] 
that you had yesterday of a [from the] community… Many people in that 
area [Niger Delta] felt these boys are standing up to those who are 
cheating us that was the dominant view but they have seen that you [the 
militants particularly the top commanders] are taking the benefits and we 
are getting nothing. Instead it is you [militants but specifically the top 
commanders] and those people [Nigerian government] who are now in 
bed...251 
 
Beyond sustaining the C&C structures; the policy of patronage and exclusion was 
counter-productive to security stabilisation in several other ways. Foremost, the 
way the DDR patronage was applied led to the emergence of peace spoilers. 
Stedman (1977: 8) posits that spoilers can be from inside or outside the peace 
process. He maintains that an insider spoiler usually signs a peace agreement 
indicating his/her willingness to comply with the terms of the agreement but 
reneges on the entire or key provisions of the agreement. Insider spoilers are 
likely to comply with the terms of the settlement and remain committed to it so 
long as the peace process continues to benefit them. Alternatively, ‘outside 
spoilers are parties who are excluded from a peace process or who exclude 
themselves and use violence to attack the peace process’ (Ibid: 8). 
The exclusive nature of the Niger Delta ADDR patronage system gave rise to 
insider-outsider spoilers. In this case, mostly among middle-level commanders 
who originally were part of the peace process and signed the renunciation of 
militancy bond but because of being marginalised and alienated in the course of 
time they reneged on their renunciation of militancy thereby becoming insiders 
turned outsider spoilers. Such peace spoilers re-mobilised to the creeks 
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established new camps and recruited their own foot soldiers reigniting fresh 
violence. A pertinent example was the case of John Togo a field commander 
under ‘Government Ekpemupolo alias General Tompolo’. ‘General Tompolo’ was 
the overall MEND commander but John Togo was his field combat commander 
and the ADDR patronage was exclusively given to Tompolo with John Togo 
completely left out.   
 Meanwhile, all efforts by John Togo to access some patronage from the state 
were blocked by ‘General Tompolo’ which prompted him to return to violence. A 
military officer serving with the JTF observes that: 
Asari Dokubo…became very vocal almost wanting to assume that 
Tompolo is given more prominence than some of them and that is why 
some of them decided to… go back to their creeks (sic). John Togo did the 
same, but understanding John Togo’s angle is different from those ones. 
John Togo was the General or the so-called war commander of 
Tompolo…Tompolo…was more of a spiritual leader than of a fighter so 
Togo was his actual commander the head of the foot soldiers for the 
prosecution of the conflict but they gave recognition to Tompolo and he 
felt cheated because he asked for a share which from what I heard, 
Tompolo refused to give him. Even when he asked for a contract from 
Governor Oduaghan of Delta state, Tompolo will use some people to go 
and block him because he is very close to the government. So, John Togo 
now said if this is it and the whole thing started from the creek well I am 
going back to the creek. I am going back to go and get my own share. I 
think in the process, he killed soldiers and he was of course taken out.252 
(Also see Amaize, 2011). 
 
Clearly, the case of John Togo demonstrates a typical case of an insider who 
later became an outsider peace spoiler due to the grievance of exclusion and 
marginalisation. Similarly, the ADDR patronage became counterproductive to 
security stabilisation because it resulted in the formation of several breakaway 
factions as noted by a Port Harcourt-based female civil society respondent:  
…some of them were also not adequately rewarded and these led to 
gangs breaking away from each other. So if you are not satisfied with the 
way your Oga253 has treated you and you think you have the muscle, you 
break away from him. That’s why we have rival gangs shooting from time 
to time.254  
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However, the problem of peace spoilers was not limited to the rank of former 
middle-level commanders but even among the foot soldiers. For example, a key 
member of the TCND asserted that some of them that ‘…were not caught in the 
web of this distribution of patronage…’255 felt cheated and undermined the 
relative peace in the Niger Delta by attacking their former bosses.  A pertinent 
case was the report by Okhomina (2013) titled ‘Gunmen kill 13 policemen in 
Bayelsa state’. The reporter revealed that some disgruntled foot soldiers formerly 
under the command of ex-MEND South Wind commander, Kile Selky Torughedi 
alias General Young Shall Grow attacked and killed thirteen policemen deployed 
to provide security during the internment of the ‘general’s’ late mother at 
Azuzuama Sothern Ijaw Local Government Area of Bayelsa state.256 The reporter 
further alleged that the boys were aggrieved because the General abandoned 
them despite having hugely benefitted from government patronage and being 
appointed Senior Special Adviser to the Bayelsa state governor on Marine 
Waterways Security (Okhomina, 2013).  
As further revealed by the member of the TCND the high level of disgruntlement 
among former foot soldiers and the threat it posed to the safety of the former 
commanders explains why the top ex-commanders are always surrounded by a 
large retinue of state armed security personnel. As he noted: 
One of them came to see me some days ago, the number of Mobile Police 
he was carrying was more than a minister, now who is he hiding from, he 
is not hiding from the government, he is hiding from his boys. One of them 
came to Port Harcourt and he changed four hotels a night because he is 
being hunted by his people because they are seeing them as the people 
who have benefitted.257  
 
In another vein, the manner in which the ADDR patronage was offered to militants 
also sent a wrong signal that taking arms against the state was a lucrative 
enterprise. Thus, an academic expert contends that it incentivised violence: 
…the biggest danger really is that the way…the amnesty program 
addressed combatants … but there were also communities that went 
through all those difficulties… they bore it, they did not join the armed 
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struggle and so on … now the danger is that people are seeing that ‘oh, 
actually it pays… to be a combatant, to take up arms,’ and so on…258 
 
While another regional expert says ‘it now motivates people to become violent 
because if you go round Yenagoa the best buildings are owned by former 
militants, so violence now pays, that’s the message it has sent to the younger 
ones precisely.’259 Indeed, ADDR has provided an impetus for the emergence of 
certain latent militant groups which, during the peace process, were considered 
inconsequential but emerged to threaten the relative peace achieved in the Niger 
Delta. In other words, the ADDR patronage system also encouraged the 
emergence of outright outsider peace spoilers, a situation Greenhill and Major 
(Winter 2006/07: 10) describe as ‘…dogs that did not originally bark may later 
emerge, threatening…’. For example, the emergence of Kelvin Ibruvwe who in 
2013 proclaimed himself as the leader of Liberation Movement for the Urhobo 
People (LIMUP) an ethnic nationality in Delta state attests to the veracity of these 
assertions. Kelvin Ibruvwe and his followers took up arms against the state 
declaring that: 
We are giving this ultimatum because the cheating is too much, the federal 
and state governments had neglected us for so long and now we want 
them to hear us because for over 50 years now, they have been drilling oil 
from our community which is the second best oil in this country, yet we 
have nothing to show for it. There is hunger everywhere; graduates have 
no jobs. So we want the government to listen to us and that is why we are 
giving them 60 days’ ultimatum to listen to us or else we will shut down all 
the well heads in the area. If they like, they should bring soldiers. When 
we want to strike, no amount of security can stop us …When the Ijaws and 
Itsekiris [were]… agitating with arms, we the Urhobo youths chose to be 
peaceful, but what did we get? We are rather left out completely in the 
amnesty programme [my emphasis]. Is it not the same oil that the Ijaws 
and Itsekiris produce that is also produced in Kokori, which has the second 
best oil in Nigeria? So what is our crime (sic)?  (Orosevwotu, 2013: 2). 
 
The emergence of Kelvin illustrates the fact that if not carefully planned and 
implemented, DDR can establish the roots of further conflict and instability. 
Equally important is that the emergence of Kelvin raises an important theoretical 
issue that strengthens the empirical and analytical relevance of Kaldor’s (2006: 
vii-ix and 2015: 90) new wars thesis whereby alleged political grievances are 
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used as a cover for the pursuit of criminal agendas. This is because while Kelvin 
portrayed his action as driven by genuine political grievances, the Nigerian police 
adduced criminal evidence and declared him the ‘most wanted kidnapper and 
robbery kingpin’ (Amaize and Ahon, 2013) in Delta state as at that time. 
Furthermore, the selective application of patronage has reinforced aspects of the 
conflict economy that centred on illegal oil bunkering. According to Ledum Mitee, 
the Chairman of the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI) 
there are three dimensions of illegal oil bunkering: 
First is the small scale pilfering of crude (and sometimes condensates and 
refined products) through pipeline vandalization for use in artisanal or 
illegal refineries. Although this is generally referred to as small scale but 
considering the fact that recent studies have shown that it now engages 
(employs) some 450,000 mostly youths with a GDP that is more than twice 
the national average shows its depth and extent. The second  is the large 
scale theft of crude oil through very skilled and sophisticated processes 
involving attachments to pipelines, illegal tank farms, barges and 
international maritime tankers transported for international market. The 
third (sic) which is the excess lifting of crude oil beyond the licensed 
quantity (Mitee, 2013: 2). 
 
The data on the numbers of arrests made in connection to illegal oil bunkering 
that I collected from different security agencies operating in the Niger Delta shows 
that the first and second dimensions remained a recurrent phenomenon during 
the year 2013.  For example, the Nigerian Navy (NN) destroyed a total of 1,669 
illegal260 refineries and arrested 1,806 suspected perpetrators of the act between 
January and October 2013.  Likewise, it arrested twenty-eight261 vessels in 
connection to illegal oil bunkering during the same period. The JTF reveals that: 
From January to date, the Joint Task Force Op Pulo Shield conducted a 
total of 1,025 anti-illegal oil bunkering patrols, while over 1,951 illegal 
refineries have been destroyed. Also scuttled were 81 barges, 1,117 
Cotonou boats, 82 tanker trucks, 1,873 surface tanks and 1,857 suspects 
were arrested. Additionally, 39,760 drums of illegally refined products, 570 
pumping machines and 75 outboard motor engines used as apparatus to 
facilitate oil theft were seized and destroyed. Forty-six vessels of various 
sizes and capacities were also arrested during the period under review. 262 
 
                                                          
260. These figures were extracted from Nigerian Navy 2013 report titled ‘Nigerian Navy efforts at 
curbing crude oil theft and pipeline vandalism: facts behind the figures’ reference number NHQ: 
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261. Ibid.  
262. This information was extracted from a report titled ‘Media brief on the operational activities of 
Joint Task Force (Operation Pulo Shield) for the year 2013 by Major General BA Debiro’ dated 
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In 2013 the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria threatened to shut 
down its operations due to colossal crude oil theft and illegal bunkering. Its 
Managing Director, Mr Mutiu Sunmonu attests to this: 
We have now witnessed a significant upsurge in the activities of crude oil 
thieves. The situation in the last few weeks is unprecedented. The volume 
(of crude oil) being stolen is the highest in the last three years. Over 60,000 
barrels per day from Shell alone. So, that, for me, is a great concern. Over 
time, this whole crime has got a lot more sophisticated and you could see 
that the perpetrators are now setting up barge building yards; they are 
setting up storage facilities; they are setting up tank farms for storing the 
crude oil, prior to shipping out (Olaniyi, 2013).263 
 
Several respondents alluded to the crude way patronage was applied in the 
ADDR programme as responsible for the significant increase in illegal oil 
bunkering and local refining in a number of ways. Specifically, the exclusion of 
middle-level commanders and foot soldiers from the ADDR patronage system 
and the rapid decline in their standards of living encouraged some of them to fall 
back again to illegal oil bunkering and local refining as a strategy to maintain their 
previous living standards and ventilate their grievance against the state in a 
nonviolent way for excluding them. The member of the TCND noted that many of 
those excluded felt that: 
Ok since you people in Abuja feel that you only know these people ok stay 
there now we will make some money out of what we know best, we cut 
these pipes and then we do our own refinery. That is why I said that these 
are the linkages that we are not able to make…You see, you picked up the 
leaders, made them rich, what I called the…militants are not covered who 
feel aggrieved by the process... They are now seeing their bosses…rich, 
buying houses everywhere living in Abuja and they don’t see them. So it 
is now like through my own this thing you have now made all this money. 
So because of that people now say ok, fine, this oil we can make money 
out of it so that we get something also out of…our struggle together 
(sic).264 
 
Similarly, when youth who refused to participate in militancy witnessed how those 
that took up arms against the state were handsomely rewarded, many felt 
cheated and resorted to the business of oil theft. Again, a member of TCND 
narrated his personal encounter with a youth from his local community who had 
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not originally been a member of the Niger Delta militants or involved in illegal oil 
bunkering: 
I can give you an example in my village. Last Christmas I went home, one 
of the boys who comes around and beg me money, when I arrived there 
he came to me and say Oga what would you drink? I said you in my house 
asking me what I would drink. He said Oga levels have changed. I said 
what is levels have changed? He said he is a proud owner of three 
refineries and he has bought a car outside and he wanted me to come and 
see it.265 
 
The respondent explained that the youth was part of those who were aggrieved 
because of the huge patronage extended to the ‘top generals’ without any 
provision for those that refused to participate in militancy. 
The manner in which the ADDR patronage system was applied suggests that it 
created a serious backlash that strengthened militarisation in the Niger Delta as 
can be deduced from a statement made by the Shell Petroleum Development 
Company Managing Director Mutiu Sunmonu. According to Mutiu Sunmonu ‘this 
(oil theft/illegal bunkering/illegal refining) is beyond communities. This is well-
funded… heavily-armed gangs. What type of collaboration with communities will 
help you against people carrying guns, people who are very well armed?’ (Olaniyi, 
2013). Suffice to say that the militarised nature of illegal oil bunkering will motivate 
individuals to acquire arms thereby reinforcing arms proliferation. 
In another dimension, the practical method through which demobilisation was 
achieved via cantonment helped to sustain existing horizontal links among foot 
soldiers as colleagues in combat. Horizontal demobilisation seeks to destroy the 
psychological bonding that developed among combatants as colleagues and 
comrades during their combat life. However, the manner in which cantonment 
was carried out was inimical to achieving horizontal demobilisation. To achieve 
horizontal demobilisation, the original plan was that militants from the same state, 
camp and commander were to be encamped separately. However, given that this 
plan was not followed through combat fraternities were extended to the Obubura 
demobilisation camp. As one member of the Disarmament and Demobilisation 
Implementation Committee noted: 
  …what we wanted to do was take some people from Bayelsa, take some 
people from Ondo state, some from Delta, some from Akwa-Ibom state to 
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form a team… and take those ones to Jos; form another group and take 
them to Taraba… so that it is not all of them from one particular set that 
would go to one camp and continue with their contacts and relationships; 
they should see fresh people that they didn’t know…, you know, because 
the whole idea is to turn them to individuals again; because they always 
think in terms of ‘I am from camp this … I’m from Ateke Tom, I’m from this 
… so the whole idea there is to separate them totally; at the end of the 
day, when we take them back to society…they are now on their own… but 
… all those things, because of the way things went we were unable to do 
them properly; so I don’t think we’ve been able to achieve … the 
demobilisation in the real sense…266  
 
Also, certain routines observed during cantonment were contrary to the goal of 
demobilisation. For example, the militants’ militarised mindset was supposed to 
have been demilitarised during demobilisation. However, a female staff member 
of a nongovernmental organisation noted that some of the routines observed 
during cantonment tended to reinforce these attributes instead of demilitarising 
them. According to her: 
What happened during the camp was that they had some kind of military 
training… it was like a military camp, they march, they [come] came out 
for morning exercises, there were military people everywhere in the 
camp…for some of us it was funny! We know that in their camps they had 
such military formations and even while they were in camp they still 
recognize that military line of communication that they had when they were 
in the creeks… some boys were forced to be respectful…And we warned 
that if those people had this kind of military training as militants and you 
are saying that you are demobilizing them…it really didn’t make any sense 
to us...267 
 
The above evidence was further buttressed by an audio-visual268 of the various 
activities observed at the demobilisation camp that I watched. In the audio-visual, 
the demobilisation closing ceremony of every cohort was marked with a military 
passing out parade as was the case in the military, police or paramilitary training 
institutions. In my view, this practice amounted to reinforcing the militants’ combat 
mindset and sense of regimentation that was supposed to be neutralised during 
demobilisation. A Niger Delta expert contended that more time should have been 
used to engage the ex-militants in nonviolence training.269 Again, the routines 
observed during the cantonment highlighted why a female staff of a 
nongovernmental organisation contended that the situation at Obubura 
                                                          
266. Respondent 042, December 2013. 
267. Respondent 020, November 2013.  
268. Sourced from key informant. 
269  Respondent 032- Niger Delta researcher, November 2013. 
 250 
 
demobilisation camp was such that ‘lines of command were high, were still in 
order…and it is still in order, I don’t think it has been … [dismantled].’ This lends 
credence to Özerdem’s (2009: 29) assertion that ‘…the cantonment of 
combatants reinforces the command structures that the process is intended to 
dissolve’. 
In conclusion, it is my contention that the symbolic significance of amnesty and 
disarmament as an informal social contract helped to provide immediate relative 
stability in the Niger Delta. Nevertheless, demobilisation failed to successfully 
consolidate the short-term stability achieved by ensuring that existing vertical and 
horizontal C&C (Command and Control) structures among the ex-militants were 
broken. Instead, the manner in which inducement was crudely applied in the form 
of ADDR patronage resulted in a neopatrimonial DDR that ensured their 
perpetuation, thereby strengthening the capacity to remobilise on the part of the 
‘top generals’ which suggests that the potential for the Niger Delta region to 
relapse into violence remains very high. That notwithstanding, I also argued that 
the use of patronage has produced some unintended but positive consequence 
that tends to diminish and undermine the capacity of the former top commanders 
to remobilise. Most notably, it has undermined their credibility as actors claiming 
to use violence to redress grievances of the wider Niger Delta community. 
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5.1.4. Reintegration and Security Stabilisation in the Niger Delta 
 
Reintegration is the final phase in the DDR process as outlined in the UN IDDRS 
(2006). While according to Berdal (1996: 39) reintegration consists of ‘…medium-
and long-term programmes, including ‘cash compensation, training or income 
generation meant to increase the potential for the economic and social 
reintegration of ex-combatants and their families.’ More specifically, Kingma 
identifies three dimensions of reintegration when he asserts that: 
Social reintegration is…the process through which the ex-combatant and his or 
her family feel part of and are accepted by the community. One should thus not 
only consider the ex-combatants and their families, but also the attitude of the 
communities towards the ex-combatants… Political reintegration refers to the 
process through which the ex-combatant and his or her family become a full part 
of decision-making processes. Economic reintegration is the process through 
which the ex-combatant’s household builds up its livelihood, through production 
and other types of gainful employment (Kingma, 2000: 28). 
 
It is the critical phase of the DDR process because its success determines 
whether ex-combatants and society at large can return to the path of long-term 
peace (Shibuya, 2012: 85). Therefore, it is key to the restoration of security and 
stability in the aftermath of a violent conflict and also the benchmark for 
measuring the overall success of any DDR programme. Against this background, 
the extent to which reintegration can contribute to security stabilisation in the 
Niger Delta depends on the degree to which the ex-militants’ are socially, 
politically and economically reintegrated into society. 
5.1.4.1. Social Reintegration and Reconciliation 
After being demobilised, ex-combatants are confronted by a number of personal 
challenges such as their separation from and the destruction of the social network 
they relied on during the war, which Hazen (n. d.: 1-11) refers to as the war family. 
Likewise, they are also confronted with stigma and rejection by family and 
community members (Operational Guide to the UN IDDRS, 2014: 172). This 
implies that ‘an ex-combatant who has economic opportunities but who is socially 
isolated or excluded cannot be considered as successfully reintegrated’ (Ibid.) All 
these underscore the importance of ex-combatants achieving social 
reintegration. Equally, social reintegration should incorporate reconciliation and 
trust building among and between different groups and communities affected by 
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conflict (Ibid.). Indeed, it is against this background that Özerdem (2013: 225-
236) contends that successful social reintegration is a fundamental precondition 
for the economic and political reintegration of ex-combatants. 
In light of the above, a key question is to what extent the Niger Delta ex-militants 
were successfully reintegrated into the societal social milieu and how were they 
being perceived by the broader members of society. Were they perceived as 
perpetrators of violence or new advocates of peace? This question is pertinent 
because Niger Delta ex-militants oftentimes engage in predatory activities 
against their people. For example, a Port- Harcourt based female civil society 
member observes that even though the Niger Delta militants were not at war with 
their communities some of them perpetrated violence such as rape, kidnapping, 
murder and destroyed peoples’ property during the course of the conflict.270  
Thus, if the ex-militants are to be socially accepted and reintegrated, a genuine 
process of social reconciliation must be pursued to change the negative 
community perception about them. Conversely, several respondents interviewed 
shared the consensus that the ex-militants, particularly the foot soldiers, are still 
grappling with the challenge of social reintegration. This is because the 
reintegration phase of the DDR programme lacked any social reconciliation 
agenda. In line with this a female staff member of a nongovernmental 
organisation contends that: 
There should have been a kind of sensitisation on the amnesty programme 
because… the amnesty programme is actually giving them pardon and if 
the Federal government has given them pardon it means that their 
communities also should forgive them for whatever they had done…and 
that was what …should have been done… there should have been some 
sessions of healing or some form of restorative justice…to prepare the 
community, to say that this person actually did all these things but he is a 
different person now and we should accept him. That was not done, that 
was not done.271 
 
Also, a Niger Delta development activist argues that the social reintegration of 
the Niger Delta militants was not given any priority during the planning of the 
ADDR programme because local communities were not considered a critical 
stakeholder that needed to be carried along in the process. According to him ‘it 
is obvious… everybody was not carried along. The community was not even 
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thought [of,] it was not even remembered as a critical sector of the entire amnesty 
that has a role to play.’272 The obvious implication of neglecting a social 
reconciliation agenda in the reintegration process is that many of the communities 
to which the ex-militants were expected to return still harbour negative 
perceptions of them. This has generated a general apathy on the part of the 
communities expected to receive the ex-militants particularly the foot soldiers. 
This suggests why most of the ex-foot soldiers are settling in the capital cities of 
their states instead of their local rural communities.273 Residing in cities makes it 
easier for them to conceal their identity as former ex-militants and so escape 
societal negative perception about them. However, the above Niger Delta 
development activist contends that this could have been mitigated ‘…if the 
amnesty had…carried the communities along in the dialogue, in the discussion 
and all that…’.274  
A staff member of a nongovernmental organisation points out that it was in 
recognition of the clear gap in the social reintegration of the foot soldiers that the 
Oil and Gas Industry Foundation (OGIF) selected a number of the ex-militants 
and organised them into clusters with funding to execute community development 
projects in selected communities.275 The aim was to create a positive social 
perception about them as reformed persons and agents of change, thereby 
serving as a springboard for their social reconciliation and reintegration into 
society.276 However, this approach did not succeed because as elaborated by the 
respondent above, ‘the problem with the clustering was that you have people 
coming from different areas by that you put them together the first problem is 
where the project will be sited’277 The second challenge was the reluctance on 
the part of communities to accept such a gesture of goodwill from ex-militants 
who were still negatively perceived. Again, the female respondent asserts that:  
…because some of these people you are asking these communities to 
take back have killed loved ones of people in the community, some of them 
have raped, looted, have burnt people’s houses and you think by getting 
them to build a primary school will make the community see them in a 
different light. I mean that doesn’t make any sense to me.278 
                                                          
272.  Respondent 022, November 2013. 
273.  Personal observation during field work 
274. Ibid.  
275. Respondent 020, November 2013. 
276. Ibid. 
277. Ibid. 
278. Respondent 020, November 2013. 
 254 
 
 
Her position was corroborated by a Niger Delta academic expert who notes that:  
Some of them [ex-militants] started as sea pirates, some started as 
warlords in intra-communal conflicts or inter-communal conflicts and had 
killed people, community members before they transformed to become 
militants, how do you reintegrate such a man back into his community? 
The man who loss his father because of him, will he receive him?279  
 
Consequently, such negative perceptions have undermined the social 
reintegration of the ex-militants’ soldiers. Yet, a better way of achieving it would 
have been to adopt community-based approaches. As asserted by Haider (2009: 
4) ‘community-based approaches (CBA) seek to empower local community 
groups and institutions by giving the community direct control over investment 
decisions, project planning, execution and monitoring, through a process that 
emphasises inclusive participation and management.’ He further argues that 
agencies that can be used to achieve community-based peacebuilding include 
association, cooperative, civil association, community-based organisation, village 
leadership (Ibid.). This suggests that grassroots civil society organisations 
(CSOs), community and opinion leaders, community age grades’, the media and 
churches in the Niger Delta ought to have been fully involved in the ADDR 
process from its conceptualisation, design and implementation. These networks 
of partners could, in turn, have educated and mobilised the receiving communities 
as well as contribute to transforming their negative perception of the ex-militants. 
As a member of the Ogoni Solidarity Forum points out, some of the local 
communities strongly believe that the ex-militants have committed sacrilegious 
offences and acts and therefore must undergo spiritual cleansing.280 This again 
suggests that, where necessary, traditional mechanisms of social reintegration 
could have been explored, as its efficacy has been tested in the reintegration of 
child soldiers in places like Liberia, Angola and Northern Uganda (Verhey, 
2001:18). 
Undisputedly, the failure of the OGI Foundation initiative demonstrates that 
without achieving social reconciliation and reintegration the political and 
economic reintegration of the ex-Niger Delta militants is likely to be jeopardised. 
Conversely, this study discovered that it was comparatively easier for the ‘top 
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generals’ to socially reintegrate into society compared to the foot soldiers. This 
was because the state patronage extended to them empowered them 
economically to purchase social respect and recognition. A Niger Delta expert 
observes that their social reintegration was more a consequence of the patronage 
they gave out not because the perception held about them had fundamentally 
changed. According to him:  
A few of them are well accepted, but not because people see that they are 
new creatures but because some of them still have money to patronize 
their communities. They still have money…they pay school fees for people 
and all that. See like there were some of them during militancy they took 
over the functions of government, they were providing water, scholarships 
ok so those were the heroes of their communities and they are still heroes 
they are still received by their people. So the reception or what appear to 
be that they are reintegrated is not because those persons have new 
orientation but simply because of some patronage that exist between them 
and their people (sic).281  
 
 Consequently, unless the negative perception of the ex-militants is transformed, 
their social reintegration will be difficult to realise. Likewise, while it appears that 
the ultimate goal of the social reintegration of the ex-Niger Delta militants was to 
achieve their reintegration into the community, in terms of operationalization the 
entire DDR process was combatant centred instead of community-based. As 
noted by Özerdem (2012: 58) in the community-based approach to reintegration 
‘… the target caseload would be considered as part of their family and community 
within the wider framework of development challenges in the peace-building 
context.’ This is to say that ex-combatants’ grievances would be addressed 
simultaneously with that of the community.  But, in this context reintegration 
support was strictly provided to the ex-militants excluding their expected 
communities of return and other victims of the conflict. The practice above 
reinforces what Özerdem and Podder (2015: 63) described as an “us” and “them” 
type of distinction which generates the resentment that inhibits the assimilation 
of the ex-militants into their local communities’ socio-economic and political 
milieu. This, at the end of the day, becomes counterproductive to the political and 
economic reintegration of the ex-militants particularly the foot soldiers. 
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5.1.4.2. Political Reintegration 
Conceptually the political reintegration of ex-combatants has remained an under-
theorised and researched area (Söderström, 2013: 1 and 2015: 6; Özerdem and 
Podder, 2015: 56). Söderström, (2013: 10-13 and 2015: 6-17) argues that the 
political reintegration of ex-combatants can be subsumed under three main 
areas. One, the transformation of former military elites into a political elites 
whereby former warlords and military commanders succeed in becoming elected 
representatives in the post-war re-formed state. Two, transformation of an armed 
group into a political party or civil society organisation whereby it becomes a 
platform for advancing the resolution of the conflict through democratic means. 
Three, the individual rank and file of former combatants becoming democratic 
citizens, understood in terms of ‘…the process whereby political channels are 
increasingly seen as viable for handling societal problems for the individual ex-
combatant’ (Söderström, 2015: 14). In other words, political reintegration is 
concerned with ‘…the extent to which democratic norms and ideals are embraced 
by ex-combatants’ (Ibid). The quality of political values voiced by ex-combatants 
and the extent they feel they have a voice and can express it freely, all constitute 
indicators of the political reintegration of the rank and file of the ex-combatants 
(Ibid). Furthermore, Söderström argues that the transformation of an armed group 
into a political party depends on its internal cohesion, the degree of popular 
support and legitimacy accorded to it by the international community as well as 
its economic viability (Söderström, 2013: 11 and Söderström, 2015: 13). 
 The political reintegration of the Niger Delta ex-militants and their family 
members was not given any priority in the reintegration process. Nonetheless, 
one way to achieve this was for MEND to have transformed into a political party 
or civil society organisation thereby becoming a platform for advancing the 
resolution of the conflict through democratic means. Respondents attributed the 
failure of MEND to metamorphose into a political party to different reasons. For 
example, an expert on the Niger Delta argues that such an idea was not given 
any priority by the Nigerian State and was therefore never contemplated as an 
inducement to be extended to MEND while negotiating the ADDR programme, 
neither was it demanded by the Movement.282 He also points out that MEND was 
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not a cohesively structured organisation but a conglomeration of self-independent 
commanders collaborating together to advance the course of the Niger Delta 
violent struggle.283 Thus, MEND lacked the internal cohesion needed to 
successfully transform into a political party.  Another Niger Delta academic expert 
argues that the peace process that led to the ADDR programme did not provide 
an enabling environment for MEND to undergo this kind of transformation 
because the ADDR programme was not a product of a formally negotiated 
settlement284 and as Högbladh (2012: 45) points out, successful cases of armed 
groups transforming into a political party have been achieved within the 
framework of negotiated peace agreement.  
It is also arguable that political reintegration did not form a component of the 
reintegration process of the Niger Delta ex-militants because MEND has never 
articulated any clear agenda of political transformation or indicated interest in 
acquiring direct political power as a means of effecting genuine political 
transformation. For instance, even though MEND had clamoured for absolute 
resource control to be granted to the Niger Delta region they have never 
demonstrated how that would translate into concrete development of the region 
within the context of the rentier-neo-patrimonial character of the Nigerian State 
where public office has become a means of prebendal accumulation by political 
elites and state bureaucrats as well as an avenue for extending patronage to their 
cronies.  
The failure of MEND to articulate any transformative agenda suggests that we 
can categorise its leaders as representing what Reno (2011: 164) described as 
warlord rebels which I earlier highlighted in this work. In the case of MEND, as 
they challenged the Nigerian State there was nothing reformist in their narratives 
or actions. Arguably too, the Nigerian government may have deliberately decided 
not to give any priority to the formal political reintegration of the Niger Delta ex-
militants because it interpreted MEND actors as loot-seeking opportunists 
masquerading as freedom fighters. Indeed, the above lends credence to my 
theorisation of MEND actors as essentially motivated and driven by greed, albeit 
greed wrapped up in a strong narrative of community grievance. 
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However, some of the ‘top generals’ of the Movement are truly getting 
mainstreamed into the Nigerian political landscape through the informal neo-
patrimonial system, particularly in Delta and Rivers states.285 For instance, the 
elected deputy governor of Delta State during the 2015 governorship election is 
said to be a cousin of the ex-MEND commander ‘General Tompolo’ who played 
a key role in the politicking and lobbying that led to his emergence as the deputy 
governor of the state.286 Similarly, in Rivers State, a former top commander Farah 
Dagogo won an elected seat in the state parliament during the 2015 national 
assembly election.287 Also, a Niger Delta development activist asserted that 
during the run off to the 2015 general election, Ateke Tom one of the former 
militant commanders in Rivers state openly expressed interest in contesting the 
governorship office in the State,  and circulated campaign posters all over the 
state.288 Therefore, even though the Niger Delta DDR programme does not have 
any formal process of political reintegration as argued in the literature, the 
mainstreaming of the ‘top generals’ into the Nigerian political landscape is 
evidently being successfully realised informally through their co-optation into the 
neo-patrimonial political economy of the Nigerian State. This was made possible 
via the ADDR patronage system which catapulted them into the league of 
regional neo-patrimonial ruling elites.  
In contrast, an expert on matters relating to the Niger Delta observed that the 
political reintegration of ex-militant rank and file is tenuous because they lack the 
resources to extend patronage, which could have paved the way for them to 
exercise some level of influence in the decision-making process of their local 
communities.289 Another respondent, a Niger Delta development activist, argues 
that the major obstacle to their political reintegration is the lack of proper 
reorientation and attitudinal change on their part.290 Many of them, he argues, 
lack courtesies; display unruly behaviour and abuse drugs, a situation he blamed 
on the poor psychosocial support and counselling given to them during 
demobilisation and thereafter.291 This suggests that the political reintegration of 
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the ex-foot soldiers into the decision-making process of their local communities 
is not being achieved. However, this contrasts with the conflict era where in some 
communities, the militants imposed the agenda for decision making through the 
barrel of a gun, thus it is clear that for many ex-militants, the new era offers 
relative powerlessness and marginalisation. 
5.1.4.3. Economic Reintegration 
As asserted by Kingma (2000: 28) economic reintegration is the process through 
which ex-fighters and their households build up new livelihoods by engaging in 
productive activities and gainful employment. Therefore, the failure to achieve 
economic reintegration ‘…can lead to considerable insecurity at the societal and 
individual levels, including rent-seeking behaviours through the barrel of a gun’ 
(Colleta et al, 1996: 18). Supporting this position, Collier (1994: 343-351) argues 
that failure to adequately cater for ex-combatants’ economic wellbeing will trigger 
an avalanche of micro and macro security challenges. In line with conventional 
practice in DDR, the economic reintegration of the Niger Delta ex-militants was 
prioritised. For instance, a documentary titled ‘Presidential amnesty programme 
Niger Delta 2014’ provided insight on the achievements being recorded in 
economic reintegration of the ex-Niger Delta militants. The transcript of the 
documentary testifies as follows:  
  …out of … 30,000 persons enlisted in the first, second and third phases 
of the Presidential Amnesty programme an appreciable number of them 
totalling 5,000 are currently undergoing training spread across… 104 
universities and 22 skilled acquisition centres in 28 countries and 19 
training institutions in 8 states of the country. About 1,000 of them in the 
oil and gas sector have graduated and currently in training (sic), 29 have 
graduated in… engineering in France. Over 13,000 delegates have 
graduated from local and foreign training centres in various skills 
acquisition programmes. At a ceremony in Lagos recently…The Chief 
Host and President Goodluck Jonathan’s Special Adviser on Amnesty 
Matters Honourable Kingsley Kuku introduced to the public 65 youths who 
trained and qualified as commercial pilots and 61 youths who trained and 
qualified as aircraft maintenance engineers. The training was carried out 
by world-class aviation companies like Boeing and Lufthansa.292    
 
                                                          
292. This information was sourced from a transcription of the commentary of a documentary tilted 
‘Presidential amnesty programme Niger Delta 2014’available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ap8OJh-AlG8  and accessed …. 
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Furthermore, the Head of the Reintegration Department at the Office of the 
Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta revealed the successes being 
recorded in the area of human resource development of the ex- Niger Delta 
militants. As he noted: 
 …some of them now are in Lufthansa, doing what we call type rating to 
move from one level of being a pilot to the top most level of what we call 
the end level new generation level. Some of them, six amongst those 
people and the deprived communities, six of them are distinction holders 
from UK universities from a post-graduate programme, 14 of them are 
pursuing PhD, of course, you know that 19,000 more of them are currently 
in training… is the only DDR programme that is training somebody to be a 
PhD holder, is the only DDR programme in the world that is not targeted 
at training artisans... it is succeeding…because we have people who will 
fly planes, we have people who are already flying and earning money, we 
have instructors from the programme teaching in institutions including 
flying institutions…currently… we have over 16,000 graduates. And now 
we have taken it to a new level we are collaborating with Schneider in 
France to train people in power generation…293 
 
However, it is pertinent to point out that for economic reintegration to contribute 
to security stabilisation in the context of DDR certain fundamentals about it must 
be right. First, it is necessary that the genuine ex-combatants are given priority in 
the training opportunities being offered. Contrariwise, evidence from this study 
suggests that many of the ex-militants had been short-changed. A female staff 
member of a nongovernmental organisation observed that many of the ex-
militants were frustrated because: 
…they feel that they had been sold out…some of them complain that the 
reintegration aspect of it (sic), all the promises the government made that 
they were going to give them skills, send them to skills acquisition centres, 
they were going to get them back to school… most of those promises have 
not been fulfilled, and what most of them complain is that those that are 
close to power have used that opportunity to send their siblings, their 
cronies… their relatives who never fought, who didn’t know what was 
going-on to foreign Universities… send them out of the country for one 
thing or the other (sic).294 
 
Corroborating the above submission, a former MEND commander testifies that:  
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Most of these boys…our boys they have not gone to even Obubura till the 
Obubura stopped. And they have not even gone to the so-called abroad 
or whatever you understand. And these are the main boys, these are key 
people, they have their original amnesty identity card, the Federal 
Government Amnesty Identity Card they have it but they have not gone to 
the training in Obubura until that one stopped. Then at the same time they 
have not call them for this other training again. So these are the boys that 
are falling back to the river to do all these things because they don’t have 
hope.295  
 
This suggests that the possibility of economic reintegration to contribute to 
security stabilisation in the Niger Delta has been undermined because a lot of the 
genuine ex-militants have been substituted. Furthermore, for economic 
reintegration to enhance security stabilisation the trained ex-combatants must 
also have access to gainful employment or financial capital to start up small scale 
business. Judging from the response of a Niger Delta female respondent, a lot of 
those trained are yet to be gainfully employed: 
…though they said they are teaching some people work, but I know some 
group of boys that have finished learning the job they are back home doing 
nothing…yes, yes, they are back home they have finished training them 
but they are not engaged. So you discover that after some years the trade 
even they have learnt will no longer be useful. Although they said they 
don’t owe them the responsibility of engaging them but if it must be 
sustainable I think one of the things is that as you train them in their trade, 
also engage them for sustainability. But now they are back at home, and 
an idle hand is the devil’s workshop. After sometimes when this free 
money will stop I think those boys will carry up arms again…296    
 
In the same vein, a community leader of an oil producing community in Bayelsa 
state concurs with the above response and asserts that: 
During the introduction of amnesty programme most of our boys…went as 
far as to embrace in the first phase and the second phase. But according 
to them few were sent to courses and since when they returned they have 
not been employed. Like some of them who did…sea welding… Imagine, 
these boys here who did this welding…are not employed but they bring 
some boys from down, down, down not from Niger-Delta, they bring some 
experts from foreign lands to come and work here…you send them to 
course when they come back they are not employed…They are awarded 
certificates… but these certificates are just useless, somebody who is 
certificated is supposed to be employed, so what is the use of the 
certificate then.297 
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Likewise, another former MEND commander contends that ‘… the rehabilitation 
process was very successful. But the other area that is yet to be successful even 
up to … today is the creation of jobs.’298 In a similar vein, the latest information 
disclosed by the Special Coordinator of the Amnesty Programme revealed that 
11,768 of the ex-militants are yet to be empowered.299 Consequently, it is 
pertinent to say that the failure to absorb several of the trained ex-militants into 
gainful employment raises the fundamental question as to what extent the training 
was truly based on a realistic survey of existing labour market and business 
opportunities in the country. The rationale behind this practice is questioned by a 
Niger Delta academic expert: 
 
… I did not see any reason why you send several persons to go and learn 
to become pilots when you don’t have a viable aviation industry what would 
they come and do? I did not see any reason why you send several persons 
to go and learn and become crane caterpillar operators when you do not 
have several construction firms and even the ones that you have how 
many of them have cranes and caterpillars for people to ride [sic]. I don’t 
know if you understand the point [I]am making. You send someone to go 
and learn welding then he comes and there is no electricity, he needs 
patronage to live if there is no patronage he cannot live…300 
 
Suffice to argue that a discernible issue from the above response is the question 
of mismatch between the kind of training offered and existing opportunities in the 
Nigerian labour market. Certainly, sending the ex-militants for training abroad 
without adequate absorption capacity at home served as a useful quick fix for 
stabilising the Nigerian rentier neo-patrimonial state whose survival had been 
threatened by the militants’ attacks on oil and gas facilities. However, the fact that 
so many are returning to unemployment may be storing up longer-term potentials 
for the resurgence of violence. 
Furthermore, the huge resources being expended on training opportunities 
abroad that could be done by competent national institutions in Nigeria has 
prompted the International Crisis Group Africa Report No 231 (2015: 3) to 
observe that ‘… the very expensive program has drawn criticism…’. 
Consequently, while the idea of providing quality training to the ex-militants is a 
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laudable one, the manner in which implementers of the programme resorted to 
expensive overseas training was in defiance of the Presidential Amnesty 
Planning Committee’s position that the programme should not be 
internationalised.301 One could argue that the internationalisation of the training 
is suggestive of two things. One, it fits into the rentier state culture characterised 
by a high level of extravagance; because conducting such training in Nigeria 
could have conserved huge resources that could be used in addressing some of 
the pressing development needs in the Niger Delta such as the provision of health 
facilities and clean water. Two, while it is arguable that conducting the training in 
Nigeria could have made it susceptible to corruption, taking them abroad provided 
a leeway for implementers of the programme to manipulate the process for 
personal enrichment. As revealed by an informant within the amnesty office, 
officials engaged in frivolous frequent foreign trips in the name of monitoring of 
trainees and in search of overseas training centres.  
Similarly, the recent Economic and Financial Crimes Commission’s (EFCC) 
arrest of eight contractors to the programme for alleged cases of corruption as 
reported by Isine (2015) lends credence to the allegations that the programme 
was characterised by corruption. Similarly, a regional scholar on the Niger Delta 
also makes the allegation that taking the training overseas makes it difficult for 
the Nigerian media and members of the public to access information about the 
programme.302 Notwithstanding, the allegations of corruption and the obvious 
hitches that characterised the economic reintegration of the ex-militants, it 
represents one of the most comprehensive human resource capacity 
development programmes for youth in the Niger Delta which many of them 
believe is the only means of transforming their lives as rightly noted in this 
assertion: 
Now, there is a problem. We are currently facing a situation where every 
unemployed, uneducated or un-empowered youth in the states in the Niger 
Delta believes that his only ticket to a better future is the Amnesty 
Programme… For the past two years we have in press conferences and 
statements as well as in several meetings with critical stakeholders been 
making this point: that the Amnesty Programme cannot be for all 
unemployed, untrained and un-empowered youths in the Niger Delta. I 
regret to inform you that we have not succeeded in dissuading thousands 
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of hapless Niger Delta youths from agitating for inclusion in the Amnesty 
Programme (Alli, 2013). 
 
Nevertheless, the failure to engage those trained portends serious risk for 
sustaining the current relative stability achieved in the Niger Delta region. This is 
because the training triggered a revolution of rising expectations of job 
opportunities and a better life (International Crisis Group African Report No 231, 
2015: 3). But regrettably, such expectations were dashed due to lack of 
opportunities for gainful employment. Evidently, the above failure reinforces the 
conditions for further grievance and frustration and the potential to resort to rent-
seeking behaviour through the barrel of a gun on the part of the ex-militants. This 
is because in the past the excuse for not being offered jobs in the oil and gas 
sector was the lack of relevant qualifications and skills but now the youth are 
qualified the jobs are still not obtainable. Consequently, as in the case of 
demobilisation, economic reintegration has failed to consolidate the relative 
security stability achieved via the grant of amnesty and disarmament. 
5.2. The Niger Delta Amnesty Disarmament Demobilisation and 
Reintegration Programme from the Perspective of the Technical 
Committee on the Niger Delta 
In the previous section, I evaluated the extent to which the Niger Delta ADDR 
programme has succeeded in achieving its statutory goal of security stabilisation 
in the Niger Delta region. However, in this section, I evaluate the programme as 
recommended by the TCND, which membership comprised of a broad spectrum 
of stakeholders and members of civil society organisations from the Niger Delta 
region. My aim is to demonstrate how the implementation of a maximalist DDR 
that aims to achieve security stabilisation and development303 concurrently could 
have been a better alternative to the securitised one that was implemented.  
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5.2.1. Overview of the Niger Delta Amnesty Disarmament 
Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme as 
Recommended by the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta 
The TCND’s recommendation for an all-inclusive DDR was premised on the 
contention that the basis for a long-term solution to the crisis of militancy in the 
Niger Delta was to address the roots of the conflict. Consequently, it asserts that: 
…the Committee believes that for the Federal Government to effectively 
overcome the barriers to the Region’s development, it has to set in place 
institutions and mechanisms that effectively contain the brazen abuse and 
misuse of public funds in the Region in particular and the country as a 
whole…In response to the above; the Committee… proposes actions to 
address the challenges of governance, militancy, the  rule of law and 
corruption within and outside the Region, including tackling the non-
transparent and unacceptable practices of oil and gas companies 
(Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People, 2009: 65). 
 
The TCND further posited that reversing the trend of underdevelopment in the 
Niger Delta region which is at the root of militancy ‘…demands good governance, 
stronger anti-corruption procedures, credible and better elections…’ (Ibid: 69). 
The TCND also identified key development challenges which it encapsulated into 
three broad areas; governance reforms, regional development and human capital 
development. On regional development, the TCND maintained that ‘the crisis in 
the Niger Delta was strongly linked to the absence of physical development and 
the inadequate access to resources’ (Ibid: 76). Consequently, it suggested a 
comprehensive regional development plan that addressed the infrastructural 
deficit in the region, environmental degradation and sustainability, etc. (Ibid). On 
Human Capital Development (HCD), the TCND recommended that DDR should 
be implemented together with ‘... massive and well-targeted investments in areas 
such as health, education and MDGs related matters’ (Ibid: 87). 
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5.2.2. Evaluating the Niger Delta Amnesty Disarmament 
Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme as 
Conceptualised by the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta 
This section evaluates efforts at addressing the core issues that formed the 
TCND’s recommendation for a holistic/maximalist DDR. These include the lack 
of good governance which breeds corruption and the need for legislative reforms. 
The second issue is regional and infrastructural development, environmental 
remediation, MNOCs and host community relationships and human capital 
development.   
5.2.2.1. Lack of Good Governance and Corruption 
The TCND posited that the Niger Delta conflict is rooted in the long years of lack 
of good governance in the Niger Delta region and Nigeria in general. Accordingly, 
it asserted that the absence of these fundamental principles of good governance 
and the consequent corruption it breeds were responsible for the state of 
underdevelopment that gave rise to militancy in the Niger Delta region. The TCND 
then posited that a long-lasting solution to the crisis of militancy in the Niger Delta 
depended on the extent to which bad governance which breeds corruption is 
addressed in Nigeria: 
The Committee is of the view that a crucial factor in resolving the Niger 
Delta crisis is dealing with the problem of militancy within a governance 
framework…Whilst it is true that paucity of funds have affected the 
development efforts of the Region, the Committee observes that had 
available funds been judiciously used, it would have gone a long way to 
address the development challenges in the Region. The implications of 
corruption for Nigeria as a whole are wide and multiple and even more 
grave for the Region...the Committee believes that for the Federal 
Government to effectively overcome the barriers to the Region’s 
development, it has to set in place institutions and mechanisms that 
effectively contain the brazen abuse and misuse of public funds in the 
Region in particular and the country as a whole. (Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni People, 2009: 65).  
 
However, the views expressed by respondents clearly suggest that neither 
concurrently with the DDR programme nor in its immediate aftermath was any 
effort made by the Nigerian government to address the problem of the lack of 
good governance and the brazen corruption that permeates the Nigerian State, 
particularly the Niger Delta oil-producing states. A member of the TCND 
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expresses his frustration concerning the lack of commitment on the part of the 
Nigerian government: 
…that is why I feel scandalized in the sense that we took pains to look at 
the whole issue even the issue of governance, and if you see our 
recommendations we tied it to the fact that you cannot even do this without 
looking at some governance issues even in the Niger-Delta. You cannot 
just throw money at things. There are governments that have gotten a 
whole lot of money. Look at River state for instance, if you calculate how 
much money that has come in the hands of the government, how comes 
that the lives of the people are still worse than it was. With all the 
resources, they have money more than some countries in Africa…So we 
thought that even the EFCC will be restructured to have a section that will 
focus on government in these areas from the local government and all 
that… because… you cannot look this only from the federal side, almost 
all the members…lamented that even though we are Niger-Delta people 
we cannot close our eyes… We cannot close our eyes… that corruption in 
this area is also there...304 
 
Likewise, a respondent from the Nigerian Anti-Corruption Network argues that 
‘except we tackle corruption there cannot be proper development in the Niger 
Delta, and once there is no proper development in the Niger Delta there can never 
be peace in the Niger Delta’.305 Yet he notes that the ADDR was carried out 
without any effort to address the problem of corruption. While another Niger Delta 
academic expert asserts that not only was corruption not addressed but the DDR 
as a solution to the conflict was undermined by wide allegations of corruption; he 
exclaimed that ‘people have become billionaires through the amnesty 
programme.’306 Furthermore, given that addressing the Niger Delta conflict 
hinges on addressing the problem of corruption in the Nigerian oil and gas sector, 
I investigated whether the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
(NEITI) was part of any such government effort. A key statutory responsibility of 
NEITI is to tackle the problem of corruption as well as ensure transparency in the 
oil and gas sector. However, a high-ranking official of NEITI that I interviewed 
stated: ‘No, I don’t think we’ve been in contact with them whatsoever and we’ve 
not… [had] any role to play with them.’307 This suggests that the DDR 
implementation agency is not involved in any form of collaboration with NEITI as 
part of a broader effort to address the roots of militancy in the Niger Delta of which 
                                                          
304. Respondent 008, October 2013. 
305. Respondent 005, October 2013. 
306. Respondent 032, November 2013.  
307. Respondent 046, December 2013.  
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corruption and issues of transparency in the Nigerian oil and gas sector is an 
essential component. This further suggests that the solution to insecurity in the 
Niger Delta was pursued in complete isolation from the real underlying issues 
that produced it. This contrasts with Hill’s (1999: 57-82) suggestion that for DDR 
to contribute to lasting peace it must have a two-pronged objective; addressing 
the security dilemma and the root causes of conflict. Whilst it was not possible for 
me to access hard facts regarding corruption and of course, perception may not 
always correspond to empirical reality; when the evidence of corruption adduced 
in Chapter Three is taken into account the above opinions cannot be wished 
away. Overall, the failure to address the critical issue of good governance shows 
that the fundamental source of the conflict remains unaddressed as an expert on 
the region asserts: 
 
These are the things we should have addressed…look at … [it] in totality. 
Look!, the point is this, when once there is good governance this conflict 
will stop, but for as long as we have bad governance, for as long as people 
in government steal money, for as long as the rural populace did not feel 
[the impact of] government, for as long as there is injustice… for as long 
as there is no one to complain to, for as long as parents are so impoverish 
or they cannot take care of their children, no social security, these conflicts 
will continue all we are doing is to postpone it. That is the key, that is the 
most critical factor, governance. If you say it is because Niger-Delta people 
are minority, the major groups oppress them, the only reason it could have 
happened was because there was a lack of good governance, that’s all. 
Then you said give them 13%, the money comes and their own people are 
also wasting the money. It is the lack of good governance, so once you 
institute good governance and once the institutions are strong… these 
issues will begin to take care of themselves.308 
 
5.2.2.2. Legislative Reforms 
Within the broader governance reforms, was the need to review or abrogate 
certain obnoxious laws that were inimical to the interests of Niger Delta minorities.  
One such law recommended by the TCND was the revenue allocation formula.  
As I argued in Chapter Three, the Niger Delta ethnic minorities maintain that they 
are negatively affected by the environmental consequences of oil exploration and 
production activities, yet the sharing of the revenue is skewed in favour of the 
hegemonic ethnic groups that control the Nigerian State. A further issue concerns 
                                                          
308. Respondent 032-November 2013. 
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the legislation309 that completely dispossessed the Niger Delta minorities of their 
land and resources and transferred such rights to the Nigerian State. Therefore, 
within the framework of an all-inclusive DDR such laws were to be reviewed or 
abrogated. However, laws such as the revenue allocation formula and other 
obnoxious laws pertaining to land tenure still remain intact. One Niger Delta 
academic expert interviewed posits that ‘…the derivation funds310 have not been 
addressed’.311 This was confirmed by another Niger Delta academic expert who 
contends that:  
… perhaps much more importantly, there is no demonstration of the fact 
that the government is addressing the fundamentals which led to its 
abinitio. The laws are still the same, the policies are the same, nothing has 
changed, what has changed, what has changed, derivation is still 13%., 
the channel for distribution is still the same corrupt structure, it has not 
changed. The oil laws that the people were asking should be changed are 
the same, the attitudes of the oil companies have not changed...312 
 
 
The failure to review, amend or abrogate most of these laws implies that the 
structural issues that are at the root of the Niger Delta conflict still persist despite 
the semblance of relative stability achieved. It also means that the ex-Niger Delta 
militants are being reintegrated into the status quo ante society with the 
fundamental pre-conflict grievances unresolved. 
5.2.2.3. Regional and Infrastructural Development 
Another dimension of the all-inclusive DDR as conceived by the TCND was the 
need for a comprehensive regional development plan to address the multifaceted 
issues of infrastructural development including environmental decay occasioned 
by oil exploration activities in the Niger Delta. Yet, the general consensus among 
respondents was that despite the acclaimed promise by the Federal Government 
to engage in massive infrastructural development there was no corresponding 
effort to match the promise with practical commitment. Affirming this, a military 
                                                          
309. Appendix 6 to TCND report contains a list of all the laws negatively impacting the Niger Delta 
Region. 
310. According to Iledare, W. and Suberu, R. (2010) the derivation rule allocates 13% of natural 
resources’ revenues accruing to the federation back to the constituent units or states of orig in. It 
is a constitutional arrangement for compensating oil producing states by paying them 13% 
portions of the centrally collected oil revenues based on the principle of derivation or unit of origin 
basis (the derivation principle stipulates that the 13% to be paid to each oil producing state is to 
be determined based on the amount of oil revenue it is contributing to the federation account).  
311. Respondent 040, November 2013. 
312. Respondent 032, November 2013. 
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officer that served with the JTF argues that he had travelled widely in the Niger 
Delta region but was yet to see any commitment on the part of the Nigerian State 
towards addressing the problem of infrastructural deficit in the region. According 
to him: 
 
…as I speak, I have not really seen any radical steps that have been taken 
to address those critical issues that the genuine agitators of the militancy 
advanced as their reasons. For instance, I have not seen the 
establishment of industries or any major government intervention that will 
provide jobs for the teeming unemployed youth in the place… The genuine 
agitators talked about the lack of infrastructures, they say there were no 
good roads in the Niger Delta; are there good roads now? My answer is 
no! …They talked about the absence of sustainable environment in Niger 
Delta… are those things there now? No! I would not say they are there 
now.313 
 
Beyond demonstrating the government’s lack of commitment to infrastructural 
development, the respondent’s reference to ‘genuine agitators’ and implicitly 
‘non-genuine agitators’ has important implications that need to be highlighted. 
The respondent’s comment suggests that the ADDR was launched at a time 
when the conflict had metamorphosed to a phase that agitators were principally 
driven by personal economic agendas under the pretext of regional struggle. This 
lends credence to my argument that the MEND era of the conflict was 
fundamentally driven by greed. Alternatively, grievance had largely mutated into 
greed.  
However, returning to the earlier discussion on the government’s failure to 
address the issue of regional development and infrastructural challenges in the 
Niger Delta, a community development chairman of an oil producing community 
in the Southern Ijaw Local Government Area of Bayelsa state corroborated the 
previous respondent’s remarks when he noted that: 
 … if you talk about infrastructural development, from the promises of the 
government we have not seen any infrastructural development per 
se…And then on the area of construction of roads: construction of roads 
was also promised by the government that there will be an inter-linked road 
- they call it coastal link road – of all the villages that are located in the river 
basin – that was how it was promised; but no one construction have been 
done by the federal government; yes, we have not seen any road 
network.314 
                                                          
313. Respondent 009, October 2013. 
314. Respondent 031, November 2013. 
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 In addition to the above, the TCND recommended the immediate execution of 
some infrastructural projects that had the capacity to restore confidence between 
the Niger Delta region and the Nigerian State. A member of the TCND refers to 
these projects as ‘quick impact yielding projects.’315 One such project 
recommended was the dualisation of the East-West road from Calabar to Lagos 
to be completed by June 2010 (Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People, 2009: 
61). However, the head of a Port Harcourt based environmental nongovernmental 
organisation observed that the failure by the Nigerian State to complete the East-
West road indicates the government’s lack of commitment to the infrastructural 
development of the Niger Delta. He noted that: 
 …The amnesty process was supposed to be accompanied by all the other 
recommendations of the Technical Committee, one of them…giving us a 
road called an East-West road so that the Niger Delta is connected to all 
parts of the country. Now, you have travelled around here, you have been 
to Warri, haven’t you? Have you travelled from Warri down here? That 
East-West road till today is only about 35% completed… we want to travel, 
we cannot travel because our roads are all broken-up…and everybody 
who passes this road accident are occurring …at least one major road 
crossing East to West in the Niger Delta, you cannot do it, how can you 
say that, meanwhile you are building places in Abuja like Maitama … Why 
can’t you replicate another Maitama in the Niger Delta, why can’t you 
replicate another similar place here in the Niger Delta…316  
 
Equally, as revealed by a key member of the TCND even as at July 2015 none 
of the quick impact yielding projects including the East-West road recommended 
by the TCND and being constructed by the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs had 
been completed.317 Also, commenting on the East-West road and the general 
performance of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs created to fast-track 
infrastructural development in the Niger Delta, the International Crisis Group 
observed that ‘… the ministry has had little impact’ (International Crisis Group 
(2015: 8). More worrisome was that the latest information released by the current 
minister in charge of the ministry under the President Buhari administration 
                                                          
315. Respondent 008, October 2013.  
316. Respondent 021, November 2013.  
317. Respondent 008, June 2015. 
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indicates that since its establishment eight years ago, the ministry has completed 
only one project, a cassava processing plant in Ondo state.318 
Likewise, the Niger Delta Action Plan319 an all-inclusive action plan for the 
infrastructural and social sector development of the Niger Delta was yet to be 
implemented despite its potential to engender peace by addressing the key 
drivers of the conflict.320 However, despite the lacklustre performance of the 
Federal Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs and the Niger Delta Development 
Commission they are still involved in the implementation of various development 
projects in the region as part of their statutory responsibilities. For instance, 
according to the former minister in charge of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs 
during the former President Jonathan Administration, apart from the ongoing 
construction of the 388 kilometre East-West road, the ministry as of 2014 was 
executing 16 different projects across the region which included building skills 
acquisition centres in nine states of the Niger Delta, women and youth 
empowerment programmes, and 9 housing estates comprising of 40 housing 
units (Onabu, 2014).321 Also, the Niger Delta Development Commission in its 
official website page-News and Events322 presented information on different 
development projects both infrastructural and others it executed across the Niger 
Delta from 2011-2015. However, commenting on  the performance of both the 
Federal and State Government’s development efforts in the Niger Delta a 
member of the Environmental Rights Action and Friends of the Earth Nigeria 
observed that ‘…the states may be trying their best but such efforts have not been 
good enough’.323 What this suggests is that the federal and state governments’ 
performance in the Niger Delta region does not match the extent of empirical 
development deficit and the expectations of people from the region. 
 
                                                          
318  See story titled ‘Eight years after creation, Niger Delta Ministry completed only one project-
Minister’ in Premium Times. Available at: http://www.premiumtimes.com/news/top-news/208270-
eight-year... (Accessed 18 September 2016). 
319. For more details, please see Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs Federal Republic of Nigeria 
(December 2012) publication titled ‘Niger Delta action plan: design and formulation of the Niger 
Delta infrastructure and social sector investment action plan’.  
320. Respondent 006, July 2015.  
321. Details can be found in the report titled ‘Niger Delta Ministry’s mandate beyond East-West 
road, says Oru’. Available at: http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/niger-delta-ministry-s-
mandate... (Accessed: 14 July 2015). 
322. Details of various NDDC’s projects executed or at various stages of completion from 2011-
2015 are Available at: http://www.nddc.gov.ng/newsandevents.html (accessed: 14 July 2015). 
323. Respondent 026, June 2015. 
 273 
 
 As I already emphasised, the implementation of development projects by the 
Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs and Niger Delta Development Commission is not 
done within the framework of a holistic/maximalist DDR recommended by the 
TCND but as part of their statutory mandate. Consequently, the implementation 
is not in harmony with the timeline recommended by the TCND for their 
accomplishment. In line with that, a member of the Stakeholder Democracy 
Network nongovernmental organisation asserts that even in the post ADDR era 
the activities of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs and Niger Delta Development 
Commission do not signify any serious commitment by the Nigerian State to 
address development needs in the region because the agencies are never 
provided with the necessary funding as stipulated in the law that established 
them.324 Furthermore, he argues that contracts for project implementation are 
given to political cronies as part of the larger Nigerian patronage system and so 
the agencies are tools in the hand of politicians.325 His assertion on the lack of 
adequate funding was corroborated by the permanent secretary in the Ministry of 
Niger Delta Affairs who asserted that ‘since August 2014, we have not received 
any capital per head. So, a lot of our projects are being stalled and we don’t want 
abandonment of projects [sic]’ (Adetayo, 2015).   
 
Moreover, as the International Crisis Group’s (Africa Report No 231, 2015: 7) has 
noted, performance of the Niger Delta Development Commission has been 
hampered by ‘recurrent internal power struggles and distrust among principal 
officers, compounded by board-management politics’ and the fact that they have 
become a ‘… conduit through which funds are pumped into the pockets of 
politically connected individuals [rather] than a vehicle for the region’s 
development.’ Overall, the general expectation was that in the post ADDR era the 
agencies would be fully reinvigorated by the Nigerian State to confront the 
development deficit in the Niger Delta instead they are being confronted by the 
same challenges that undermined their effectiveness prior to the ADDR 
programme. 
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5.2.2.4. Environmental Remediation 
A critical aspect of the regional development component of the DDR as 
recommended by the TCND was the need to carry out environmental remediation 
in the Niger Delta and enforce the culture of environmental sustainability. This 
was to be achieved by ensuring that MNOCs comply with environmental best 
practices in their operations. Accordingly, the TCND recommended that the 
Nigerian State should: 
Establish by 2010, regulations that compel oil companies to have 
insurance bonds against environmental pollution, strengthen independent 
regulation of oil pollution and work towards an effective E.I.A mechanism. 
Make the enforcement of critical environmental laws a national priority. 
Expose fraudulent environmental clean ups of oil spills and prosecute 
polluters. End gas flaring by December 31st 2008 as previously ordered by 
the Federal Government (Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People, 
2009: 61). 
 
Nonetheless, opinions expressed by respondents suggest that the DDR 
programme was implemented without any regard to the state of environmental 
degradation in the Niger Delta. Communities in the Niger Delta region continued 
to experience a lack of sensitivity as well as poor or slow responses from the 
Federal Government and MNOCs to issues of oil spills both during and after the 
DDR. According to a member of the Ogoni Solidarity Forum: 
 
…how do you explain that there was an oil explosion in Koloma, Koloma 
is in Bayelsa state, for weeks running into months that the president was 
begged to even visit, he did not…how do you explain that the Niger Delta 
president326 is unable to implement UNEP327 report on Ogoni environment 
how do you explain that?328 
 
The respondent contends that the failure by the President to visit the site of the 
Bayelsa oil spill and implement the United Nations Environmental Programme 
(UNEP) report for the remediation of Ogoni land demonstrates clearly the 
Nigerian government lack of sensitivity and commitment to the environmental 
                                                          
326 .  What the respondent infers by ‘the Niger Delta President’ is that the Nigerian President at 
the time the interview was conducted hailed from the Niger Delta region. 
327. Based on a Nigerian government request the United Nations Environmental Programme 
conducted an independent assessment of the environment and public health impacts of oil 
contamination in Ogoniland in the Niger Delta and recommended strategies for remediation 
(Additional information is available at: 
http://www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/CountryOperations/Nigeria/EnvironmentalAssessmen
tofOgonilandreport/tabid/54419/Default.aspx).  
328. Respondent 015, November 2013. 
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issues confronting the Niger Delta. Also, an academic expert on the Niger Delta 
argues that MNOCs have continued to violate the principle of environmental 
sustainability in their operations because up to now ‘gas flaring is still going on in 
the Niger Delta, oil spillage is still going on in the Niger Delta, destruction of the 
ecosystem is still going on in the Niger Delta…’.329 Thus, ‘environmental 
conditions, which have not improved and may have further deteriorated, are 
another source of tension’ (International Crisis Group Africa Report No 231, 2015: 
9).  For example, a cassava farm flooded with oil in 2011 is shown in figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1: Cassava Farm in Bayelsa state Flooded with oil as at 12/11/2011 
 Source: Environmental rights activist Yenagoa Bayelsa state. 
 
My effort to ascertain how the MNOCs have been responding to issues of oil spills 
and adhering to principles of environmental sustainability by interviewing Shell 
Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) senior management staff was 
unsuccessful as explained in my earlier discussion of fieldwork challenges in 
                                                          
329. Respondent 004-academic expert on the Niger Delta, October 2013 & Respondent 032, 
November 2013.  
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Chapter One.330 Nevertheless, members of environmental rights civil society 
organisations (CSOs) who have been monitoring the situation responded to my 
investigation. A member of the Environmental Rights Action and Friends of the 
Earth Nigeria expressed the opinion that ‘one cannot completely rule out 
accidents in the oil industry, but what is not normal is the impunity with which oil 
companies address oil spills; with clear disregard for the environment.’331 A staff 
member of a nongovernmental organisation also posited that environmental 
degradation started and continued until now because the Nigerian State lacked 
the capacity to enforce the relevant environmental best practice laws. According 
to the staff member, ‘I was meeting with the Safety Engineer from Chevron one 
time and he said do you know we can get away with things here [more] than we 
can get away with things anywhere else in the world.’332 Equally, a coalition of 
twenty civil society groups in the Niger Delta working to address the persistent 
environmental degradation linked to oil spills, gas flares and illegal oil bunkering 
in the Niger Delta maintains that the Niger Delta environment remains one of the 
most degraded in the world to-day (National Coalition on Gas Flaring and Oil 
Spills in the Niger Delta, 2015). The Nigerian State has created an agency known 
as the Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) which is: 
… vested with the responsibility to coordinate the implementation of the 
National Oil Spill Contingency plan (NOSCP) for Nigeria in accordance 
with the international convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness Response 
and Co-operation (OPRC) 1990, to which Nigeria is a signatory. NOSDRA 
is also mandated to play the lead role in ensuring timely, effective and 
appropriate response to oil spills, as well as ensuring clean up and 
remediation of all impacted sites to all best practical extent. It shall also 
identify high risk/priority areas in the oil-producing environment for 
protection as well as ensure compliance of oil industry operators with all 
existing environment for operators with all existing environmental 
legislations in the petroleum sector (Federal Ministry of Environment 
Website, n.d.) 
 
However, a Nigerian staff member of the Stakeholder Democracy Network 
contended that the agency is dysfunctional because it lacks the resources and 
technical capacity to function effectively.333 In terms of financial resources, he 
                                                          
330. My decision to interview its official on this issue was informed by the fact that Shell Petroleum 
Development Company is the oldest and has the largest portion of onshore oil fields in the Niger 
Delta. 
331. Respondent 026, June 2015. 
332. Respondent 027, November 2015. 
333. Respondent 037, June 2015. 
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argues that over the years there has not been any increase in the agency’s 
budgetary allocation while in terms of technical equipment NOSDRA does not 
have helicopters and speed boats to access spill sites but relies on the goodwill 
of MNOCS to do so.334 This was also corroborated by an Amnesty International 
(2103: 15) report on the state of oil spill investigations in the Niger Delta. 
In my opinion, all these suggest two things. one, the post ADDR response and 
compliance to environmental sustainability principles by MNOCs in the Niger 
Delta remains as it was in the pre-ADDR era. Secondly, the Nigerian government 
remains inept in its response capacity and ability to enforce compliance with 
environmental sustainability principles by MNOCs. Against this backdrop, a Niger 
Delta academic expert observed that as far as the ADDR programme is 
concerned ‘…the environmental consequences of oil production were never 
addressed.’335 
5.2.2.5. MNOCs and Host Communities’ Relationships  
I investigated if the adversarial relationships between the MNOCs and their host 
communities had been transformed into a harmonious one based on mutual 
respect. However, an ex- MEND commander expressed the view that as far as 
the MNOCs is concerned ‘if they want to work in the community they will park like 
four, five, six gunboats to the area.’336 Also, a community youth leader from 
Southern Ijaw Local Government Area of Bayelsa State observed that despite the 
implementation of the ADDR programme ‘the relationship between host 
communities and oil companies... without mincing words… is still the same, if not 
worse’.337 While a member of the Environmental Rights Action and Friends of the 
Earth Nigeria observes that the MNOCs with the clear support of the Federal 
Government ‘…use the Joint Task Force as a tool for intimidating community folks 
who are bold enough to challenge the prevailing situation.’338 
 
Furthermore, one way of measuring improved harmony between MNOCS and 
host communities is the process through which a General Memorandum of 
                                                          
334. Ibid. 
335. Respondent 032- academic expert on Niger Delta, November 2013. 
336. Respondent 039- an ex- MEND commander, November 2013. 
337. Respondent 03, November 2013. 
338. Respondent 026, June 2015. 
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Understanding (GMoU) is arrived at and the extent of compliance to it by the 
MNOCs. GMoU is a form of written agreement signed between oil companies 
and clusters of oil producing communities in the Niger Delta. It harmonizes mutual 
objectives, obligations and time frames for executing them. It also makes 
provision for arbitration in the event of its violation. However, as a 
nongovernmental organisation Shareholders Alliance for Corporate 
Accountability noted; most stakeholders in the Shell Petroleum Development 
Company operational locations in Bayelsa State ‘…insist that the GMoU 
agreement was foisted on them, that it was a case of ‘take it or leave it’. They 
lament that the agreements were designed by SPDC alone and though they 
contested different sections [of the GMoU] it fell on deaf ears.’ (Shareholders 
Alliance for Corporate Accountability, 2014: 3).  
A staff member of the Nigeria Stakeholder Democracy Network maintains that 
there has been no general change of behaviour by MNOCs towards their host 
communities.339 According to him, their pattern of behaviour has been entrenched 
to the level of a culture.340 Nevertheless, he notes that sometimes at the national 
headquarters of the MNOCs there is some commitment and intention to change 
the way of doing things but due to vested interests and lack of will among the top 
and middle-level management staff in Nigeria, such intentions are stifled from 
becoming a reality.341 He maintains that the only single positive development in 
terms of MNOCs and host communities’ relationship in the post ADDR era was 
Shell’s payment of compensation to the Bodo Community in Ogoni land of Rivers 
State over an oil spill.342 However, he is quick to point out that this was an isolated 
case that cannot be used as a basis for generalisation across the Niger Delta 
States and in addition the spill site has not been cleaned.343  
Similarly, the head of a Port Harcourt based environmental nongovernmental 
organisation equally cited the same payment as a positive sign of improved 
relationship by asserting that ‘as I informed you the relationship between 
communities and companies has improved a good deal since we last spoke…in 
2013. The one between SPDC and Bodo Community in Ogoni is a good example, 
                                                          
339. Respondent 037, June 2015. 
340. Respondent 037, June 2015 
341. Ibid. 
342. Ibid. 
343. Ibid. 
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and we in Civil Society believe that will be a good example that will be referenced 
in the future, and one that is worth emulating by other companies in similar 
situations’.344 However, he concurs with the contention that this development 
cannot be generalised across the Niger Delta. Indeed, the fact that a single case 
of compensation is being used as an indication of improved relationship is 
suggestive of the extent to which the relationship between MNOCs and their host 
communities has still to be repaired. 
5.2.2.6. Human Capital Development 
 One of the integral components of comprehensive DDR, as recommended by 
the TCND, was the need to pursue human capital development in the Niger Delta. 
‘Human capital’ is the term economists often use for education, health, and other 
human capacities that can raise productivity when increased’ (Todaro and Smith, 
2006: 369).  In consonance with the above conceptualisation, the TCND’s 
‘recommendation touching on…human development approach aims to improve 
the human capital of the Niger Delta through massive and well-targeted 
investments in areas such as health, education, and MDGs related matters’ 
(Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People, 2008: 87). The TCND’s 
recommendation on human capital development was premised on the fact that 
youth in the Niger Delta were in the past denied employment opportunities by 
MNOCs due to lack of or limited educational qualifications and vocational skills 
relevant to the oil and gas industry.345 This position was supported by a youth 
leader from the Southern Ijaw Local Government Area of Bayelsa State who 
argued that: 
 …we are not employed because… we are less educated… When …you 
go to companies, they will say: ‘ah, you don’t have this qualification. 
Because you are not educated they will not employ you… So what can our 
people achieve?  Those that are not educated.346 
 
Equally, a field investigation report on the current state of health facilities in rural 
communities of Bayelsa state noted that ‘most communities have no health centre 
and those that have can hardly benefit from them because they are either 
                                                          
344. Respondent 021, June 2015. 
345. Respondent 008, October 2013.  
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abandoned or a shadow of what they should represent in the actual fact.’347 
However, in the area of educational development, the Nigerian government has 
recorded some level of success in terms of the development of human resource 
capacity among youth in the Niger Delta. Even though these educational 
development efforts are not being implemented as part of the holistic DDR 
recommended by the TCND they reflect what the TCND has recommended. For 
instance, the Niger Delta Development Commission foreign scholarship 
programme has so far sponsored 1,021 graduates to attend masters and 
doctorate programmes in the field of engineering, sciences and medicine while 
3,000 candidates were shortlisted for the 2015/2016 academic year award 
aptitude test (Niger Delta Development Commission, 2015).   
Similarly, the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) is a 
parastatal of the Nigerian government established ‘to achieve safe, secure 
shipping, cleaner oceans and enhanced maritime capacity in line with the best 
global practices for Nigeria’s economic development’ (Nigerian Maritime 
Administration and Safety Agency, (n. d.). Therefore, it has been engaged in 
human resource capacity development in the Nigerian maritime sector for the 
country’s youth. In doing this, some degree of priority is given to qualified youth 
from the Niger Delta which occupied the major segment of the Nigerian maritime 
landscape.348 One such capacity building programme is the Nigerian Seafarers 
Development Programme in which 2,500 Nigerian youth have so far been 
sponsored to attend different institutions in the United Kingdom, Egypt, Romania, 
India and Philippines. As of July 2014, 23 qualified seafarers have graduated 
from the Arab Academy for Science and Technology and Maritime Transport 
Egypt with 14 of them graduating with first class honours.349 Similarly, part of this 
human resource capacity development effort was the establishment of the 
Nigerian Maritime University and Shipbuilding and Repair at Gbaramantu 
Kingdom of Delta State. The institution is aimed at producing multifaceted 
indigenous high-level manpower needed by the sector, while the 
Shipyard/dockyard facility also provides practical training opportunities for 
                                                          
347. Quote from a field investigation report titled ‘A report relating to an investigation into some 
oil company built health facilities and their operations in Bayelsa State’ conducted by a field staff 
of Environmental Rights Action /Friends of the Earth Nigeria dated 08 June 2015. 
348. Respondent 051- senior management staff of NIMASA, June 2015. 
349. Sourced from the speech delivered by Ziakede Patrick Akpobolokemi, Director General 
NIMASA at the World Press Conference held on Wednesday July 23, 2014 at Eko Hotel Lagos 
(Online). Available at: http://www.nimasa.gov.ng/press.php?id=7  (Accessed 21 July 2015). 
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students of the university.350 As of May 2015 over 32,600 students had benefitted 
from NIMASA’s scholarship scheme programme.351 NIMASA has equally 
established a Science and Technical College at Okoloba in Delta State for the 
enhancement of maritime science and technology, and the development of 
middle-level manpower capacity for the sector.352   
In an interview, a senior staff member of NIMASA confides that while the 
Seafarers Development Programme appears to be working smoothly, placement 
opportunities for the trained seafarers remains a pressing challenge.353 He 
argues that the huge resources invested in the programme may be a wasted 
investment because the certificates issued are time bound.354 This implies that 
candidates must have the opportunity to practice the skills acquired within a 
certain period of time as failure to do so means that the candidates must undergo 
another training to be certificated again.355 Similarly, the senior staff member 
revealed that the process is not free of corruption as fees paid for services are 
often inflated.356 His insinuation of corruption becomes credible in view of the 
reported investigation of the sacked NIMASA director general by EFCC for paying 
N13 billion for the acquisition of land for the Nigeria Maritime University 
permanent site in Delta state (Ibekwe, 2015).  
As I earlier argued in my analysis of economic reintegration, the Nigerian 
government has prioritised the equipping of Niger Delta youth with the needed 
skills to take advantage of opportunities in the oil, gas and maritime sectors of the 
Nigerian economy. However, the challenge remains that the employment 
opportunities are not forthcoming. This means that trainees are adding up to the 
teeming number of unemployed graduates searching for white-collar jobs thereby 
creating a market of trained but unemployed youth which in turn reinforces the 
                                                          
350. Sourced from the speech delivered by Ziakede Patrick Akpobolokemi, Director General 
NIMASA at the Ground-Breaking Ceremonies of the Nigeria Maritime University, NIMASA 
Shipyard/dockyard and the Flag-Off of activities at the Kurete temporary campus of the university 
Gbaramantu Kingdom Delta State (Online). Available at: http://www.nimasa.gov.ng (Accessed 21 
July 2015). 
351. Sourced from NIMASA’s press release titled ‘Maritime Varsity to generate over $6bn-Mr 
Patrick Ziakede Akpobolokemi (Online). Available at: http://www.nimasa.gov.ng/press.php?id=7 
(Accessed 21 July 2015). 
352. See NIMASA Vision and Mission statement (Online). Available at: 
http://www.nimasa.gov.ng/nstc/about.php (Accessed: 21 July 2015). 
353. Respondent 051- senior management staff of NIMASA, June 2015. 
354. Ibid. 
355. Respondent 051- senior management staff of NIMASA, June 2015. 
356. Ibid. 
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conditions for grievance and frustration. Nevertheless, the fact that Niger Delta 
youth are scampering for such training opportunities suggests that in the short-
term such initiatives may have a positive effect on the teeming despondent youth 
in the region.   
5.3.  The Implementation of the TCND’s Recommendations, 
Liberalism and the Maximalist Perspective to DDR 
I argued in Chapter Four that the TCND viewed the Niger Delta conflict and the 
resultant militancy as the long-term consequence of human security, 
development and good governance deficits and this, therefore, informed its 
recommendation for a maximalist DDR that aimed to address the development 
and security challenges confronting the Niger Delta region simultaneously. In 
other words, the ADDR programme should be used as an opportunity for 
development. Consequently, in the previous section I evaluated the 
implementation of the ADDR programme against the backdrop of the TCND’s 
recommendations. Accordingly, in this section, I shall interrogate the 
implementation of the TCND’s recommendations by juxtaposing it with my 
broader theoretical orientation and the maximalist DDR literature I examined in 
Chapter Two. The aim is to demonstrate that the implementation of a 
maximalist/transformative DDR as recommended by the TCND instead of a 
securitised one skewed in favour of the militants would have laid a solid 
foundation for lasting peace in the Niger Delta. Equally, the aim is to further 
reinforce my argument that unless a DDR programme is conceptualised, planned 
and implemented from the maximalist/transformative perspective of an 
opportunity for development its potential to contribute to lasting peace and to 
serve as an effective conflict prevention mechanism will remain minimal and 
questionable. Similarly, the discussion in this section is also aimed at reinforcing 
the explanatory potency of my broader theoretical framework-liberalism. 
Nonetheless, a brief recapitulation of liberalism and the maximalist/transformative 
perspective of DDR is necessary. 
To recapitulate, liberalism holds strongly that the foundation of peace and conflict 
in any society is predicated on whether society is founded on the ethos of 
democracy, good governance, participation, rule of law, transparency and 
accountability, responsiveness, consensus, equity, and inclusiveness (Burchill, 
2009: 57; Brown and Ainley, 2009: 20; Doyle, 1983: 206-207 and Owen, 1998: 
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145). Societies where such elements are absent or of poor quality are less likely 
to deliver effective, inclusive and sustainable human development and security. 
This, in turn, has the potential to exacerbate factors such as alienation and 
frustration that provide a breeding ground for conflict. This concurs with the 
position of the TCND that the roots of conflict in the Niger Delta are anchored in 
the lack of good governance and accountability which in turn generate the social 
conditions of alienation and frustration in the region (Movement for the Survival 
of Ogoni People, 2009: 65). 
This implies that for lasting peace to be achieved in the Niger Delta region 
governance reforms must be embedded in the ADDR programme. Similarly, from 
the maximalist/transformative perspective; Muggah (2004: 27) and Muggah and 
Batchelor (2002: 37) argue that unless a DDR programme is conceptualised, 
planned and implemented as an opportunity for development and reconstruction, 
its potential to contribute to peace is limited to security stabilisation. This is 
because the fundamental grievances of underdevelopment which are social, 
political and economic in nature and which are the root causes of the conflict may 
not be addressed. Reconstruction in this context goes beyond returning the 
postconflict society to its former pre-war status quo ante but to a better-
regenerated society where the pre-war grievances are substantially addressed or 
are being addressed. For instance, Muggah (2009: 2) observes that ‘a failure to 
effectively and comprehensively address the immediate and underlying causes 
of armed conflict meant that the embers smouldered, waiting for the next spark 
to reignite open collective violence following an end to formal hostilities’. This 
suggests that unless a DDR programme is premised on a maximalist agenda of 
an opportunity for development it would not be an effective conflict prevention 
mechanism. In a similar vein, Jennings (2008: 331) contends that reintegration 
within the framework of maximalist DDR must go beyond the short-term goal of 
mollifying ex-combatants to engendering fundamental social change ‘… by 
addressing substantive grievances…’ that led to the conflict, which suggests that 
it must have a transformative agenda of changing the social conditions that lead 
to the violent conflict. On his part, Cockel (2000: 20) contends that the impact of 
any form of postconflict intervention such as DDR is to be measured in terms of 
how it has contributed to the transformation of existing socio-economic and 
political structures that generate violent conflict in society. However, some may 
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argue that expecting a maximalist DDR to bring about the wholesale 
transformation of the Nigerian neopatrimonial state is unrealistic and over-
ambitious, nonetheless, it is my contention that it can serve as a platform to kick-
start the process. Conversely, the evidence adduced in the previous section 
suggests that this is far from being realised.  
Against this background, it is my contention that if the TCND’s recommendation 
for a maximalist DDR were implemented the conditions for lasting peace in the 
Niger Delta would have been more effectively laid. However, the TCND’s 
maximalist/transformative framework was jettisoned for a securitised DDR 
skewed in favour of the ex-militants. Consequently, both the immediate and 
underlying sources of the conflict remain intact, and as Muggah argued these can 
easily spark and reignite another conflict. Indeed, the latest development in the 
Niger Delta with the emergence of a group known as Niger Delta Avengers357 
lends credence to Muggah’s assertion. The group which has begun wanton 
destruction of oil facilities in the Niger Delta states has so far rejected all 
entreaties for dialogue and gestures of reconciliation by the Nigerian State. The 
Group stated on its official website that: 
The Niger Delta Avengers are not Boko Haram, we are not ISIS, all we are 
asking for is a better living [condition] for the people of the Niger Delta and 
self-determination … to govern ourself. We will soon raise our flag and 
name our interim ruling Council.358 
 
This clearly demonstrates that despite the acclaimed success of the ADDR 
programme in terms of the number of ex-militants disarmed, demobilised and 
reintegrated or in the process of being reintegrated there is the high potential for 
a relapse into violence because the fundamental grievances that led to the 
conflict remained intact. This was because the ADDR programme was 
implemented not based on a maximalist/transformative agenda of achieving 
security stability and development simultaneously but a minimalist agenda of 
achieving security stabilisation. Thus, evidence from the Niger Delta ADDR 
programme once again reaffirmed the efficacy of maximalist/transformative over 
                                                          
357. Additional information on the Niger Delta Avengers and what they stand for can be obtained 
fro0 m the Group’s website-http:// www.nigerdeltaavengers.com/ (Accessed: 27 April 2016). The 
Group has so far rejected all entreaties for dialogue and gestures of reconciliation by the Nigerian 
State and has continued to sabotage oil facilities in the region. 
 
358. Ibid. 
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the minimalist approach to DDR in terms of contributing to lasting peace and 
stability and as an effective conflict prevention mechanism.  
5.4. Conclusion 
As I noted at the onset, this thesis is an evaluative case study that seeks to 
interrogate the extent to which the Niger Delta ADDR programme has achieved 
its stated objective. As I argued throughout in this study, the Niger Delta ADDR 
programme was premised on two conflicting conceptualisations. First, the TCND 
recommended a maximalist DDR that aimed to address the crisis of militancy and 
underdevelopment in a concurrent manner while the Presidential Amnesty 
Planning Committee designed and implemented it as a security stabilisation 
programme. Consequently, in the first part of the chapter, I assessed the 
programme in terms of the extent to which it has accomplished the goal of security 
stabilisation in the Niger Delta while in the second part I examined it against the 
backdrop of the all-inclusive maximalist DDR recommended by the TCND.  
In terms of accomplishing security stabilisation, the main contention I advanced 
in the chapter was that the amnesty/disarmament phase of the ADDR programme 
succeeded in stabilising the security situation in the Niger Delta in the short-term. 
However, the relative stability achieved was not consolidated by successful 
demobilisation and reintegration. This was because instead of demobilisation to 
dismantle the existing vertical and horizontal command and control structures of 
the various militants’ commanders; it further reinforced and strengthened the 
structures. As a result, the obvious outcome of the demobilisation process is a 
legacy of high capacity to remobilise on the part of the former top commanders. 
The failure to dismantle existing command and control structures indicates the 
fragility of the current stability and the potential for the Niger Delta region to 
relapse to violence as seen in the emergence of Niger Delta Avengers. The high 
capacity to remobilise and the potential for a return to violence was further 
reinforced by the failure to achieve economic reintegration of the less powerful 
commanders, middle-level commanders and foot soldiers. Furthermore, the 
effectiveness and potential for economic reintegration to contribute to peace 
consolidation was undermined by the lack of access to reintegration training 
opportunities by many of the ex-militants and the inability to secure jobs by those 
already trained due to a mismatch between the types of training offered to them 
and existing opportunities in the Nigerian labour market. Thus, this has increased 
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the number of trained youth for non-existent jobs and has, in consequence, 
strengthened the conditions for further grievance and frustration which in turn 
may increase the risk of a return to violence in the future or the resort to extra-
legal means to secure economic livelihood. This conclusion is appropriate when 
noted against Collier’s (1994: 345-351) postulation that failure to achieve 
economic reintegration of ex-combatants particularly those that fall under the 
category of Second Generation militia can result in micro and macro security 
threats or insecurity at the societal and individual levels, as well as rent-seeking 
behaviour through the barrel of a gun (Colleta et al, 1996: 18). Beyond that, the 
potential for a return to violence is further reinforced by the fact that fundamental 
grievances that led to the conflict have not been addressed despite the window 
of opportunity provided by the relative security stability achieved in the region.  
The current situation suggests that the Niger Delta region is oscillating between 
peace and violence, an atmosphere of no war, no peace. However, whether the 
region will gravitate into complete violence once again and what form the 
renewed violence will take depends on certain variables which would be part of 
my suggestion for future research in the Niger Delta in Chapter six. 
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Chapter Six 
General Conclusion 
6. Introduction 
This chapter is the concluding part of this thesis and therefore aims to establish 
the extent to which the study has succeeded in answering its primary research 
question. The chapter also highlights the study’s theoretical and policy 
contribution in the field of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), 
the theoretical and policy literature on the Niger Delta conflict as well as the 
Nigerian State. It also raises some important and valid concerns and potential 
areas of future research on the Niger Delta.  
In terms of structural outline, the first section restates the thesis’s primary 
research question and outlines how it has been answered including the main 
empirical findings relating to the question. The second section highlights the 
study’s theoretical and empirical contributions while the last section suggests 
some important and valid issues for future research on the Niger Delta. 
 
6.1. Main Research Question and Empirical Findings 
This thesis is an evaluation case study that critically examines the extent to which 
the 2009 Niger Delta ADDR programme as the Nigerian government’s most 
recent response to the conflict in the Niger Delta has succeeded in achieving its 
goal.  To explore the research question, I interviewed 53 respondents including 
ex-militant commanders, community leaders, members of the Nigerian Security 
Forces, members of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta (TCND) and the 
Presidential Amnesty Planning Committee. Others interviewed included 
members of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Implementation Committee, 
members of nongovernmental organisations, government policy makers, 
academic experts on the Niger Delta and a community development chairman of 
an oil producing community and a youth leader. Two Focus Group Discussions 
(FGDs) were also held with ex-militant soldiers of the ADDR programme. Overall, 
semi-structured interviews, FGD and secondary sources were the methods of 
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data collection used in this case study. Data collected from respondents were 
analysed using the content analysis technique as outlined by Marshall and 
Rossman (2006: 151-167) and in order to achieve an informed interpretation of 
the data, triangulation was applied at the level of data analysis (Bryman, 2008: 
379). 
The primary research question for this study was ‘how successful was the Niger 
Delta amnesty disarmament demobilisation and reintegration programme in 
achieving its statutory objective?’ In this regard, evidence analysed in this study 
revealed that the programme was informed by conflicting conceptual 
perspectives and understandings of the conflict, which gave rise to security 
versus development agendas for the ADDR programme. The TCND 
recommended a maximalist DDR programme that would simultaneously address 
the security challenges confronting the Niger Delta within a broader framework of 
socio-economic transformation (maximalist DDR). However, a conceptual 
somersault took place at the level of design. This was when the government 
planned the DDR as mainly a security stabilisation programme. It was clearly 
stated by the government that the objective of the programme was to respond to 
the security conditions in the Niger Delta. This was to create the enabling 
environment for development to subsequently take place (Federal Government 
of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme, 2011: 24). Consequently, I argued 
that the securitisation of development in the Niger Delta and the conceptual 
somersault was not accidental but reflected the rentier nature and character of 
the Nigerian State. Its main concern was to restore security and stability in the 
Niger Delta because the continuing conflict undermined the operations of 
Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) and the flow of oil rents to the government. 
Therefore, given the conceptual somersault that occurred, I initially evaluated the 
programme foremost in terms of the extent to which it succeeded in achieving the 
goal of security stabilisation in the Niger Delta and thereafter the efforts by the 
Nigerian government to address the development challenges that underpinned 
the conflict in line with the all-inclusive maximalist DDR recommended by the 
TCND.  
As a security stabilisation programme, evidence from this study demonstrated 
that despite the irregularities that characterised the amnesty/disarmament phase 
of the programme, it succeeded in restoring relative security and stability in the 
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short-term both at the level of perception and in empirical terms. At the level of 
perception, it relatively deescalated the level of psychological tension amongst 
the residents of the Niger Delta, with many people feeling relatively safer in the 
immediate aftermath of the programme. Consequently, public confidence about 
safety and security in the region was restored relative to the situation prior to the 
launching of the ADDR programme. This was because the successful completion 
of the amnesty/disarmament phase and the fact that the hitherto masked MEND 
commanders and fighters now move freely in the region produced a compelling 
psychological effect in the minds of the participants, beneficiaries and all 
stakeholders that a new era of improved security had returned to the Niger Delta 
region. 
At the empirical level, the ADDR programme also succeeded in stabilising the 
security situation by ending hostilities between the militants and the Nigerian 
security forces which resulted in a significant decline and reduction in the 
kidnapping of oil workers. Evidence that the programme had succeeded in 
stabilising the Niger Delta security situation can be seen in the fact that oil 
production that had declined to 700,000 barrels per day prior to the amnesty and 
disarmament phase of the programme jumped to 2.5 million barrels per day as at 
04 October 2009 when the first phase of the amnesty and disarmament was 
concluded (Makinde, 2013: 18).  
Moreover, the pseudo-compellence negotiated settlement that led to the ADDR 
programme signified an informal social contract between the militants and the 
Nigerian State which symbolically ushered in an era of fragile trust between the 
Nigerian State and the Niger Delta militants. In this informal social contract, the 
Nigerian State granted forgiveness to the militants and promised to rehabilitate 
and empower them as well as address the crisis of underdevelopment in the 
region. On their part, the militants renounced militancy and affiliations to any 
militant group and committed to faithfully support, protect and defend the 
constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria by respecting all constituted 
authorities. The symbolic significance and impact of this pseudo-social contract 
significantly contributed to the relative stability achieved in the Niger Delta region 
even though it is still littered with hidden arms. 
On the other hand, even though evidence from this case study revealed that the 
amnesty and disarmament phase of the programme helped to stabilise the Niger 
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Delta security situation, the demobilisation process failed to successfully 
consolidate the stability achieved. This is because as demonstrated in the 
literature examined in this case study; for demobilisation to contribute to the goal 
of security stabilisation specifically when dealing with combatants of Second 
Generation militia category it must ensure that their existing command and control 
structures both vertical and horizontal are destroyed thereby making it difficult for 
them to remobilise (Alden et al., 2011: 14). However, findings from this study 
clearly show that the demobilisation process in the Niger Delta has not succeeded 
in breaking the existing command and control structures of the various top 
militants’ groups and reducing their capacity to remobilise. Rather, evidence from 
this case study demonstrated that paying the demobilised ex-militants’ foot 
soldiers through their commanders has ensured that they are continually loyal to, 
and dependent on their former commanders even after their so-called 
demobilisation.  
The second reason why demobilisation failed to break existing command and 
control structures is related to the way inducement was applied in the form of 
ADDR patronage which became counterproductive to the goal of demobilisation. 
As I argued in the thesis, what the Nigerian government did was to adopt a 
neopatrimonial approach to DDR. This is by concentrating on key commanders 
with the largest number of foot soldiers and a high capacity to threaten oil 
production and offer them huge monetary payment through contract awards 
which empowered them economically. However, the patronage system excluded 
the less powerful and middle-level commanders, including foot soldiers who were 
only left with the reinsertion allowance of sixty-five thousand Naira, which means 
that unlike the top commanders, they demobilised into impoverishment when 
compared with their previous living standards during the conflict. Thus, one way 
for them to deal with the realities of life after demobilisation in terms of the sudden 
fall in their income was to continually depend on their commanders which again 
strengthened and kept intact former command and control structures thereby 
affording the commanders a high capacity to remobilise.  
Furthermore, evidence from the case study also revealed that the exclusive 
manner in which patronage was applied, exposed the Niger Delta to further 
instability by creating the enabling environment for conflict reoccurrence in a 
number of ways. Foremost, it gave rise to the emergence of insider and outsider 
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types of peace spoilers. In the first instance, as an insider peace spoiler former 
middle-level commander John Togo who had signed the renunciation of militancy 
bond felt marginalised and cheated, and consequently remobilized reigniting 
another cycle of violence in the Niger Delta (Amaize, 2011). In the second 
instance, it encouraged the emergence of outsider peace spoilers claiming to be 
agitating for development on behalf of their ethnic nationality to emerge. Kelvin 
Ibruvwe emerged as an outsider peace spoiler who, in 2013 proclaimed to be the 
leader of the Liberation Movement for the Urhobo People (LIMUP) one of the 
ethnic nationalities in the Niger Delta. These two incidents attest to the 
counterproductive effect of neopatrimonial DDR (patronage) in the Niger Delta. 
The ADDR patronage system also exposed the Niger Delta to further instability 
by reinforcing aspects of the conflict economy that sustains the conflict. Evidence 
that emerged from this study demonstrated that many of the former middle-level 
commanders and foot soldiers that were excluded from the ADDR patronage 
decided to fall back on illegal oil bunkering as a strategy of maintaining their 
previous standard of living while in the creeks. Likewise, nonviolent youth who 
also felt cheated for not being considered in the entire ADDR process decided to 
demonstrate their anger and frustration against the government by going into 
illegal oil bunkering. The evidence adduced on the sudden increase in the rate of 
illegal oil bunkering after the ADDR programme was completed lends credence 
to this finding.  
However, despite the obviously failed nature of the Niger Delta demobilisation 
process, the use of the ADDR patronage and the concomitant peace dividend 
that favoured only the top commanders did produce an unintended but positive 
consequence that has potentially diminished the capacity for conflict 
reoccurrence in the Niger Delta. This is because it has exposed the selfish 
agenda of those masquerading as freedom fighters for the purpose of advancing 
their personal economic agendas. Thus, in the future securing community 
legitimacy which is critical for the Niger Delta oil insurgency to flourish may be 
difficult. 
As argued in the literature examined in this case study, security stabilisation can 
only be attained if ex-combatants are reintegrated into society at the social, 
political and economic levels. However, evidence from this study demonstrated 
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that social reintegration was largely sidelined in the reintegration process of the 
ex-militants, while political reintegration in the case of some of the top 
commanders was achieved through informal neopatrimonial co-optation via the 
ADDR patronage. Nevertheless, achieving political reintegration through 
neopatrimonial cooptation of some of the top commanders has in the short-term 
produced a positive consequence in terms of reducing the potentials for conflict 
occurrence in the Niger Delta, because given their newly acquired status, these 
top commanders will be more interested in maintaining stability than returning to 
violence. 
 As for economic reintegration, it was highly prioritised in line with the practice in 
most DDR programmes. Economic reintegration as argued in the literature is the 
process whereby ex-fighters and their households build up new livelihoods by 
engaging in productive activities and gainful employment. The prioritisation of 
economic reintegration over the social and political dimensions of reintegration is 
in line with the security stabilisation agenda of the ADDR programme which 
theorised youth idleness as a cause of militancy in the Niger Delta. However, for 
economic reintegration to contribute to security stabilisation, certain 
fundamentals about the process must be right. One, it is necessary that genuine 
ex-combatants are given priority in the job training opportunities. Two, having 
been successfully trained, they must have access to gainful employment or 
financial capital to start up small scale businesses. However, evidence from this 
study demonstrated that, even though significant achievement was recorded in 
terms of providing them with skills acquisition and educational advancement 
opportunities both at home and abroad, there were several cases of alleged 
demobilised militants who had been short-changed. For those short-changed, 
there is a risk that they may return to rent seeking behaviour through the barrel 
of a gun, producing what Collier refers to as micro and macro security threats. 
Also, even though the process of economic reintegration is still ongoing and to 
some extent the number of the interviews I conducted are limited in number to 
allow one to make a far-reaching claim; evidence from this study suggests that a 
tentative claim can be made that many of the ex-militants have yet to be absorbed 
into paid employment, or provided with sufficient capital to start up their private 
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businesses.359 Consequently, the failure to provide job opportunities for the 
trained ex-militants reinforces the potential for further grievances and frustrations 
to develop. Therefore, as in the case of demobilisation, economic reintegration of 
the ex-Niger Delta militants is yet to impact positively in terms of consolidating 
the relative stability achieved through the amnesty and disarmament phase of the 
ADDR programme.  
However, as I argued, despite the short-changing of many of the ex-militants the 
programme has produced some unintended and positive consequences in terms 
of enhancing security stabilisation in the short-term. One, the massive jobs 
trainings, irrespective of the lack of absorption capacity responded to one of the 
age-long demands of the Niger Delta people and one of the identified drivers of 
militancy in the region. Secondly, it may be that those already trained or are 
undergoing training would be more interested in ensuring some level of stability 
when they return with the hope that they can get better jobs in the course of time. 
However, whether such a commitment to maintaining stability will hold in the long-
term in the absence of jobs or empowerment opportunities is a debatable issue.  
Generally, the security stabilisation achieved in the Niger Delta was generally 
undermined by the Nigerian government’s lack of commitment to address the 
fundamental source of underdevelopment as recommended by the TCND and 
which centred on the crisis of neo-patrimonial system of governance in Nigeria. 
Therefore, in terms of addressing the source of underdevelopment and its various 
ramifications and dimensions in the Niger Delta, the evidence adduced confirmed 
that the state of underdevelopment in the region remained largely the same prior 
to the launching of the ADDR programme. Indeed, in some cases, some of the 
dimensions and indices of underdevelopment such as environmental degradation 
have increased from what it used to be prior to the ADDR programme. This 
means that within the context of the maximalist perspective to DDR which this 
study aligned itself with, pre-conflict grievances in the Niger Delta remain the 
                                                          
359. As of July 24 2016, the Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta and the Chairman of 
the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) revealed that 11,768 ex-militants out of the 30,000 
disarmed and demobilised in the ADDR Programme are yet to be economically empowered (see 
report tilted ‘Amnesty Office yet to empower 11, 768 ex-militants-Boroh’ (Available at: 
http://guardian.ng/news/anesty-office-yet-to-empower-11768-exmi... Accessed: 13 August 2016). 
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same. Thus, the ex-militants are being reintegrated into the pre-conflict status 
quo ante which suggests that the possibility of relapse into violence remains high.  
Overall, the failure to ensure the breakdown of existing horizontal and vertical 
command and control structures, the denial of reintegration training opportunities 
to some of the ex-militants and the lack of job opportunities for many of those 
trained shows the fragile nature of the current stability achieved in the Niger Delta. 
The high capacity to remobilise, and the fact that the fundamental sources and 
drivers of the conflict remained intact means that the Niger Delta today straddles 
between negative peace and the potential to return to violence. This attests to the 
fact that a minimalist DDR can only lead to the attainment of negative peace and 
not long-term sustainable peace. Nonetheless, the relative stability achieved has 
provided the Nigerian government with a window of opportunity to address the 
fundamental sources and drivers of the conflict assuming there is the political will 
to do so. However, at the moment this appears a rather large assumption. 
6.2. Theoretical and Empirical Contributions  
As I stated in Chapter One, a key significance of this study is its contribution to 
current academic debates in the field of DDR, and the political economy of armed 
conflict. I also claimed that at the empirical level, the study will contribute to 
current policy literature on the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict. Against this 
backdrop, in terms of contribution to the field of DDR, evidence from this case 
study has corroborated and strengthened the veracity of the theoretical positions 
advanced by the likes of Muggah (2004: 27), Jennings (2008: 6-7), Özerdem 
(2009: 45-48) and Özerdem (2013: 226-227). These scholars posit that; in order 
for DDR to serve as an effective conflict prevention mechanism, its 
conceptualisation, design and implementation should be anchored on a 
maximalist perspective that sees DDR as an opportunity for development. 
Evidence that emerged from this study has clearly demonstrated that the failure 
to conceptualise, design and implement the Niger Delta ADDR programme along 
the maximalist perspective recommended by the TCND explains why even 
though relative peace in terms of reduced physical violence was achieved in the 
short-term there remains a high potential for a return to violence because the 
fundamental sources and drivers of the conflict remain intact. 
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A key issue in the literature on DDR is the contention that a comprehensive peace 
agreement provides the most auspicious environment for the conduct of 
traditional DDR (first generation DDR). Prominent advocates of this position 
include UN IDDRS (2006), Spear (2007: 9), Ong (2012: 55-56), Özerdem 
(2009:16). However, some scholars contest such a position and argue that 
absolute military defeat instead of a peace agreement provides the best enabling 
environment for DDR and a perfect guarantee that a country will not experience 
a relapse into war. Specifically, Walter (2004: 374) posits that wars that end in 
decisive military victory for one side are more likely not to result in a return to 
violence. However, evidence from this study corroborates the validity of the 
theoretical position which argues in support of a peace agreement as an ideal 
framework for achieving traditional (first generation) DDR. This is because the 
pseudo-compellence nature of the peace deal that led to the ADDR programme 
kept the militants in doubt about the Nigerian government’s sincerity regarding 
their safety and security which compelled many of them to self-demobilise.  
Another important theoretical and empirical issue has been the criticism by 
human rights organisations against the use of amnesty in peace processes 
arguing that it encourages impunity. However, the findings from this study have 
clearly confirmed that without the offer of amnesty the Niger Delta militants would 
never have contemplated surrendering their weapons. Therefore, irrespective of 
the argument that amnesties encourage impunity, evidence from this study 
suggests that it is a necessary evil that will continue to be relevant in war to peace 
transitions.  
Further to the above, an important theoretical contribution to the literature on 
peace process negotiations emanating from this case study is my claim that the 
Niger Delta ADDR programme was neither achieved through clear military victory 
or negotiated settlement but through a process that incorporated both elements 
as well as the use of patronage. Thus, the Niger Delta ADDR negotiation is better 
conceptualised as a pseudo-compellence-negotiated type of peace settlement (a 
peace negotiation that integrates elements of peace enforcement, negotiation 
and the use of patronage as an inducement). To my knowledge the only 
theoretical resemblance to this in the literature is Toft (2010b: 1-4) who advocates 
for a hybrid strategy that integrates elements of negotiated settlement and military 
defeat and Muggah and O’Donnell (2015: 1-12) who postulate the concept of a 
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‘stick then carrot’ strategy as one of the twenty-first century newest approaches 
to peace processes particularly in dealing with extremist non-state armed groups 
such as the Boko Haram, Al-Shabab and Islamic States in Iraq and the Syria 
(ISIS). Therefore, the concept of pseudo compellence-negotiated settlement 
represents a modest addition to the literature on peace processes and DDR 
negotiations. 
The theoretical literature that analyses DDR from a political economy perspective 
argues that apart from security, weapons have an economic value to combatants.  
Indeed, Berdal (1996: 33) postulates that weapons also have a security value, so 
monetary compensation should be given as an incentive to motivate combatants 
to renounce violence and commit to disarmament and demobilisation. Likewise, 
Isima (2004: 3) reiterates that for DDR secured through a peace agreement to be 
successful cash payment as an inducement is necessary. Equally, the UN IDDRS 
(2006) suggested the idea of ‘commanders’ incentive’ as a way of pacifying top 
commanders to commit to disarmament and demobilisation. Likewise, Spear 
(2006a: 168-189) contends that combatants are stratified in hierarchies and each 
hierarchy has its underlying economic agenda for engaging in violence. 
Therefore, appropriate incentives must be worked out commensurately to their 
economic agenda for them to demobilise and commit to a nonviolent way of 
pursuing livelihoods. However, while evidence from this study did corroborate the 
validity of these theoretical assertions at the same time it reveals that the use of 
monetary incentives should be applied with caution. In particular, it should not be 
elevated to the level of state patronage as in neopatrimonial DDR which will 
become counterproductive to the goal of DDR. Even though it engendered a 
short-term commitment to peace on the part of the top-level commanders it 
nevertheless over empowered and positioned them with a high capacity to 
remobilise and to threaten peace and stability if they so wish.  Likewise, this study 
has shown that when inducement is elevated to the level of state patronage it can 
potentially reinforce pre-conflict grievance bequeathing a combustible condition 
for conflict recurrence.   
Evidence from this study clearly shows that a major challenge in the literature 
and DDR policy documents is their lack of preciseness on what constitutes 
appropriate inducement or how to arrive at an appropriate incentive. 
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Consequently, DDR practitioners must tread with caution when deciding on the 
appropriate amount of inducement to be offered to combatants. 
 
Likewise, in the subfield of the political economy of armed conflict, this study has 
made some modest contribution that corroborates or challenges the assumptions 
of some of the existing theories in the field. Particularly, the evidence adduced in 
Chapter Three has proven that despite the validity of the numerous criticisms 
advanced against Collier and co’s greed theory and feasibility thesis, at least in 
certain circumstances the theories still have potent explanatory validity and 
relevance. For instance, evidence from this study showed that while Collier and 
co’s greed theory of conflict and feasibility hypothesis may not be a valid 
explanation for conflict onset they do provide an explanation for conflict dynamics; 
what led to escalation and the process of conflict mutation particularly as seen in 
the Niger Delta conflict. For instance, in line with Collier’s feasibility thesis, there 
is unanimity of opinion amongst respondents in this study including militant 
commanders that their ability to sustain a prolonged armed rebellion against the 
Nigerian State was fundamentally linked to their ability to generate funding from 
several sources. Similarly, evidence from this study corroborates the supposition 
advanced by Mary Kaldor’s new wars thesis, because the dynamics of the MEND 
era of the conflict clearly fits into it. This is because the MEND’s era clearly shows 
the use of political grievances as a cover for perpetrating criminality as also 
claimed by Collier et al. In other words, MEND actors were very much engaged 
in criminality yet verbalising a powerful metanarrative of regional grievance which 
provided moral legitimacy and cover for their actions.  
 
This study has also contributed to the theoretical literature on the Niger Delta 
conflict. The existing scholarly works on the Niger Delta conflict show that the 
literature is bifurcated between those that attribute the conflict to the long years 
of relative deprivation, environmental degradation, marginalisation and lack of 
basic human needs etc. leading to frustration and aggression. Others attribute it 
to the nature and character of the Nigerian State.  Those that subscribe to this 
perspective maintain that understanding the root of the Niger Delta conflict 
requires the unpacking of the nature and character of the Nigerian State which 
as I argued in this thesis is fundamentally rentier-neopatrimonial (oftentimes 
refers to as prebendal state). This thesis, therefore, came as a strong validation 
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and contribution to the literature that locates the conflict within the context of the 
nature and character of the Nigerian State.  
 
 Likewise, in terms of the theoretical literature that interrogates the Nigerian State, 
this study has provided further elaboration that corroborates and reaffirms the 
enduring explanatory potency and analytical relevance of the theoretical positions 
that interrogates the Nigerian State from the political economy point of view. For 
example, evidence from this case study aptly showed that Richard Joseph’s 
(1987) seminal work titled ‘Democracy and prebendal politics in Nigeria: the 
rise and fall of the Second Republic’ remains a potent theoretical framework 
for understanding the nature and character of the Nigerian State, as well as the 
origin of violent conflict not just in the Niger Delta but Nigeria at large.  
 
At the level of empirical contribution, Jennings (2008: 5) argues that studying how 
DDR is practically designed and carried out can help in enhancing effective future 
programme design and implementation that can improve outcomes as well as 
mitigate possible undesirable consequences. In this respect, at the empirical 
level, this study has demonstrated that DDR design and implementation must 
conform to some basic benchmarks such as adequate planning and the failure to 
meet these can result in undesirable consequences. Thus, this study 
corroborates the validity and continued relevance of the various empirical 
planning considerations examined in Chapter Two. 
 
In another vein, the consensus in the existing literature is that the extent to which 
a disarmament programme can contribute to stability depends on how successful 
it was and this is measured in the number of weapons recovered. However, this 
case study has shown that often times the restoration of peace in the short-term 
may not be the direct outcome of the number of weapons recovered but the 
symbolic significance of the exercise to the participants, beneficiaries and other 
stakeholders. This study has also buttressed the fact that oftentimes, irrespective 
of how haphazard a disarmament programme is, its short-term confidence-
building potentials can still be relatively positive.  
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6.3. Potential Concerns for Future Research 
This study has demonstrated how a neopatrimonial DDR successfully restored 
stability in the Niger Delta in the short-term but in the long-term ensured the 
survival of existing vertical and horizontal command and control structures among 
the Niger Delta top militant commanders as well as reinforcing the conflict 
economy that sustains the conflict. Consequently, in the long-term, there is a high 
capacity to remobilise on the part of the top Niger Delta militant commanders. 
This was further compounded by the failure to provide reintegration training 
opportunities to many of those that demobilised, and jobs for many of those that 
have been trained. All this underpins the fragile nature of the relative stability 
achieved in the Niger Delta and the high potential for a return to violence which 
therefore raises some important concerns for future research in the Niger Delta 
and in the field of DDR. First and foremost, it would be useful to undertake further 
research to identify instances where neopatrimonial DDR has been adopted as 
an approach and how successful it was. Secondly, what may be the post ADDR 
pattern of violence in the Niger Delta? Will former top commanders who have 
been co-opted into the Nigerian neopatrimonial state system decide to make real 
their high capacity to remobilise? Will their former soldiers respond if re-
mobilised?  Or are new commanders likely to emerge? Furthermore, in the event 
of a return to violence, can the new commanders secure community legitimacy? 
Investigating these questions will enrich state capacity to determine appropriate 
and adequate response to the post ADDR programme emerging security 
challenges and violence in the Niger Delta. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
 
 
Information Brief for Prospective Participants in a PhD Research Work 
Department of Peace Studies University of Bradford, United Kingdom 
 
 I am Mr Solomon Inuwa, a PhD Research candidate from the Department of 
Peace Studies University of Bradford, United Kingdom. I do hereby invite you to 
participate in a research study titled “A critical evaluation of the 2009 Niger 
Delta amnesty, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (ADDR) 
programme” which I am conducting as part of the requirements for the award of 
a PhD in Peace Studies. The research is aimed at evaluating the efficacy of DDR 
as a conflict prevention and resolution mechanism using the 2009 Niger Delta 
ADDR programme as an empirical case study. The research primarily seeks to 
examine to what extent and how effective has the Niger Delta ADDR programme 
is, in achieving its fundamental objectives. You are selected to participate in the 
study either because of your in-depth knowledge of the conflict, involvement in 
the peace process that led to the offer of amnesty to freedom fighters in the Niger 
Delta or the process of implementing the component elements of the amnesty 
programme. Please kindly spare a little time to go through this information brief 
as it contains information regarding what you need to know and is expected of 
you if you agree to participate. Please feel free to ask questions or request 
additional information as you deem fit. Thank you for taking your time to read 
through. 
 
Contact details of the researcher: 
Mr Solomon Inuwa 
University of Bradford 
Department of Peace Studies 
United Kingdom (UK) 
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What you will be asked to do if you agree to take part 
In the event you agree to participate, I will ask you certain questions pertaining to 
the DDR process in a face to face interaction. The discussion is expected to last 
for approximately 1 hour. Please note that there is no right or wrong answer to 
the questions but all I want is your honest opinion. 
 
How is confidentiality of information going to be guaranteed? 
 
Whatever information I shall obtain from you shall be strictly used for academic 
purposes. Consequently, every effort will be made to guarantee the maximum 
confidentiality of all information to be collected by storing it in a dedicated 
computer to which only I will have access. Similarly, the information provided will 
not be released to any person or group of persons.  
 
Where is the interview going to be conducted?  
  
The interview will be conducted in a safe place to be consensually agreed 
between me and you. 
 
Is the product of this research going to be published? 
 
The product of this research will be submitted as a thesis for the award of a PhD 
in Peace Studies by the University of Bradford. Subsequently, it may be released 
to the public domain either in the form of journal articles or presentation at 
conferences.  
 
Right to participate and disengage from participating 
 
Your decision to participate should be voluntary, and even when you decide to 
participate you are free to withdraw your consent and disengage from the 
interview process at any point in time without providing any reason for 
withdrawing. You are also free to request the retrieval of the information you 
provided in case you wish to do so. 
Will my responses be recorded on tape? 
 
 346 
 
Yes, please kindly note that with your kind authorization your responses will be 
audio recorded for accuracy and clarity purposes. However, you are free to grant 
or decline the request without providing any explanation. In the event you do not 
want your voice to be recorded, I would appreciate your kind permission take 
handwritten notes as you speak. 
 
Who is supervising this research? 
This research is being supervised and guided by Professor R. Neil Cooper of 
the department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford. In case you need further 
information, he can be contacted as follows: 
 
Professor R. Neil Cooper 
Associate Dean for Graduate Research 
School of Social and International Studies 
University of Bradford 
Richmond Road, 
Telephone: +44 (0) 1274 234776  
Email: r.n.cooper@bradford.ac.uk  
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Appendix -2 
 
 
 
 
Consent Form 
I……………………………………………………….do hereby agree to participate 
in a research study titled “A critical evaluation of the 2009 Niger Delta 
amnesty, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme”. I 
wish to state that the purpose and nature of the study have been fully explained 
to me in writing/verbally as has this consent form and have in turn understood it. 
I also had the opportunity to ask the researcher questions regarding the project 
and what is expected of me as a participant. 
I understand that my decision to participate is voluntary and that I can withdraw 
at any time without any repercussion. 
I understand that information to be gathered in this study will form part of a thesis 
to be submitted to the University of Bradford. 
I understand that the confidentiality of the information I am going to provide as 
well as my anonymity in the final report, publications and presentations 
emanating from the information will be guaranteed. 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
Participant’s Name                                                                     Signature 
 
Date:………………….................... 
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Appendix 3 
 
RESTRICTED 
                   
RENUNCIATION OF MILITANCY 
I…………………………………………residing at ……………………………  
of ……………………. State an indigene of …………... in ………………. 
…………………… State. Formerly engaged in militant activities in the  
Niger Delta region of Nigeria, do solemnly swear (affirm) that I hereby 
renounce all my previous acts of militancy, including my affiliations and 
allegiance to any militant group and/or organisation; and that I will 
henceforth faithfully support, protect and defend the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria and respect every constituted authority; 
and that I shall never again engage in any act of militancy in the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria or anywhere whatsoever; and that I will in like 
manner, abide by; and faithfully and lawfully support every effort being 
made by the Federal, State and Local Governments and their agencies for 
the overall development of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. 
                                                                                           
DEPONENT 
                                                                  
                                                                 BEFORE ME;  
                                                    COMMISSIONER FOR OATHS  
                                                                  RESTRICTED 
 
PPA/NDR/09 
DATED: AUGUST 2009 
